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I served as a platoon leader in the U.S. Army at the height of the surge in Dora, one of Baghdad's most violent neighborhoods. While deployed there, I learned what is required to build a nation's security forces. It is a lesson that appears to be largely overlooked in Washington in the ongoing debate over how to proceed in Afghanistan.
As I discovered firsthand, creating security forces is not simply a matter of recruiting troops, giving them training and equipment and then sending them out to do battle against a hardened enemy. The real process of forging foreign military forces only begins when they are partnered with American combat units. This partnership takes time and requires the commitment of large numbers of American and other coalition troops. As we found out in Iraq, avoiding such a full-fledged partnership merely guarantees failure.
Before the surge, we attempted a premature transition, quickly handing over responsibility to newly created Iraqi military units. Following minimal training, these units were sent to the front lines with small U.S. training teams of a dozen or so men. Few were partnered with American combat units.
Lacking in confidence, this resulted in fractured Iraqi forces and widespread sectarian violence. The American advisers played critical roles, but by themselves they could not train and prepare new units for independent operations.
