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Speakers: Gen. William L. Nash, Rachel Bronson, Najmaldin Karim
Presider: Peter W. Galbraith
April 8, 2003
Washington, D.C.
Peter W. Galbraith [PWG]: Thank you very much. It's a mixed set of topics today, really moving with the news. I'd like to introduce the panel here beginning with General Nash, William Nash, who is on loan to the Council from ABC News this morning. (Laughter) Bill had a very distinguished military career with a lot of relative experience. He was a Commander in the first gulf war in southern Iraq. He also led American forces into Bosnia during the I-4 phase, and after retiring from the army he had the hardest job in the Balkans as the administrator for Mitrovitsa(?) in Kosovo. So we have the benefit of his military analysis as well as his practical experience.
Rachel Bronson is the Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and expert on US security and foreign policy toward the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf. She has previously held positions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, and was a consultant to the center for naval analysis. And most recently she directed a joint study, a report between the Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute in Houston.
To my immediate right is Dr. Najmaldin Karim, the President of the Washington Kurdish Institute and a former President of the Kurdish National Congress of North America. He is a member of the 65-member Iraqi opposition steering committee that was elected in December in London and he was just recently in Iraqi Kurdistan as part of the ... for the opposition meeting that was held in February. Dr. Karim is a neurosurgeon by trade. He was Mullah Mustafa Barzani's personal physician and it was Kurdistan's loss but America's gain when the tragic events of 1975 brought him to the United States where he really has made a major contribution, both as a Kurd and as an American citizen to our country's understanding of the situation in Kurdistan and in Iraq.
I'd like to begin with General Nash and ask basically your view of the latest developments, particularly in the battle for Baghdad. We're now inside the city. What next?
William L. Nash [WLN]: Well, there is plenty of work to do in the city but that will not keep us from pursuing a campaign throughout the country. I think that's an important thing. As I said last week in addressing some of the issues, this campaign, military campaign has been marked by overwhelming use of intelligence-based action with very precise fires in great quantity and speed of maneuver. And that has continued as the American forces arrived in Baghdad. Very bold moves to enter the city, to take the airport first and then to move into the city very rapidly after that, and some tank sweeps, thunder runs you might have heard on television.
I don't know if thunder run is a term that dates as far back as World War II but it was certainly something that was used in Vietnam on a number of occasions. But fast tank sweeps through an area accomplishes a couple of things. It seizes the initiative and demonstrates the promise of a force executed to power, executed to move. It gives you an ability to assess the offense's capabilities, resistance. Then finally it helps you develop specifically intelligence on objectives that you might want to go after in future operations.
I think there would be more patience exhibited in Baghdad, not unlike what the British have exhibited with Basra, and it may be time to look for a little bit more patience in some of our operations. The events of today are very positive in the terms of attacking a leadership target. Again, an intelligence-based operation with quick decisions to use the precise fire that's coming from the B1 bomber.
But also the incidents that have occurred around the Palestine Hotel today told us three journalists killed, two cameramen and one reporter, indicates we may be getting into a few fights that we don't want to get into yet. And I'm not sure of the productivity of that. But certainly taking over the palaces, establishing defensive positions, and if he really so chooses, to come to us, that we can deal with that. That's a much less dangerous situation in terms of civilian casualties and unnecessary damage. I'm trying to exclude the phrases "collateral damage" from my vocabulary.
Last week I talked about cyops a little bit. I would just add that ... or make the point today that I'm becoming less convinced of the reliability of the cyops campaign on a number of counts. On the cyops campaign I would just argue that we need to talk less and do more, and then when we say something it's self-evident. I'm not sure that that's being followed anywhere.
Finally, I have to bring up the post-war issues, and I know others are going to talk about that, but from the military perspective the transition from peace to war began the first day of the ground attack, as parts of southern Iraq came under allied control. That whole process needs to continue in the wake of the attacks. We've seen some reports of that, we've seen some efforts, but we've also seen chaos, we've also seen the looting. Some reports are coming in of revenge killings and the like, and of course the debate internationally as late as yesterday of course in Belfast and elsewhere, in the pages of ... opinion pages of lots of newspapers on everything, the whole management of the post-war Iraq, the role of in interim government and how the interim government comes about, all of this manifests itself on the battlefield. And the same Iraqis that were cheering the British arriving yesterday were asking when we're going to leave. So this whole business is going to impact on the fight.
And finally to the future, I wrote a note to my night-job folks and said ... they were asking for storylines, and I gave them two or three and my fourth one was Tikrit, Tikrit, Tikrit. I think that's an issue we're going to have to deal with as the Northern front meets the Southern front. I think they're going to join simply around Tikrit as that all comes together. And I'll leave some of the Northern front issues to later.
