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George J. Mitchell: [GJM]: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen and welcome. Unlike most council events, this one is on the record. I thank you all for coming to be with us today to meet Hamid Karzai who first came to prominence in Afghanistan in the fight against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. After graduating from Shimla(?) University in India with a BS and Masters in Political Science and International Relations, he went to Pakistan where he served as Chairman of the Political Bureau of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. In 1992, under the coalition that drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan, he joined the foreign service. Later, when the Taliban took control, he again left for Pakistan to organize a resistance to that regime.
Hamid Karzai's father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, the head of the influential Poplazai(?) clan in Kandahar, was deputy speaker of the parliament and President of the National Council under King Zahir Shah. He was assassinated in 1999 in Pakistan and thereafter, the tribal leaders looked to Hamid Karzai to lead the anti-Taliban resistance among the Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan.
Soon after the September 11th attacks on the United States, Karzai re-entered Afghanistan to foment grassroots resistance in the Kandahar region. That's the Taliban's spiritual stronghold. As he led the resistance, the Pashtuns rallied behind him and the Taliban forces gradually began to crumble, at first at the Kandahar Airport, then Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city. And southern Afghanistan was finally liberated and millions of people were freed.
In December of 2001 at the United Nations sponsored conference in Bonn, Karzai, with the backing of the United States and the entire international community was chosen as interim chairman until Afghanistan's traditional grand council could meet six months later. In June of 2002, almost unanimously, the Loya Jirga elected him to lead Afghanistan as their president. As the president of the transitional Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai is faced with a daunting challenge: to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure, to develop its political institutions, to keep its people free. Under the terms of the Bonn accords, President Karzai will guide Afghanistan's transition to a democratic state and in the reframing of its constitution to ensure that all Afghans, regardless of religious affiliation or gender, are protected under law. A year ago, most people had never heard of Hamid Karzai. After listening to him, I believe you will agree that he is an outstanding political leader facing a difficult challenge who represents a critical part of the future of the people of Afghanistan.
He is joined here today by several officials of his government: Vice President Ar Sallah(?), Foreign Minister of
Gallah(?), Ambassador to the United States, Shaya(?), and Ambassador to the United Nations, Bahadi(?). Please join me in welcoming them and the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai.
(Applause)
President Hamid Karzai [HK]: Thanks very much. Thank you very, very much. Thank you so much. George Mitchell I wish I had you doing the Loya Jirga. (Laughter) You would've made my election much easier. And for the first time—while I knew I was going to be elected, it still makes you very nervous before counting the votes.
Ladies and gentlemen, it's an honor once again to be here before you at the Council on Foreign Relations. I was here in January at this same room. And the Council on Foreign Relations is something that all students of political science and foreign relations know of from the early years of their studies. So, It's an honor for me to be here.
As Senator Mitchell mentioned, Afghanistan has gone through different periods, most often in the past 23 years. Very painful periods of its history. The Soviet invasion. The fighting inside of Afghanistan caused by foreign interventions. The arrival of the Taliban in the—of Afghanistan in the name of peace for Afghanistan. And then, the movement's unbelievable atrocity in Afghanistan, together with the terrorist groups: al Qaeda, the name of which I learned only when I went into Afghanistan in October. I didn't know they were called al Qaeda. We only heard of Osama bin Laden and the organization that he had, we did not know.
But I must confess that the common Afghan man knew what the country was going through. The common Afghan knew the great, the power, the assembly of means, of material, of weapons, of money, of vehicles, of organization that there was by al Qaeda and the Taliban and some of their friends from the religious extremist organizations in Pakistan and from the rest of the world.
When we were fighting the Taliban as a political opposition and other parts of our country was fighting the Taliban as a military political opposition as well, when I would talk mainly with the clergy and the travel editors that would visit us from Afghanistan while we were leaving as refugees in Pakistan, and I would at times get mad at them. I would say "What's happening to you? Why can't you defeat the Taliban? They're just a bunch of few, you know, ignorant people and a few farmers with them." They told me it's not that easy. It's a much broader menace than we can imagine.
I only saw the magnitude of the problem when we went into Afghanistan. And ladies and gentlemen, all along the five or six years to fighting the Taliban, the common Afghan man always told me when I asked him to rise against the Taliban and to launch a movement, they said to me in very, very, very clear words, that it is not possible without the help of the United States. The most common Afghan, a man that cannot read, that cannot write. A man that has not moved out of his village probably even, a man who had hardly even come to the largest city of southern Afghanistan, Kandahar, understood perfectly the global impact of what was going on in Afghanistan and that we could not do it on our own and that the U.S. must step in.
It became more glaring, much more direct when I was in a hearing in central Afghanistan, hiding in the house of a clergy. A mullah, as we call it. A very conservative family of mullahs who were mullahs for centuries. When I was hiding in that man's house around the 28th of October, the 22nd, the 23rd of October, and called for a meeting one evening of some senior most travel editors and they came at night. Jumped over the walls of the house. Did not use the gates of the house in order not to be recognized or seen by the Taliban. The Taliban was very much in control of the whole country.
