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Council on Foreign Relations
New York

Note: Remarks as prepared for delivery

Richard Haass [RH]: Well, good afternoon or good evening. I'm Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. And with me, as you all know, is Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan. This is going to be, let me say, an on-the-record meeting. The only request I have at the moment is that if anyone does have a cell phone or a beeper, they assign it to oblivion.

That doesn't apply to you, Mr. President. [Laughter]

Hamid Karzai [HK]: I don't have one. I'm not that lucky. [Laughter] I don't have one and I'm glad I don't have it.

RH: The format for this afternoon's program is, after I introduce the president somewhat more completely than I just did, I will have a conversation with him where I will pose some questions to him and then we will open it up to you all. And when that happens, I simply ask that you be as brief as you can so as many people as possible get a chance to ask questions, and obviously that you identify yourselves and your affiliation.

Let me, though, begin with a few words about President Karzai. He is the president of Afghanistan, as you know, though technically it's known as ITSA, by that I mean the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan. Those of us from Washington are rather stuck on acronyms. And he's been president, as you all know I expect, since June of last year. His contributions, though, to Afghan life hardly began there. He was and is a true hero of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union and played a critical role in the transition over the key months after 9/11.

At the time right after 9/11 I was asked by the president and Secretary Powell to become the U.S. coordinator for the future of Afghanistan, and what immediately became apparent to me, and everyone else who was looking at the subject, was that President Karzai -- not yet then President Karzai -- was perhaps the only person in Afghanistan who could facilitate that transition. He was the one person who had the authority and the legitimacy and the acceptability and the vision to see through that critical transition.

May I also just add that it's a real pleasure to have him here. This is his third visit with my --

HK: Third visit.

RH: To the Council, which I dare -- over the last, what, year and a half?

HK: Year-and-a-half.

RH: I won't take a poll, but I daresay it's more than some members of the audience. [Laughter] Indeed, we're about to confer a new honorary membership in the --

HK: Yes, I'd be honored.

RH: -- Council on Foreign Relations. But, again, on behalf of all of us, thank you for taking time out from an extraordinary schedule to put up with some of our questions and observations.

I want to begin, if I may, sir, with a report that was issued by a task force in June, several months ago, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and it said the following, "Afghanistan is once again threatened with disorder and insecurity. The political and economic reconstruction process is in danger of stalling. The attention of U.S. policymakers has shifted elsewhere. Unless the disturbing trends are arrested, the successes of Operation Enduring Freedom will be in jeopardy. Afghanistan could again slide back into near anarchy and the United States could suffer a serious defeat in the war on terrorism."

Is that correct?

HK: It's fair; it's unfair. It's fair where it says that there are dangers still lurking around Afghanistan, the continued terrorist activity and extremism. It was always feared by us too in Afghanistan that with the operation in Iraq, the United States might focus the attention that it has on Iraq, because human beings have so much capacity to focus on things at one time.

But, fortunately, when I visited Washington last time, President Bush categorically assured me, so did other members of the administration and even the Congress and the Senate, they would not do that, that they would focus attention on Afghanistan, and they did. And they proved it by announcing a few days ago more money for Afghanistan, which is $1.2 billion, and the day before yesterday President Bush spoke well of Afghanistan and asked other nations too to contribute to Afghanistan.

Yesterday I found out at the meeting of the Friends of Afghanistan that the major donor countries, the countries in the neighborhood of Afghanistan, continue to pay attention to Afghanistan, continue to be concerned with developments in Afghanistan now. Having said this, are we out of the woods yet? No, we are not. Are we worried about the possibility of terrorism and extremism bringing again instability to Afghanistan or hurting the peace process and the reconstruction process that we have? Yes, I am worried.

But I can say that Afghanistan has made significant progress. The reconstruction process for the past six months has been better. The major reconstruction activity, which is the reconstruction of Afghan highways, has begun. God was very kind to us. We had plenty of rain last year so we have lots of crops growing in Afghanistan. Good crops and bad crops.

[Laughter]

At this point I'm talking about the good crops, which is wheat and plenty of fruit. And actually we had the best agricultural year for Afghanistan in 25 years. Afghanistan produced surplus wheat. We asked the World Food Program to buy our wheat and give it to other countries. Afghanistan's economy grew by 30 percent. The economic growth last year, according to IMF, the International Monetary Fund, was 30 percent, considering that we began from a subzero level, from a level of destruction. And their prediction for this year is around 20 percent, which is all very good.