PWG: Bill, thank you. I should have said at the beginning that, unlike usual council events, today's session is on the record. When we come to questions I would ask the questioners to identify themselves and their affiliation. Bill, put yourself in the Iraqi shoes. Aside from surrender, let's say you are commander, you've had your order to put up the best possible defense, make this as painful and as difficult as possible, what would you do?
WLN: Well, let's just say I was a marginal character in the Ba'ath party and had aspirations for a future political role in Iraq. I would maintain as much pressure on the American-British forces ... allied forces as I possibly could. I would continue to use the Fedayeen to attack the Americans. I would continue to draw attention to every mistake the Americans or British make, with respect to civilian casualties. I would obviously make the point that this coalition is anti-Arab: look, they're even bombing Al-Jazeera and other…television. And then I would start preparing for an intifada following American success.
I would make it very clear that if you stay in Iraq you're going to pay a long-term heavy price. I would begin now setting up a five-year war to run off the Americans. That's what I would do.
PWG: Well, let me turn to you, Najmaldin, and first ask you what's the latest from the North? What do you hear?
Najmaldin Karim [NK]: Well, the latest, of course most of you listen to the news and see what has ... basically what the situation is there. There are obviously not as many US forces or nearly as many US forces in Kurdistan as it is in southern or central Iraq. General Nash brought up Tikrit and what I'd like to say is there's been ... the areas where the major cities are controlled by the regime, in Mosul, in Karkuk and in Hanakeem, Hanakeem is near the Iranian border, we are just a few kilometers away.
In Mosul, the Kurdish forces with the US Special Forces, but mainly Kurdish forces, are about 30 kilometers from Mosul, coming from the eastern part and from the northern part of Mosul. In Kirkuk the Kurdish forces have come as close as 12 kilometers from the north and from the east. And from the south they are two kilometers from Tuslarmat(?), which is a major ... it's a big town in the southern region of Kirkuk.
The only thing that's really holding them back from going into that is American ... are the Americans. They are restraining them from doing that. Actually, people are getting edgy a little bit about that. The peshmergas are getting edgy. We have a lot of refugees. Some of them are ... a lot of them have peshmergas who are in their families, they want to return.
We also have heard that the villages that were “Arabized” outside the city, most of the people have run away. Most of the Arabs that they have brought from the South have either ran into the city or have gone away to the western part. The western part of Kirkuk is still controlled by government or for government forces because that's the road that leads to Tikrit. If you look at the situation today in all of Iraq, Baghdad is a mixed city. It's really not a Sunni city or a Shi'ite city, it's mixed. If you have censors there you may end up having more Shi'ites than Sunnis in Baghdad. But all the major Sunni centers are still controlled by the regime, Mosul, Tikrit, Balkuba(?), Kirkuk, all those areas are still controlled by the regime, Samara(?), it's all controlled by the regime.
One thing is, if it was not for Turkey's decision to prevent US forces from coming through to the North, the closest spot from Kurdistan to Baghdad was 110 kilometers from Kiffre(?). And just imagine what could have happened if you'd had those forces there and you had friendly forces, friendly population with them, because after all in Kurdistan the Americans have been met with ... they have been welcome. They have cooperated with them and I think you all see the reflection of that in the news media.
PWG: Well, let me pursue this. I mean, the Kurds have been great allies. It would seem that they have played their cards really well today. They have avoided taking the steps that might provoke Turkey. But at some point are they going to be in the driver's seat? And then the question is what will they want? They have had for 12 years what is de facto an independent state. I think you would agree if an election was taken in the area now controlled by the Kurds on whether people want to be part of Iraq or not it would be almost unanimous against being part of Iraq. We're talking about a democratic country. In what sense will the Kurds be part of Iraq? Will they accept authority from Baghdad?
NK: Well, that is a question that has been asked by many. First let's come to provoking Turkey and Kurdish cooperation. Turkey has drawn up some red lines as far as the Kurds are concerned, including going in Kirkuk, going into Mosul, those things. But if you look at the reality, what is Turkey's interest in Iraq, other than security of the border to prevent military incursion or actions by Kurds of Turkey against it? All those places where Turkey is worried about are part of Iraq. Turkey's interest is no different than Iranian interest, than Syrian interest, than all the other neighboring countries. That is very clear. To us, it is totally unacceptable for Turkey to be demanding things in Kurdistan that's really not demanded by any of the other neighbors.
As far as the Turkomans are concerned, 80 years the Turkomans have been in Kirkuk and Turkey has never raised the issue of the Turkomans with any central Iraqi regime. Actually it's only a small fringe of the Turkomans which is the Turkoman front that is being used by the Turks. The majority of the Turkomans have every right in Kurdistan. They have their parties, their television stations, their schools, and actually they have said so. They are happy to live in Kurdistan within the federal state.
