Share

--

--

Q: (In Progress)…So he's someone who brings a wealth of both political and scholarly experience to our discussion. We're going to proceed in the following format. For the next 20, 25 minutes or so I will pose a series of questions to Dr. Amato to get the ball rolling, and then around 6:25, 6:30, we'll open it up for a general discussion. And I think Giuliano is very much interested in what you have to say.

GA: More in what you have to say than in what I have to say. (Laughter)

Q: As you can see, let's keep this informal and have much more of a town meeting than a one way conversation. Let me begin with the following question, Giuliano. Some people see this convention as something that in historical terms could be compared to the Constitutional Convention here in the United States or to other watershed events in the history of polities. I'd like to ask you whether you think 10, 15, 20 years from now, historians, journalists, politicians will look back at this period not just the convention, but the convention intergovernmental conference that's coming up in a couple of years, as a real watershed, as a turning point. So I'm less interested in what pieces of paper you think will come out of this and more of your gut feeling as to whether we are really entering the turning point for Europe.

GA: Yeah, I will say yeah. (Clears Throat) You are right. At the moment this idea that our convention will remain, let's say, comparable with the Philadelphia Convention is spreading around. At the moment, let's say the only benefit out of it is really private for me, because I'm receiving books on James Madison, the records of the convention, which are quite difficult to find around. So my private library is being (Inaudible).

But for the future, I think that if this is happening, it is because a turning point is needed. It is needed. It's a sort of cross road now for Europe. On the one side the, let's say, increasing difficulties of the existing European setting in, let's say, performing what it is necessarily to perform in relation to the original missions of the community…enlargements, the machinery which is more and more cumbersome, the increasing demand for more transparency and more democracy that is coming everywhere to vis-à-vis national governments, vis-à-vis Europe, vis-à-vis whatever sort of public institutions we have, on the one side.

On the other side, the new missions that Europe has to face for the future. The fact that, let's say, from the inward looking Europe of the previous decade is entirely devoted to the building up of an integrated domestic market to a Europe that has got to play a role in the world. Not just because Europe has to, let's say, exercise unilateral influences around, but for the simple reasons that Europeans perceive that many of their anxieties, of their uncertainties are due to external factors, to a world where borders are not so greeted as they were in the past. With a consequence that in order to have an impact on the roles of these anxieties, they understand that Europe has to play a role also upon the outside world.

Now this is really a turning point. Now will we catch up with the expectation? Will we succeed in, let's say, somehow eliminating the clear mismatch nowadays existing between these demands and the architecture, the institutional architecture that we have been building up to now. This is an open question mark. But I can tell you that inside the convention as far as I understand from the first meetings and from what people say, there is the sense of this badly changed and somehow not marginal, not limited change that we need.

Q: Let me pick up on the question of Europe's place in the world. The question of projection of Europe's voice on the global stage. If you look at how European politicians have legitimated the EU over the last 50 years, it was primarily about escaping the past, getting rid of national boundaries, getting rid of war. If you look at speeches of European leaders over the past one or two years, you see a very significant change. It's about the future, it's about projecting European power and importantly, it's about creating a counter weight to the United States. It used to be just the French who were saying that. Now Schroeder is saying it, Fisher is saying it, Blair is saying it, Prodi is saying it. So my question is…is that rhetoric actually going to turn into an anti-American impulse? An impulse that could significantly distance Europe from the United States?

GA: Well, the problem exists…it's undeniable…with, let's say, some caveat. The first caveat that I keep repeating and repeating…France is not Europe. What is being said in Paris is not the voice of Europe. It's the voice of a country that more than other European countries, for historical reasons perhaps, perceives her own goal as somehow alternative to.

Around Europe, and this is something that has to be said, there is a…how could I call it? A Leftist nostalgia, that having lost a previous ideological visions that could allow this part of the Left to feel somehow opposed to the States now is thinking of Europe as the remaining…as a sort of pillar upon which to build a Europe that is somehow versus the US. But having said so, I must be frank. I don't think that this is the mainstream of the European perception of the European vis-à-vis the US.