After dinner, we got together in a group of four…this clergy whose house we were in and two other senior most travel editors. And the clergy told me "Karzai, do you really want to see the Taliban defeated?" I said "Well, of course. I am here hiding in your house and trying to launch a campaign. Of course I want to." He said "Well, the people also want this. Every one of us in this town, in this village, want the Taliban to go. But if you really want them to go, then you call the U.S., you have a satellite telephone," he said." I said "Yes, I have one." (Laughter)
So he said "Call, call, call the U.S." That's really what he said. He did say "You have a satellite telephone." He had seen me using it. Then he said "Well, call the U.S. and ask them to send a plane to bomb the governor's residence and a command quarter for the Taliban security forces for the Taliban troops." This is a clergy talking and the clergy was supposed to be the backbones of the Taliban. The mullahs.
I told him "Well, Mr. Mullah, how can I do that? How can I call the U.S. to come and bomb my country?" And he told me "Well then, you're not serious. Or that you want us to pay a tremendous price. Because if we attack them, we will take the city, the people will go to the town—take it over and then the Taliban and their foreign friends will come and destroy our homes, kill our women, kill our children, and we'll be off in the mountains and the morale will die down in the whole of the country. And after that, if you ask for help, it won't help us. So do it now."
I did not agree. I was wrong. I had to go to the mountains and eventually the bombings began and that did the work. So, the common Afghan man understood the magnitude of the problem there. We did not with all our analytical tools.
During the interim period, from the time of the establishment of the interim administration in Kabul until the Loya Jirga, the Afghan people had a period of celebration. A period of happiness. A period of tremendous expectations. They would come and tell us of how happy they were. They would come and tell us of how good it is going to be for Afghanistan's future. They also came and told us of how significantly important it was for them to have the international forces in Afghanistan. The related international forces in Afghanistan, even to their own personal security at their homes, they elders of Zabel(?) province, which is a small province in southwest Afghanistan, were talking to me one day...I'm not going to measure policy points and things, you have to be patient with me for now because I would like you to know the inner mind of the Afghan society. What the common man in Afghanistan thinks, what the village man thinks there.
They came, they were talking to me one day and I said "How is security in your province? How is peace in your province?" They said "Perfect. It's very, very good." And later on the conversation, one of them who was sometimes back in the 1960s a member of parliament, an elected member of parliament, when we had an elected parliament, said "Well, Mr. Karzai, could you send us some International Security Forces?" I said "What?" He said "American forces?" I said "How many?" And he said "Well, between ten to 15 of them." To…to one whole province. I said "How will ten to 15 American troops help you there in the province and you say that the peace and security in the province is very, very good?" He said "Yes, it is very good. We are happy with the governor that you have sent, we are happy with the security people that you have sent. But sending 15 troops there would give us a lot of security that really nothing would happen there. Really nothing would happen there." And that's the kind of sentiment in Afghanistan, that was the kind of sentiment in Afghanistan. And it ran all over. It ran everywhere from any corner of Afghanistan to the other corner.
So, the understanding in Afghanistan of the international community's importance for peace and stability in Afghanistan is truly wide and really comprehensive. That is why when the Afghan asks for the expansion of ISAF, the International Security Force, they don't really ask for that as a measure of real physical security for them, but as a measure or as a guarantee that the international community will not abandon Afghanistan again. That Afghanistan will not be left alone as it was left alone after the withdrawal of.... It's a political move on behalf of the Afghan people. We are clever people. You know, don't underestimate us. How to have you there for a much longer time.
The Loya Jirga, the Grand Council, which came after—of the Bornakalts(?) in—with the Bornakalts, was a tremendous experience in finding out from all walks of life in Afghanistan, for men and women, businesses, politics, groups, this, that. The yearning, the desire for an Afghanistan that should be democratic, that should be with its own culture and religion, that should live at peace in the region with the neighbors, that should be a full member of the international community.
An Afghanistan in which the people of the country would want to participate fully in decision-making. This became very, very clear. That was the good side of it. There were 150 women for the first time in Afghanistan and quite a few of them elected in their villages and towns to the Loya Jirga. They had a tremendously strong vocal participation. They were the most vocal part of the Loya Jirga. And they showed that Afghanistan had really changed.
The Loya Jirga had a side effect. It had tremendous pluses. The plus was that they elected a—. The plus was that the unity of the Afghan people was shown to the international community and to the Afghans themselves. It was shown that Afghanistan was, as we always say it, a country of debates. A country where people participated in councils and meetings and debate and things. Debates were plenty. Debates were a lot. There were of course conflicting views, which is natural.
