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home > by publication type > backgrounder > NORTH KOREA: The Crisis
March 5, 2003
Experts say that North Korea appears to be intensifying the crisis over its nuclear weapons programs to force the United States into face-to-face negotiations. But they disagree over Pyongyang's longer-term objectives.
Some analysts say that North Korea might be willing to give up its pursuit of nuclear arms in exchange for economic and energy aid and formal security assurances from the United States. Others, including some top Bush administration officials, argue that the North wants both aid and atomic weapons.
In its second such test in two weeks, Pyongyang fired a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan on March 10; the earlier launch happened on March 4.
On March 1, four North Korean fighter jets shadowed a U.S. spy plane, reportedly coming within 50 feet of it, as it flew in international airspace off the North Korean coast. An unnamed Defense Department official told The New York Times that hand signals used by the North Korean pilots suggest that they intended to force the U.S. aircraft to land in North Korea. Pyongyang may have planned to hold the crew hostage, the official said. But the American airmen did not heed the signals and instead returned safely to their base in Japan. That encounter followed North Korea's reactivation a few days earlier of a 5-megawatt reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex that had been shut down under a 1994 aid-for-disarmament deal with the United States. Experts say that the reactor will produce enough plutonium for about one nuclear weapon a year.
In October 2002, after Pyongyang reportedly admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In December, North Korea announced it would reopen the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. It also removed monitoring equipment from the site, expelled inspectors from the IAEA, and withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Administration officials, while concerned by these moves, are reportedly more worried that North Korea will reactivate a facility at Yongbyon that could quickly reprocess its store of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons-grade material for five or six bombs.
No. In 1993, North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it joined in 1985. U.S.-North Korea negotiations led the North to suspend its withdrawal from the accord, but talks eventually stalled. After Pyongyang began removing spent fuel--which could be turned into fissile material--from its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the United States pressed for economic sanctions. Washington also considered launching a pre-emptive strike on the Yongbyon facility. But following a key meeting between former President Jimmy Carter and North Korea's then-leader Kim Il Sung, a deal was reached in 1994 in which the North agreed to freeze its nuclear program and open Yongbyon to international inspectors in return for foreign aid.
Yes. In 1969, Pyongyang shot down an American reconnaissance plane, killing 31 U.S. soldiers. Before the current crisis over the North's nuclear ambitions broke, North Korea reportedly hinted that it might be willing to return the U.S.S. Pueblo, a spy ship that it captured in 1968. In that incident, one sailor was killed and the remaining 82 crew members were held prisoner for 11 months.
North Korea's latest round of provocations has so far failed to force the United States to the negotiating table. Washington has refused to talk face-to-face with Pyongyang until it first abandons its nuclear weapons programs. Instead, the United States has said that the crisis should be resolved with the cooperation of other countries and that talks must occur in a multilateral forum.
So far, Pyongyang has refused multilateral talks. Experts say the Bush administration can't effectively pressure the North without the help of other countries in the region, which have been reluctant to cooperate.
South Korea, China, and Russia, as well as a number of current and former U.S. officials, are putting increasing pressure on the Bush administration to talk to Pyongyang directly. But the administration does not want to appear to reward bad behavior and is wary of addressing the crisis without the cover of an international forum.
Some top administration officials have defended their position with the argument that if tensions with the North continue to escalate, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia--which have varying degrees of leverage over the North and support a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula--will press the North economically and financially until it agrees to multilateral talks.
That seems unlikely. Intelligence reports indicate that North Korea has developed a ballistic missile capable of reaching the western United States, but the missile, known as the Taepo Dong 2, has never been tested. And U.S. intelligence officials have said that North Korea had the capability to produce one or two plutonium-based nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, but there is no evidence that it has done so yet.
Yes. On February 12, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution declaring North Korea in violation of its non-proliferation commitments--a move that automatically refers the matter to the United Nations Security Council.
The United States had backed involving the Security Council, reportedly to bring increased international attention to the crisis. U.S. officials have said that they would support a new Security Council resolution condemning North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but would not push for the imposition of economic sanctions. Pyongyang has warned that sanctions would mean a war.
Washington is sending mixed signals on this. U.S. officials have said publicly for months that the United States does not intend to attack North Korea and is pursuing a diplomatic solution to the standoff. More recently, though, the administration has emphasized that it has not ruled out any military options in dealing with the North.
Because it would probably mean a war on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has more than 8,000 artillery pieces, some possibly armed with chemical or biological weapons, along its 150-mile border with South Korea. A counterattack by the North would devastate Seoul and put the U.S. soldiers stationed there at risk, as well as threaten Japan, another key U.S. ally in the region.
The Bush administration argues that North Korea and Iraq are distinct issues that call for different approaches. First, the United States doesn't want to fight a war with North Korea. Second, U.S. officials have pointed out that the North has not launched an invasion since the 1950-53 Korean War and has never used weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, they say, Saddam Hussein is a uniquely aggressive tyrant who attacked Iran in 1980 and invaded Kuwait a decade later in a bid for regional dominance. He has used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and, reportedly, against opposition Kurds in northern Iraq.
Another consideration: Some experts say the Bush administration hasn't been tougher on North Korea because its priority is disarming Iraq and it doesn't want to fight two wars at once.
Click here for background on the North Korea crisis.
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