Now, back to your central question, which is Kurds are free now. They are independent. We have run our own affairs. We have a generation probably 25, 22 years, 25 years and younger, that have not seen domination by the central regime. They have not seen the Ba'ath regime, they have not seen any Arab regime for that matter. And these people will be very, very difficult to go back and accept central authority.
But yet the leadership has convinced the population our interest today is to be part of Iraq, but that Iraq is not the Iraq that was created 80 years, and not the Iraq that followed the overthrow of monarchy, or the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. It's an Iraq where there is true democracy, where there is federalism, where all of Kurdistan is involved in this federalism, and where the Kurds will have their own parliament, just like we have now, our own government, elected by our people.
Historically, Kurdish areas have to be within this federal region. No “Arabization,” no ethnic cleansing can change that. Just as it has not been acceptable in Kosovo, in Bosnia, it should not be acceptable in Kurdistan as well. That is what our people look for. Anything short of that will lead to problems in the future. Because in 1974, the government of Saddam Hussein was willing to give us all those areas, that are under our control now, plus half of Kirkuk where the river crosses in the middle, to be under Kurdish control, but the Kurdish leadership did not accept that. Because we consider that part of Kurdistan and it will remain so and no Kurdish leader can compromise on that.
The other thing is we are willing to give up some of the things that we have to do, by having total control, to be part of the central government as well, to have a say in central government. To be part of Iraq we have to also be accepted to be able to hold any position as long as it's done democratically and the people are qualified for it. Why shouldn't the President of Iraq be a Kurd? Why does it have to be a Sunni Arab or a Arab Shi'a. It has to be ... the Kurds have to be allowed to be in this. We can no longer accept we can have five junior cabinet ministers in Baghdad and a vice president who has no authority. And then there are a lot of other issues.
The issue of flag, the issue of is Iraq an Arab state? We have a problem with that. We don't believe that Iraq is an Arab state. Iraq unlike any other country in the region is not homogenous, it's not Saudi Arabia, it's not Egypt, it's not Syria. Even Syria's Kurdish population is much smaller percentage-wise. But Iraq is not an Arab country and the Iraqi opposition we can ... in London actually recognized that and for the first time that was not acknowledged, that Iraq is part of the ...
PWG: Arab world.
NK: But that doesn't mean Iraq should not be a member in organizations that Arab countries belong to. That's fine with us. In 1963, when negotiations were going on between the Kurdish leadership, and actually it was led by Mr. Talibani at that time, and the Iraqi government, our view was, which was accepted by the Arabs then, that the Arab part of Iraq is part of the Arab world, but Iraq itself is not part of the Arab world. In the event of union between Iraq into any Arab unity, then the Kurds will have a right of self-determination, including seceding from Iraq, because we are not part of that Arab.
Then the issue of the flag, I was surprised when the Americans went into Basra and, you know, a flag was raised by somebody.
RB: The Iraqi flag.
NK: Because this is occupation flag. Well, the flag that is there is Saddam Hussein's flag. It's really not an Iraqi flag. Iraq does not have a flag. This flag, without the writing that was very bad handwriting by Saddam Hussein on it, is actually the Arab Union Republican flag that was established after the union became Egypt and Syria. And then Iraq was added to it, then it became three stars, in 1962. The accepted flag in Iraq was the one that was established after 1958, which had symbols of Kurds, of Arabs, and the natural resources in Iraq, all right, but nobody had been seeing that anymore.
PWG: Let me press you very briefly on one point. Can you conceive though of the Kurds for example giving up their peshmerga?
NK: Not at the time being, no. Because we have had experiences with different Iraqi regimes and we don't know what the future Iraqi regime will be like. We hope it will be democratic, pluralistic and all of the things that everybody is talking about. But that remains to be seen. Every Iraqi government that has been created has concentrated on strong military.
Even today I heard on the news that the Americans are trying not to destroy the tanks anymore and some of the weapons anymore because they want Iraq to have a strong military. Iraq has always used its military for aggression, either inside or outside. Iraq does not need a strong military. No one attacks Iraq. So the peshmerga forces have to be there to defend ... its Kurdish defense forces, they have to remain there to be able to defend the area of Kurdistan against aggression. We have never attacked anybody. You can see that in the last 10, 12 years, we have never been aggressors. We have always defended ourselves. I think that's something that in some way or form we want to keep.
PWG: Thank you. I'm going to pose a quick question back to Bill and then turn to Rachel. But Bill, picking up on that, can the American administering authority, occupation authority, can it live with the Kurds having their own military? And can you see that as a viable option for the indefinite future one looks to rebuild Iraq? And if not, is there anything that the United States can do about it?
WLN: Well, the United States has great experience dealing with countries of two or three different arteries (Laughter). And we have found during our time in Bosnia that it really doesn't work very well, and it doesn't build the national unity that's necessary. So over time, if there is going to be an Iraq, there will have to be one army. I would agree that it does not need to be a big army or near the size of the army it is. But disarmament probably would be good for all parts of Iraq, not just the southern half.