Does this mean that we are on our own feet? No. Does this mean that we do not need any more help? No, we do need a lot of help.

On the question of terrorism and the possibility of them posing a serious threat to us, I believe Afghanistan cannot do the job alone. I believe Afghanistan needs sustained, strong support from the international community. Afghanistan also needs the strong cooperation of the neighbors, especially Pakistan, in this regard. We cannot defeat terrorism or extremism in Afghanistan or in the region without cooperation from Pakistan.

RH: Are you suggesting you don't have enough?

HK: I would ask for more.

RH: Let me broaden that, and I expect we might have some follow up on that. A few weeks ago, maybe months ago now, the local newspaper in this town, The New York Times, had a Sunday cover story about your country which was titled "Warlordistan." And the question I would raise, because it came up a lot in the government when we were thinking about policy, what is a realistic balance in Afghanistan between the power of the central government and the power of regional authorities and players? What would be too much centralization, what would be too little? What is the Goldilocks solution for Afghanistan?

HK: Good question. We had -- let me begin somewhere else. When the Taliban came to surrender their power to me north of Kandahar City two years ago -- or a little less than two years ago, I had two feelings: one of extreme happiness that this dark force of terrorism and extremism was going away from Afghanistan. But I had a worry as well: worry about the future, worry about the return of some elements that had brought the Taliban to Afghanistan by the consequence of their actions and their brutality. That feeling was there, that fear was there, and the Afghan people had the same concern.

But to call Afghanistan "Warlordistan," as The New York Times has called it, is somehow of a, you know, exaggeration of the situation. We are worried. We have trouble with gangs of armed people, with people who can be called warlords, but it is not to the extent that is beyond management. To put it in different terms, the political authority of the government extends very well to the whole of the country. There is obedience, there is allegiance, and when we make a decision it is taken, it is considered legitimate.

I asked the governor of Kandahar to come to Kabul and be minister of urban development. He said, "Very good," and he came to Kabul and he is now the minister of urban development. And we sent the minister of urban development to Kandahar as the governor. We asked the governor of Herat, who was holding two jobs, the governor of Herat and the corps commander of Herat, to give up his corps command post and he said, "Fine," and we sent a new corps commander there.

So whatever changes we have decided to bring about in Afghanistan, we have done. We appointed 22 people to the reformed ministry of defense just five days ago, and those appointments took place and are having an effect there -- the restructured ministry of defense. The problem is not in the politics of things, in the legitimacy of the government, but the problem is in the inability of the Afghan government to provide effective administration, the inability of the service sector of the government. We are weak in human resources, we are weak in technical management, we cannot reach the country to provide proper administration and services like a normal government would do. So that is at times interpreted as the lack of government and the influence of warlords.

This does not mean that at times violation by armed men does not hurt Afghan civilian life. This does not mean that there are no people who are hurting the government's activity or causing harm to the civilians in the country. That is there, but we are much better than when we began two years ago and I'm sure if this trend continues, we'll be much better if I come to sit with you next year again -- if I'm re-elected.

RH: Well, if you are or not, we'd love to have you sit with us again. Let's, if I could, just follow up on the security situation. Obviously a key component of it is the strengthening of a national capacity in the area of police, in the area of the military. Why is it proving so agonizingly slow? Why is it proving to be so difficult?

HK: The training of the police, the training of the -- well, the training of the police is -- that's the kind of attention paid to it. We need to pay a better attention, larger resources to training of the police all over the country.

The training of the national army has been slow because we were working on the reform of the ministry of defense. Now that we have done that, we at this point have about 6,000 of the national army in Afghanistan and they are very popular, by the way. They go to every part of the country and people receive them and trust them. But we have to add to that. It's because of question of resource, because of the question of the unreformed ministry of defense. Now that we have that, probably this process will speed up and with it will be the process of the DDR, the disarmament, the demobilization and the reintegration, picking up speed. And the implementation of this I hope will begin from 15th of October onwards in two major cities of Afghanistan: Qunduz and Ghardez.

RH: Let me, if I can, quickly move to the political situation. If I understand, the constitution was originally meant to be completed by the end of this year and elections by next summer?

HK: Mm-hmm.

RH: What are the odds that Afghans can keep that timetable?

