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Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside

Authors: Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray
May/June 2006
Foreign Affairs


“Throughout of relative external peace for Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, in 1991, Saddam Hussein continued to receive and give credence to optimistic assessments of his regime’s prospects dished up by his top military officers. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz described the dictator as having been ‘very confident’ that the United States would not dare to attack Iraq, and that if it did, it would be defeated. What was the source of Saddam’s confidence?

Judging from his private statements, the single most important element in Saddam’s strategic calculus was his faith that France and Russia would prevent an invasion by the United States. According to Aziz, Saddam’s confidence was firmly rooted in his belief in the nexus between the economic interests of France and Russia and his own strategic goals: ‘France and Russia each secured millions of dollars worth of trade and service contracts in Iraq, with the implied understanding that their political posture with regard to sanctions on Iraq would be pro-Iraqi. In addition, the French wanted sanctions lifted to safeguard their trade and service contracts in Iraq. Moreover, they wanted to prove their importance in the world as members of the Security Council—that they could use their veto to show they still had power.’”

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