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The Department of State makes an inherent assumption that security assistance lies within its domain; indeed the U.S. Congress has established that de jure. But DoD enjoys three distinct advantages over State that naturally push it into the driver's seat and challenge State's assumption de facto: a culture of operational planning, a regionally-aligned operational structure, and an internal cadre of operators. Persistent, regional engagement is important for security cooperation activities where states share borders: if you work only with Mali to defeat Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb you are likely to push the problem to Niger; and if you partner with countries sporadically you are unlikely to realize sustained progress
DOD's six geographic combatant commands (COCOMS) have a culture of developing contingency and security cooperation plans with a regional focus and (except for AFRICOM) have deployable forces. COCOMs often lack, however, deep regional expertise and understanding of the political dimensions so vital to security assistance. For that reason AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and EUCOM each has an Ambassador from the Department of State as a Deputy Commander to make the COCOM a more capable “whole-of-government” body. Critics argue that this risks further “militarizing foreign policy” but State lacks robust military expertise within its organizations, does not have the people and equipment to carry out security assistance efforts, and conducts routine planning only on a bilateral level through U.S. Missions. Only when a crisis erupts does State organize regional approaches (think AFPAK) and then it struggles to fit the new approach into its existing bureaucracy and lead the rest of the interagency.
