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Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
LISA GORDON-HAGERTY: OK. Good afternoon, everyone. Before we begin, I’d like to remind our audience to please turn off your cell phones, your pagers, your Blackberrys. Second of all, unlike most Council events, today’s meeting is on the record. And finally, for today’s event, the schedule will be as follows: Secretary Abraham will make introductory remarks, which will be followed by a brief discussion between the secretary and myself, and then I will open it up to the floor for a question-and-answer period. Finally, I’d like to remind everybody that Council members around the nation and around the world are participating in this meeting via teleconference, for your information.
OK. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, and I’m delighted to be here with you today to hear from a person who has presided over what historians may someday consider a time period during which the most significant changes in global, national, and domestic security policies have been made since World War II. Since being sworn in on January 20th, 2001, the Honorable Spence Abraham has held the distinction—and forgive me, but it’ll—it’s somewhat premature, but on January 18th—as the longest-serving secretary of energy in history. [Laughter] And we’ll leave it at that. [Laughter] Prior to his present position, he also served as a United States senator who represented the great state of Michigan. Go blue! [Laughter]
And while I won’t go into his bio, as everyone knows how wonderful it is and how much he’s—how wonderful he’s done and the accomplishments he’s had, it perhaps isn’t a stretch to state that with perhaps the exception of the recently created Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Abraham has led an agency with one of the most diverse portfolios in the executive branch, from the study of basic science to emerging technologies; development of nuclear and other forms of energy supplies; the monumental task of overseeing the environmental management and remediation of former atomic weapons sites; to the shepherding, the research, development, testing, maintenance, and retirement of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by an attached but semi-autonomous agency reminiscent of the Atomic Energy Commission [1947-75]. Today, Secretary of Energy Abraham and likely as what—in what is likely to become one of his final public appearances as secretary of energy [laughter]—
SPENCER ABRAHAM: [Laughter] Ever. [Laughter]
GORDON-HAGERTY: —[laughter] will focus on another element of this yet vast and far-reaching portfolio, nonproliferation—where we are today, and what we might expect in the future. I believe the secretary, through his vision and tireless efforts, has created a foundation for the new and improved efforts on which to continue the development and implementation of a robust nonproliferation effort for not only the United States, for—and the world. This afternoon, it’s my personal honor and pleasure to introduce to you the secretary of energy, Spence Abraham. [Applause]
ABRAHAM: Lisa, thank you very much. I always wondered what hearing one’s own obituary might sound like, [laughter] and I sort of feel like I may have just heard part of it at least. But thank you all for being here. And to the Council, I want to especially say thanks. It’s good to be with this organization, and to all of you who are here, and to those who may be tuned in through the teleconferencing, we welcome you as well.
I have to say, at the Department of Energy [DOE] we have an auditorium that has the capacity to broadcast any remarks I make there throughout our complex. And I’m always assured, when there’s like 11 people in the audience for my live presentations, [laughter] that thousands across America are glued to their webcast to hear this. And actually, I’ve never met one human being who said that they had seen one of those. [Laughter] But I’m certain that’s only out of shyness. But in any event, I hope that today there might be a few folks not in this room who are also participating.
As I said, it is an honor to be with you today. This Council for 80 years has played a leading role in guiding American foreign policy. As [Council President Emeritus] Leslie Gelb once said, “If the Council as a body has stood for anything, it has been for American internationalism based on American interests.” And that certainly is the case. This body has not just stood for American internationalism and American interests, in my judgment it has helped to guarantee them. Scholars and historians have dubbed the last 100 years “the American Century,” and I think there can be little doubt that the Council on Foreign Relations helped to make it so.
As my tenure in the Bush administration comes to a close, I wanted today to discuss with you a topic which, at bottom, encompasses what I think probably are the most important duties entrusted to the secretary of energy. The issues and challenges surrounding nuclear nonproliferation are continuously evolving. They’ve changed dramatically at several junctures in recent memory. Today we face different challenges from those of a decade and a half ago, certainly, but also different from the ones we encountered when we took office just four years ago. So today, I’d like to take the opportunity to outline for you some of the challenges America and the world face in this arena, and then I’d like to discuss methods and strategies for constructing a workable nonproliferation regime that deals with 21st century geopolitical realities, with 21st century technologies, and with 21st century threats.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, followed just a few years later by East Germany’s Soviet parent state, it appeared that after a half-century of hair-trigger tension, America’s major security fears would ease. The Cold War was over. The global standoff between superpowers was at an end. The world saw America and the West triumphant, freedom preserved, and the promises of Marx and Lenin and Stalin discredited. The great foreign policy and national security concern of the last half of the 20th century had been resolved, and we had won out against Soviet expansionism. This was a great and really a liberating moment for the American spirit. For the first time in most people’s lifetimes, we were truly safe. At least that’s how it seemed to most Americans in the early 1990s. That’s how it seemed as America continued to enjoy unparalleled economic prosperity.
