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The C. Douglas Dillon Annual Lecture
Royal Institute for International Affairs
Chatham House
London
June 1, 2004
It is a great honor and pleasure alike to be here today to deliver the annual Dillon lecture in European-American relations—or, as most of my countrymen tend to put it, American-European relations. I realize that this is an annual event; I intend no disrespect to my illustrious predecessors when I say I am hard pressed to think of a more timely moment than the present to address this topic.
I would be remiss if I did not take a moment to acknowledge the gentleman for whom this lecture is named. C. Douglas Dillon embodied public service. He served under three presidents: as secretary of the treasury, under secretary of state, and ambassador to France. Country came first, party second. He also found ways to contribute outside government. He was chairman of our greatest museum, led the board of our greatest university, and was vice chairman and a member for more than half a century of what I would like to think is our greatest organization devoted to foreign relations. Thank you for permitting me to pay tribute to this extraordinary man.
I would also be remiss if I did not add that being here today has special significance for me given my own life. As many of you know, I was fortunate enough to do my graduate work in your wonderful country, after which I stayed on (as Paul Scott might have put it) to spend nearly another three years at a rival institution down the road. Every now and then I would make my way over to this splendid building to take advantage of the Chatham House library. I can still recall long afternoons here, researching one of my first published works, on the future of the nation-state.
It is difficult for me to get comfortable with the fact that all this took place more than a quarter century ago. At the time, the dominant issue that occupied politicians, pundits, and protesters alike was how best to manage the competition with the Soviet Union, and, more specifically, how best to deal with the perceived challenge posed to the countries of Western Europe and to NATO cohesion by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.
The disagreements were often prolonged and intense, much as they had been over previous matters of policy, much as they would prove to be over still others, such as whether to fund the gas pipeline that some feared would give the Soviet Union great leverage over the countries of Western Europe. The differences today that dominate trans-Atlantic discourse stem from contemporary matters – Iraq is for good reason uppermost in our minds, though it is far from the only source of discord – yet they are similarly intense.
But it would be wrong to see today’s differences as simply more of the same, one more chapter in the long story of European-American relations that had its roots in the post-World War II period and went on to survive tension over Korea, a full-blown crisis over Suez, and deep differences over Vietnam.
What all these earlier disputes or crises had in common was that they occurred within a geopolitical context – the Cold War – and an intellectual and political framework, that of containment. This context and framework introduced a certain discipline into trans-Atlantic ties. Europeans and Americans alike recognized the need to limit and manage their differences so that their core capacity to deter and, if need be, to defeat the Soviet Union remained intact.
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union brought the context to an end and rendered the framework obsolete. A policy that had weathered any number of dissents and debates proved incapable of surviving success.
It is now 15 years, not quite a generation, since the Berlin Wall came down. The features of the post-Cold War context are relatively clear if, alas, not always benign. Fundamentals include the reality of American primacy and a resulting imbalance of power; globalization, i.e., the vast number and speed of cross-border flows of people, technology, goods, services, ideas, germs, dollars and euros, arms, e-mails, carbon dioxide, and just about anything else you can think of; and relatively peaceful relations among the major powers, which at a minimum include the United States, China, Japan, Russia, India, and an increasingly integrated and enlarged Europe.
If the context is clear, the political framework, that is, the successor to containment, is not. The challenge, then, for Europeans and Americans today could hardly be greater: to cooperate in a much-different context than the one for which the relationship and its institutions were designed – and to do so absent an agreed-upon policy framework.
Such cooperation is possible. In 1990, in the wake of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Europeans and Americans joined to resist and ultimately reverse Saddam’s aggression. And throughout the decade of the 1990s, Europeans and Americans combined (if not always quickly and smoothly) to stop ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. Europeans and Americans also worked together to bring about NATO’s enlargement. Most recently, Europeans and Americans have collaborated in the war against terrorism and in particular in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO personnel are both present and active in a precedent-setting “out-of-area” intervention.
What made these cases of cooperation possible was that Europeans and Americans saw the situations similarly. Saddam’s aggression was seen as a direct challenge to the basic and widely-held legal notion that a state could not employ military force to gain control over the territory, people, or resources of another country. When it came to the Balkans and Afghanistan, a good many Europeans and Americans shared the view that sovereignty is less than absolute, that governments had obligations as well as rights, and that the international community had a right to intervene when governments either fail to live up to the responsibility of protecting their own people or chose to support terrorism.
Expressed differently, similar approaches to international law have on occasions provided the necessary framework for concerted trans-Atlantic action. But the extent of this shared perception should not be exaggerated. In recent years, a significant rift has emerged across the Atlantic over a range of international arrangements, including the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the ABM Treaty as well as the role of the UN more generally. Europeans tend to believe the United States is uncritically supportive of Israel and insufficiently sympathetic to Palestinian rights and claims. Even when there is agreement in principle between Americans and Europeans, such as in the realm of trade, it does not always translate into practice.