The side effect of the Loya Jirga, ladies and gentlemen, was that it really raised the expectations of the Afghan people. Members in the Loya Jirga, the Afghan community as a whole thought that the Loya Jirga is a magic wand. That with the Loya Jirga over, with the people coming together in Afghan over and making their own decisions, the next day our highways will all be paved, reconstructed, the next day the warlords will all be out of the country, the next day the picture will be rosy in Afghanistan. They thought that Afghanistan is going to be Hawaii in a day after the Loya Jirga. (Laughter) And our fault was that we did not see that. I only saw that after the Loya Jirga, when people compare - why it is so hostile here in this country? Why are these two having guns? Why is our road not fixed? Why don't we have schools there? Why are our doctors studying…and studying under a tent? Why not this? Why not that?
And then I began to recognize that there is a dangerous trend of high, high optimism in the country. And that high optimism, if not fulfilled, if not addressed quickly, will take people into despair. That is still our problem. There's tremendous expectation in Afghanistan. Tremendous expectation. Tremendous expectation of the international community's presence, tremendous expectation of the government to do well. The Afghans now want a real, honest government or no government at all. And they'll be happy with both situations. (Laughter)
So, we have the country that really wants to participate in decision-making. And I have seen that in my visits to the provinces. I've seen that in talking to the people. I've seen that in lots of other ways.
In other words, ladies and gentlemen, and that's the good part of it, the Afghan people are far ahead of us, the government, in looking for a better future, in working for a better future. We have not done much reconstruction in the country as a government. But the people, especially the refugees who have returned back to the country, have already begun rebuilding their lives, their arches, their vineyards, their houses and everything else. If those of you have been in Kabul sometime back, say six or seven months ago, if you go to visit Kabul today or other cities in Afghanistan today, you will see a vast difference. There is more color. There is more reconstruction. There is more order. And that's the good part.
As a government responding to the demands to the desires of the Afghan people, I can point out a few areas of success. One is that we managed to send to school…we were actually planning to send to school 1.5 million children, boys and girls. But we came to know about three months ago that we actually had three million children going to school and I saw that with my own eyes. I've been to some of the farthest points of the country, even in the smallest villages, boys and girls go to school. And the good thing is that they all go in one uniform all over the country. So the universality of education and the desire for education is vast and I must here thank the governments of Japan and the United States and the UN organizations in this regard. They have helped us a lot. So we have three million children going to school.
The other tremendously good thing for us is that we have over 1.6 million of our refugees have returned and most of them have gone back and settled in their own areas and places of origin and they've begun reconstruction.
As a government, we have taken certain steps. We have created a Human Rights Commission to look after womens rights, civil liberties, rights of people as a whole. We have a private investment law, extremely important for Afghanistan. Something that we did not understand in the beginning. We were overwhelmed with other things. There were tremendous approaches from business investment in Afghanistan by Afghan businesses, by foreign businesses. And the Afghanistan bureaucracy was dependent in terms of its regulations of the Soviet style bureaucracy and it made it extremely difficult for businesses. Our plan here is to have an investment policy that would make it very, very easy for businesses to come and—begin to work in a one window operation. Hopefully, a one window operation that will not require more than a few hours for businesses to come—and do their work. That's the easy part. The difficult part is to protect their investment. To give them legal protection. To make it easy for them to make money and to protect their profits and things like that. Those are requiring laws and security instruments. We're working on that. We're working on the legal part. The security instrument part is also being worked out. The overall security in the country is improving, with the exception of a few incidents, like attacks on me and bomb blasts. Otherwise, it's all right. (Laughter)
We also are, with regard to security, we see the key demand of the Afghan people working on the creation of the National Afghan Army. Now, this is an extremely important undertaking. The police force. Another extremely important undertaking. In this regard, we have the cooperation of the United States as the primary source of help for us.
We also have the cooperation of Britain and France who have trained some of the battalions for us. For the police force, Germany's very full(?) country is responsible for training the police force and finding the police force. Recently, the U.S. has also contributed some good amount of money for that.
In the demobilization effort in taking people away from guns and taking them to work force and things like that, Japan is the leading country in providing assistance. We have set up a National Army Commission. And the Commission job is they have begun to work, but they're somehow slow, and will return—that the Army Commission gets up to its job in a more effective way. The purpose of the National Army Commission is to make sure that the National Army that we create is acceptable to the whole of Afghanistan. That all Afghans across the country…and it's time that this is their army and that this is…and that the army is in their service protecting them, not violating their rights.
We want to have an army, ladies and gentlemen, that we can afford when the work community slows down, it's help to us. Eventually, we have to stand on our own feet. Eventually, we have to pay our own salaries. Eventually, we have to pay our own soldiers. Eventually, you have to live off our own hard work and of our own pockets.
Afghanistan does not want to have a hand extended forever to the international community. We are a country of resources. We are a country of national resources and we are, a lot of you may not know, quite an enterprising society. Our business tradition is very strong. In the worst of times, the Afghans have been able to make money and make good money. What is lacking is the surety of institutions in Afghanistan to guarantee that that money can be kept in our banks, to guarantee that that money will not be interfered with by the government, to guarantee that officials, our governments, our political elements, will not steal that money as was in the case in the past few years. And of course, those are the areas of our concentration.