I would say it really honestly, saying what I think, and I think is mostly accepted in Europe that we don't think that it's healthy for the world, and not even for the US, this lonely super power role that the US is playing now. That for several reasons having Europe as a player might smooth several relations that we have with other parts of the world and may also make the role of the US easier in being the world, because it is undeniable that the lonely super power generates hostility because it happens to be in that position.

While a partnership with different ideas but not opposing ideas could be useful, let's say, as I said for the world and for the US. Most of us aim at this kind of European role. And, happily, we are very far from this kind of partnership. What happens in the Middle East…but here I would leave the floor to him…is a reason for…Let us speak of other things now, because otherwise our debate will go to the Middle East and there it will…

Q: No, I'm sure we'll get there before too long. Let me take you back to the question of the convention and institutional reform. And, again, in some ways bounce off American history what Europe is going through. The question is the following. A lot of analysts see enlargement as something that will trip up the EU, it will make the EU too big, unwieldy, expensive, divided. Let me offer an alternative argument, and that is that in the same way that America resolved its internal structure because of enlargement—it caused our North/South to go to war—enlargement is also going to force the EU to address tough questions about its future, and in particular it'll force Italy, Germany, France to deepen because they have no choice. Do you see enlargement as the triggering event that will in some ways create some sort of final vision of an institutional structure?

GA: Well, I must say that we…you're right in this final point. Because we wouldn't have the convention and we wouldn't have these really fuel injected institutional reform without the nightmare of an enlarged Europe with the existing institutional setting. That's the point. I use the word “nightmare” not for enlargement as such. I want to be clear and not to be misunderstood, because I personally think that enlargement is something that…I mean, it has to happen. I'm one of those who have always spoken of return to Europe of countries that were stolen of their European identity by the Communist regimes of the World War II aftermath.

And therefore it would be beyond credibility that we now say to these fellow Europeans now you have the Communists regimes and you're not European anymore. This would be a sort of double punishment for something they have no fault for. And therefore this is the sense for me of enlargement. Obviously the machinery is already in great difficulty with 15 members. That's the point, that's the point. Because these kinds of institutions were originally envisaged for a six-member community. And therefore, let's say, unanimity, the difference itself between intergovernmental and communitarian was almost irrelevant in the first years of the community with six members around the table.

Already now it is so cumbersome for us to reach agreements among the 15 existing members. Therefore we would be paralyzed when we reach the 20, 25, 27 member size that we intend to reach in a few years. Therefore the enlargement gives us the opportunity to do what? On the one side, to restore national and even regional responsibilities where they are needed after 40-50 years of harmonization. Because somebody says “Well, but, 50 years of harmonizations for you exist in member states.” But these guys are entering now, they are not harmonized at all. Not at all.

They are already from this viewpoint even more harmonized than we were, because the requirements for them went far beyond the requirements that we had to comply with at the beginning. Our key communitaire(?) had to be absorbed into their legal system. And you know how many pages it is, the key communitaires? Eighty thousand pages, the key communitaire. If you put French and German bureaucrats together, they can do even more than the Italians. I can assure you.

So there is room for more diversity now in areas where integration has always been accomplished. And there is the need for unification in areas where if it has to be Europe, it has to be Europe, and not 20, 25, 27 voices talking one…speaking one after the other. So I'm confident one say “Okay, the economy”…he's a master. I know that American economists are better than European ones. I learned this from Kolasky(?), from Priest(?) and others. And I respect their viewpoint. Portugal and Greece, the gap between their economies and ours was wide. I understand that these two are wide gaps. But only medicine I can think of is integration. And it has been working up to now if we work closer for the future. And we have already integrated, because Romania is one of the countries that (Inaudible) front runner. But part of the Italian economy is already there.