HK: We have kept, fortunately, the timetable set out for us by the Bonn process. We had the transfer of power in time, we had the first loya jirga to create the new government in time, and we began the commission for the constitution in time. All the stages are done. The December deadline that we have I'm quite confident will be met. As soon as I return, we will have the final look at the draft of the constitution and then we put it once again for public consultation to see the draft through physically and give us their opinions, and then we will give it to the Grand Council in December and I hope that the Grand Council will ratify it without much debate, but there will be debate surely. And six months from that, six months from December, which should mean in June or July of 2004, we are trying to have elections.

Now, that's the difficult part. This country is going for such an election for the first time in 30-35 years. We don't have the mechanisms in place, we don't have the manpower in place, we don't have the technical know-how in place. We are working very, very hard because we have promised Afghan people that we will act to the promises that we have made. And I hope we can achieve it. We should try.

RH: If it turns out that you couldn't and you had to postpone it simply on, well, for technical reasons, that we simply don't have the voter rolls in place, we don't have enough -- or the machinery that you need to have elections -- and an American speaking about this subject has to do it with some humility -- [laughter] -- If that were the case in Afghanistan, would that be accepted, that rationale? Or would it cause a major political firestorm?

HK: No, it will be accepted. The Afghan people will accept it if they find that we have sincerely worked for that end and we have not reached it because of technical reasons. I would be very uncomfortable with it. I don't want to go beyond the legitimate time given to me by the loya jirga, by the last loya jirga. So for me it will be difficult, but to explain to the people it will be easy. Let's presume now that we are going to meet that deadline. I'm not working on the premise that we are not going to meet that deadline. I'm working on the premise that we are going to meet the deadline.

And to add a word on the constitution which I'd like this distinguished audience to know. While we were making the constitution of Afghanistan -- drafting the constitution of Afghanistan, we had a first stage of a drafting committee and then a second stage of a larger commission, which is a review commission. The review commission divided itself into sub-commissions that visited the whole country and sent 460,000 questionnaires to all of Afghanistan. So far we have received -- well, maybe I'm not right. About 10 days ago we had received 85,000 questionnaires back from the Afghan people, 17,000 verbal messages back from the Afghan people, and 6,000 letters back from the Afghan people recommending various things, of which 26 items were the most important, the essence of those questionnaires. They were strongly demanding that the constitution make all the necessary provisions for keeping the national unity of the Afghan people.

Second, they were strongly attaching importance to the traditions and values of the Afghan people and that the constitution must keep and respect Islam, and that the constitution must also have respect for other religions in Afghanistan. Human rights came very high in the priority of the Afghan people, and I was very glad to know, ladies and gentlemen, that the rights of women was considered a very high priority by the Afghan people, fifth or sixth was this priority, and affirmative action in favor of women. And to my surprise again, in a negative way, the president was their 12th item.

[Laughter]

RH: I personally find that a rather unfortunate precedent. But let me just ask a few other questions before I open it up. One is about the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF], which is now headed by NATO. Are you comfortable with the fact that that's still confined to Kabul or would you like to see it expand to your entire country?

HK: Well, this is a question very close to my heart. The Afghan people have been asking for the expansion of ISAF from the very beginning of this arrangement that we have since Bonn. And I raised it with the international community, and the international community was not inclined towards it. I'm happy to note that for the past month the international community has talking about the expansion of ISAF, and Germany has begun a debate about this.

We have some sort of expansion of ISAF in the form of the PRTs, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, that were initiated by the Americans. They've gone to certain provinces. Now New Zealand has come to take over one of the PRTs. The U.K. is handling one in Mazar-i-Sharif. Germany is supposed to go and do it in Qunduz. Other nations have also joined in. So there may be an expansion of ISAF, as ISAF, but there already is an expansion of security activity in the name of the reconstruction activity in the provinces, which is done by managing forces, which is a combined thing, reconstruction and by unintended consequences, security.

RH: Let me, if I may, ask you a slightly awkward question. As I said before, people in the U.S. government over the last couple of years came to see you as uniquely positioned to play the sort of role you play. And imagine through the electoral process, or whatever, people decided differently in Afghanistan or, God forbid, something else were to happen, how much does the political trajectory and evolution of your country right now depend upon you? Or do you think it's reached the point now where, essentially, it's self-sustaining?