So, the army will be one that should be mobile, effective, well-equipped, well-paid, and affordable. By affordable, I mean it should not be beyond our means. It should be an army that we can pay ourselves. Help is coming and we are grateful for that.
In reconstruction we have one top priority and that somehow was fulfilled yesterday. The proudest years, the reconstruction of Afghan highways. Highways are of extreme significance to us. Highways will make the distances shorter in Afghanistan. In the 1970s - not in the 1980s, the highways got destroyed with the Soviet intervention - in the 1970s, we would travel a distance of 1100 kilometers from the border with Iran up to Kabu, about 1100 kilometers, and be there in nine to ten hours. Wonderful highways. For those years, our highways were very good for that part of the world. Now, ladies and gentlemen, it takes three days to travel from the…into the west of the country up to Kabul. It's an urgent, urgent priority. It connects us with each other, it connects us with the neighboring countries, it provides transit to central Asia, it brings stronger—within the country, it costs us less because we don't get to repair our vehicles so often, and it makes business and transportation much easier.
We got yesterday from the United States $18 million and from (Inaudible) and Japan $50 million each. A $180 million to begin the work, hopefully, before winter on our highways. That's news that I'll be taking home and that's a good news.
Other sectors are…all those sectors that are labor intensive, dams, reconstruction of dams or repair of dams, making new dams, constructing new dams, electricity are other top priorities after highways. We're doing well in communications and telecommunications. There's a lot of interest by major international companies in the telecommunications sector in Afghanistan. We'll be awarding late in September…early October. Yes, we'll be awarding contracts…what is it called? Contracts? Contracts to companies, to a very transparent system. We have hired foreign procurement agencies, or companies, to do the purchasing for us so that the purchasing will be transparent. We want to have the international donations to Afghanistan to come and be spent through the government of Afghanistan so that we…so that that donation, that help, helps the institution building in Afghanistan, the capacity building in Afghanistan, rather than going entirely through NGOs or UN organizations. We are grateful to some of the NGOs who have done very, very good work in Afghanistan. We are also grateful to the UN agencies who have done some very good work in Afghanistan.
But for Afghanistan to emerge from this troublesome period of its life and to be firmly on its own feet, we required to have the international donors, money spent through our own institutions so that we can build our own capacity.
The vision that we have for Afghanistan for the future. We are a Muslim country. We are a deeply believing Muslim society. But we never were, and will not be, a radical society. This is the most important part of my talk today here. Terrorism in Afghanistan, extremism in Afghanistan, was never grown in Afghanistan. It came to us from outside.
First, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when they tried to superimpose communism on Afghan society, on our values. So they tried to destroy Afghan traditions and values and sense of history and all of that to bring in communism. And while we were fighting the Soviet Union, some of the countries that helped us fight against the Soviet Union tried to superimpose a radicalism of the other kind. A religious radicalism on Afghanistan. Moderation in Afghanistan was under constant, brutal attack for 20 years. But because the roots of moderation, because a sensible cultural society was there and so deeply rooted in history, it was difficult for them to achieve that. It hurt us a lot. It damaged us a lot but we survived.
And that is why it was so easy to defeat the Taliban in a period of two months. If there was any sympathy for the cause of extremism in Afghanistan, the defeat of the Taliban would have not been so easy. The reason that the will to win lasted a month…less than a month-and-a-half…is because the Afghan people did not want them.
So, we are a Muslim country but very traditional, having deep roots in civilizations in that part of the world. It is never, ever a radical society and it hates radicalism. Islam itself is a religion that stands for moderation.
The Taliban, having destroyed Afghanistan the way they did, did not represent the Afghan people. And in our opinion, the al Qaeda, the Arab terrorists, they did not represent the Arab world. And both of them did not represent Islam. They only represented their own criminal activity. Their heinous crimes.
Rule of society based on rule of law, justice, human rights, free market economy, and all other standards that will make it easy and good for us to be a nicely participating country in the international community. That's what we aspire to and hopefully will get to that point. And also society, as I mentioned earlier, to eventually stand on its own feet and make its own money. We were not always poor. We had money in the past and there are lots of—who have a lot of money. Only their money is in the United States or Europe, not in Afghanistan. So we try to have that money come to Afghanistan.
We will continue very, very strongly, even if the United States stops, even if the rest of the world stops to fight terrorism, we will continue to fight terrorism. There is no way…no way, ladies and gentlemen, that Afghanistan will let down on its guard in the fight against terrorism. Because we were the first and the worst victims of it. We were slaughtered for years. Our people, our women, our children, were killed in exercises by terrorists in training on guns and equipment and weapons. Our homes were destroyed. We were the first victims. There was no aspect of our life that was not damaged or destroyed or hit by terrorist groups and organizations and the Taliban from all over the world. So, we will continue despite very, very strongly - even if you guys stop it. And I hope you will not. And finish this job to the end.