Q: Let me pick up on the economic theme. One of the most difficult changes ahead in terms of economic growth is labor mobility and getting Italians to move north and northerners to move south. And right now what we're seeing is potentially things moving in the opposite direction, in no small part because of the Middle East. In your country, this government, there's been a sort of anti-immigrant overtone, synagogues are being burned in France. There is a concern that the openness of borders needed to make the EU market work could come at the expense of domestic security. Is this something that you see as being on the agenda?

GA: No. There are different concerns for…on the one side for, let's say, what we still call immigration from Central and Eastern European countries after their entrance into the union and immigration from outside the union. Now, as for the first one, I must say there are different positions in different countries. It is well known that Germany is somehow concerned because of the Polish migrants that might look for a job in Germany. Schroeder frequently says it's not my fault, but the further process of legalization and privatization in Poland might lead to further unemployment there. And Germany is so close. And that's why Germany asked for a transitional seven years close of limitation of the freedom of movement in analogy with what was done with Portugal and Greece. It wasn't used at the time. At the time, it has to be on the line. There was a similar concern for a flood of Portuguese and Greek workers going north. There was no flood at all. After the process of integration gave its fruits, they found the jobs mostly in their countries.

We Italian have, let's say, Slovenia. Our Poland is Slovenia geographically. And all we want, but not a similar clause, because the economy of Slovenia is already totally integrated with the economy of our northeastern regions. And in fact the final agreement I'm sure will be that this clause will be there, but will be somehow bilaterally handled between neighbors. It won't be a general rule. As for the immigration from outside, I worked on these. I also did research on this. And no elements to conclude that we will be really flooded by external immigration. It's something that we can manage. The only real problem that I can see is North Africa, because there is a still high rate of growth in Egypt, the Maghreb, Libya. And it's impossible for these countries to produce jobs corresponding to the new entrants in their labor markets. So they will come up. And we should handle this thing better than some other countries are doing now. But I don't like criticizing governments on these occasions.

Q: Let me ask one final question and then we'll open it up to the audience. Give us your thoughts on EU relations with Russia and in particular whether you think that there is an opportunity here in the aftermath of September 11 Putin's clear desire to move Russia westward and attach it to Europe for some sort of significant change; whether it be institutionalized or less formal. But a way of pulling Russia and attaching it in a permanent way to the EU.

GA: The change after September 11th has been really remarkable because these three guys, the U.S., the Russians, the Chinese meeting in China, allied to each other, is something that the world has never seen before. And as one of the consequences of a very tragic event, it was not negative in itself because it created some sort of common understanding on the threat of terrorism in the world. And I must say that somehow this was a victory for Putin because I remember when I first met him—the visit to Italy was the first one that he paid to a European country after he was elected President—and we had a long, long talk in Rome. And I still remember him with great passion underling the fact that we were not entirely aware of this terrorist chain. Of course he wanted to plead his case for Chechnya. And this is quite obvious. This does not mean that he was lying and that he did not have a realistic vision of a terrorist chain that could reach our country and perhaps had already reached our country easily.

And this was a world problem and that we should find sort of alliance in this problem. It took September 11th to realize that this was badly needed. Putin, I don't think he would be happy to join Europe at the moment. Nor would be Europe at the moment of a Russian membership. If you ask Europeans why, the immediate reply is almost childish. They are too big. (Laughter) Perceiving by instinct and on balance, because it would be sort of a second Europe at that point. I would think that this is going to be a long, long process. At the moment, it would make it easier for us to enlarge NATO. Don't forget that until last year, enlargement to NATO for neighboring to Russia was something that they immediately rejected. Now their position might be different. And you might start with NATO and of the change in NATO that now they perceive differently from what they did a year ago, and something in Europe would happen in the future.

I must say that I'm one of those who think that culturally Russia belongs to Europe. Of course their position is half Europe and half Asia, and this is geographic, I would way. But if they succeed in developing a real democratic system in that country, and they are not yet at that point, this will make them more European than Asian. I am convinced of it. And the fact that Europe was depicted in the seventeenth century as a lady whose head was in Portugal and with legs in Russia means something to me. (Some laughter) And it was like this for (Inaudible). But sooner or later. It's a process. It's not something for the next couple of years.