PWG: Yeah, but I have to observe though that probably some of the same issues that exist in Bosnia exist in Iraq, which is that while the United States may wish to see a unified Iraq, there are a significant number of Iraqis, as with Bosnia, who don't wish a unified country. That's one reason why they're unprepared to give up their armies.
WLN: I mean, and that's the whole mishmash and that was the deal made, a conscious deal made, to stop the fighting between those three armies in 1995. As we address the issues of 2003 in Iraq, we need to find a way not to put ourselves back in that same position, put the world back in that same position.
PWG: Rachel, I want to turn to the larger region with you and start with Turkey. So far we've seen the president warning Turkey that under no circumstances should they come in. Tough language from an American president to a NATO ally. You've seen the president actually in his news conference endorse the Kurdish vision of an Iraq, that is that it should be a federation of Kurds, Shi'ites and Sunnis. A lot of grumbling in Turkey but so far they've stayed out. Do you they're going to continue to stay out?
Rachel Bronson [RB]: Well, I think we haven't gotten to the key test yet, which is what happens in Kirkuk. And I think that's what the Turks are watching very carefully. I think a lot of what the problems that we're seeing is quite frankly before we went in the US didn't really establish a vision for what it wanted from Iraq. That has led to a lot of confusion and ambiguity, and it's allowed for every party to both be nervous and therefore assertive at the same time.
I think you see a Turkey who is very nervous about an independent Kurdistan despite what you hear from the Kurds themselves. And so I think that the key issue in this is Kirkuk. What the Turks are going to be watching very carefully is economic control over the oil. Because as been reported in the newspaper, it is believed that if the Kurds do have control over the economic resources that mostly come from Kirkuk, they will be able to have an independent Kurdistan. So the challenge really is to create an Iraq where many of the political and religious issues and cultural issues that we just heard about are recognized as Kurdish without creating the incentives and the ability to create independent states.
So for the Turks I think we see the grumbling, we see very, very tense relations, we've seen Turkey in a sense damage itself in the relations with the United States, probably more than they anticipated, and the Turks believing that they had a different kind of hand to be played in the lead up to the war than they actually did. But we haven't passed the key crucial test for Turkey. That's why I worry when we're watching this war unfold and it seems to be going so well in many ways that all of these key challenges that we worry about, many of them are still out there. Some have been somewhat solved.
The oil fields in the South, which we were so worried about, seem to be secured. And Scuds raining in on Israel hasn't happened. But the North and Kirkuk and what happens like that is still evolving and we haven't reached sort of the crucial issues yet.
PWG: Well, Rachel, you raise a good point on the oil. Of course what the Kurds have proposed on that is that the revenues be pooled and then that they, the Kurdistan regional government will receive its proportionate share. But it's unresolved and I think that is the question of who controls the production. Because there is a lot of economic benefit if you're exploiting it, not just in the revenues. I think they're looking to the idea that they might control that. But I'll turn to ...
RB: But on that point, I think it is very important because there is the proposal that the revenues get pooled and go back. I think that is part of a vision of Iraq that's whole and free. The fear is in the uncertainty, I think made worse by the fact that the US hasn't laid out its guiding principles very clearly. The fear is that everybody makes a grab because things are uncertain. But you're right to point that out.
PWG: I want to ask you about another issue. Now that we're into Baghdad we're hearing from some elements of the administration, Syria next, Iran. I'd like to ask you about whether you think that's serious or not. I'm going to ask you though, is that heard in the Arab world? Is that heard in the region? And how does that play out for us?
RB: Yeah, it's very much heard and it's heard within a wider context of a preemptive strike. That the doctrine of preemption issued before this war has I believe so damaged the United States ability to pull together a coalition and get UN approval to execute this war. And so the calls for Syria and Iran to stay out fits within this larger context. For Syria and Iran that they may be next fits within this larger context of what the region thinks that this is about.
The doctrine of preemption suggesting that we're going to go after a threat that we think may be materializing against us, that is viewed as, Well, who's next? Who's next? Who's next? And you've seen a lot of resistance in joining the US for a cause that many supported not that long ago, because they believe it is validating the US claim that it can pick and choose who it wants to go after and they're not going to lend their support to it.
I was out in the region in February, the first week in February, and the question that I was bringing to people I was meeting was why aren't you supporting us? It was a legitimate question because part of my real ardent support for this war comes out of my time spent in the Persian Gulf where people in sessions like this were asking, When are you going to get rid of this guy? Why are you keeping him there? And their stories of why it was so necessary for us to get rid of him led me to believe that there are many very, very good reasons and necessary reasons to do this.
