Historical precedent shows that fears of Romney following a popularly dictated foreign policy are unjustified; as president, Romney would have leeway in fashioning popular opinion, especially on war policy, writes Robert W. Merry in The National Interest.
Paul Pillar's regular contributions to this web site constitute an invaluable gift to all regular readers, as well as to anyone who values smart, incisive, provocative commentary, particularly when it arrives in a steady stream of thinking that bounces off the headlines on a consistent basis. Last week, Pillar issued a warning against a populist approach to presidential decision making in foreign policy—basing decisions on popular sentiment rather than a prudent view of national interest—and suggested that GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney appeared to be the kind of man who would succumb to that particular danger. Pillar may be right. In the spirit of the kind of discourse we wish to foster at The National Interest, however, I should like to elaborate on Pillar's analysis a bit and offer a somewhat different perspective.
Pillar views Romney—quite accurately, based on the record—as a man habitually fixated on pleasing whatever audience is before him at any given time. From this he adduces that the former Massachusetts governor would govern as president in ways designed to ensure a second term. He explains:
So the choice will be between a foreign policy that is shaped overwhelmingly by whatever is seen to be politically advantageous and a foreign policy that is shaped by a less politically minded sense of what is in the U.S. interests. A populist response would be to go with the first alternative, out of a belief in democratic principles and in the idea that, in foreign as well as domestic policy, the people ought to determine what is in their own interests.
The problem here, Pillar suggests, is that most people seldom know what is in their best interests, and hence they can be manipulated by leaders absorbed with visions of national or personal glory. That may sound elitist, he concedes, and "it would be poison for any politician to utter it openly." But the truth of it is demonstrated by a host of faulty and even tragic presidential decisions related to the presidential war power. And Pillar concludes: "During the next presidential term, a foreign policy that responds largely to popular impulses is more likely to result in misdirection than in accomplishment." He sees Romney as a man likely to respond to, or even stir, those popular impulses.