Q: The floor is open. Please state your name and affiliation and a brief question.

(Note: Audience is not miked well—difficult to hear)

Q: (Inaudible) from the Council. Do you see an intense concern for further integration into Europe of Muslim peoples because of the fear this will heighten domestic security problems in European countries?

GA: Obviously there will be attention, of course. I live in a country where we have a university in Perugia which is a university for foreigners where young students from other countries generally foreign to the European Union more than foreign to Italy come and learn European languages. Now, Perugia has been under the attention of our security for years already, and certainly attention is badly needed even more now. At the same time, we have now in my country a significant Muslim community, more than 600,000 people—many of them peacefully live and are getting integrated in Europe. Certainly what has happened as an input which I mean is something that concerns me because I know several Muslim families who are totally integrated in our country and in Europe. And they might pay a price for what is happening. So the distinction is absolutely necessary. We will have certainly more immigrants as I was saying from North Africa. Certainly so.

Q: You'll have them unless you restrict them.

GA: You know that there is a new statute in Italy which is being

passed now. It was approved by one of the two chambers and it has to come to the Senate, which limits quite rigidly entrants allowing only…this is something we had already, only to persons that already have a labor contract with an employer as somehow guarantor of their presence in the country with the possibility to throw them off (sic) when the contract is over. And this is something that I frankly consider against all of the beliefs of our time because we are preaching flexibility. We are telling people that our times are not times for long-term jobs but everybody has to get acquainted with short-term labor contracts, and you will find another job in the future. So we receive immigrants and we tell them that in this time as soon as their first labor contract expires, they can be expelled.

Q: (Inaudible) Part of our title for this evening is the constitutional convention itself.

GA: Yes, we are forgetting about it. (Laughter)

Q: I don't want to forget about it.

GA: It's a week of leave for me.

Q: I want to (Inaudible) a rather basic question. How are delegates selected? How do you work? Do you have committee structures? What is your time frame for a delivery of a document? Do you intend to have it approved in a European referendum or country by country? How was Chairman Giscard d'Estaing selected? I'd like to know something about how this whole system was…

GA: Yeah. I mean it's nice but you have too many hows. (Laughter) I don't know whether I can go through the entire list satisfying your curiosity. Don't ask me how Giscard was selected because I expected to be selected, and instead he was the guy. (Laughter) I understand that my former colleague in the European Council, Jacques Chirac, had reasons to prefer him mostly because otherwise Giscard would have been a candidate in the presidential campaign. So he let's say deprived Giscard of 3-4 percent, no more, but I couldn't do anything there. I could not campaign in France. But I'm happy with the choice. I can tell you I like him. He's really suited for the job. He looks like a president and that's more than I would do. And he was expected to be rigid. He looks very sort of an aristocratic old man. But he tends to be flexible. He relies on others' opinions, et cetera. So personally I am satisfied. After all, I like the job in the convention because I wanted to be involved in this matter. So I happen to be involved.

I remember the last press conference that I gave as Prime Minister at the end of the last European Council I attended, I was asked by journalists in what position will you still work in Europe, because they were aware of my interest for these matters. And my reply was “seated or rocking or on a sidewalk or in a railway station. Whatever. But I will keep working on Europe.” So being Vice President of that convention is much more than being in a railway (Inaudible) things on Europe.

With selection, the selection of the members. These will require a research by somebody country by country, how they were selected by national…as you know, there are several sources for the convention—national governments. Each of the national governments selected one member. National parliaments selected one for the majority and one for their position, plus the alternates. The Commission had two. The European Parliament has 16. Candidate countries are represented the same way as existing member states. How are they selected? I mean I really don't know. I can tell you that while—and this is interesting for the constitutional expectations that have been stilled by this event—in defiance of convention, the convention that could use last year(?) the Charter of Human Rights, which was (Inaudible) as a political document in Nice and that should be somehow inserted into the future Basel Treaty produced by the convention. At the time, national governments send experts, professors. The Italian government sent a professor. This time, there are highly regarded political figures at the convention. Italy after all sent the Vice President of the country, the ministers, the vice (Inaudible). And other countries, as well. Germany sent Glotz.(?) Glotz is not an active politician anymore, but is a widely respected intellectual and political leader of the country. The UK sent the Minister for Europe, Hayne, and France did the same thing with Moscorici. So a selection of really heavy political figures, which reflects the expectation that something substantial might be produced by the convention.

