Introduction

The United States adopted targeted killing as an essential tactic to pursue those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency have employed the controversial practice with more frequency in recent years, both as part of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Since assuming office in 2009, Barack Obama's administration has escalated targeted killings, primarily through an increase in unmanned drone strikes on al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership, but also through an expansion of U.S. Special Operations kill/capture missions. The successful killing of Osama bin Laden in a U.S. Navy SEAL raid in May 2011 and the September 2011 drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Yemeni cleric and AQAP propagandist, are prime examples of this trend. The White House points to these outcomes as victories, but critics continue to condemn the lethal tactic on moral, legal, and political grounds.

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Despite the opposition, most experts expect the United States to expand targeted killings in the coming years as military technology improves and the public appetite for large-scale, conventional armed intervention erodes. The Defense Department's 2013 budget request highlighted the potential for such a transition with its plans to move away from troop-intensive counterinsurgency operations, toward a leaner, more agile fighting force that operates with a smaller footprint.

In early 2012, U.S. drone policy seems to be shifting gears. The number of strikes in Pakistan, where relations with Washington have suffered in recent months, has reportedly fallen to historic lows in the first quarter. However, strikes in Yemen, home to AQAP, are on the rise and likely to accelerate.

What are targeted killings?

According to a UN special report on the subject, targeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody. "Targeted killing" is not a term distinctly defined under international law, but gained currency in 2000 after Israel made public a policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the Palestinian territories. The particular act of lethal force, usually undertaken by a nation's intelligence or armed services, can vary widely--from cruise missiles to drone strikes to special operations raids. The primary thrust of U.S. targeted killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S. operations are continuing to expand in Horn of Africa countries such as Somalia and Yemen.

What are the legal considerations surrounding U.S. targeted killings?

The Bush and Obama administrations have sought to justify targeted killings under both domestic and international law. The domestic legal underpinning for U.S. counterterrorism operations and the targeted killing of members of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its affiliates across the globe is the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which the U.S. Congress passed just days after 9/11. The statute, which lawmakers reaffirmed most recently in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, empowers the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force" in pursuit of those responsible for the terrorist attacks. Peacetime assassinations, which are sometimes conflated with targeted killings, have been officially banned by the United States since 1976.

The Obama administration asserts the United States remains in a state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces, and has laid out its justification for targeted killings over several major policy speeches. These include those given by Harold Koh, legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State, in 2010; White House chief counterterrorism adviser John Brennan in 2011; Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson in 2012; Attorney General Eric Holder in 2012, and Mr. Brennan, once more, in 2012.

The White House maintains that the U.S. right of self-defense, as enumerated in Article 51 of the UN charter, may include the targeted killing of persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks, both in and out of declared theaters of war. The administration's posture includes the prerogative to unilaterally pursue targets in states without their prior consent if that country is unwilling or unable to deal effectively with the threat. The Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is demonstrative of the administration's policy, which some have condemned as a violation of national sovereignty.

In his February 2012 remarks, DOD General Counsel Johnson said the AUMF remains the "bedrock" of the military's domestic legal authority, adding that it only covers the use of force against al-Qaeda and "associated forces," and not all terrorists. Notably, Johnson reaffirmed the administration's prerogative to kill targets "without a geographic limitation," including "belligerents who also happen to be U.S. citizens."

Speaking at Northwestern University in March 2012, Attorney General Holder elaborated on the targeting of U.S. citizens abroad (i.e., Anwar al-Awlaki), stating that such individuals may be killed by U.S. forces, but are still protected under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause--albeit a consideration that "takes into account the realities of combat." Holder added that it would be lawful to target a U.S. citizen if the individual poses an imminent threat, capture is not feasible, and the operation would be executed in observance of applicable laws of war.

In yet another major policy speech one month later, White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan specifically addressed the standards by which the administration authorizes lethal strikes on al-Qaeda outside Afghanistan. Steps in the process include: deciding if the target is a significant threat to U.S. interests; being cognizant of state sovereignty issues; having high confidence in the target's identity and that innocent civilians will not be harmed; and, finally, engaging in additional review if the individual is a U.S. citizen.