HK: Mm. Well, when I address Afghans, I really speak to them about this. I keep urging our people that they must look to the future. They must have the younger generation of Afghans come to the fore, that we must prepare for the future, that nations that are doing well have done very hard work and the consequence of that hard work is the greatness that they have today. So, Afghanistan is no exception.

I very much am disturbed by the [unintelligible] that a nation should depend on individuals. I'm not the type of people to like that, and I hope that Afghanistan will have a multitude of leaderships to choose from. And if they choose to elect somebody else in the coming elections, I will be sad. But I will be happy that Afghans have found a way to choose a new leadership to lead their country.

The other thing that you mentioned was probably not a defeat in elections, probably assassinations and things like that. Well, I like to be alive, elected or unelected.

[Laughter]

RH: We like it that way as well.

Let me just ask one last question to take us a little bit farther afield. It was no coincidence that the president's speech at the U.N. earlier this week discussed Afghanistan and then discussed Iraq. And your own country, if you will, has been on a nation building process that predates Iraq by a year or a year-and-a-half. What do you see as the relevant lessons? Are there things that you say, "Here's what we did in Afghanistan. Here is what we didn't do," and you would advise the United States or Iraqis to learn from your experience?

HK: Well, they're two different stories. Afghanistan was a country that went through 30 years of war and destruction and interference and violence and terrorism and extremism and all that from the Soviets, and Afghanistan was a poor country to begin with, even before the Soviets came. But Afghanistan was culturally, historically a very strong country. A very powerful entity is there. It is a strong Afghan identity. It has strong rules and regulations. There are strong traditional values in this country that keeps it together. There is a strong nation there.

Iraq was a highly educated country. The Iraqi people are among the most educated of the Muslim world. Somebody told me the other day they have 20,000 Ph.D.s. We don't have 20,000 graduates in our country, so there is a vast difference in the human resource potential and the international resource potential. What Iraq lacked was political leadership and a society that could be free. Afghanistan is egalitarian, if not democratic. I don't know how you would differentiate between the two, but we are at least some sort of an argumentative society. Arguments are national in Afghanistan. Councils are national in the country.

So for the United States, the lessons that it can learn from Afghanistan is to launch the reconstruction program in Iraq sooner than they did in Afghanistan. And that what was easy in Afghanistan was the availability of people in the form of political leaderships or groups that managed things. In Iraq that is -- maybe I'm wrong, I hope I'm wrong -- not there and I think the world, all of us, should do our very best to provide the Iraqi people with the mechanism that involve the Iraqi people with some form of decision-making in politics of that country as soon as possible.

RH: Thank you. The bad news, Mr. President, is the easy part of the program is now over. Now we're going to open it up to individuals here, mostly members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Again, I ask you to stand, wait for the microphone and please be very short with questions, and also let us know who you are. And I don't have my glasses with me so I'm going to have trouble, but I see a gentleman in the back. Yes, sir. Right there, yes.

Q: Thank you. Charles Ferguson, Brookings. Mr. President, you seem to have characterized the power of the warlords as secondary or marginal. How can that be, given that it's estimated that over half of Afghan GNP [gross national product] is now opium cultivation?

HK: That's not related to warlords. It's the farmers' difficulty. Afghanistan went through 30 years of that growth. There was a time 30 years ago that I remember that any form of narcotics-related activity was a crime and people were ashamed of it. There was also a time seven years ago that I was in large meeting of senior Afghans and people were talking about poppy cultivation in the area as if they were growing wheat or something. So it became part of the Afghan economy, and not illegitimate. I can't say it was legitimate. It was not illegitimate. It's the Afghan farmers.

And recently, in the past six or seven years, the drought affected the situation even worse. People depended on the growth of poppies in order to earn some money. Warlords don't have a role there. It's the wider farming community in Afghanistan that depends on that. It became a form of agriculture for us. Since last year we've began to attack it by eradication and by other means. And as the economy improves, as the water situation improves, people will go to more legitimate forms of agriculture and a better economy.

And it will take us a lot of time to do this and a lot of international assistance to attack narcotics and finish it. We are determined like hell. We know the consequences of this for Afghanistan and for the rest of the world. This money is funding terrorism. This money is criminalizing the Afghan economy. This product is killing Afghan agriculture, and Afghanistan was among the best countries in that part of the world in the quality of foods. It is destroying that and the people are aware of it. But [unintelligible] relationship to warlords. It can have a relationship to Mafia, not to warlords.