Why the change? There is a lot of reasons we didn't get support. But a very important one was this fear that the United States is becoming reckless, that nothing was out of bounds, we were on this preemptive campaign, but after Iraq it could be Syria, it could be Iran, it could be Saudi Arabia, it could be Egypt. We've heard all of those mentioned in sort of discussions in Washington. Many of us don't take it seriously but it all gets gleaned out there. The context for how to understand it is the doctrine of preemption.
And so it's being taken very, very seriously. It's very damaging. And I think we've already paid the cost of some of that in the lack of support that we go for going in.
PWG: Thank you. Now I'd like to turn it over to the audience here. Fritz?
Unknown: This is... I'm sorry, Umit Enginsoy, NTV Television. Well, basically, despite opposition by Turkey, Iran and some others, do you think eventually there is a need for the creation of an independence state for the Kurds, after all they're seen as a stateless nation? And is just Turkey's or Iran's objections, is this the only thing in the mid or long term, do you think an independent Kurdish state is viable? Is this for example good for the United States? Thank you, Professor Galbraith and Dr. Karim, please.
PWG: Well, Najmaldin, why don't you take the question of whether it is the objections of the surrounding powers or do the Kurds have an attachment to any of these states?
NK: The answer to attachment, definitely not in Iraq, for sure. In 1993, February, the president was always briefing. And I asked him the question of what he thought about independence for Iraqi Kurdistan and his answer was -- and this is recorded, you can probably find it somewhere -- his answer was yes, in Iraq there are the treaties originally and the way Iraqi Kurdistan was next to Iraq during the formation of that state probably will leave you ... gives you legal grounds for claiming that, especially after having been subjected to genocide, to mass killing and all that, would give us that right.
I'm actually telling the truth, in Iraqi, Kurdistan, most of the people do want independence. I do want independence for Kurdistan if I can get it. It is objection of Turkey, it is objection of Iraq. But for Turkey, there is a large ... you're from Turkey yourself so you know there are about 15 million Kurds in Turkey, maybe a little less, a little more, but most of the Kurds in Turkey do live in western Turkey. Really they don't live in the Kurdish region.
Most of the Kurds of Turkey have so far at least political parties, organizations have expressed in the remaining part of Turkey. The problem with Turkey objecting to this, instead of being so adamant about any Kurdish, any recognition of any Kurdish structure, whether it's a federal structure or an independent state for Iraqi Kurdistan, is really its own failure to deal with the Kurdish problem in Turkey, complete denial for centuries calling them different names, mountain Turks, all kinds of things. But if they deal with this they will not have problems with Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iraqi Kurdistan has been the best protector of the border of Turkey. As far as Iran is concerned, the Iranian, because really after ... even in 1947 when the Republic of Mahada(?) was established, it was established for an autonomous republic, it was not independent. So the only Kurdish medium that has come close to wanting independence is in Iraqi Kurdistan. And yes, we believe it's actually in the interest of the region to have probably Iraq broken apart. A unified Iraq has been a source of problems internally and externally over the years. But we have been constrained. A lot of threats have been used against her(?), not just by Turkey and Iran but even by the United States in a sense.
PWG: And if I can speak for at least my view of an American view, I certainly think the United States has a strong interest in the territorial integrity of Turkey. As to the territorial integrity of Iraq, or the maintaining of Iraq as a single state, if it becomes very costly to break it up then it's not in our interest.
But I don't think that the United States has any intrinsic interest in the unity of Iraq if such unity is not desired by think constituent components of the Iraqi state. Colored by my experienced in the Balkans and I can certainly say that the break up of Yugoslavia, the break up of a state, can be a very nasty affair. But what can be worse is trying to hold a state together against the will of its people. The problem with the Kurds is that for 80 years Iraq has been nothing but a miserable experience.
The most recent period, the last period of Saddam's rule in the '80s was characterized by genocide. And who amongst us if were in their shoes would want to be part of that state? The answer is no one. And so that is an inherent problem of the situation. But again, I don't think that the break up of Iraq at this point in time is a realistic option. Therefore trying to find a solution, perhaps a Bosnia-type solution, but in which you have two entities within a single boundary, probably is the optimal one. And perhaps the simple fact of sharing oil, of making a voluntary union, as opposed to a Kurdist one, will in fact lead to a viable Iraq, and a viable Iraq is so desired by the Iraqi people, there's nothing wrong with that.
SA: Shavat Ali, Department of Defense. I'd be interested in anyone's perspective on the recent phenomena with the influx of foreign volunteers, for lack of a better word, into Iraq, and whether that phenomena presents a short-term…and really is sort of a minor problem, or is more of a strategic long-term threat where Iraq will now become, because of the large concentration of US forces that will stay after the campaign, that Iraq will now become sort of the new battleground for religious extremists, people who are really angry with US policy to conduct terrorism, guerilla warfare, those types of attacks?
PWG: Bill, you've discussed the intifada strategy, is this part of it?