We like to be a bridge between civilizations and cultures. And if we can achieve that, it will be a very good thing. We will be a very friendly country for investment, especially foreign investment. All your good companies.
In foreign policy, ladies and gentlemen, Afghanistan is a country that has in the past somehow troublesome relationships with some of our neighbors. Afghanistan recognizes that it is in the interest of the people of Afghanistan to be friendly with the neighbors. Afghanistan will be of its own absolute national interest be very, very friendly with the neighboring countries of Afghanistan and the countries in the region.
What Afghanistan will not allow, under no circumstances, its soil to be used by any country or groups against another country. And Afghanistan will also not allow the export of radical elements into Afghanistan from outside of Afghanistan. While we want to be friendly and cooperative and trade and this and that with all our neighbors, we will be very strict in not allowing Afghan soil to be used against any other neighbor or against a country or countries in the region. And Afghanistan will not tolerate for one single second the export of radical elements into Afghanistan from outside of Afghanistan. These are two areas which we will fight strongly.
But Afghanistan recognizes its interests very well. The interest of Afghanistan is in a society that has good trade and business and links with the region and the neighbors. On that account, Afghanistan will give absolute assurances to the neighbors of Afghanistan so that Afghanistan will be very, very friendly. Especially to our two big neighbors: Pakistan and Iran. That they should expect only extreme good will and good relations from the Afghan people. That Afghanistan will defend them if they are, God forbid, anytime ever in trouble.
We will also be, at the same time, participating fully in regional forums and bodies. We will promote freight, we will promote transit, that is the only way for Afghanistan to be rich. Afghanistan will also be participating fully in the international community. Afghanistan will maintain its strong friendship with the United States and Europe. Afghanistan will maintain a very strong relationship with Japan. Afghanistan will fully participate in the causes of the Islamic world. Afghanistan is a member of the Islamic world. Afghanistan will respect that. We'll be a full participant of that and have…will try as best to devote our relationship—possible. And we also expect from the Islamic world to come and invest in Afghanistan and help the reconstruction of Afghanistan, as I told the OIC yesterday.
We know, we are aware, there cannot be prosperity in Afghanistan unless there is security and peace in Afghanistan. And the region should know that there cannot be prosperity in the region unless there is peace and security in Afghanistan. So, I hope all of our neighbors will understand that prosperity in the region and in their countries very much rests on a good Afghanistan, on a secure and stable Afghanistan.
With regard to another very important question, and that's my last remark - I saw you looking at the watch. (Laughter) With regard to another very important question: narcotics. We have a serious problem on our hand. Regardless of the magnitude of it - regardless of the magnitude of it - Afghanistan is deadly determined, ladies and gentlemen, to fight it. This is one menace that goes hand in hand with terrorism. The money that is made off narcotics pays terrorism. The two co-exist. So, if we want Afghanistan to be free of terrorism, if we want to fully throw out terrorism out of our country or destroy it and remove it, we have to fight narcotics. We have to fight the temptation of poppies. It is against our religion. It destroys our agriculture. We were, and we are still somehow but less than the past, one of the best fruit-producing countries in the world. Narcotics has destroyed that. Poppy cultivation has destroyed that. So we are determined like hell to fight this menace, whatever it may take.
We decided some months ago to destroy poppy fields and we were fortunately successful in that. We destroyed three or four months ago poppy fields worth…the street value of narcotics…that's heroin? Yeah. Eight billion dollars, the street value of it in European markets and we will continue to do so. And hopefully, may God bless us in this effort, if we succeed in destroying the poppy fields in Afghanistan and in destroying the trade and the manufacturer of these harmful substances, terrorism will also see a serious defeat.
That's an area, again, that Afghanistan will be willing even to take on its own with or without international help. But we must recognize that it is a task beyond us. Afghanistan will need strong assistance from the international community, from the UN and from big countries, to continue to fight with us the menace of drugs and narcotics. That's our vision. An Afghanistan free of terrorism, free of narcotics. An Afghanistan that prospers well, an Afghanistan that engages well with the laborers and the international community and a democratic Afghanistan in which human rights have the highest respect and priority. And by the way, we have a good free press nowadays. We have too many radios in the country and nobody listens to Afghanistan's official radio. And we have lots of newspapers, over 90 dailies and weeklies printed in Kabul and most of them are run by women. This is for women who are here. Thank you very much. Thank you.
(Applause)
GJM: The president has kindly agreed to take questions and I'll be recognizing people for questions. Please rise, state your name and affiliation, wait for the microphone to get to you and then ask your question. And I respectfully ask that we're here to hear the president give a speech, not to hear anyone else. So, try to be concise in your questions. Way in the back there is the first one. Good.
Audience: Mr. President, Sean McDevitt, Alterity Partners. I appreciate your coming here. You said that one of your primary objectives was to rid your country of terrorism. And speaking a question that the common American man and American woman wants to know, how come it's so hard to deliver Mullah Omar?
