Judged by the standard of protecting U.S. interests, things have worked out quite well for the Obama administration; judged by the standard of midwifing a new global order, they remain a work in progress.

Intervening militarily to save lives abroad often sounds good on paper, but the record has not been promising.

The bold visions of Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and John Mearsheimer, however powerful, do not hold up as reliable predictors of particular developments.

George Herring's well-written and lively book may turn out to be one of the last attempts by a leading scholar to compress a comprehensive and comprehensible account of the United States' foreign relations into a single volume.

One of the most important figures in Obama's administration will be his national security adviser. An examination of past advisers shows how to get the job right—or wrong.

If it hopes to achieve its foreign policy agenda, the Obama administration will need to undo the damage to the Foreign Service wrought by the Bush administration.

To avoid some of the mistakes from past Israeli-Palestinian peace processes, the Obama administration should consult Martin Indyk's insider account.

To be successful in the Middle East, the Obama administration will need to move beyond Iraq, find ways to deal constructively with Iran, and forge a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

During Richard Nixon's first term, when I served as secretary of defense, we withdrew most U.S. forces from Vietnam while building up the South's ability to defend itself. The result was a success -- until Congress snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by cutting off funding for our ally in 1975. Washington should follow a similar strategy now, but this time finish the job properly.

Public support for the war in Iraq has followed the same course as it did for the wars in Korea and Vietnam: broad enthusiasm at the outset with erosion of support as casualties mount. The experience of those past wars suggests that there is nothing President Bush can do to reverse this deterioration -- or to stave off an "Iraq syndrome" that could inhibit U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.

This module features teaching notes by Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, coauthors of America Between the Wars, along with other resources to supplement the text. In this CFR book, Mr. Chollet and Dr. Goldgeier explore how the decisions and debates of the years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Twin Towers shaped the world we live in today.

The first full history of the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, revealing why the alliance was formed and what we stand to lose if it collapses.

In 1945, the United States was the founding impulse behind the cornerstones of the international community: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. At that time, American ideals were perceived to coincide with American actions, intended to expand social, legal, and economic protections around the world. Sixty years later, “Anti-America” has spread into a global phenomenon, crossing borders, classes, ideologies, religions, and generations.

Russia, once seen as America ’s greatest adversary, is now viewed by the United States as a potential partner. This module traces the evolution of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union , and later Russia , during the tumultuous and uncertain period following the end of the cold war. It examines how American policy-makers coped with the opportunities and challenges presented by the new Russia.

The United States has had a more successful foreign policy than any other great power in history. Council Senior Fellow Walter Russell Mead attributes this unprecedented success (as well as recurring problems) to a vigorous interplay among four powerful political traditions that have shaped foreign policy since the Revolution. The tension among these competing forces guides American foreign policy toward prudent action. Mead argues that the United States is successful because its strategy is rooted in Americans’ concrete interests, which value trade and commerce as much as military security.