WLN: Yes, I think it is. It is in fact a non-state sponsored phenomena, and I will do anything to include lowdown on the tracks to prevent this from being a focus on Syria next or Iran, wherever. Because I think this is a non-state actor phenomena. But it is my belief, and we've got to hear from Rachel on this too, but it's my belief that this now would be the focal point of anti-US behavior, actions for as long as we're there. It's going to be so much easier. You don't even need a fake passport.
RB: Yes, I have two thoughts. First of all, I'm actually very interested in who these people are who are returning, first of all. We hear numbers of 1,000 or thousands, and I'd be very curious to know how many are coming in to fight the good fight against the Americans for taking over Iraq, the story that we're hearing in the news. But we're also hearing stories of people going home because their parents are in Baghdad and they never had money to go home before or they thought they would be executed if they went home, and so they're going home now. So I think that's sort of an important story that's also out there, leaving a question of who actually is coming in.
But there is this fear that it becomes a new kind of Afghanistan, a drawing place. Here's where you need again the neighbors to be working with the US, and you need to make sure that you are building up an indigenous force within Iraq using forces that exist and trying to find a way to merge them. So those are going to be two important tasks.
Syria has control to some extent of who is coming in and who is not. To the extent that we say Syria is next, they open the floodgates. To the extent that we try to find a way to work with them and make sure that if they don't work with us they're paying some sort of price, we have some sort of people. Iran is going to use this to their advantage as well and they're going to push and prod to see what kind of influence they can have.
So I think the president was right when he was talking about state-sponsored terrorism and holding states responsible. I think we're going to hold Syria responsible for who is coming in and out, we'll hold those, but we do have to build ... be working with Iraqi forces, there's the Kurds in the North, there's the army as well, and finding a way to integrate them. Because I do think that is the answer for the future.
PWG: Next?
CR: Thank you. Christophe de Rocquefeuil, Agence France Presse. What kind of role do you see for the international community in a post-conflict Iraq? Do you believe that for example the UN should be a partner, as Secretary Powell suggested recently, or should the UN have a central role in the reconstruction and stabilization of the country as most UN countries are calling for? Thank you.
PWG: Rachel…
RB: Yeah, personally I think there is a very important role for the UN to play. But that role isn't clear. I think there is enormous room for a sort of good negotiation to come up with something that all parties can feel ... or parties can feel comfortable with.
Why I think the UN is so important, and I'll tell you why I think it's in US interest to use the UN, which is if you look at the State Department and the Defense Department and the sort of incredible battles that are going on between them, they actually agree on a lot. What they both agree on is you need a short-term American presence, and the French agree with this as well, they've made statements to this effect, that you need short-term coalition forces on the ground providing for law and order.
What they also agree on is we want to try to pull the US out and the coalition forces out as fast as possible. Where they disagree is in the middle stage. The Defense Department I think sees it that law and order, you want to get out fast so you quickly turn it over to the INC, and then you sort of go home. I think the State Department, what the State Department sees is if you do that it will look like a puppet government and it will fall, creating all the kinds of conflict and chaos that many have been predicting.
And so what you need to do is buy yourself some time between the first phase of the law and order and the third phase of turning it over for indigenous Iraqi control. And for the State Department that's where they see the UN, that the UN can actually buy you some time. It can buy you some legitimacy. It can give the Iraqis themselves time to figure out how they're going to incorporate the exiles into their political system as well as those who have lived in Iraq for so much time.
I think for the Defense Department and others they feel the UN was not helpful getting us here, and the UN hasn't done a particularly good job in places where it's had executive authority. And you hear them mentioning Kosovo or East Timor. I think the challenge for those of us advocating for a UN role is to try to figure out what's the next model that we can use. Where can the UN be useful and how do you work this in the structure? In some ways Afghanistan provides a hint of perhaps a direction to go in, where you have the Secretary General giving authority to a special representative to work closely with Iraqis. And that's very difficult than executive authority, what happened before.
The problem still is that the transition isn't easy. We haven't found a way to transition from international or UN control back to the indigenous population, and we're going to have to figure out again what the role is for the UN, because Mark found that the UNDP says they don't want to take this over. They're not good at it. There's a lot of things that they don't do very well. So the trick for those of us I think arguing for the UN is really what is the actual role other than just bringing in the humanitarian issues, which they're very good at doing.
PWG: Rachel, I'm going to add something to that, then that Najmaldin and Bill will want to say something. Well, it seems to me that there are several advantages to the UN. This legitimacy argument is not nothing. I mean, there is a blotter international community in the Arab world, in Europe, and possibly inside Iraq.
I was part of the UN mission in the East Timor government, which I actually think went very well. But I can tell you that after about three months, people get -- I think Bill you would say that in Kosovo -- they say, Great, we're so happy to be liberated. And then they say, Well, how come I don't have a job? How come security hasn't been restored? Where is my new car? All the things that they think are going to happen, that even if we devoted $100 billion to Iraq wouldn't happen. There is some advantage to having that aimed at the UN.
