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[Note: A transcript of this meeting is unavailable. The discussion is summarized below.]

Presider: Scott Lasensky, Council on Foreign Relations

Project Director: Henry Siegman, Council on Foreign Relations

Origins of the Current Intifada

The Palestinian “Intifada” that began in September 2000 should be viewed as a “social convulsion,” a grassroots phenomenon not unlike the first Intifada of the late 1980’s or the Palestinian violence in 1947-48. But unlike the earlier Intifada, the Palestinian leadership has been unable to exert control and direct events.

A principal cause of this convulsion is that the Oslo process led to great “quality of life” discrepancies. For Palestinians, the 1990’s brought more Israeli settlements, harsh Israeli-imposed restrictions on travel and work, and a more than 20 percent drop in living standards. During the same period, Israeli living standards rose nearly twenty-five percent.

As violence has continued to worsen over the past two years, leadership structures within the nationalist mainstream—such as the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—and within the extremist Islamic groups have disintegrated. There is a growing disconnect between the leadership and “the street” – one reason why recent intra-Palestinian talks to reach a cease-fire are unlikely to succeed. Even though accommodation remains unlikely, do not expect a decisive PA crackdown on Palestinian radicals. There is little chance of confrontation between Palestinian factions – solidarity remains high and there is a strong sense of collective memory of intra-Palestinian fighting in 1948.

Despite a growing sense of fatigue and desperation among the Palestinian public, the Intifada still has “a long way to go.” However, in its present form it is “stuck” and “leaderless”; the violence of the Intifada has left Palestinians “stranded.”

Support for Hamas

Islamic radicalism has cultural and social underpinnings -- which is how to understand the rise of radical Palestinian Islamic groups. The present Intifada has brought with it a culture of “austerity” – which feeds into suicide bombings. Hamas has been able to make a virtue out of the austerity (even though Palestinians are not an austere people). This phenomenon of austerity can be seen in every facet of life. For example, even weddings (a traditional source of pride for Palestinian families, and typically ostentatious) are much more austere. Hamas has organized and sponsored many recent weddings, often marrying 10 or 12 couples at a time – these events are serious and somber.

Palestinian public opinion polls show a surge in support for Hamas. In the past, support was never more than 10-15 percent. But it now stands at about 30 percent. This increase has come at the expense of Arafat’s Fatah organization. A growing number of Palestinians are losing trust in Arafat and view him as presiding atop a corrupt structure. But Hamas (and, to a lesser extent, Islamic Jihad) are not able to translate their new support into political power because of political fragmentation.

Political Fragmentation and the case of the Al Aqsa Brigade

The current Intifada has caused political fragmentation throughout Palestinian society, especially within the extremist groups. This fragmentation has helped perpetuate the cycle of violence because decisions are being made at the local level, without consulting the leadership. Control is slipping fast, both within Arafat’s camp—the PLO, Fatah, and the PA—and among the extremist Islamic groups.

This is partly due to the effectiveness of Israeli military operations --- especially Israel’s policy of targeted killings, which has led to an increasing number of leaderless Palestinian factions. Israel’s re-occupation of most of the West Bank and its iron grip on Palestinian towns and cities contributes to rising atomization, creating an “enclave” environment.

The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a wing of the Fatah-affiliated Tanzim organization, is a localized phenomenon, not an organization in the traditional sense. A small group in Jenin may act independently from the Fatah or Tanzim leadership and groups of 30 or fewer people will operate locally with little or no control from above.

Why did Arafat reject the Clinton Plan?

The Clinton Plan remains the most promising initiative on the table. Arafat rejected the plan because he thought it could be improved through further negotiations – not because he rejected the idea of a negotiated settlement. Once the Intifada broke out, Arafat believed the violence could be used to put pressure on Israelis. This was his crucial mistake. Arafat thought Israelis lacked solidarity, when in fact the violence has united most Israelis and created a “bunker mentality.”

Looking Ahead

Political fragmentation and a devastated economy have created an atmosphere with little hope. Arafat may appear to be the captain of the ship, but he is certainly not at the helm. At least in the short term, militant groups will continue to act independently, conducting suicide bombings and other attacks, and thereby thwarting negotiations. The Israeli iron-fisted policy produces pessimism in the “short-term;” however, there is a glimmer of hope in the “middle-term,” with the prospect of the return of settlements.