But slowly, slowly, as we moved ahead, it began to dawn on some that our national security problems were not entirely solved with the demise of the USSR. Indeed, other problems of great and terrible gravity could be seen to emerge as a result. And so, an unsettling air hung over a seemingly safe United States of America, because even while we celebrated the fact that the breakup of the Soviet Union left a foe in tatters, it was becoming clear that it also left the Soviet nuclear arsenal quite vulnerable. During the many decades leading up to the fall of Soviet communism, we knew that the nuclear weapons aimed at us—whether from Russia or one of its satellites—were under the closely guarded control of one centralized power in the Kremlin. With the Soviet Union folding its tent, and the ensuing disarray and political and economic turmoil that followed, we could no longer count on those weapons and materials being protected.
My Senate colleague, Sam Nunn [D-Ga.], best summed up our dilemma in a 1996 speech when he said, “The collapse of Soviet communism and the end of the Cold War eliminated what many considered to be the gravest threat to world security. Yet, today the concerns of the Cold War have been replaced with new and far different threats.” He went on to say, “We have moved from an era of high risk but also high stability, to an era of much lower risk but also much less stability.” Sam Nunn was right. While we had reduced the possibilities of nuclear Armageddon between the Soviets and us, we were entering a different period—one where the potential for dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials was skyrocketing, while our enemies were not as plainly seen. Simply put, despite winning what in effect was the Third World War, it turned out we were not as safe as anyone thought.
Now, I think we must credit those men and women who sounded the alarm and raised the nation’s consciousness about the nonproliferation threats in the wake of the Cold War. People like Sam Nunn, [Senator] Richard Lugar [R-Ind.], [Senator] Pete Domenici [R-N.M.], and a number of people with this Council helped frame an uncomfortable issue at a time when, frankly, I think many would have preferred to not worry about it at all. But because of their persistence, America took steps during the 1990s to reach out to counterparts in the new Russian government, and elsewhere, on ways to address eliminating and securing nuclear materials.
Several important programs were launched to deal with a proliferation threat that was still being defined—programs aimed at securing or even destroying weapons and weapons-usable materials in the former Soviet Union; programs aimed at working with Russian customs to combat trafficking of illicit nuclear materials; programs aimed at engaging out-of-work weapons scientists and physically downsizing Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. These were steps in the right direction, and they made a significant mark. But I would suspect that even the authors and shepherds of these proposals would acknowledge they were not enough.
That point was, of course, made frighteningly clear on September 11th, 2001. The horror of 9/11 didn’t change the challenges we face; it shone a new light on them and it made the world fully aware of them. And it convinced us that we had to broaden the scope of our nonproliferation efforts beyond just nuclear weapons, loose nukes, or weapons grade materials. September 11th clarified the geopolitical situation and it brought the threats posed by nuclear weapons and unsecured nuclear and radiological materials into the sort of very hard focus that had not existed before. The fact is that the concept of Cold War nuclear annihilation might have been horrifying—it was—but it had also become something of an abstraction. Nations interested in their self-preservation were unlikely to risk certain destruction, so the idea of nuclear annihilation really wasn’t a part of average Americans’ everyday lives. There was, in reality, a perverse safety in the idea of mutually assured destruction.
The attacks on Washington and New York, however, brought a different idea to the fore. It forced us to acknowledge that while the safety of mutually assured destruction might be the order of the day in dealing with nuclear weapons states, the immediate nonproliferation challenge facing the civilized world was altogether something else: nuclear terrorism, dirty bombs, radiological attacks from enemies not afraid to sacrifice their own lives for their cause. It forced us to confront a different and altogether more likely scenario than that with which we had been dealing, and it forced us to recognize that our challenge isn’t just related to securing dangerous materials. In fact, to define it as such kind of makes nuclear nonproliferation little more than a housekeeping exercise.
After 9/11, it became clear that the challenge before us actually involves thwarting the aims of senseless killers determined to sow terror and death, even at the cost of their own lives. Has the Bush administration risen to meet this challenge? On the whole, I think so, and I am very proud of the achievements we’ve had to date. During the president’s first term in office, we have taken a number of significant steps to demonstrate the seriousness of our commitment, actions which I think have intensified as well as accelerated vital nonproliferation programs. Among the things we’ve done include: first, we’ve substantially increased our nonproliferation spending. The department’s request to Congress last year sought a nonproliferation budget of nearly a 75 percent increase over the last budget request to the previous administration. We’ve accelerated our efforts to secure 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material in Russia and, to date, have upgraded security on over 50 percent of the material in nearly 70 percent of the sites where they have been found. This acceleration program has cut nearly two years off the schedule which we began with.