HK: Because nobody recognizes him. Really. I mean, if I saw him tomorrow on the streets of Kabul I wouldn't recognize him. This is a man nobody has seen. Nobody. And he goes and hides in homes. He never travels. And we don't know where he is. We knew a few months ago the area where he was. We went after him but he was not there. Probably he is crossing borders easily. It's not easy. There are plenty of examples in the world where fugitives run for a while but they're captured eventually. He will not hide. We'll find him.
GJM: Right next to you. Right there.
Audience: —at SJ Partners.... what you see as the greatest risk to stability in Afghanistan and what your government is doing about it. And lastly, what the repercussions to your country or your neighbors may be if there is military action in Iraq. Be it unilateral or multilateral. Thank you.
HK: Well, the greatest threat to Afghanistan's stability or to our campaign against terrorism can only come from lack of cooperation among neighbors in that region. I would emphasize very strongly that our neighbors see if we do not cooperate sincerely and very, very strongly against terrorism, that it is going to pull us down altogether. We must recognize now, and the neighbors, I hope, will recognize that if terrorism could gain a foothold in Afghanistan, destroy our country and people and also reach as far as New York City, it can easily extend to any of our neighbors. That is what everybody should know. So, if we have good neighborly cooperation on terrorism and if we can fight it together, there will not be any other danger to us. The country will do well. On Iraq, ladies and gentlemen, of course I don't want Afghanistan abandoned because of Iraq or to be left alone because of Iraq. That will be leaving a job unfulfilled, half the way.
On Iraq, I have seen some years ago pictures of…photographs of people who were lying dead on a street. And in that photograph I saw a woman holding a baby in her arms and was dead. That…I don't know if she was a Kurdish woman or something. That is too strongly embedded in my memory as a painful thing. As I want Afghanistan to have a good life, the people of our country to be free of—and repression. The same way I would want as a human being all other societies to be free of torture and repression. And the people of Iraq, who are great people, by the way, very educated people. In the Arab world, the Iraqis are among the best educated, I would wish them a better way. And if there is a way to bring them a better life and government, good. We'll go for it.
GJM: Right here.
Audience: (Off-Mike) Steven—to talk about—which would leave us to believe that possibly tribal societies continue to have a greater impact on the Afghan people than the government that seeks to control or to govern all of them, especially of the Pashtun region where you may have what you call a border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and yet, you cross from one side to the other and it looks like the wild, wild west to us. You know, gun shops. People are making guns. I mean, it makes one believe that this could be the brewing ground for further turmoil in your country because they don't seem to…it appears to me anyway, that they don't recognize the country of Afghanistan, only their own tribal methodology. Could you comment on that?
HK: Certainly. Yes. Well, I'm a tribal man myself. I come from one of the tribes. I think it's the other way around. In Afghanistan, there are—there are ethnic groups, there are tribes. But the sense of nationhood is very, very strong. Because we are a country that has not been in the general media, in the people's fair media, to the rest of the world people don't see us in the light that Afghanistan is.
And because a cameraman goes and focuses on a shop in Pakistan that is producing weapons or selling weapons, that is taken as the average representing all. That is not the way it is.
I'll give you an example. And this is a very important question. And I'd like to address it because I've seen too many stories in the press, especially in the Western press in the past month or so about (Inaudible) and instability in Afghanistan.
I'll tell you why Afghanistan survived. Any other country with the kind of poverty and destruction that went on in Afghanistan would have not been there by now. Afghanistan survived the Soviet occupation, terrorism, Taliban, interferences from their neighbors and interferences that targeted the identity of the Afghan people. That wanted to destroy the nation, not just the Afghan people. Afghanistan survived because of the strong, strong feeling of patriotism. All the groups fighting in Afghanistan, each other, and all the foreigners that tried to destroy Afghanistan, they did it in the name of Afghan-ness, Afghanistan. That is because the common man was so strongly attached to the idea of Afghanistan. And maybe as—say it, a—man. But it doesn't occur to me. I am an Afghan. It's the Afghan identity. It's like a man from Michigan or Los Angeles or say, Phoenix, Arizona. So if somebody tries to have his Arizona identity, or a man from Texas wearing cowboy boots, that doesn't mean that he is not recognizing the United States or Washington as the capitol. It's exactly the same way. This is an individualistic society. It is a society where individuals have lots of presence.
But that presence is nationally felt all over and there is a strong sense of nation. Very, very strong. You'd be surprised that it could be stronger than a lot of very developed countries.
I'll tell you why. Be patient with me, please. I was on a trip to three provinces in the northeastern part of the country just recently about 20 days ago. And I stopped on the way in a shrine, in a very little shrine, and there was a shop, a very small shop made of hay and straw. Afghanistan has very good melons. It's probably the best melon-producing country in the world and we have our melons (Inaudible) in Phoenix, Arizona as well. They're good but they're too big for an American family. (Laughter) People don't buy them. I was there. When I came down from the shrine, the shopkeeper, probably who doesn't earn a dollar a month, opened one of the watermelons this small. I mean, no Afghanistan would eat that kind of watermelon this small. And he said "Please have some." When I took one part of the piece of the watermelon, I told him "Well sir, may your shop be as big as Afghanistan." And you know what this man told me? He said "No, sir. May Afghanistan do very well altogether and I'll be fine too then." That's the kind of sentiment.
