Print
Email
Share
On Shadow Government, a Foreign Policy blog, Phil Levy writes about the viability of G20, if it matters at all, and what it will mean for the future of the global economy.
We're in the analytical interlude between bursts of G20 news stories. Late last month, G20 finance ministers met to seek agreement in advance of their bosses' gathering. On Nov. 11-12, G20 leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama, will gather in Seoul for their second meeting of the year. In between, there is a nice opportunity to reflect on the question of whether the G20 matters at all. Recent events suggest it may not.
Not so long ago, the Obama administration was prone to trumpet the elevation of the Group of 20 as one of its signal foreign policy achievements. Although the G20 heads of state had met in Washington in Nov. 2008, with George W. Bush presiding, the leaders' summit was warmly embraced by the Obama team. The G20 was lauded both for its style and its substance. In style, it was more inclusive than the G8 that had previously held center stage. Perhaps the most significant newcomer to the global confabs on economic matters was China. In substance, the G20 was praised for coordinating action to save the world from economic disaster and a descent into protectionism.
It is not clear that such enthusiasm was merited. On style, it was certainly a good idea to include China in global economic talks, but gathering 11 more countries around the table may not have been the most efficient way to do that. Although it would have strained diplomatic politesse, it might have made more sense just to substitute the PRC for Italy or Russia in the G8 (or for both). A broader group has more legitimacy when it can reach an agreement, but that potential enhanced legitimacy is worthless if the breadth of the membership makes agreement impossible.