Most pronounced have been differences over how to deal with what the United States traditionally terms “rogue actors,” including Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, and Saddam’s Iraq. Europeans lean toward dialogue and incentives, the United States to isolation and penalties. Iraq, of course, is the most salient example of this phenomenon, where a marked majority of European governments and publics opposed the U.S. decision to go to war, believing it to be premature at best, unnecessary and ill-advised at worst.
In some cases, these differences reflect different experience; Americans understandably felt September 11 more acutely than did Europeans. But there are also differences regarding the perceived utility and legitimacy of military force, the role of international law, and approaches to statecraft. And there are the political and demographic realities that lead to divergent approaches vis-à-vis the Middle East and trade.
It will not be easy to bridge these differences. Still, I am prepared to assert that it is important to try to maintain the integrity of trans-Atlantic cooperation – less as an end in itself so much as a means to important ends. The United States, for all of its power, very much needs partners in addressing the regional and trans-national or global issues that constitute the principal strategic challenges of this era. There is nothing the United States can do better on its own. In particular, there is no way the United States by itself can successfully tackle terrorism or the spread of nuclear weapons or global climate change or maintaining a world trading system. Europe both as a collective and as individual states constitutes a principal partner, one which for all its differences and limitations is still relatively likeminded and capable.
But Europe, too, needs to work to maintain the basic trans-Atlantic bond, if for different reasons. Europe has a stake in the success of an American-led enterprise that seeks to promote greater order, wealth, and opportunity. Differences over strategies and tactics should not obscure the reality that the United States and Europe still share a good deal in common. Both oppose and are prepared to act against genocide, terrorism, and proliferation.
In addition, Europe has much to worry about. These problems will not simply go away or leave Europe untouched. Europe may be more at peace than at any moment over the past few centuries, but Europeans should not assume their continent will remain an island of stability and prosperity. European construction cannot be allowed to be all consuming; a parochial Europe is vulnerable to unsettled regional conflicts and to many of the challenges associated with globalization.
Translating an appreciation of this mutual need into reality, however, will not happen of its own accord. It will require both intellectual honesty and political investment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Europeans for their part must be willing to shed illusions about what they can accomplish in the world on their own. Loose talk about resurrecting a multipolar world is just that – loose talk. It is neither feasible nor desirable for Europe to set itself up as an independent geopolitical entity, much less as a competitor of the United States. Second, Europe must develop greater capabilities in the military realm. This is not so that it can become a major power on the scale of the United States, but rather so that it can act as a partner of the United States and carry out tasks on its own. A division of labor, one in which the United States employs military force and Europe turns to other policy instruments, will gradually divide the United States from Europe. An absence of common experiences and shared costs will over time exacerbate tendencies toward divergent perceptions.
Europeans must also be realistic in another way. Diplomacy cannot consist only of dialogue and incentives; credibility requires a willingness to use sanctions and if need be military force. This applies to such countries as Iran and North Korea. Europe must also confront its own politics if there is ever to be a new global trade arrangement. There is no way the current Doha development round can ever come to fruition if the Common Agricultural Policy remains largely intact. Here, recent indications of greater EU flexibility in this realm are welcome.
Americans for their part must accept that a strong and active Europe will not simply be content to do America’s bidding on the world stage. Still, Washington should support European construction, as a strong Europe is at least a potential partner of the United States whereas a weak Europe is not. That said, Europe should not expect that this support means that the United States will forego the option of working with individual European states when there is no EU consensus to partner with Washington.
The United States also needs European resources. American power is truly great, but it is not unlimited. The U.S. military is stretched given current needs in Iraq and Afghanistan; the fact that troops are being withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula and sent to Iraq is both unfortunate and revealing. The sort of troop-intensive nation-building exercises taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan are hardly unique; they are sure to be repeated elsewhere, and European contributions will be required in those two countries as well as in others. The good news is that Europe has much to add, especially as more than military might will be relevant. This clearly pertains to the global struggle against HIV-AIDS and other infectious diseases, as well as to global efforts to alleviate poverty. A strapped U.S. economy, one experiencing enormous fiscal and current account deficits, cannot bear the burden of promoting world order and development on its own.
Genuine consultation is a must. Consultation cannot consist of simply informing others of what has already been decided or going through the motions and not adapting policies yet still expecting support. Nor can consultations wait until a crisis is upon us; talks should be held in advance on how to deal with the central challenges of this era. This promises to be the best and most likely only way of forging a policy framework relevant to the challenges central to this era of international relations.