And further ahead, there was a village school and the little children, five, six of age, the primary school, had come out to greet on the road. And one girl sang a song. Something. A patriotic song. A boy her age was standing with an Afghanistan flag in his hand. So he was holding it high. The height he was.
At the end of the song, the girl said "Be the Afghanistan flag higher" and the boy tried to raise himself to make it higher. It's that kind of society. And in Kandahar, the southern bit of the country, which is the heartland of the Taliban, a man from central Afghanistan, from another (Inaudible) group, run in front of my car, in front of the convoy, and my security thought that probably this was a danger to me. And he held my hand and he kept shouting "Make this country! Make this country!" Nobody ever has come to me in the past many years to speak of his region. They all speak for Afghanistan. I am very confident of that.
GJM: A lady right here in the row.
HK: But…but…but ...
GJM: Oh, excuse me. I'm sorry.
HK: But…no, no. The important part is the…but the trouble which you are referring to, the water belt, that is a tricky part. That is a tricky part because there are two entities, two countries, there. And there are terrorists there. They've had time to play in there for many, many years. There is money coming in there. That is why I so emphatically in my statement talking about cooperation between neighbors. That is a troubled area. We have to watch it. But not because it's trouble. Because there are other games have played there.
GJM: I apologize to you. In the Senate, if you pause for a breath someone jumps up. (Laughter)
HK: Oh, yes. Yes.
Audience: Felice Gear(?)—the Jacob Bladstone(?) Institute. President Karzai, we all welcome and are heartened by your affirmation that human rights and tolerance will return to Afghanistan under your leadership. But we also well aware of recent reports of the return of religious police to religious forms. A judicial commission which has indicated its support of Sharia Punishments. Corporal punishments. A chief justice who affirms that amputations will take place but only in private and no longer in public. And the problems of wardlordism, power that's unaccountable and investigations that are not taking place into atrocities that have been reported. How will you react to this? Can you assure us of your actions with regard to these kinds of abusive punishments of the past? Thank you.
HK: All very relevant questions, ma'am. The religious police question. It is not a religious police. It is a preaching body. It's like missionaries. Religious elements who want to volunteer to preach spiritual over evil. And there are only 200 of them resistant. No more than that. And the man who was in charge of this who made somehow a statement that was not in keeping with the government's policy was dismissed the next day by the ministry without letting me know. So, when I called the minister to complain about his official, he said the man has been already dismissed. We're very careful about that.
The question of Sharia, ma'am, we are an Islamic country. When you ask a clergy of…or a man who interprets jurisprudence in accordance with Islam as to what will be the punishment of a man that would steal? The book says cut off his hand. That's the straight answer. But that's not the circumstances in which he does that. It is extremely, extremely difficult in the real interpretation of Sharia to cut off somebody's hand. The hand-cutting part is only applicable, only applicable, if the society has been provided with all the means of work and earning and making a life. In the absence of that, you are not allowed to do that.
So, Afghanistan is not an ideal society for earning money. So, in Afghanistan it will not happen. I asked the chief justice about this when he made the statement. I have told him you have made the statement. This will probably cause a lot of concern. He said, "Yes. The media do not publish the explanation that I had, they only published my statement." So, I assure it will not happen. There are strict, strict rules of earning that kind of punishment. Very strict rules. Very strict rules.
On the violation of human rights, you maybe referring to the mass graves, ma'am. Three times this is up in Afghanistan and parts of the country. It's a painful, painful thing for the common Afghan man. We had a cabinet meeting on this and I've never seen the Afghan cabinet so unanimously, so strongly in favor of inquiry and investigation as the war on that day. I really had to cool them down to say "Look, guys, hang on. We have not so much (Inaudible) to do things like that." But the cabinet insisted and we have made our intention clear that we will investigate. We've asked the international community to help in the investigation and the UN. We will not stop short of anything to investigate and to find out if there was any wrongdoing done and by whomever it was done. We're sure of that.
Warlordism is something that of course is there. Warlord means someone having guns without being (Inaudible) as the army of Afghanistan. And that's also the problem of the Afghan people. It's something that the common Afghan man is very mad at me for. And it's something that we are looking at. It's something that continues to be a problem in our country in just a few parts of the country. It will take time.
Audience: Richard Holbrooke. Mr. President, your eloquent remarks only reinforce the views of many of us that the West, the United States, the friends of Afghanistan should make a long-term commitment to your country and roads, education, all the other issues. I'd like to address two issues, one of which you just touched on. Many reports, including those of the International Crisis Group, which George Mitchell has headed, has suggested that the strengthening of the warlords, the decision to work with the warlords, has worked against the other goal of strengthening your government. And by the way, these reports also suggest that drugs don't just go to terrorists, but they are one of the main things fueling the warlords and that this will work against everything you talked about, about a loosely federated but single country. And I'd like to ask you to comment on that.