RH: Yes, sir -- yes, ma'am, I mean.

HK: It doesn't mean that they don't benefit from it, but they're not the overlords of this.

Q: Lyndsay Howard, Howard Communications. President Karzai, your government has done remarkable, even miraculous, work in the area of telecommunications and developing the framework and strategic architecture for telecommunications networks. You are soon to launch an international satellite tender. Could you tell the audience a little about the progress, a little about where additional resources are needed for this endeavor?

HK: Ma'am, I'm sorry to tell you I don't know much about that. [Laughter] The minister of communications came to tell me that Afghanistan was going to launch that, and the minister of information and culture was with him to inform me of that and, to tell you the truth, I didn't take interest.

[Laughter]

RH: Isn't delegation a wonderful thing? [Laughter] I'm learning so much from this.

HK: And, you know -- [laughter] -- and you know what I told them? I said, "Really? Okay." [Laughter] And then they went away. [Laughter] And now I hear it from you.

RH: I've got somebody on this side. Yes, sir.

HK: I know about cellular phones, though. [Laughter] We have two companies working in Afghanistan, [unintelligible].

Q: Mr. President -- Mr. Karzai, my name is Steven Mukamal and at the last meeting that you were here we discussed the issue of the warlords and I had presented you with the question of, is this a nationalist country or is it a country divided by different warlords? And what I want to know is the impact of this on your education program in the country. Do you have a different methodology or is there a way that you can produce the kind of education that would be necessary to unify the country?

HK: Afghanistan is -- it's a very relevant question. It's something in my heart. Afghanistan, contrary to the image that it has, contrary to the impression that the world has of Afghanistan, is a country with a very powerful nation. By powerful, I mean a united nation, united country. Don't mistake it for the United Nations. It's a country that the people are very united with very deep historical roots with each other. The reason that Afghanistan survived so many atrocities and interferences and invasions is because there was a nation. But this nation, by the consequences of war and interference, lost all its institutions: a bureaucracy, an army, a legal framework and the educated, the human resources of this country.

It's like an engine, and I gave this example earlier at the Colombia University -- I might repeat it elsewhere too -- that's the best example I have. It's an engine that's strong, but it doesn't have a good transmission line to the wheels and it doesn't have good wheels as well. And the wheels are the bureaucracy and the legal system and all that. We have to give that. So we have to give this nation a state that can make it run well.

On education -- the presence of warlords, which has changed a lot, that presence has diminished a lot in Afghanistan in the past year-and-a-half -- it's universal. The ministry of education set up the curriculum and the system of education, and it's all the same all over the country. 4.2 million children go to school and all of them take their instructions and their programs from the one unit, which is the ministry of education, and their sub-offices in the provinces and their sub-, sub-offices in the districts and in the villages. It's universally the same in the country.

RH: Yes, sir?

HK: And they don't interfere in the education, the warlords, no.

Q: Mr. President, my name is Roland Paul. I'm with the law firm Ivey Barnum and O'Mara. In days gone by I was with the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I'd like to join in welcoming you here. For obvious reasons, we're all very pleased you are here.

My question is this: Some members of the American press and media, in light of recent military activity in the southeastern part of your country, have described the Taliban as the resurgent Taliban. Do you have a feel for roughly how many Taliban and al Qaeda fighters there are in this area? And would you describe it as a resurgent Taliban?

HK: I don't know, sir, how many there are. I would not call them a resurgent movement. I would call on some of the clergy in Pakistan -- the clergy in Pakistan that a place of teaching religion must remain a place of teaching religion. It must not be turned into a ground for training. It must not be turned into a ground for preaching hatred against other people or religions. The people that we have arrested recently have told us that they have been preached in those madrasas, or so-called madrasas, hatred against Afghanistan. They've been told to go and attack road workers in Afghanistan, those that are reconstructing the highways and the roads of Afghanistan. And one of them was paid $55 to commit murder, and the other one was preached for nine months to a year to convert him into aggressive behavior. I would really talk to them not to do that.

I have spoken about this in Afghan mosques some time back. I would ask them that if they are training their own sons to become clergy and participate in elections and become members of parliament and sit down and debate with the opposition party in the parliament and try to form governments or break governments democratically, and if they're teaching their daughters and sons how to become doctors and engineers that we in the neighborhood have that right, too.