We’ve dramatically accelerated our work with the Russian navy to secure their fuel and nuclear warhead sites. During my first trip to Moscow in 2001, I met with Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov of the Russian Navy, the head of the Russian Navy. It was probably the most telling meeting I had in the entire tenure in this job, because I remember vividly his making a personal appeal to me to help him secure Russian navy warheads and highly enriched uranium [HEU] fuel storage sites on a faster and fuller basis. He was genuinely frightened, in the wake of 9/11, that the pace with which we were acting was simply not enough. I gave him my commitment that we would move aggressively, and we have. I’m happy to report that we will have secured 100 percent of Russian navy fuel and weapons storage sites by the end of next year.
In 2002, the president proposed, as you know, and the G-8 leaders established the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction [WMD] to bring important new resources to bear on nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety. The following year, we launched the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI], marshalling the international community to act effectively to stop the trade in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. We have begun building a global network to prevent rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring WMD by interdicting shipments at sea, in the air, and on land. Under the PSI, we exposed both the [Pakistani nuclear scientist] A.Q. Khan network and shipments for Libya’s WMD program. And of course, since, we worked with Libya and the United Kingdom to dismantle Libya’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
We’ve done other things as well. We supported efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards system. We achieved a real increase in the IAEA’s budget for safeguards, and the president gained Senate advice and consent to the U.S. Additional IAEA Safeguards Protocol. And we have focused attention on the need to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
In cooperation with the international partners as well as the IAEA, we have returned significant amounts of Russian-origin HEU to Russia from various international research reactors to be downblended and used for civil nuclear purposes. And in the past two years, we have returned more than 100 kilograms from six nations. Working with the IAEA, Russia, and many other countries, we have developed a comprehensive global effort to improve the security and controls of high-risk radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb.” We held a very successful conference to launch this venture in 2003. And in 2003 we launched the Megaports program to begin to place radiation detection systems at the world’s most dangerous and most used seaports. We have already completed agreements to place equipment in critical seaports in the Netherlands, Greece, Sri Lanka, Belgium, Spain, and the Bahamas, with more to come. Finally, last year we led efforts to pass unanimously U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to criminalize proliferation of WMD, including by non-state actors, and to enact and enforce effective export controls and secure proliferation-sensitive materials.
These efforts have been very successful. I went through a very long list here today because I’m very proud of the achievements which we have made. They have made the world safer. Every instance in which we’ve worked to secure and remove dangerous materials has meant less opportunity for terrorists to acquire them. But having said that, in my view there can be no “good enough” when it comes to these issues. Over the last several years it became apparent to us that we could, and that we had to do a lot more, and we must do more to involve as many nations as possible in this effort. Given the constantly evolving threat environment, given the resolve of terrorists thinking up new ways to do the unthinkable, given the need to focus not just on rogue nations but on shadowy, stateless networks, it was clear that we had to find ways to further improve, to further enhance, to further accelerate our nonproliferation work. And so last May we introduced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative [GTRI]. The GTRI contains new measures to provide international support for countries’ national programs to identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and other radiological materials and equipment around the world as quickly and expeditiously as possible which pose a threat to the international community.
There are four components to GTRI: first, we will work in partnership to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU fuel by the end of this year. We will also work with Russia to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all Russian- origin spent fuel by 2010. There are roughly two metric tons of this material located at more than 20 facilities in 17 countries, and we are on the way with a very good start. Secondly, we’ll likewise take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under our existing program from locations throughout the world. Right now, there are 41 countries eligible to participate in this voluntary program. Under the acceptance policy, about 22,700 fuel elements are eligible for return. As we accelerate and complete these tasks, our aim is to give priority to cases involving the greatest security threats and situations in which diplomatic and cooperative opportunities present themselves. Under the third element of our GTRI program, we will work to convert the cores of targeted civilian reactors that use HEU to use low-enriched uranium fuel instead. We’ll do this not just in the United States, where more reactors have converted to LEU [low enriched uranium] than in any other single country, but throughout the entire world. We already have converted 39 research reactors to use LEU fuel, and another 35 can convert with currently available fuels. And meanwhile, we are accelerating the work to develop a new higher-density LEU fuel, which we hope will enable conversion of the remaining 31 reactors. The fourth and final pillar of GTRI is working to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts. This includes material located at enrichment plants, conversion facilities, reprocessing plants, research reactor sites, fuel fabrication plants, and temporary storage locations. There are hundreds such facilities throughout the world, serving to demonstrate, of course, the scope of our challenge.