Secondly, the International Security Assistance Force. You have been very public in your desire to see it expand out of Kabul. Many of us feel that that was a tragic miscalculation at the end of the successful military campaign. How important is it? Are you still pushing for it? And do you think that recent remarks from Washington suggest a significant change in expanding (Inaudible)? Thank you.
HK: Sometimes you don't have a choice in a situation. I don't think the U.S. had a choice. I don't think any of us had a choice. They wanted the defeat of terrorism. They wanted the destruction of the Taliban. There were certain forces available in Afghanistan. There were certain elements available in Afghanistan that could help and those forces were strengthened. Those elements were strengthened. And inevitably, that had consequences. Consequences that some people with divisional armies had regained power and strength.
But most of those elements are not part of the Afghan government and they comply with our demands. They comply with the rules that we have set for them. The situation on that front is improving. And the question of warlords, there are only one or two elements that we have to handle in parts of the country. They're not as big or as significant as shown in the media. Of course, the people want absolute calm, absolute security. It's a question that we are aware of. It's a question that we are working on. Things in that regard are much, much better. We will have a meeting in Kabul on the 19th, I guess. On the 19th of this month in which a lot of people will come to attend and we will be addressing the question of armed men and never to be able again to damage civilian lives or property or cause lawlessness. So, that's a question that we are seriously considering.
I believe there's also a change in the U.S. thinking on that front. I believe that there is a realization of the side effects of things. You know? There is the law of unintended consequences that we all know about. This was one thing that occurred to us: the unintended consequences. The strengthening of certain elements. But it's on the way out. It will take time.
The question of ISAF, yes, I did speak publicly about it because the Afghan people asked me so openly and publicly about the expansion of ISAF. This was mainly a repeat of the demand of the Afghan people. I became a loudspeaker for them to the world. I don't see the expansion of ISAF all over the country as a necessity. I think there is…the country as a whole, the countryside is doing well. I find some benefit in expanding ISAF to major cities, to three or four cities. And in very small numbers. It's the psychological impact that it helps the country, as I mentioned earlier, that Afghanistan will not be abandoned again. I'm glad that there is a good change in the U.S. thinking on it. I hope that the European countries will also see to it that it's helpful and if they had done it many months before, we would've been far ahead in the process that we have undertaken. And I agree with you.
GJM: Right here. This lady right here. Wait for the microphone, please.
GJM: This will have to be the last question.
Audience: Yes. Just to quickly come to the point. My name is Paula Japarno(?). Could you possibly refer to the state of the natural resources of the country which obviously underpin a lot of economic development and the heart of people, especially an agricultural people like yours.
HK: Well, agriculturally, Afghanistan could do very well. Afghanistan in the 1970s was almost a self-sufficient country. And some accounts told me - I was a student and had no idea of how much money the country had. Some accounts tell me that Afghanistan, when the communists took over, when the Soviets intervened, Afghanistan had a…what is that called? A reserve? Or…the foreign currency account. Whatever. We had about $800 million in our banks in the 1970s. I don't know if it's true or not true but (Inaudible).
So, Afghanistan - if the machine begins to roll - can make a lot of money as a country of its own. We are about 22 to 23 million, less or more, and a fast country with the resources. We only pray that God will give us some brains this year and the years after. There was a time when that we thought that our water resources were unlimited. But we came to recognize that no, we do not have unlimited resources. We are very good in water resources. Probably one of the best countries in that part of the world in water resources. We can generate tremendous electricity and power from our rivers and water resources. But we have to be careful. We have a tremendous capacity of building small dams to conserve water and to use it for power generation.
We have a lot of natural gas in the northern part of the country. There is a potential of oil. Some fringe companies were looking at that in the 1970s. The Soviets had looked at it and then they went with our maps and never came back with it. So, we don't know what we have where. There are areas in southern parts of the country that are known probably to have oil. There are areas in western parts of the country that have the potential of oil reserves there that have to be explored. The American Geological Survey is looking at mapping Afghanistan to find out what more is there.
We are very good in iron reserves. Iron oil reserves. We have a lot of copper in the country. We have lots of other minerals and underground resources. We have the best marble stones probably among the countries in this would.
So, if we go to explore and put into industrial production or into export our national resources in a systematic, scientific way, we will do very well. But it will take time, I believe. What we are lacking, ladies and gentlemen, I forgot to tell you - it was not in my brief - is the tremendous damage that Afghanistan has received in human resources. It's daunting us everyday. Everyday of life in Kabul that I…when I come to my office and I leave my office, what hurts me is the second by second reminder of lack of human resources. We need a lot of help in that. So education is a key element. So vocational training is a very, very important element. If we have tomorrow 50,000 trained Afghan in various walks of life, I will not come to Washington to ask for money. I will come to Washington to bring money.
