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| Author: | Esther Pan |
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February 7, 2005
The most difficult issues, including the right of return and settlements, were deliberately excluded from the Oslo Accords and left to be addressed in so-called permanent status talks. Still, the accords made several breakthroughs. Then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), agreed to the creation of the Palestinian Authority as an interim self-government in the Gaza Strip and portions of the West Bank. Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist, renounced its goal of the destruction of the state of Israel, and foreswore armed attacks.
President Bill Clinton called a summit at Camp David in July 2000 to jump-start negotiations between Arafat and then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The Palestinian side insisted on the principle of the right of return for all Palestinian refugees; details of their return would be negotiated. Israel refused. Barak offered the Palestinians 92 percent of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip, and a land swap in exchange for Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinians refused, claiming Israel wanted to swap unusable areas in the Negev Desert for the West Bank’s most fertile land, and pushed instead for a one-for-one swap to get up to 100 percent of West Bank territory. Israel offered to concede three of the four quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem. The Palestinians demanded full sovereignty over the Temple Mount, which for Jews would have meant risking access to some of their holiest sites. Israel refused. (The Temple Mount, or Al Haram al-Sharif, is sacred to both Judaism and Islam. The compound’s summit includes the Dome of the Rock, an Islamic shrine, and the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of Islam’s most revered houses of worship. The site is also the historical location of the Temple of Solomon, and part of its outer wall—known as the Western Wall or Wailing Wall—remains. Access to the Temple Mount has always been a contentious point in negotiations between Israel and Palestine.) The Camp David meeting concluded without agreement, but both sides agreed to continue the negotiating process. However, in September 2000 the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising, began, derailing the talks.
In late December 2000, Clinton mounted a last-ditch effort to make peace before he left office. Known as the Clinton Parameters, the plan offered proposals for dealing with the most protracted problems: settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees.
The plan offered the Palestinians:
The plan offered Israelis:
Both sides tentatively accepted the deal with reservations; some experts say Arafat later added so many conditions that the agreement fell apart. Clinton left office, and talks continued in January at an Egyptian resort.
At the Egyptian resort of Taba in early 2001, Israel proposed keeping 6 percent of West Bank land; the Palestinians offered 3.1 percent. Disputes at the Taba talks continued over refugees, land swaps, and sovereignty over the Temple Mount. The two sides were unable to reach agreement.
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia proposed a Saudi peace initiative in March 2002 that formally changed the Arab world’s position on Israel. The proposal, endorsed by the Arab League, asked Israel to withdraw to the 1949 borders and establish an independent and sovereign state of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital. It stipulated that displaced refugees should either be allowed to return to their homes or be compensated for their loss of property. In return, the Arab states would consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over, sign comprehensive peace treaties with Israel, and normalize relations. The proposal was received with skepticism by Israel and had little practical effect.
In June 2002, Bush became the first U.S. president to call explicitly for an independent Palestinian state existing in peace next to an Israeli state.
In April 2003, the Bush administration publicly committed itself to the road map, calling it “a framework for progress towards lasting peace and security in the Middle East.”
The road map, as developed by the quartet, proposed three phases to a final settlement:
In addition to official plans proposed by governments, there have been recent non-governmental initiatives proposed by private parties. The two that have received the most public attention:
Negotiated by Ami Ayalon, former director of Israel’s security services, and Sari Nusseibeh, the Palestinian president of Al Quds University, the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Principleshas attracted 100,000 Israeli and 70,000 Palestinian signatures in support of its ideas, according to its advocates. The proposal:
The Geneva Accord built on the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Principles and was developed by former Israeli and Palestinian diplomats, officials, and security experts who had participated in past official negotiations. The accord was an attempt to gain public support and thereby pressure political leaders to seek a negotiated peace. Some observers consider the document significant because it offers detailed ways—agreed to by both sides, albeit unofficially—to resolve the most contentious issues.
Some of its points:
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