All these elements of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and especially this last one, have been designed to reflect a threat which is ever-changing and evolving. And they have been designed to broaden the international focus of our nonproliferation efforts. When we launched the GTRI last September, it took place in a partners conference in Vienna, which was in conjunction with the IAEA’s annual meeting. And more than 100 countries endorsed the statement of principles, affirming GTRI on that occasion and laying the cornerstone for a heightened international effort. We’re very excited about these prospects. And the accomplishments I have cited today, from our efforts to secure the Russian navy’s nuclear warhead sites to our multilateral labors under GTRI—all of these represent promising developments. They are positive steps. They are needed. They will help. But even they will not be enough because, as I said, we can never settle for good enough in this area.
And so in that vein, I think it’s worth asking what is now required to continue building the sort of nonproliferation regime that will guarantee the safety of the American people and our fellow citizens of the world. What is the unfinished business we must undertake? Let me begin by outlining what I see as the most significant issues still facing us, and by us I don’t just mean the United States, but the entire international community. One, as the president has said, and I agree, the threat of nuclear proliferation is the most serious national security challenge we face today, and nations throughout the planet must address these issues as comprehensively as possible. Second, I think we need to intensify the security of radiological materials that could be used for dirty bombs and place an even greater international focus on that issue. Third, we need to limit access to nuclear fuel cycle technologies and associated nuclear materials. Fourth, the programs I have mentioned need to be sustained in Russia in the future, and it will take more than just American financial assistance and resolve for that to happen. And finally, it is essential that the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA are strengthened in order to make them more effective in dealing with the new challenges presented by 21st century threats.
If we are to be ultimately successful in addressing these issues and building a nonproliferation regime that deals with 21st century realities and 21st century challenges, it seems there are, in my judgment, four broad areas which have to be undertaken. Each of these areas contains elements that will help meet those specific challenges I just mentioned, and each contains elements that are necessary to ensure our nonproliferation activities are germane in the age of terrorism. The first deals with our own responsibilities. The United States must fund and finish those programs that we have committed to doing. We have set very ambitious timetables for a host of programs. They are ambitious, but they are by no means unattainable. I think our administration has already demonstrated a commitment to fund these programs. The challenge for future presidents, energy secretaries, and other top American officials will be to ensure that the commitments which we are making and that we have made continue to be honored, and to keep up the intensity of our efforts. A good example is megaports. With our scientific and technological pre-eminence, America is well positioned to enhance the capabilities of our international partners to detect, to deter, and to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. The equipment, training, and technical support we provide other nations will allow them to screen container cargo as it moves through their ports. And this will help screen not just cargo destined for America, but cargo moving throughout the international maritime trading system.
I mentioned before that we have concluded megaport agreements with a host of nations and some of the world’s busiest ports. This is helpful, but it is not sufficient. The safety and security of the free world demands that every major port around the globe be engaged in this form of detection. There are more than 20 of these worldwide that should be covered, a process that needs to happen sooner rather than later. If we remain vigilant, and if we continue to press this issue on the diplomatic front in the years ahead, I believe we can accomplish this goal. But I see it as a major challenge that still confronts us.
The second major area of action deals with our counterparts in the Russian Federation. The Russian government must play an even greater leadership role in the future than it has over the last 10 years. That is not to minimize the contributions they have made, only to suggest that it is absolutely imperative that they take on a larger share of responsibility. This means several things. First and foremost, it means Russia needs to increase the amount of money it devotes to financing domestic and international nonproliferation efforts. The Russian economy is improving, and the government is capable of shouldering more of the financial burden. Contributing more to the financial end would clearly demonstrate Moscow’s commitment to these programs, but more importantly, it would show everyone that these efforts are permanently sustainable. In addition, Russia must work harder to address vulnerabilities at their nuclear and radiological facilities. At a time when terrorists are known to be scouting under-secured locations worldwide, it is absolutely essential that we meet the accelerated 2008 deadline which we have set to complete security upgrades at Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. We’re still working to gain access to some of these facilities in Russia that, in my judgment, need to be addressed sooner rather than later. It is imperative that the Russian Federation work together with us to quickly resolve outstanding questions about access to these sites so that we can get this job done to ensure that terrorists are cut off from these locations and this material. Finally, Moscow also will have to work more aggressively to more quickly accept Russian-origin spent fuel from foreign Russian-supplied research reactors. And in particular, Russian consideration of a programmatic or at least regional approach to the environmental review process prior to the return of spent fuel would greatly accelerate this process.
