Kim Jong-il's death has prompted discussion about the future of the isolated country and its nuclear weapons program. Experts cited in this CFR Backgrounder believe a post-Kim regime in North Korea would remain a tough nuclear negotiator.

Frank G. Klotz, Susan J. Koch, and Franklin C. Miller argue that as the United States and Russia continue to reduce long-range, strategic nuclear weapons to increasingly lower levels, a disparity in tactical nuclear weapons has serious implications for the overall nuclear balance between the two countries and the continued efficacy of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for its allies.

Matthew H. Kroenig argues that the world will not be safer if the United States had no nuclear weapons.

Stephen Sestanovich testifies before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee that, though the U.S. and Russia restored broadly cooperative ties after 2008, the relationship is marked by lingering frustration and even friction.

Is reducing the world's nuclear arsenals to zero possible, or even desirable?

How would the Israeli defense establishment respond if Iran went nuclear?

Jonathan Pearl says that with the New START treaty entering into force, next steps must begin now for the U.S. to achieve further bilateral nuclear reductions with Russia.

This Working Paper reviews different possible Iranian nuclear capabilities, examining the conditions under which Iran should be considered a genuinely nuclear-capable power. It also assesses the regional and global consequences of a nuclear-capable and nuclear-armed Iran.

Following U.S. ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, join Rose E. Gottemoeller, Steven Pifer, and Micah Zenko for a discussion of the next steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear cooperation.

Following U.S. ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, Rose E. Gottemoeller, Steven Pifer, and Micah Zenko discuss the next steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear cooperation, in particular with regard to missile defense cooperation and the new "123 Agreement."

Following U.S. ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, Rose E. Gottemoeller, Steven Pifer, and Micah Zenko discuss the next steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear cooperation, in particular with regard to missile defense cooperation and the new "123 Agreement."

All previous attempts at total nuclear disarmament have failed, as strategic logic and state interest have prevailed over wishful thinking. A similar fate awaits Global Zero, the newest disarmament movement, for similar reasons.

Michael A. Levi discusses the New START treaty.

Jonathan Pearl cautions that the Obama administration should be careful not to place too much weight on the new START treaty as a stepping stone toward deep nuclear force reductions and global nuclear disarmament.

Micah Zenko argues that controlling U.S. and Russian supplies of tactical nuclear weapons would reduce the potential for nuclear terrorism, decrease the perceived threat to U.S. allies, and maintain momentum toward President Obama's goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

The independent Arms Control Association (ACA) today released the 2009-2010 report card on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, concluding that the current global institutions are "neither on the verge of crumbling nor on the cusp of success."

What comes after the New START treaty? A follow-on treaty should limit the U.S. and Russia to 1,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, says this CFR report.

With the U.S. Senate set to consider ratification of President Obama's new nuclear nonproliferation strategy, four experts assess the strengths and weaknesses of the New START agreement.

Is it too late to convince North Korea and Iran to dismantle their nuclear programs?