Print
Email
Share
Saddam Hussein will welcome the French and German proposal to deploy a U.N. "blue helmet" operation to support weapons inspectors in Iraq. Other than its propaganda value demonstrating Iraq's compliance with U.N. demands, the initiative has little chance of actually disarming the Baghdad regime.
The Franco-German initiative is a bad idea, at the wrong time, which will result in the worst possible outcome -- more time for Iraq to develop its weapons of mass destruction. If the blue helmets, or peace-keepers, were lucky enough to stumble onto a storage or production facility for weapons of mass destruction, Saddam would never let them leave. More likely, he would make hostages of the U.N. personnel. Using them as human shields, blue-helmets would be chained to potential bomb targets to deter military action. Such ignominy would discredit the United Nations, bringing ridicule and ruin to the world body.
How can we say confidently that this is what will happen? The initiative is eerily reminiscent of the international community's failed diplomacy during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Europeans most of all should remember the U.N.'s tragic inability to stop atrocities in Bosnia. Only a few years have passed since troops from European countries, assigned as U.N. peacekeepers, were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs and chained to potential NATO air strike targets. The lessons from Bosnia are clear. Adopting resolutions at the U.N. Security Council without the resolve to implement them is a formula for failure. Unless diplomacy is backed by force, tyrants will always prevail. Moreover, appeasement by European leaders did not work in Bosnia, and it will not work in Iraq.
When reports surfaced of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, European statesmen wrung their hands and protested something must be done. The U.N. Security Council adopted a series of resolutions and then, beginning in 1992, the U.N. launched the most massive humanitarian operations in its history. Backed by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the mission was intended to feed starving refugees; create safe havens for vulnerable persons displaced by the conflict; and create conditions for their safe return home.
But without active cooperation by the Bosnian Serbs, the U.N. faced an impossible task. U.N. Security Council resolutions lacked effective enforcement mechanisms and a timetable for implementation. By focusing on feeding the victims, the international community demonstrated it was only prepared to address a symptom of the problem not the root cause of the crisis.
The security council dithered over dozens of resolutions while the killing continued for more than three years. Despite threats against the Bosnian Serbs, the U.N. blue helmets had neither the mandate nor the equipment to achieve the mission's goals. UNPROFOR tragically became an accomplice to the genocide. Instead of standing up to General Ratko Mladic and insisting that the Bosnian Serbs fulfill the international community's demands, it tried to cajole the Bosnian Serb commander. The U.N. was blackmailed and paid bribes to the Bosnian Serbs to let food convoys pass through checkpoints. Whenever the U.N. threatened more robust action, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to new U.N. demands, but then ignored their implementation.
The U.N.'s disgrace peaked during the summer of 1995. Despite repeated demands to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and to abandon aggression against U.N. guaranteed "safe havens," the Bosnian Serb army intensified its attacks. In late May, Serbian artillery shelled the central marketplace in Sarajevo. General Mladic claimed that Bosnian "Muslims" had launched the mortar attack to stimulate international sympathy and support. Meanwhile his forces were tightening the noose around the eastern enclaves of Zepa and Gorazde.
In response to the blatant shelling of Sarajevo and other safe areas, NATO threatened air strikes but the U.N. Chief of Mission, Yasushi Akashi, was reluctant to authorize them lest it appear that the U.N. was picking sides. After a few pin prick air strikes, Mladic retaliated. His forces took 350 U.N. blue helmets hostage. On May 27, Serbian television broadcast images of French, British and Canadian blue helmets that had been chained to airplane hangars and other potential targets of NATO air strikes.
The photos outraged the world. Yet the Security Council was unable to act. It was feared that air strikes would result in the execution of U.N. hostages. Outrage was especially strong in France. Jacques Chirac, France's newly elected president, was mortified by images of French blue helmets waving white handkerchiefs.
Having tested the U.N. and gauged the limits of Western resolve, the Bosnian Serb army renewed its aggression against the enclaves. On July 6, Dutch peacekeepers were taken hostage in Srebenica. The city fell five days later, and all told, more than 8,000 people were killed.
The U.N. mission in Bosnia had failed. With the Security Council paralyzed, NATO's decision making body, the North Atlantic Council, authorized air strikes on August 31, 1995. U.N. forces were withdrawn from the country or consolidated in cities under control of the Bosnian government. Massive air strikes ensued. Within months, the war was over and the Serbs were summoned to Dayton, Ohio for peace talks.
Given his experience with Bosnia, it is shocking that German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, supposedly with Jacques Chirac's complicity, is now calling for a U.N. blue helmet mission in Iraq. The mission is doomed to fail for the same reasons that it failed in Bosnia.
Europe still has not learned its lesson. Neville Chamberlain's appeasement did not work against Hitler, and appeasement failed in Bosnia with Slobodan Milosevic. Appeasement will also fail in Iraq, with deadly consequences.
Mr. Phillips is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.
