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Last week, when a suicide bombing at a club in Israel brought a sudden end to a meeting between President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that had been intended to bring the warring sides closer to peace, I was reminded of a lesson I learned long ago: You can't judge a battle from afar. From a distance the spiraling violence in the Middle East seems incomprehensible. Only by walking the ground, by talking to those who were there can you get a real understanding of what conflict is about.

Two weeks ago I was given the chance to do just that -- to break through the confusion and condemnations and take part in a United Nations fact-finding mission aimed at piecing together what had happened in Jenin during the Israeli incursion into the Palestinian refugee camp last month. But instead of achieving that goal, our mission ended in further frustration and controversy. My chance appeared to come when I received a call during a Saturday morning drive in the Virginia countryside. It was the chief of staff to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan on the line: Would I serve as the senior military member of a team reviewing the events in Jenin? I knew basically what was happening: The Palestinians were accusing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) of having committed a "massacre," while the Israelis countered that the camp was a nest of suicide bombers, and that their own actions were appropriate given the nature of the threat and the difficult conditions they encountered.

I spent the next couple of days getting my marching orders, and fielding calls of congratulations, advice and commiseration. One friend even told me to turn down the offer, saying I would be tarred by the experience. But I was ready to go. By Wednesday, I was on my way to Geneva with a ticket to fly to Tel Aviv on Thursday. It felt like the Army again. And, like the Army, it turned into "hurry up and wait." We were delayed by the first of many Israeli concerns.

The first day or two in Geneva were useful. Within days, my military team added British and French army officers with experience in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and Africa. Members from the Irish police had counterterrorist and investigative expertise and had worked in Cambodia, Namibia and Yugoslavia. Our Finnish forensic pathologist was renowned for her work in Bosnia and Kosovo. All 20 of us were seasoned veterans of war, as well as ethnic and civil conflicts throughout the world.

We began an extensive review of published accounts of recent events in Israel and the occupied territories in order to develop an understanding of the larger war as it applied to Jenin. We also received a number of background briefings from representatives of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who had been on the ground in Jenin before, during and after the fighting. Our goal was to develop a comprehensive plan for collecting information in the field. The plan we came up with was specifically designed to avoid the possibility of relying on preconceived conclusions.

However, by the end of the first week, Israel's need for clarification turned to obstruction and then to blockage. Our mood in turn changed from bemusement to frustration to anger.

We followed the debates in New York and Jerusalem with interest. There was so much misinformation about our intentions, about who we were and about whether our backgrounds predisposed us to misunderstand military necessities or the tragic circumstances of urban warfare. Several Israeli politicians said they were convinced that our mission would lead to unfair war crimes charges against their soldiers. Our own impression was different: As a team under the wise and balanced leadership of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, our success or failure would depend on all of us contributing to the effort with impartiality and the perspective born of our experience.

From time to time we were consulted on how to deal with Israeli concerns about both the procedures and the substance of our mission. Former president Ahtisaari's replies were always intended to resolve the confrontation: No, we would not provide conclusions, just facts; yes, we would give the report to the parties before its publication. But it soon became clear that the Israelis were fundamentally hostile to the very concept of finding out what had happened in Jenin. When the secretary general informed the Security Council that he could not overcome Israel's objections, the council could not or would not help him fulfill its resolution calling for the fact-finding team. The role of the U.S. government in abandoning the resolution it had sponsored was an even greater disappointment.

What is most interesting is that when the public debate in Israel is added to reports from the international media and NGOs, a fairly consistent picture of Israeli concerns begins to emerge. It appears to me that the leadership of the IDF was worried that the conduct of the battle of Jenin would be questioned on both professional and legal grounds. These are indeed grounds that deserve further exploration.

First, there are many indications that the Israeli units sent into battle were hastily assembled and given little time to plan, prepare and rehearse for their attack. Their intelligence about the Jenin refugee camp was insufficient to support the deliberate, measured attack that circumstances required. Inadequate measures were established to handle the 13,000 people living in the camp, some armed and dangerous; some unarmed, but sympathetic to and supportive of the armed Palestinians; and some true noncombatants. The IDF seems to have underestimated the intensity of the resistance that it would face.

Second, I believe from the multiple sources I have read and listened to in the past two weeks that there is reasonable cause to examine a number of alleged violations of the laws of war, as provided in the Hague Convention of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 protocols to those Geneva Conventions. (Although the United States and Israel are not party to the 1977 protocols, many of the rules reflect customary international law or derive from the rules of the 1949 conventions, by which both countries are bound.)

Most importantly, these concerns about war crimes apply to both the armed Palestinians and the Israeli forces.

For the Palestinians, the indications of violations include their placing armed forces and facilities within densely populated areas, attempting to use noncombatants to render specific locations or areas immune from military attack, using indiscriminate booby traps and, of course, carrying out terrorist attacks on civilian targets throughout Israel.

On the Israeli side, several issues come to mind: Were the noncombatant populations in Jenin given adequate warnings? Were appropriate measures taken to evacuate and protect those people? Was the force used by the IDF on a number of occasions excessive? Were noncombatants used as shields by IDF soldiers? And what about the IDF's failure to allow a search for the dead and wounded and to allow free passage of medical personnel and vehicles?

All of these issues need to be examined and the truth revealed, for better or worse. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians need more myths created or unfounded charges added to their already heavy burden of history.

Little more than a week after my return, as I listen to the news of further attacks in the Mideast, I remain convinced that a factual account of what happened in the Jenin refugee camp would have helped lessen that burden and, by replacing speculation and accusation with fact, might even have helped to prevent further tragedy. The journalists and others who have visited Jenin in recent weeks say the initial Palestinian allegations of a massacre were overblown. But some also add that there were violations of the laws of war. That is why it would be better for all concerned for the facts to come out in an official report from a neutral group such as ours.

After our fact-finding mission was finally abandoned at the beginning of this month, we sat at the airport with a feeling of overwhelming frustration. We had the leadership, the experience and the right plan. But rather than having helped in uncovering the facts that could have dampen emotions, our thwarted mission only added to the controversy.

William Nash, a retired Army major general, is director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. A shorter version of this article appeared in the International Herald Tribune.