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In an attempt to manage the expectations of a notoriously impatient American public, President George W. Bush and senior U.S. military leaders have begun to refer to the struggle against al Qaeda and its associated movements as the “Long War,” suggesting that the duration of this struggle may be measured in decades, not years. Although this characterization may be accurate, the duration of this conflict is not predetermined or inevitable. The United States can take steps to shorten the struggle and hasten al Qaeda’s defeat. The key is whether the United States can develop a comprehensive strategy that kills or captures today’s terrorists and eliminates the sources of radicalization for tomorrow’s.
The U.S. military presence in the Middle East has represented one of the leading sources of radicalization and terrorism directed against the United States. Yet, protecting U.S. interests in the region does not require an obtrusive U.S. military footprint characterized by sprawling bases occupied by large numbers of permanently stationed ground troops. In fact, a large U.S. military presence in the region is unnecessary and often counterproductive. If policymakers ignore the role of the U.S. military presence in the radicalization process and fail to assess the actual necessity of a large U.S. military presence, the United States will find itself in a needless predicament not unlike the Herculean struggle against the mythological hydra. For every Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that the United States kills, the continuing sources of radicalization will generate a virtually limitless pool of replacements.