There are two other things that ... advantages to the UN. First, what's the final exit strategy. The final exit strategy is holding an election. If the UN does it nobody will question its legitimacy. Second, the UN actually does a very good job of holding elections in post-conflict situations.... had the misfortune of having to talk ... be the fellow in charge of elections in East Timor, trying to ... you know, they said, Why is an American talking to us about elections? (Laughter) But the UN does know how to run elections.
The final element is justice. There is an issue of what we're going to do if there are any survivors from this regime. And if we try them in military tribunals I think those will probably be fair trials. But I don't think very many other people will think that. I think the same thing is true for Iraqi tribunals. They could well be fair but they wouldn't be seen internationally as that. Whereas going to something like the Yugoslavia tribunal has the disadvantage of not having a death penalty, from the point of view of some people, but there is an overwhelming case. I think that case is worth making. Najmaldin?
NK: From the Kurdish perspective I think there is a reluctance for a UN role as an authority. We have had experience with the UN over the past ... over a decade. And the bureaucracy is just unbelievable. They are very slow. Actually we have also had an experience, which I hope nobody will interpret it as being prejudice against any group, but a lot of the UN personnel, particularly from Islamic and other countries, were dramatically prejudiced against the Kurds for being pro-American, for example. And they would slow things down. This is a fact of life.
As far as the State Department and the Defense, that you mentioned, you know, my own personal view unfortunately with the State Department, they are for status quo and they don't like to change. That is what probably got us into this, by supporting regimes of Saddam Hussein, of corrupt regimes of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and all of those, that has alienated the whole region from us. We had experience of Marcos, of the Shah of Iran, and all of those. It's always status quo dealing with an elite and ignoring the population and not knowing anything about them.
PWG: Bill?
WLN: First of all, we need to distinguish between the operations of the Security Council, 15 nations coming together to make a decision, and the administrative authority of the United Nations and the execution of peace-keeping operations and the like. I agree with it, the statement that it's less than the model of efficiency, but I would remind you that there is an advantage to legitimacy even if the UN muddles a bit.
But the other point I'd like to make is we continue to establish a series of self-fulfilling prophecies with respect to the UN performance. The Security Council Resolution 1244 for Kosovo was written in the last week of a 78-day war that was supposed to just last a week. And then we throw the UN in, in the mishmash of organizations and shared authority, give ... second guess them on about two-thirds of their decisions, and then throw rocks at them because they're not perfect.
In Bosnia, we threw out the UN civil administration baby with unpurified bath water. I would agree with Peter's assessment, self-aggrandizing assessment on East Timor (Laughter). But I would argue that the reason it worked so damn well is we didn't screw with it so much. And that was to our great advantage. Timor is a much smaller place and much less of a challenge than Iraq is, no doubt about it, but it worked pretty well. And they made it an independent country, Barania. So I think it's extremely short-sighted of the United States not to incorporate a larger role for the UN, to include a sooner rather than later transition of civil administration.
RB: Can I follow up on self-fulfilling prophecies? Because I think this is also important to how I think about where we are right now diplomatically. There was this notion that we wouldn't get Arab support, overt Arab support. We would get ... the neighbors would support us quietly, but there was no way to get them to publicly go on record and support us. So we didn't really try that hard.
What I found very interesting was when the president went to the UN on September 12th, 2002, he went to the UN, he made the case. The next day, so on September 13th, Mubarak of Egypt, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and Amarusa(?) of the Arab League, all came out with very public statements of support for going in after Saddam. That led me to believe what they had been saying all these times, we can help you if ... publicly if you go through the UN.
Now, some might not want their help for the reconstruction but the UN does provide legitimacy that makes our job a lot easier. We can create self-fulfilling prophecies by saying, They won't support and so why bother doing any of this? But I think the evidence suggests had we been able to work with the UN more constructively the whole international diplomacy of this, or of follow-on after the war would look very different.
PWG: General Rowney.
ER: Ed Rowney, former army officer, former arms comptroller. I'd like to bring General Nash back to the tactical situation. I also would like to ask Galbraith and the panelists to join in, if they like. It's got to do with urban warfare. A very provocative article in the Army Magazine this month ...
... I think you've read it, says that it's time to forget Sun Tzu, time to forget Clausewitz, time to forget…that they're wrong, that the situation has changed profoundly. They used to fight wars in open plains. And there were very few cities. Now there are lots of big cities and therefore we should think about fighting wars in cities. Now, I had some bad experiences in fighting in World War II, way before lots of you were born, fighting house to house in cities, and I have avoided cities. I don't expect Baghdad to become Napoleon's problem, or where the Russians burn it and run away.