The third major nonproliferation need for the immediate period in the 20th century involves other nations doing far more than they do at present. The task cannot be left up to the United States, Russia, and the IAEA. Terrorists have struck not just Washington, New York, Moscow, and Beslan; they have also struck Bali and Madrid, Tokyo and Jakarta, Nairobi, Yemen, Turkey, Tel Aviv, Saudi Arabia, Munich, Beirut, Cairo, on the seas and oceans, and in the skies. Terrorist plots have been thwarted in Vancouver, London, Berlin, the Philippines, countless other places. The point is that the challenge of confronting terrorism falls to every nation. It is not just because the opportunities to acquire nuclear and radiological materials are spread all over the globe, but because every civilized nation is a target of those who have made clear they hate modern civilization. A global threat demands global participation. That’s why we must have a broader program addressing radiological materials which could be employed to construct dirty bombs. The universe of materials that could be used on a radiological dispersal device [RDD], as you all know, is very wide. It includes not only spent nuclear fuel, but low-level materials common to everyday medical as well as industrial uses. So as we intensify efforts to strengthen the protection of weapons-grade materials around the globe, we should anticipate that enemies will turn their focus to acquiring materials for dirty bombs. Already the United States has taken big steps already to combat and raise awareness of this threat. In September of 2002 we proposed an international effort [to] address these issues, and then in 2003 I co-chaired the aforementioned partners meeting in Vienna which followed. Since then, we’ve made excellent progress, working with governments around the globe to secure at-risk radioactive sources such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators or equipment for food irradiation.
But the actions which we have taken are certainly not enough to date. Given the breadth of the challenge, it is clear that guarding against the threat of RDDs simply cannot succeed without the active participation of as many nations as possible. We must also take steps to develop a safer, more orderly way of distributing fuel for civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. Last year in February, as you know, the president called on the world’s leading nuclear exporters to ensure that states have reliable access to fuel at reasonable cost for their civilian reactors, so long as they renounce enrichment and reprocessing. He called on the 40 nations that comprise the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. That idea is a good one. It provides a foundation for all parties that wish to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy to do so, without spreading the most dangerous elements of the fuel cycle. It also offers the ability to cut off what we see as the most worrisome channels employed by proliferators today. Input from other nations, of course, is required, and this process will be ongoing. But I’m confident that by working on a broad international basis we can construct a workable 21st century framework that assures nuclear fuel supply for the peaceful development and use of the atom.
The fourth and final major step toward strengthening the 21st century nonproliferation regime requires that we ensure that the IAEA and the Non-proliferation Treaty are effective vehicles for our common nonproliferation aims. Recent years’ developments in North Korea and Iran have seemed, I think, to call the question and effectiveness of both the IAEA and the NPT into doubt. In North Korea, we have the example of a state which, under the NPT, purported to be a member of the treaty, enjoyed the benefits of its membership—including automatic access to sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies—all the while secretly putting in place the assets needed to break out and declare itself a nuclear state. I think we all have a sense of something similar occurring in Iran. So, it’s worth asking whether the framework for the NPT and the process by which the IAEA works are sufficient to meet the challenges of today. They were fine in dealing with the challenges that were presented in the Cold War. But how can we ensure that they are capable of preventing the sort of gamesmanship that has led to the crises we face today?
Presently, we seem to have meeting after meeting on topics of serious concern, only to put matters off to the next meeting. And that must change. We must take appropriate steps to ensure that the nonproliferation tools contained in the NPT are effective, and that the treaty’s members have the political will to ensure that no nation can exploit the treaty to its own advantage. For example, I personally believe that we should limit the availability of fuel only to those states who have signed the Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol should be adopted by all nations and become a standard for states that wish to engage in nuclear commerce. And here, of course, the United States has led by example. Furthermore, we need to put in place, I think, a more efficient and effective mechanism within the IAEA Board of Governors for dealing with countries that appear to act in defiance of the treaty. There must be an expedited process that either achieves compliance with nonproliferation obligations or leads to swift action. The reality is that the IAEA Board of Governors must serve as an instrument for guaranteeing the safety and security of its members, not merely as a debating club, and not as a convenient protective shield for those who in reality might jeopardize the world’s safety.