We have a deadline formally set by the Lochen(?) Declaration, which is our bible. It's where our mandate was established, and the Lochen Declaration says March the first at Eyr(?), so it's Eyr. Giscard, because he likes the job, but for other reasons thinks that it's too early. I think that's right. Whatever the reason, he's right because it's such a heavy assembly. I was telling Charley that to allow all of them to speak, we had to set a three-minute limit of the European Parliament and it takes roughly eight hours to have all of their interventions. So it takes time. In Philadelphia, there were only 55, and we have the full members, the alternates, the observers, et cetera, et cetera. So it might take a couple of more months. There is a political argument here that Giscard rightly has submitted to the Prime Ministers that he has met, we're going to have the British referendum per (Inaudible) on the Euro in the spring of next year. It is expected in the spring. Now, if you ask Tony Blair, he might say “Referendum? What referendum?” I'd say but we know that they have it in mind if they think they can win it, as we perfectly know.

Q: Let's ask more people. There's a long list.

GA: My final point. Now, what happens if the final recommendations of the convention are thrown into the campaign for the referendum, question mark. Now this is a politically relevant argument.

Q: This gentleman right here.

Q: (Inaudible), New York. Should we view this convention as a step in the direction as the ultimate one nation of the United States? And if that is (Inaudible), how does the Arab and other Islamic (Inaudible) what this evolution (Inaudible)

GA: I understand your point. I don't think that Europe will ever be a single entity as the U.S. I really don't think. I keep saying Bismarck once said after getting acquainted with the U.S. at the time, he said “I think that these Americans have a future. All of them speak the same language.” (Laughter) And it was more than a century ago. Now, I think we have a future, but we don't speak the same language, and this makes a difference. Which difference? That the attention to our diversities will remain as part of our European construction. We say and we will keep saying that the democratic legitimacy of Europe is based on two pillars.

They don't say the same thing in this country, even though the rights of the member states are so important. But there is no doubt that the federal powers are based in just one pillar, the American people, the American citizens as such. The legitimacy of our (Inaudible). Whereas I said about institutions is dual. One the one side, the European electorate, the European Parliament and the commission. On the other side, member states directly represented in the European structure much more than nowadays. Member states are directly represented here through the senate, quite obviously. So this dual legitimacy which reflects the sense of the enduring diversities that have to remain in Europe makes Europe a did kind of single entity.

Certain, for sure, Europe will have to have a single voice in foreign relations. The growth that Europe wants to play in the world is a goal that requires us to accept not to send all these Prime Ministers around. (Inaudible) difficult to understand when they overlap each other. We need just one. That's why I'm convinced that one of the proposals the convention has to make is to change article 18, which says that we have to coordinate each other when we are represented in supernational institutions. We have to delete these and to say at the U.N. there is the European seat. And also elsewhere I'm convinced IMF will then et cetera. We should also strengthen our position and play at that point a role with the U.S. having more or less the same weight. No, we will have even after heavier weight in the IMF and the World Bank if we merge our shares, et cetera.

Now, let me say this final thing. This in my view will be accepted and appreciated by our neighbors and by the Arab world because we can play a role vis-à-vis the Arab world if we have a single voice. Now we could play a role. We could. And it would be badly needed. But we don't. And part of the Middle East tragedy is also due to the fact that Europe is not succeeding really in having a role. It is unilateral and confused and confusing.

Q: (Inaudible) from the Washington Institution Near East Policy. This is my segue into the question that I would like to raise. It reminds me that the White House in the Reagan/Bush days, one of our goals was to keep Europe interfering with the Middle East…

GA: I know. We remember. (Laughter)

Q: And we succeeded.