Q: You just mentioned Afghan mosques. Could you just say something here about the state of Islam in your country, what is -- and its relationship to politics?

HK: We are a very deeply, fundamentally believing Muslim nation. Afghanistan is a very deeply Muslim country. That's why it's tolerant. That's why it has always been tolerant. That's why it fell victim to extremist activity and the suffering that we had. Our life, our politics is strongly affected by our beliefs, and we have that in the constitution as well. So, we are, being deeply believing Muslims, strongly against extremism or the preaching of extremism or violence that generates from extremism. We have suffered because of it and we are at war with it.

RH: Sir.

Q: Jon Hartzell, KWR International. Mr. President, it's very good to see you back here again. A few days ago the Council was visited by President Musharraf of Pakistan, and coming back to your response to the prior -- earlier to the prior question of the madrasas, and the resurgent, in quotation marks, Taliban was discussed to some extent by him as well. My question is, how would you characterize or could you talk about the state of cooperation with Pakistan in dealing with some of those issues in the east, on the Pakistani side, and the impact they may have on the Afghan side of the border, and how well it's working out? General Musharraf mentioned that he had frequent communication with you, and it would be interesting to know how that's playing out.

HK: Well, President Musharraf and I have a very good relationship. We talk on telephone with each other; we have a secure line between us. Yes, he told me too -- I asked him the other night as well, at the Natural History Museum in President Bush's reception, as to what could be done more to curb extremist preaching and terrorism in the region. We are realistic about this, sir. There is no way that extremism, the crossing of the border by extremists and the terrorist activity in Afghanistan can stop without the cooperation of Pakistan. President Musharraf is concerned. He has promised me that he would do his best, that he is doing his best, and we're looking forward for results in that regard.

RH: Yes. You've got a microphone coming about 10 seconds behind you. You have now two microphones.

[Laughter]

Q: Felice Gaer, Blaustein Institute for Human Rights. Following up on your comments on the constitution and the role of Islam and freedom, recently two journalists were arrested for blasphemy. A year ago a Cabinet member was accused of blasphemy. It raises the question -

HK: My Cabinet member?

Q: Sima Samar

HK: Oh, okay.

Q: Felice Gaer. Accused. It raises the question of whether you will support provisions in the draft -- in the new constitution to ensure that Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, will have their human rights explicitly guaranteed in the constitution. And if the draft constitution says that no law will violate the principles of Islam, who will decide that? Will it be the chief justice? Will it be the Guardian Council? Will it be you? Can you tell us?

HK: Our constitution will not be in contradiction to the principles of Islam. That's certain and that's what the Afghan people want. The principles of Islam do not stand in contradiction with human rights. The Afghan constitution has given explicit, clear backing to human rights, and this was done in full knowledge of the clergy. They said so that this is in absolute, you know, agreement with the principles of Islam and with our religion.

About five or six months ago the Supreme Council of the clergy in Afghanistan met in Kabul and they had a declaration -- they have a monthly declaration. And that declaration -- I hope somebody has a copy around in New York for this. The Clergy Council said that the Afghan women must enjoy and fully benefit of the natural right of freedom to education, to work and participation in politics and in society and in economic activity. This was reaffirmed a few days ago by the chief justice.

Ma'am, I assure you, I assure you in the strongest possible words, that Afghanistan's constitution will be one in strict, strict regard of human rights. You know why? The third item in the questionnaires that we sent to the Afghan people spoke, after having received answers from the Afghan people, of respect for human rights. We have suffered, we were victims. Victims always want their rights to be protected. And if it is not that, I will not continue in this job. If the demand of the Afghan people -- you come to us and you attend the meetings with the people there, listen to what they're telling us on human rights. They're very strong about it, as any victim would be, men and women in our country.

RH: Yes, ma'am.

HK: Kathy.

Q: I'm Kathy Gannon. I'm a fellow here at the Council and a journalist. My question -- I have two questions. One is that Pakistan and that you said at the beginning that Pakistan can do more. You said you met with President Musharraf at the meeting and he said that they're doing all they can and that he's doing the best he can. What specifically would you like to see them do? Like, in specifics, from Pakistan -- what do you want from Pakistan to do to try and curb -- whether terrorism or their madrasas? Which specifics do you want from them?

