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[Note: A transcript of this meeting is unavailable. The discussion is summarized below.]

What We Know:

After twenty-four years of theocratic rule by conservative Muslim clerics, Iran is viewed as a repressive state that sponsors terrorism (supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad), and seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Iran continues to flout International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Despite this record, Iran has made significant strides towards democracy: tolerating some civil society activities and twice electing a reformist Prime Minister. Ultimate power, however, remains firmly in the hands of the clerical leadership and the regime appears committed to suppressing the most basic human rights—using the judiciary as a political weapon to imprison dissenters and resorting to fear and torture when other methods fail.

In June 2003, thousands of protesters took to the streets in the latest demonstration of their desire for greater social and political freedoms. Many speculated that these protests were catalyzed by U.S.-based privately owned Farsi broadcasters. In other recent developments, during a trip to Washington, Hossein Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, was surprisingly vocal in his support of deposing the clerics and establishing democracy in Iran, and an Iranian lawyer, Shirin Ebadi, became the first Muslim woman to win the Noble Peace Prize.

This climate of persistent pressure on the regime for change offers a fortuitous opportunity for the United States to reassess its democracy promotion strategy in Iran.

What We Don’t Know:

Just three years ago, National Iranian Television (NITV) was the only independent Farsi media outlet broadcasting into Iran. Today there are 14 Farsi stations, although several are thought to be fronts for the Iranian government. These media operate on meager budgets, but often have a direct line of communication with the democratic opposition within Iran. In NITV’s case, its broadcasters correspond in real time with Iranian students. The U.S. government-funded, Radio Farda and the Voice of America’s Farsi-language radio have also played a role in giving a voice to the opposition.

Democracy has deeper roots in Iran than in other Middle Eastern countries. The question of democracy in Iran is one of “when” and “how,” rather than “if.” The country’s extremely active civil society will eventually help to bring about change and the impending parliamentary elections scheduled for 2004 will indicate Iran’s democratization trajectory. If turnout is low, however, as was the case for the municipal election, this will not bode well for the Iranian opposition. Following the parliamentary elections, Iran commences the process of vetting candidates for the presidential election.

The United States is making a grave mistake by not having formal relations with Iran. Even during the height of the Cold War the United States had direct contact with Moscow. Moreover, in the past, the United States has interacted with other “odious” regimes.

Inside Iran, most people are focused on their declining living standard, rather than democracy—which in their case is an abstract and somewhat obtuse concept given their daily lives under the rule of the clerics. The lack of job creation, the severity of the “brain-drain” (among the highest in the developing world), and endemic corruption also rank as high concerns.

What Are the Next Steps:

The United States should think seriously about ways to support and nurture Iranian pro-democracy groups. In doing so however, democracy promoters should be cognizant of the fact that the struggle is not dependent on external factors, but rather is guided by internal changes. Whether in contention or friendship, supporters of democracy should know who and what they we are dealing with in Iran—this requires engagement.

Meeting participants agreed that the prospects for Iranian democracy greatly improve with more engagement and diplomacy on the part of the United States. A few participants stressed the fact that Iranians are well educated and independent-minded, therefore, as difficult as it may be, democracy will emerge. The international community needs to engage Iran—it is essential to the cause of democracy to treat Iranians with dignity and engage directly through open channels of communication with Teheran. Having an American embassy in Teheran would help spur democratic change in Iran. An embassy would be able to reach out to Iranians, see situation on the ground first-hand, and ignite the Iranian opposition (e.g. as it did in many former Soviet states in the late 1980s and early 1990s).

Several participants suggested that the United States can, and should, do more than it has to support the Iranian pro-democracy movement. The opposition needs external support and the United States could help Iranians organize and communicate by offering resources. There are already U.S. government-funded Farsi media and with Persian websites and other media outlets, international communication could serve to put more pressure on the regime.

One participant concluded that Iran cannot continue to support terrorism and be a part of the international community. The IAEA is asking Iran to comply with the same standards it asks of all non-nuclear countries, therefore, if Iran does not cooperate with IAEA, the international community will have to reinstate inspections through the United Nations. The United States could potentially gain more ground on WMD through direct discourse with Teheran.

Further, there are untapped networks that the United States and others could use to facilitate a move from just track-two diplomacy. Many Iranians traveled to the West before the 1979 revolution and are now back in Iran—they are a potential network of democracy supporters. One participant reminded the group that even the Ayatollahs have children in the United States and often visit them—this fact presents further opportunities for engagement. The United States should also tap into the diversity of clerical thinking and engage Iranians on their native ground.

Finally, in terms of Iraq, Iran’s strategic concerns are such that it needs to feel it has a friend inside Iraq. With Iran being the first to endorse the Governing Council and also announcing its intention to participate in the Madrid donors’ conference for Iraq’s reconstruction, the United States has multiple opportunities to engage Iran—these should not be squandered.