GA: It was so easy to succeed with us at the time. (Laughter)

Q: The European proposal that was supposed to make a contribution to the peace process, but no one paid any attention to it. Now however it seems that the European Union has a greater impact because it has aligned itself with the moderate Arab states and it is pushing the United States to (Inaudible) with respect to what you might call the green light to Sharon and Israel. I would say that Europe is having a major impact, but is it a wise impact? I would suggest that we might think of (Inaudible) the coalition of terror as it developed that temporarily aligns Iran and Iraq with Lebanon, with Syria and with the Palestinian Authority in a way that might result in increased levels of terror and more (Inaudible) in the Middle East later.

GA: Yes. You know what I think because we had a few minutes before. You know that I don't entirely agree with you but I partially agree with you in the sense that I'm not satisfied with the European position the same way I'm not satisfied with the U.S. position. I find that it's a sort of tragedy that these two main actors in the international arena are biased on opposite positions while the correct position would be—Tony Blair would say the third way (Laughter) somehow in between—in the sense that I'm satisfied I must say with what the President said this morning, which is much more balanced than the messages that were coming from Washington in the last weeks. And these messages were go ahead, Sharon, because you are fighting the axis of evil. Which meant necessarily and blowing the entire matter up necessarily because this meant stirring up the terrorism that was there instead of fighting it. This is my opinion of this unilaterally pro-Sharon position.

At the same time, Europe, which has very good relations with the Arab world, with the Palestinians, was in the best position to be tough with Arafat and to tell him you enjoy the sympathy here of a great part of the European public opinion, you have to accept what we are telling you, that this kind of suicide bombing, et cetera, that these weapons coming from there is something that you should have noting to do with if you want to maintain our support. And you have been saying and saying and saying, but you haven't done enough. Now it's too late perhaps for him to do something, because I don't know how he can really control what is happening around him. And Europe should have said these things. I remember that when I was Prime Minister, I was really friends with Arafat. And therefore we should merge our two positions. That's why I keep saying that these two voices, which are different but can be merged, could have an enormous and positive impact on the world.

Q: Bill (Inaudible), retired diplomat. (Inaudible) Iraq, nuclear weapons (Inaudible), Palestine, Israel, (Inaudible) in Afghanistan, treaties from the Rights of the Child to the CPDP. This is a list getting longer and longer of complaints and differences between Europe and the United States. And I guess I'd like to know how serious is this list becoming, and when does the long list (Inaudible) affect the quality of change?

GA: What I think is that we are members of the same family, and it happens that in families there are different views but basically this is what I think. So I don't see for the future our relations falling apart because you go there and we go here. Of course, until a few years ago, we had a common enemy to fight, and any other issue was somehow secondary. We happen to quarrel about bananas nowadays, and 22 years ago we couldn't find even the time to give the world the satisfaction of seeding Europeans and American…

(SIDE B)

GA: This is quite obvious, I would say. And we are not used to dealing with divergences because of that reason. While it is normal, obvious, ordinary business that we don't share the same views entirely, my friend, despite the fact that he is a member of the current cabinet in Italy, Antonio Martino, whom we all know, he is a professor, a colleague of mine, an economist. I think he was born in Chicago as an economist, and even though he clearly looks like he's Sicilian. (Laughs) Anyway he says that when there were two (Inaudible) that exactly share the same ideas, one of the two ones is supposed (Inaudible), and he is right. And so we do not share the same ideas.

Third, the differences also depend on political majorities running our countries one way or the other. There is nothing wrong if I say that when Clinton was your president, for many of the Europeans it was easier to find agreements. Not trade. Trade is really bipartisan. But let's say on the Kyoto thing. On the Tribunals on Crimes Against Humanity. After all, he was ready to ratify and he signed it before leaving the presidency. Now, I think that the position of President Bush is legitimate, obviously. But it's different from the position of his predecessor and I and other Europeans found it easier to converge with the previous, while other Europeans are more in agreement with Bush. So there is also this kind of political sort of vision that is important. But I wouldn't be pessimistic.