CFR's Matthew C. Waxman says the ongoing challenge for the Obama administration has been to balance several opposing imperatives (CNN): asserting broad war powers while assuring critics that they are limited; justifying actions that remain covert; and promoting government transparency while protecting sensitive intelligence programs.

Philip Alston, the former UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, condemns the U.S. claims of self-defense as overly expansive, stating that "if other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos." Waxman says that while the strike on bin Laden would normally be a violation of state sovereignty, the U.S. government "is well within its rights" to use force on foreign soil without consent if there is an overriding necessity of self-defense.

CFR national security expert John B. Bellinger says the law is in need of a significant update. "The 2001 AUMF is ten years old now and getting a little long in the tooth--still tied to the use of force against the people who planned, committed, and or aided those involved in 9/11," he says. "The farther we get from [targeting] al-Qaeda [e.g., al-Shabaab in Somalia], the harder it is to squeeze [those operations] into the AUMF."

What methods of targeted killing does the United States employ?

Drone Strikes

Targeted attacks launched from unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have ballooned under the Obama administration. A study undertaken by the New American Foundation reports that in his first two years of office, President Obama authorized nearly four times the number of strikes in Pakistan as President Bush did in his eight years. The report, which relies solely on media accounts of attacks, claims that some 295 strikes have been launched since 2009, killing somewhere between 1,489 and 2,297 militants (as of April 2012). While alternate reports (BIJ) also document the escalation in drone strikes in recent years, the accounting of militant and civilian deaths can vary widely depending on the source.

Traditionally the CIA has managed the bulk of U.S. drone operations outside recognized war zones, such as in Pakistan, while the Defense Department (DOD) has commanded operations in established theaters of conflict, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. But in some instances, the drone operations of both the CIA and DOD are integrated, as in the covert drone campaign in Yemen (WSJ), where the United States is marshalling counterterrorism forces in the wake of recent political unrest.

Kill/Capture Missions

Since President Obama assumed office, the Pentagon has also increased the use of special operations raids (aka kill/capture missions) from 675 covert raids (ArmyTimes) in 2009 to 1,879 through August 2011. According to the Pentagon, approximately 84 to 86 percent of these night raids end without violence (NationalJournal). NATO officials report that the target is successfully killed or captured (WashPost) 50 to 60 percent of the time. As conventional U.S. forces begin to drawdown, "the role of counterterrorism operations, and in particular these kinds of special missions, will become prominent," says ISAF commander General John Allen.

The covert raids are directed by an elite element within the U.S. military known as Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The clandestine command draws top personnel from groups like the Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force and maintains a direct relationship with the executive branch. JSOC has tripled in size since 9/11 and currently operates in a dozen countries. Jeremy Scahill of The Nation writes, "The primacy of JSOC within the Obama administration's foreign policy--from Yemen and Somalia to Afghanistan and Pakistan--indicates that he has doubled down on the Bush-era policy of targeted assassination as a staple of U.S. foreign policy."

What are the political implications of U.S. targeted killing?

A prominent criticism of U.S. targeted killings, and of drone strikes in particular, is over the issue of collateral civilian deaths. Some official Pakistani sources claim that seven hundred innocents were killed in 2009 alone, while U.S. government sources claim that fewer than thirty civilians were killed from May 2008 to May 2010. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Peter Bergen says the more salient question is, "What impact has the drone program had on the insurgency in Pakistan and, by extension, that in Afghanistan?" Violence in Pakistan has risen sharply since the drone campaign began, according to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, however Bergen adds that "a number of factors could have contributed to these increases."

In January 2012, President Obama, acknowledging the covert drone attacks (AFP) in Pakistan for the first time, argued that they had "not caused a huge number of civilian casualties" and that "this thing is kept on a very tight leash."

But some observers argue targeted killings are a bane to U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistani journalist Pir Zubair Shah writes that anti-Americanism in Pakistan (ForeignPolicy) is fueled by the domestic media's portrayal of the U.S. drone campaign as a "scourge targeting innocent civilians." This is a narrative that will persist, he says, "until the United States and Pakistan come clean about the program."