Each of us has heard it said that the 20th century began with a shot fired in Sarajevo in June 1914. That event represented the close of one era and the beginning of another, a very thoroughly different one. Thus was borne an age that would be marked by conflict, and turmoil, and bloodshed on the greatest possible scale, but also by the ultimate triumph of freedom over totalitarianism. It is sometimes hard to recognize the historical significance of activities as they occur, but I think that years from now historians will look back and say that a new era and a new century were really inaugurated on September 11, 2001. And they will also look to us and ask if we did all that we could to meet the new challenge of this age. President Bush said last year in his speech at the National Defense University: “The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons. America and the entire world,” he said, “will face this threat for decades to come.” How we face this threat is the question which historians will debate. “Responsibility is the price of greatness,” argued Winston Churchill. It is now up to us whether we affirm our nation’s greatness again by once more shouldering responsibility for its protection and the safety of our whole planet.
Given the various steps which I have outlined today, I am very optimistic that we can succeed at meeting the challenge and facing down the threats of a new era. The events of the last three years since 9/11 have constituted a very positive and aggressive start in the right direction. But as I have made very clearly here today, our work is far from done. There will be far more to do, requiring resolve, patience, resilience, courage, and an abiding faith in the American cause of freedom and democracy.
I know you join me in pledging our collective dedication to these ideals. The Council on Foreign Relations has always been a leader and will continue to stand for American internationalism and American interests. And because of that, it will continue its work to ensure the safety and security of the American people and, indeed, of the world. And so, as I close today, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss these issues, look forward to hearing from you on them, but also want to thank everybody here. There are a lot of people in this audience who, at various points over the last decade and a half, have been involved in these programs and projects in various stages, and have done remarkably important work for our country and for the world. And to all of you who have been part of this, I would like in closing today to say a special thanks. It is work that was very important and work that is deeply appreciated by all. Thank you very much. [Applause]
GORDON-HAGERTY: OK. I’d like to ask the secretary, if I may, one quick question, and then I’ll turn it over to the audience given the time constraints under which the Council is requiring me to abide. [Laughter] Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
ABRAHAM: Thank you.
GORDON-HAGERTY: We really appreciate it. I’m sure everyone in this room and everyone listening in appreciates all of your hard efforts over the last—
ABRAHAM: Thousands of them.
GORDON-HAGERTY: Absolutely, thousands of people, [laughter] and I’m sure they’ll all be writing in to tell you how wonderful [laughter]—
ABRAHAM: One would be [inaudible]. So we’ll see.
GORDON-HAGERTY: [Laughter] OK. I would like to start out by asking you one question, and that’s to focus on the Russian Federation. You mentioned that they have a responsibility, too, to secure their materials within their own federation. You also then talked about the behavior of North Korea, and what we think is going on in Iran or what our feelings are where Iran is going. But one of the most vexing issues to me associated with moving the ball forward on nonproliferation is how to deal with nations that walk the fine line between compliance and noncompliance of international treaties, like you said the NPT—how, then, do we balance, or what is your perspective on recent statements by Russian Federation officials regarding possible future cooperation with Iran in constructing additional nuclear power plants and assisting them? Whether it’s—again, providing enriched uranium is one thing, taking it back is another.
ABRAHAM: Right.
GORDON-HAGERTY: But in fact, helping them, assisting them; I think the number was thrown out at least 27 nuclear power plants. Could you give us some idea on the perspective on the Russian Federation’s behavior?
ABRAHAM: Sure. Well, let me begin with a little history from my perspective. I don’t think that there is any stronger direct relationship between our department and any counterpart in the world than exists with regard to the—formerly MINATOM [Ministry for Atomic Energy], now ROSATOM [Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency] directorate in the Russian Federation. And Minister, now director, [Aleksandr] Rumyantsev and I are very close friends. We work on these issues a great deal. We just met, in fact, last week again for a final discussion of some of these matters. And obviously, the United States and Russian Federation are not going to agree precisely on every single matter, but I think that with respect to Iran, you know, the dialogue has had some tangible and positive benefits. You’ll recall that in the summer of 2002, I believe, there was an indication that Russia was going to launch a building effort to build five or six additional sites beyond Bushehr. I was then dispatched to Russia and had meetings with counterparts there. The result of those was the subsequent statement that moved away from that announcement.
Obviously, the Russian work with Iran has not yet resulted in the provision of fuel to Iran or an agreement, even, to do so. I think that the Russian government is proceeding very carefully here, and we have a lot of contact on it. It remains to be seen, though, what steps will be taken, but I believe the discussions that we continue to have, have typically resolved concerns that have emerged. But obviously, there’s going to be periods of, I suspect in the future, of disagreement. I do think, though, that there will be constructive results from our collaboration.
GORDON-HAGERTY: OK. Thank you. Now I’d like to open it to the floor, but we do have some rules also for this. And so what I’d ask is if you would please wait for the microphone, stand—
ABRAHAM: No screaming.