Q: We have about five minutes.

GA: Despite the long list.

Q: And I am going to collect the three hands that I saw and come back to you for a summary statement. Maurizio, George and this gentleman here.

Q: (Inaudible) How would you describe the success of the (Inaudible) of the closing session?

Q: And I wanted to ask you what your commission is going to do…

GA: Call it convention, please.

Q:…to engage public interest in the campaign subject?

Q: And the final question?

Q:

(Inaudible) My guess is a tiny fraction of the European populace is able to describe accurately how the role and the selection process and the commission, the council, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament and how it relates to national financial authorities. When you're done, are you expecting that those institutions will still be in place but their role will be clarified, or do you think you have to invent new institutions?

GA: Oh, God, no! We have already enough institutions to fill Europe. With that, let's say clarify their roles, as you say, because it's already too arcane, you see, George. But people now are interested in these things. And you know what the leverage that we have. People are dissatisfied with Europe mostly for the following reasons: because the real leverage in any democracy is that you can identify the guy who did something that has disturbed you. See, he did it. You are responsible. I am against you. I can steer others against you and then something will happen. You won't have our confidence any more.

Europe nowadays is so complicated, so confusing, so overlapping that no European cities can have the satisfaction of saying who has done what. That's why they are interested. They want to know for the future who will be responsible for what. And this is part of our job, which requires us to disentangle somehow Western civilities of the European level and of member states and regions. Frequently, nowadays member states hide themselves behind Europe because if I have a piece of financial readjustment not easy to be digested by my electors, I go to Brussels, I find an agreement there on this difficult policy, I go back to my capital and I say “Europe wants me to do this and so it's not my fault.” And when Armano Fraudi's ghost is around(?), if he happens to be the only one responsible for all these things and sometimes he doesn't even know what's going on. So, member states and local authorities, give them their own responsibility. Give people the satisfaction of blaming somebody for what they dislike, because this is really democracy. Democracy is there. It's electing somebody and blaming somebody. These are the two main weapons from which a citizen can figure.

So, for the future, the many problems will be—changing slightly the focus of my argument—the respective role of the council and of the commission, because as to the first point I was now talking about, what Europe should do and what member states should do, I'm confident that we have already a reasonable agreement. As to who is Europe, sure, we will have a problem because there are the intergovernmentalists tend to turn to the council and the commission possibly as a sort of technical instrument below the council. The communitarians tend to see the opposite way; the commission, as the only interpreter of European interests, and the council, the less they do, the better it is. Those prime ministers. So I think a balance will have to be found. Of course, the success will be in proposals that succeed in being really a novelty. Should we at the end reach the conclusion that one only seat in the Security Council and in other super nation institutions, these would be the kind of a novelty proposal upon which I would measure the success in substance of the convention. Second, this proposal should be let's say put in the hands of the intergovernmental conference upon as much anonymity as possible in the convention because should we split into different positions and therefore submit the intergovernmental conference a range of options, of course we would fail because at that point our proposals would have no input at all because they would be free to choose.

The superlative success would be that these new documents, because they are expected to be a new document, a new simplified treaty structured as a constitution, principles, rights of the citizens, powers of the union, institutions of the union, relations between the union and member states, structured as an institution having the legal force of a constitution. This cannot happen nowadays according to the existing procedures. Only a popular referendum held in connection with the next elections of the Europe Parliament could give this document such constitutional strength. Were it to happen? This is really something that I don't know. It would depend on the atmosphere, on the climate, on the political consensus, on the support that we will have from public opinion, on the feelings that by working with civil society, NGOs, associations, et cetera, we will succeed in stirring up. It might happen, but this is something that I really don't know.

Q: Giuliano, thank you very for giving us rich insight. (Applause) I think I speak for everyone in the room in wishing you well. You have your work cut out for you.

GA: Yes.