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L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and Ali al-Sistani, de facto leader of Iraq's majority Shiites, have at least one thing in common: they are both preoccupied with what could prove to be the wrong issue.
Mr. Bremer advocates that Iraqis choose their new government through a complex system of caucuses. He is justifiably concerned that holding elections now, absent verified voter rolls and adequate security, could result in an outcome that would be seen by the losers as illegitimate, thereby exacerbating tensions within Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani is demanding direct elections to a national assembly prior to Iraq regaining sovereignty on July 1, no doubt in large part because the Shiites, for decades denied their fair place in Iraqi politics, would come out on top.
Yet both are placing too much emphasis on how the new leadership is to be chosen, and not enough on how they will govern. Elections are an essential element of a democracy, but hardly the only element. They are not even the most important. What matters most— indeed, what makes a democracy democratic— is the diffusion of power within government and society.
Governments require checks and balances— say, among an executive, a legislature, and an independent judiciary. But these cannot be limited to government; there also need to be checks and balances between government and society. Pluralism and a vibrant civil society including independent media, political parties, trade unions, business associations, and schools, are essential if a democracy is to endure. Democracy also requires that no ethnic group, gender, or class of people be excluded from the political process. Individual rights, including freedom of expression and worship, need to be protected.
Such guarantees are the stuff of constitutions. The most important question facing Iraq today is not whether its new government is elected, appointed, or chosen through some combination of the two. What matters is whether the new leaders will face limits in what they can do.
The Bush administration would be wise to drop its preoccupation with promoting an alternative to direct elections. This is not merely because the U.S. will be forced to give in to the ayatollah's demands, lest it find itself facing literally millions of angry Iraqis. The real reason is this: Even a textbook election can lead to ruin if those elected are able to govern without adequate constraint.
The Iraqi political process does include a requirement that an interim constitution— the "Transitional Administrative Law"— be in place by the end of February. But Iraq's current leaders only began to debate a draft a few days ago: it would be a minor miracle if consensus emerged on time. Not only are the issues controversial, but many politicians and their followers are distracted by the debate over elections.
It is time to shift the focus of U.S. and coalition efforts to constitutional arrangements. The goal is that Iraq succeed. Success requires that there be a modus vivendi among the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. This will only occur if a constitution manages to provide enough power to the majority while protecting the rights and interests of minorities. It also requires that the central government share power with regional and local officials -- and embrace a bill of rights. Unless the constitutional issue can be worked out, Iraq faces the possibility of bloody civil conflict, which would be sure to draw in Iraq's neighbors.
Much of what the U.S. and its allies have accomplished would be undone if this came to pass. What needs doing, then, is to get the U.N. into Iraq quickly so that its expertise can be brought to bear on the drafting of the interim constitution. It would help if the U.S. gave Ayatollah Sistani the elections he wants— in exchange for an agreement on the principles that would shape the way Iraq is governed. If doing this makes it necessary to relax the ambitious timetable for political transition, so be it. Better to get it done right than to meet artificial deadlines.
Mr. Haass, the State Department's Director of Policy Planning from 2001-2003, is president of the Council on Foreign Relations.