GORDON-HAGERTY: [Laughter] No screaming. State your name and your affiliation. And I would also ask, please, if you would keep your questions short and concise, to the point, so we can get as many questions answered as possible. Rose?
QUESTIONER: I’m Rose Gottemoeller from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to add my personal thanks for your emphasis on these issues and your commitment to them over the last four years. It’s been very, I think, productive and successful. So thank you very much. My question is as follows: I was very impressed with the president’s first press conference, when he mentioned the need for enhanced reciprocity with the Russians in working in nuclear weapon sites and sensitive sites on both shores, so to speak. And I wonder if you would comment as to your vision as to how that reciprocity should be further developed, what the trends should be in the next few years.
ABRAHAM: Well, I think that the—you know, these are—I’m not sure what the trend will be. I think what the trend can be is greater cooperation. I think that the—again, just last week in the meeting that I was involved with, we, I think, made some very positive progress in terms of identifying some of the impediments, you know, to issues that relate to access, that relate to moving forward with some of these programs. And I think, you know, we are very committed as a country to seeing this through, and the president is. The discussions that have taken place—you know, as I pointed out, this is—these issues are extremely high on both presidents’ agendas. When Director Rumyantsev was in Washington not too long ago, when he and I were meeting, the president joined us to participate in those discussions. When I was subsequently in—maybe it was before that; one direction or the other—when I was in Russia meeting with Minister Rumyantsev, President [Vladimir] Putin engaged me in direct discussions on this. And so I think—I guess I’m optimistic that we can resolve some of these issues, because I think there’s the highest level of interest in them and that it occupies the highest level on the agendas of both presidents.
GORDON-HAGERTY: Thank you. Yes?
QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] with the Russian news agency TASS. I also have a question, Mr. Secretary, on the challenges for the implementation of joint nonproliferation programs with Russia. And I would like maybe to rephrase a little bit the question that Rose asked you. One of the major challenges is the so-called access to the sensitive sites, and you mentioned this problem in your speech today. But I think you also remember that President Bush on—during his White House press conference on the Christmas Eve [December 20, 2004] actually mentioned it and said that we should provide access for the Russians to our nuclear sites and just to see what works, what doesn’t work, to build more trust between two governments. And so I’m wondering what practical steps DOE is planning maybe in accordance with this statement by President Bush?
And the second major challenge is obviously the issue—the liability issue, because it delays the work on two very important programs, Nuclear Cities Initiative and Plutonium Disposition Agreement. And so the question is how DOE is going to deal with this issue in the upcoming year? Thank you.
ABRAHAM: On the liability issue, let me just say that it’s not just a decision that our department makes unilaterally, it is an issue that the entire United States government participates in with all of the agencies who have a stake in that set of issues, have a voice. I’m actually encouraged and cautiously optimistic that we can make very positive progress on the liability issue in the months ahead. It is a subject which we talk a lot about internally on our side; it’s something that is very much a part of not only my discussions with counterparts, but at other levels as well. I’m not going to get into the details of where it all stands, because obviously that’s something to be negotiated between the sides. But I think that there is some—I’m not just speculating here, I really believe there is a basis to be cautiously optimistic, based on the current status of both our viewpoints and those of the Russian Federation. I’m not going to try to go beyond what the president has said in terms of the access issues in terms of our side. And, you know, that’s an issue that—those are specifics to be determined.
The point I would just make here today is that we certainly—and the president certainly has been forward-leaning in trying to accommodate the concerns of the Russian Federation, and we want to, we want to address their concerns. But I think we’ve had already a lot of positive, tangible evidence that we can engage in the safety—in the safeguards program and safety programs at sensitive sites without creating any difficulties for the Russian Federation’s host facilities or their security considerations more generally. What we’ve been doing, as you probably know, is working on a number of different projects using some pilot projects, examples of how we can do this work. We’ve done it successfully with the Russian navy, with the strategic rocket forces, to try to demonstrate that Russia’s legitimate security considerations can be protected at the same time that the world’s, and in particular the Russian Federation’s concerns about the vulnerability of these sites can be likewise addressed. And I think we can get there. As I said, it’s definitely an issue at the highest levels of both sides’ agenda, and something in which both presidents have and will continue to engage on.
GORDON-HAGERTY: Laura?
QUESTIONER: Laura Holgate from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I wanted to ask you to think a little bit more broadly worldwide and look a minute at China and see, as China increases its role as both a nuclear consumer and as a provider of nuclear technology, including HEU-fueled research reactors, are there opportunities to apply some of the skills and talents and experiences in the Russian context to some of the issues in China? So I’d be curious about your sense of the threats and the opportunities in that region.