In November 2011, the Wall Street Journal reported the CIA had made several "secret concessions" in its drone program after U.S. diplomats suggested strikes targeting large groups of militants were harming relations with Islamabad. Changes in U.S. drone policy included providing the State Department greater influence in targeting decisions, giving Pakistani leaders forewarning about certain strikes, and suspending drone operations when Pakistani officials visit the United States. In addition, some experts suggest the CIA imposed a moratorium on drone operations in Pakistan from November 2011 to January 2012--the longest pause since the program was ramped up in July 2008--against a backdrop of deteriorating bilateral relations (LWJ). In April 2012, the Pakistani parliament voted unanimously in demanding an end to U.S drone strikes on its territory. The frequency of strikes in the first quarter of 2012 indicates Washington may be winding down the drone campaign in Pakistan (Reuters), with some U.S. officials framing the decline as a sign of the program's success.

Civilians and local governments also condemn night raids as culturally offensive, given that U.S. soldiers enter homes in the dead of night, with women present, and utilize dogs (which are viewed as impure) in their search. Afghan President Hamid Karzai (WashPost) has called for a reduction in these covert missions and demanded that local soldiers take over the role.

Proponents of targeted killings say the civilian death toll is exaggerated for political purposes and claim drone strikes and night raids remain the most effective and discreet tactics in pursuing militant leaders and their networks, especially as the United States begins to seek a smaller military footprint in the region.

Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution says that targeting top terrorists like bin Laden removes charismatic and pragmatic leaders who are difficult to replace. In addition, by targeting an organization's lieutenants, "it is possible to exhaust the terrorist group's bench." CFR's Micah Zenko says that while drone strikes are an effective military tactic, "military victory is not tantamount to political success." He says that while a policy of leadership decapitation can reduce "a group's capacity, it neither ruptures group cohesion nor ideological commitment."

What is the future of targeted killings?

Blowback from civil liberties and human rights groups is likely to grow in direct proportion to any increase in targeted killings. Organizations such as the ACLU and Human Rights Watch have raised pointed questions regarding the perceived lack of accountability and transparency. Others question if the United States is setting a negative precedent that will be invoked by other nations acquiring similar technology, such as China and Russia. As an indication of things to come, security analysts project worldwide spending on drone aircraft (UPI) to roughly double over the next decade to $11.4 billion.

CFR's Bellinger expects targeted killings to become much more politically provocative given the Obama administration's current posture, and asks if drones will "become Obama's Guantanamo?"

Nevertheless, analysts point to several factors indicating that an expansion of U.S. targeted killings in the near term is likely. Drone strikes and special operations raids put fewer Americans in harm's way and provide a low-cost alternative to expensive and cumbersome conventional forces. This alternative is further enhanced given future cuts in the defense budget and a waning public appetite for long, expensive wars.

The rise of the so-called "non-state actor," operating in loose transnational networks, as the principal threat to U.S. national security also lends itself to an expansion of U.S. targeted killings, some experts say. In January 2012, the Pentagon released a fundamental strategy review that outlines defense priorities "in light of the changing geopolitical environment and our changing fiscal circumstances." The new guidance stresses the persistent threat of al-Qaeda and affiliates in South Asia and the Middle East, and commits the military to actively pursuing these threats and "directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary."

In April, the CIA requested broader targeting powers for its drone campaign in Yemen (WashPost), particulary the ability to execute strikes based on suspicious, "signature" patterns of behavior. This has been an essential element of the U.S. program in Pakistan. Experts say the new authority, if granted by President Obama, would be a significant shift in U.S. policy in Yemen, where the CIA is currently only allowed to employ "personality" strikes on specifically identified targets.

Other experts say technological advances, including precision-guided munitions and enhanced surveillance, have given the United States a greater ability to target these particular individuals while reducing collateral damage. In July 2011, Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, provided a portent of things to come: "Going forward, we will be mindful that if our nation is threatened, our best offense won't always be deploying large armies abroad but delivering targeted, surgical pressure to the groups that threaten us."