And second question, you mentioned that warlordism is improving, but there is a concern about corruption within the regions, within some of the regional governments, that there is a lot of money that they are collecting that's never getting to the central government. And at the same time you're also asking the international community for help and financial assistance. First, how do you convince the international community that the money that they give will in fact go to where it's supposed to go, to where you want it to go? And how do you plan to get some of the money that the provinces are getting and the provincial leaders are getting and are not getting to you? Millions and millions of dollars.

HK: Well, we launched a program some months ago for national revenue collection, especially from the customs. And the minister of finance went to various parts of the country that has been successful; we are receiving the registered money. Now, there may be unregistered revenue collection which we don't know about, but we'll have to find out. So the revenue collection is much better than what we had a year ago. Are we satisfied? No. Can it be better? Yes, it can be a lot better. This country has a lot more resources if we collected properly and if we stop stealing from that revenue source in Afghanistan.

Corruption? Yes, ma'am. There is a serious problem in Afghanistan. We have corruption all over the country, unfortunately. There is corruption also in the central government there in the highest part of the government, in ministries. And I've been focusing attention on this in the past five or six Cabinet meetings on this question to find the mechanism, to find an enforcement way to try to stop it. We will do something about it. Whether we can realistically address this in an effective manner, I doubt it. It will take us time. There are too many things that we cannot do something immediately about, and corruption is one of those things. The people are complaining very much. They are angry because of it. It's something that worries me too very much. But there is a debate about it in the government and outside of the government and we are looking for effective means to stop it, especially where we can.

The question of what more do we want from Pakistan or from President Musharraf, I would really want those places disguised as madrasas to be shut down. I would really want those people who are supposed to be the leaders of the extremist Taliban movements and all that to be arrested. I would really want that part of the clergy in Pakistan that preaches and own those madrasas -- or the places disguised as madrasas -- to be told not to, to be taken into account. I want specific, clear, visible action.

RH: Do you actually think the Pakistani government can do this? Do you think it's a question of ability? You think it's a question of will?

HK: Well, we must try and see where we can and where we cannot.

RH: Farooq.

Q: Farooq Kathwari from Ethan Allen. In the past, Afghanistan has suffered, as you've said previously, with the interference and involvement of many people from the outside. Now, how can, going forward, Afghanistan perhaps either suffer or benefit with the cooperation with its neighbors, especially Iran, Pakistan, India, because Afghanistan can be a center of intrigue or perhaps can be a center to help these people get together and have better relations?

HK: I like the second part. I don't want to be the center of intrigue. You know what I mean. It's very important for us, good relations with our neighbors. We have learned by experience, by a painful experience, very painful experience, that bad relations with the neighbors hurt us a lot, interference from the neighbors hurt us a lot. It is out of our very absolute interest in Afghanistan that we recognize, that we look forward for good relations with neighbors, especially with Pakistan, especially with Iran. Our economy is dependent on the trade with them and beyond them with other countries and through us for them to Central Asia.

So the interests of Afghanistan dictate that, and that is why I hope that our neighbors will recognize that since it is in the interest of Afghanistan to have good relations with them, that we need it, so we should have it. There is no alternative to that. They don't have an alternative either. It's a two-way street. We have to live and we have to make money and our people have to get rich. So if you want to get rich, we must be friendly, we must trade, we must have links, we must have relations. There's no reason for Afghanistan and Pakistan to be poor and for Malaysia to be rich or for Singapore to be rich or for the Emirates to be rich. We have more resources than those countries. It's the mindset that's hurting us and that has to change.

RH: Let me say in advance there's orders of magnitude more hands up there than I'll be able to get to, so please in advance forgive me. In the back I see a -- I'm sorry I can't see people because I don't have my glasses, but -- there we go.

Q: Andy Nagorski, Newsweek. Mr. President, earlier you had answered the question about what America should learn from your experience and how to apply it in Iraq. I was wondering what kind of tips you might have for the Iraqis, especially the Iraqi leadership, in how you deal with the Americans in this period. There surely must be some things to glean from your experience that might be useful.

HK: On how they should deal with the Americans?

[Laughter]

RH: Forthrightly.

HK: Well, there is, again, some stark difference there. When we were working against the Taliban, when we were refugees in Pakistan, whenever I would call the tribal chiefs and sit with them and urge them to work against the Taliban from inside Afghanistan, they would me, "Hamid, who do you have with you? Do you have the United States helping?" I would say, "Well, the U.S. is supporting the loya jirga." And they would say, "What beyond that? Any material help?" I would say, "No." And they would tell me, "Hamid, listen, really don't bother us or our children or our families because they will come and kill us, and you will be in no position to defend us without the United States."