ABRAHAM: I think there is. I was in China in December. I met with the leader—well, the foreign minister, as well as the head of the atomic energy agency. We had very positive discussions about several of these issues I’ve touched on today, but in particular about the issues of collaboration on safeguards and securities on materials and at sites. We’re in the embryonic, you know, stages, obviously, of collaboration here, but the receptivity where I think it matters—actually, one of the nice things, I guess, as I’m leaving this job, that I feel very positive about, is that we have, I think, established a very strong threshold of discussion now on these issues, and it’s one that I believe will be carried on. I’m optimistic it can lead to much more enhanced cooperation in this area.
And I would just say, based on, you know, the meetings we had in December, that it’s—at least my takeaway was that this wasn’t a window-dressing situation; it was quite a substantive level of interest and desire to have conversation, and to derive benefits from our expertise and to work together. And so I don’t want to overstate it, but I really felt those meetings have opened a new pathway forward there.
GORDON-HAGERTY: Thank you. Questions on this side? Yeah, sir? Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Dan Horner from McGraw-Hill Nuclear Publications. I want to go back to Russia and your point about increased contribution from Russia. In the past, you and other administration officials have specifically named programs like plutonium disposition where Russia needs to contribute more, but I think you’ve also said that in some cases, like the take back of the fresh fuel, the U.S. is willing to fund that essentially in its entirety. So can you just give a little bit more detail about which programs, and why distinction of some and not others?
ABRAHAM: Well, you know, we believe that three of the four components of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative are so pivotal that we are prepared to provide the financing for those to take place. And in fairness, those three, which are the return of fresh fuel and spent fuel to Russia, the return of spent fuel to the United States, and the conversion of reactor cores in these research reactors or the development of a new fuel of lower enrichment level for them—these are all sort of finite acts that don’t—that, once accomplished, are finished; in other words, once you’ve converted the core and—then that project is done. The maintenance of the security programs in the Russian Federation is a permanent challenge—a permanent, ongoing cost into the future. And I’m, I guess, of the view that it would be very comforting to know that these programs would be sustainable regardless of what external resources are made available, because the Russian Federation, you know, was taking a greater level of responsibility for them because those are not one-time costs; they’re ongoing costs.
There will be, presumably, a point along the way when refurbishment of materials or the technologies involved is required. And I’m not making a policy declaration that no one will help when those times come; I just think from the standpoint of the assurance that these programs will sustain, it would be, I think, very important to see the role or the Russian participation level in the financing enhanced.
GORDON-HAGERTY: One final question, please.
QUESTIONER: I’m Norman Wolf, formerly with the Department of State, presently a consultant to the Department of State. The recent U.N. high-level commission report to the secretary general said that efforts to sell the concept of countries foreswearing enrichment and reprocessing perhaps could be enhanced if there were a pilot project to guarantee fuel supply for those countries that give it up. I guess they’d like to make sure that there is something in fact going to be there on that side before they do their actions on this side. What do you think of the notion of a pilot project?
ABRAHAM: [Laughter] Well, I guess I don’t want to set policy here today, but, you know, I think this much. As I said in my comments, that going forward, constraining the extent to which enrichment capabilities and fuel cycle capabilities proliferate, constraining that proliferation is an important thing. And it seems to me, at least I personally—I’m not speaking now for the U.S. government here—think we should look at all suggestions. As I said in my comments, you know, other participation and viewpoints need to be heard.
I think it’s a positive thing that as this issue has been now begun to be discussed. We’ve not only had the president’s speech, we’ve had Director General [Mohammed] ElBaradei’s discussion of it, his proposal. I was with the president when the director general was here last, and as was reported at the time, these topics came up. And so I think there’s, you know, a lot of viewpoints now that understand the risks involved if you have a widespread capability of this technological capability. So I at least would personally be open to any of these suggestions as to how to lay the groundwork for some type of policy change. And if it’s one that would be reassuring to those not in the suppliers group at this time, then I think it should be taken seriously. I think that this discussion and ideas need to be emerging in the days ahead so that we can make real progress on this. But I think it’s clear that a key component in terms of trying to prevent nuclear terrorism is to minimize the number of sites that have to be protected, and to minimize the access to this kind of technology.
GORDON-HAGERTY: OK. Well, I would like to extend my appreciation to the audience and to the council for allowing me to preside today; and then, most importantly, to thank the secretary of Energy for his time today, and also extend my personal appreciation for your last four years, and I’m sure the audience would agree, for the significant contributions you’ve provided to keep our country and our world safer. Thank you.
ABRAHAM: Thank you, Lisa. Thank you all. It’s been nice to be here. [Applause]
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