On the other hand, I see tanks are rolling into Baghdad. And now had the Shi'ites and some of the Sunnis who are not with the regime all rallied to the US forces and dancing in the streets, you know. It would have been another problem. But I now hear intifada and I hear that the war is going to go on. And I guess the question is has this new intelligence domination, GPS and the accurate bombing of air and ground, and possibly fighting from wall to wall instead of from down the streets? Has this changed and should we be thinking of fighting in cities instead of fighting in open warfare? What's your view on that?
WLN: The article General Rowney refers to is the recent addition of Army Magazine and there is a saying from Sun Tzu is, ‘At all costs avoid cities.’ His basic argument in this article is you can't ignore cities anymore because cities ... our globe is cities, far more cities than non-cities engage in warfare.
You ignore, as you well know, Sir, Clausowitz at your peril in understanding the political objectives for which you fight. The issue I think that the United States needs to understand, and Baghdad is going to be the perfect example, and Basra even better maybe, is I think it does require an issue of patience and boldness in fighting in urban terrain. I think the bold move is to capture the palaces, to make the tank sweeps, is not ... is a brilliant operational technique, because it doesn't do the house to house. You run through who fights you and you limit the fight to those who are engaging you. You're strong enough to dominate that fight, and then move out. The seizing of palaces, generally open areas, is very good. But then it requires a patience.
What I've been trying to articulate to folks, and unfortunately reality on the ground had wore me out completely in the last 24 hours, that the issue is not Baghdad. The issue is the regime and the forces that protect the regime. So you don't fight what you don't need to fight. You're not trying to take Baghdad, you're trying to take down the regime. If you focus your power on those specific targets and are more patient in the development of your fight, and you're strong enough not to be threatened, and that's an advantage we have because of our armor and our precise fires and our capacity, then we need to approach urban warfare keeping our eye on the reason we're going there, not on the physical objective of the cities itself, and then later all that can be sorted out.
And oh, by the way, as you remember, the political objective for which we fight, all that contributes to it.
PWG: Just a quick observation, just from seeing these things. The one problem with all of this is intelligence. We can hit something very precisely but quite often ... it does seem quite often in intelligence as to what it is isn't right. I'm not sure that that's a solvable problem. I think they're just things that you may never know, why not…
WLN: Putting a tank round in the Palestine Hotel because one sniper fired at the United States was not a good move. Okay? I mean, having myself backed off from fights because there was civilians between me and the NVA, there's just sometimes it's better not to get in that fight.
PWG: Lionel?
LR: Lionel Rosenblatt, Refugees International. By the way, the other problem with that urban strategy that if it goes on too long the civilians begin to suffer. The water issue is of particular importance. If people begin to run out of water on a large scale, think of the logistical effort needed just to keep them alive. It'll have to happen very quickly, so we're concerned about that.
But I wanted to ask Najmaldin about ... an old friend from '91, about the Kirkuk situation a little more. You mentioned displaced people. We all know that many were displaced from Kirkuk. If there is not a sort of control on how they return, won't they be in direct conflict with the people who are in their homes now? And how is that supposed to work? I'm concerned they could become a real flashpoint for disorder. I don't know how many there are, but your observations would be interesting.
NK: First of all, from Kirkuk, according to the UN estimate where people come out and they give them card and all that, there are about 110,000. Our estimate is more, because a lot have come out and left actually, left Kurdistan and gone to other places. We are for orderly return of people. We are not for people going and just taking people out and go out and throw them out.
In 1991 really despite the fact that, you know yourself very well, the Kurds did not have an administration, an organization. But even then in 1991, when Kirkuk was liberated, not a single person was killed by the Kurds, Arabs or Turkomans or anybody for that matter. Actually, the only people who were killed when the government of Iraq took over Kirkuk again. So that, you know, there is history.
But a lot of the places just outside Kirkuk, the government has basically evicted the people for military bags(?) and the houses, some of them are destroyed, but those people are in tents. Those people can go back. There is no one to evict. They can go back to those places and live in those places.
As far as the city, we agree, there should be a process. Those who have been brought in as part of ‘Arabization’ they should eventually be sent back to where they came from, and given means of living and going on with their lives. But there are also people, you know, Arabs in the city, in the outskirts of the city, who have been there since the 1930s, during the first stage of ‘Arabization,’ believe it or not, it was during the monarchy after the oil was discovered. We're not for those people to be sent away or their places taken away, properties taken away. And we have a good history with those people. We have lived with them. We have a good relationship with them. No, I don't mean that we just go in and everybody has to leave. No.
PWG: Well, the hour of ten o'clock having arrived and the council adhering to a very strict rule on time, to the gratitude of its members. I unfortunately must call this panel to an end. But Bill, Rachel, Nasmaldin, thank you very much for your insights. A series to be continued.