For six years of my activity against the Taliban I, every day, every meeting, heard this from the Afghan people, that without backing from the United States and the rest of the world and Europe, especially Europe and America, we will not be able to achieve what we want to do in Afghanistan. And we would come to the U.S. every other month and urge them to help us. September 11 occurred, the U.S. approached us. There was already a community in Afghanistan for that. And when I went to the south of Afghanistan to conduct operations against the Taliban, there too I was confronted by the local people, by clergy, telling me, "What sort of support do you have from the United States? Is the U.S. with us?" And only when they were sure that the U.S. was with us did they give me a very strong helping hand because they said without that it would not be realistic, it would not be pragmatic, we would get killed, we would get destroyed and we would not win.

So in Afghanistan the U.S. had tremendous reception and people were happy to have it. They are still happy. That's why they keep asking for the expansion of ISAF. They can't differentiate between ISAF and the U.S. They think they are the same. It's a security force.

In Iraq, I don't know. If you ask me for my experience, I would believe that the Iraqi people must have been fed up and sick with what Saddam Hussein was doing to them. And I supported the Operation Iraq based on that perception. I wanted the Iraqi people to be free. I have a moral approach to international politics. Morality for me determines action, not these other things that the world capitols are talking about. Therefore, the Iraqi people, now that they are free from Saddam Hussein and oppression of that regime, it would be very wise to get together, form councils like we did in Afghanistan, and help the United States and the rest of the world, help them establish a government of their own and a legitimacy of their own. I wish I could reach them to talk to them. I told [Ahmad] Chalabi [of the Iraqi Governing Council] that today. I said, don't waste this opportunity.

Another advice on the formation of government to them would be we feel a bit rushed in Afghanistan. The datelines set up for us in the Bonn process were too short. They should be given a little more time to determine the mechanisms through which they would come up with a constitution, a representative government and all that.

RH: I hope I do not make 20 enemies in this room for all the people -- in the back. It will probably be the last question, so let me just --

Q: Thank you. Claudia Rosett. You are an island of transition surrounded by dictatorships, most of which are friends of the United States. In fact, the United States has made a point of making friends with them in order to produce a transition in Afghanistan. How does that situation complicate your life?

[Laughter]

HK: I don't know. Do you want me to offend all of them?

[Laughter and applause]

I will keep quiet.

RH: Very few people got in trouble for that insight. Last -- yes, sir.

HK: A very good question.

RH: That was a very evasive answer.

HK: Very true.

Q: [unknown] And a tough act to follow. But, Mr. President, there's been a lot of talk in this country about the idea of an American empire, and there are even some who would say that the United States had embraced an imperial identity. Afghanistan is held up as Exhibit A. Now, as someone who has been described as an auxiliary of a new American empire, what do you make of this talk?

[Laughter]

HK: Sir, history teaches something else. The Afghan history teaches that Afghanistan is an empire breaker.

[Laughter and applause]

HK: You learned from the British in Afghanistan, the three Anglo-Afghan wars, and you learned very recently from the Soviets. I don't think the U.S. is an imperial power. It doesn't have that kind of a mindset. To be an imperial power you have to have lots of pomp and show and - [laughter] -- and other things. It is not. We dragged the United States into Afghanistan. It wasn't coming. It wasn't coming. I know my friends here are a witness. I visited the U.S. once, twice, three times every year for six years, telling them, "For God's sake come into Afghanistan. There is [unintelligible] hell in Afghanistan. It will hurt you one day," I told them. They didn't listen to me. And the Afghan people told them. I went to the U.S. Senate -- my speech is there -- and I warned them of the consequences of what was going on in Afghanistan. They didn't come. An empire -- what sort of empire is that that's not interested in - [laughter and applause] -- unless you put a different name for it and you call it unwilling empire or something.

RH: Reluctant.

HK: Reluctant empire - [laughs] -- we dragged them into Afghanistan. Even now we are trying all sorts of tricks to keep them there. We're trying to --

[Laughter]

RH: Mr. President, I've over the years been at many meetings at this institution. This ranks close at the top. Thank you for an extraordinary --

[Applause]

RH: God bless you.

PRESIDENT KARZAI: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much.

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