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THE UN Security Council's agreement last week to let the secretary general administer the UN's ''oil for food'' program in Iraq is only one piece of a larger puzzle of great strategic significance to the United States: the role of the UN in postwar Iraq. Much of that puzzle is being assembled now, and the final shape will have immense implications for the future of Iraq, the relevance of the United Nations, and America's relations with the world. The White House and Pentagon reportedly seek to curtail UN involvement in political and security issues in post-conflict Iraq. Our British allies, joined by Australia, are promoting a more prominent role for the world body. The issue is now turning on at least two key questions: How should the UN endorse or participate in the governance of Iraq until self-rule is fully restored? And what role should UN agencies play in relief and reconstruction in Iraq?
American officials face a dilemma: To the degree the UN is seriously involved, Washington's freedom of action in fulfilling the responsibility we have undertaken for Iraq's future will be constrained. On the other hand, meaningful UN participation is important to our friends and allies and would enhance the international legitimacy of the post-conflict American presence. It would also strengthen the position of those Iraqis with whom we will work in the postwar period, increase the chances that Iraq's neighbors will play a constructive post-conflict role, and lighten the load for the United States, given the experience and resources that UN agencies bring to bear.
Is it worth giving up some direct control in return for sharing the burden of international assistance to postwar Iraq? The practical answer has to be yes.
The most challenging issue may be the role of the UN in governance. President Chirac has declared that France will not accept a UN resolution that gives the United States and Britain ''the powers to administer Iraq.'' Yet it is by no means clear that the UN would want that job. UN officials resisted efforts to put the UN in charge in Afghanistan, recognizing that such responsibility would go far beyond the capabilities of the institution. In Iraq, the task could be even more daunting. At the same time, the Bush administration will be unable to count on international support if the president's commitment to work in close partnership with the United Nations means nothing more than permitting UN agencies in Iraq to deliver humanitarian assistance.
The experience in Afghanistan provides a way out of this dilemma. There, the UN played a key role in re-establishing institutions of Afghan governance, initially by bringing together major Afghan political figures in a Bonn conference to determine the future of the country. The resulting agreement, strongly supported by the United States and endorsed by the Security Council, established an Afghan interim authority and outlined the process leading to a fully representative government. Although subsequent progress in Afghanistan has been uneven, UN involvement has ensured international acceptance of the transition process.
United Nations participation in the political process of post-conflict Iraq will make it easier for the UN to assume an essential leadership role on humanitarian issues. The stakes are high. Even before the war, some one million Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition, and the country has one of the highest child mortality rates in the world. It is not only our geopolitical interests in the region, but the lives of these children and other Iraqis that will be affected by Washington decisions about burden-sharing after the war.
Retired General Jay Garner, who heads up US rebuilding efforts in Iraq, suggested his support for significant UN involvement when he told UN officials that he wanted to work himself out of a job as soon as possible. Garner's words must be backed by US resources, and the first test of our commitment is likely to be our willingness to respond generously to the UN's six-month appeal for $2.2 billion in humanitarian aid. The Congress should double the president's recent request for $543 million in relief to Iraq and insist that a large proportion go through UN agencies that have proven effective in dealing with crises of this kind.
In the end, our debate on the role of the UN in postwar governance and humanitarian relief should turn not only on our humanitarian obligations to the Iraqi people, but also on our own national interests in sharing the cost -- economic, political and security -- of the extraordinary responsibilities we are assuming.
Anthony Lake is a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and former National Security Adviser to President Clinton. Eric P. Schwartz is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and directs the Council-sponsored Independent Task Force on Post-conflict Iraq.