Both Europeans and Americans have reason to maintain and where possible expand their cooperation. As has already been alluded to, this is the optimal way to deal with those regional and global challenges that affect both but which neither alone can manage. Such challenges (and opportunities) go beyond the full gamut of transnational issues. Let me single out two. The first is to promote political, economic, educational, and social reform throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. It is essential that young men and women in these societies see a reason to live. This will require meaningful reform resulting in meaningful political participation, economic opportunity, and access to an education that will provide the tools basic to this global era. Making progress here will require the wisdom and resources of both Europe and the United States.
The same applies to a second undertaking: reinforcing the integration of Russia and China into regional and global arrangements and promoting political and economic openness with them. It will be much easier to deal with today’s challenges if Russia and China are full partners – and almost impossible to deal with these same challenges if they again become rivals of the United States and Europe.
Let me conclude this speech with a dose of realism. I have tried to make the case that trans-Atlantic cooperation remains highly desirable despite the passing of a context and a framework associated with the Cold War. Europeans and Americans alike would benefit greatly from working together—and pay as great a price if such cooperation eludes them.
But I also realize that it will not always be possible to forge common policies no matter how extensive the consultation and how sincere the effort. In this case at least, Iraq will not be an exception. The fact that Europe is no longer the geopolitical center of the world will make this task of maintaining a trans-Atlantic partnership both easier and more difficult. I say “easier” because the resources of Europe will increasingly be available for use elsewhere. But it will be more difficult because it will be harder to build common approaches to challenges that arise in far-off places where stakes are valued differently.
What will be important, then, is that the United States and Europe learn to disagree. The best guideline in such circumstances is to work to isolate the disagreement and not let it spill over and complicate much less infect the rest of the relationship. Such “compartmentalization” will be essential if inevitable differences are not to lead to a general deterioration of the relationship.
Americans and Europeans each have special tasks to limit the consequences of disagreement. Americans would be wise to explain their position and to offer up alternatives when a proposed international arrangement is deemed undesirable. Consistent with this is the need to consider employing incentives as well as penalties – and not to sequence diplomatic approaches so that the problem country in question must meet all of its requirements before it can receive meaningful benefits. And Americans like Europeans must take steps to end anomalies in trade policy that are clearly inconsistent with WTO principles. Quotas, subsidies, exempting entire sectors from competition – all are inconsistent with the goal of making trade as open as possible.
Europeans, too, have special responsibilities to limit disagreements. It is one thing not to support an American undertaking deemed essential by the United States; it is quite another to actively work to block it. The latter is inconsistent with the obligation that comes with being an ally. European leaders also have to do more to stem the rise of anti-Americanism in their societies; if they do not, they will find themselves unable to work with the United States even when they judge it to be desirable.
The corollary to this theme of inevitable but manageable disagreement is the need to accept that we are likely entering a new and different era of U.S.-European relations. There will be issues arising where Americans and Europeans see things differently and are attracted to different prescriptions. At the same time, reaching consensus among the 25 of the EU or the 26 of NATO will become more difficult. Trans-Atlantic relations (any more than trans-European relations) cannot be an all-or-nothing proposition; indeed, an all-or-nothing trans-Atlantic relationship runs the risk of becoming nothing. For this reason, the United States cannot be precluded from cooperating with like-minded European states when a common EU-American position cannot be reached.
In short, we are entering a more discretionary era, one in which the United States and Europe will be more selective when it comes to which challenges they will face together. The era will also be more discretionary in the sense that the United States will on occasion have to select those Europeans it works with. The probability that Europe itself may be charting a future in which individual countries come to define their relationship with the EU in different ways further supports this contention. To suggest all this should not be understood to be in any way anti-European; rather, it is simply a judgment and a prediction about how the future is likely to unfold.
Managing this reality will be far from easy. Both Americans and Europeans will need to adjust their thinking and their practices if the trans-Atlantic relationship is to prove as robust and as relevant to this era as it was to the previous one. I believe that the United Kingdom can and must play a central role in this process of adjustment. My reasoning is straight-forward: A Europe in which Britain plays a central role (regardless of where the UK ultimately comes out vis-à-vis the Euro and the Constitution) is likely to be both stronger and more Atlanticist, one more able and more likely to be a significant partner of the United States, than a Europe from which Britain is distant.
I am aware that not everyone will support this last judgment. Many argue there is a tension between Britain’s ties to the United States and its ties to Europe. I am not sure I agree. Or, more precisely, if there is a tension, it can and should be creative, and it can and should be manageable. And again, it is surely preferable to the alternative, one in which Europe charts its future without Britain’s perspectives and Britain charts its future without Europe’s resources.
Thank you again for this opportunity to be with you today.