How would an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability affect U.S. policy in the Middle East? In this discussion paper, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Mitchell B. Reiss enumerates several strategic choices that would face U.S. regional allies and the adverse implications for U.S. interests.
How would the Arab states of the Middle East react if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapons capability? In this Working Paper, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Michael Young explores the possible impact of a nuclear Iran on Arab governments' self-perceptions, relations with Iran, relations with one another, and relations with non-Arab actors in the region such as the United States and Turkey. Young concludes that an Iranian nuclear weapon would threaten to drastically alter the regional status quo, empower Iran and its allies, and provoke sectarian reactions from some Arab states.
From a military perspective, what would be required for a containment scheme to successfully deter a nuclear Iran? In this Working Paper, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Kenneth M. Pollack presents formal and informal structures requisite to effectively deter a postnuclear Iran. Pollack's robust recommendations take into consideration important lessons learned during the Cold War.
Given the nature and structure of its government, is it possible to contain an Iran with nuclear weapons? In this discussion paper, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Frederick W. Kagan explores the applicability of deterrence--from a historic and theoretical perspective--to the Iranian regime. Kagan concludes that for numerous structural and strategic reasons, it is impossible to assess with any confidence that the Islamic Republic with nuclear weapons could be contained or deterred.
Iran's elite displayed more unity in supporting the nuclear fuel-swap deal backed by Brazil and Turkey than it did with a similar deal last year and appears intent on trying to solve the nuclear crisis, says analyst Farideh Farhi.
The UN Security Council will maintain pressure on Iran to cease its uranium enrichment program if it moves forward with sanctions, but that won't likely change Tehran's course, writes CFR's Richard N. Haass.
The nuclear fuel-swap agreement announced in Tehran put the United States in a bind. Contrary to its sponsors' intentions, it will not improve confidence between the United States and Iran, writes CFR's Michael Levi.
It is not yet clear whether a Brazil-brokered deal will complicate or help resolve the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. CFR's Matias Spektor says either way a newly assertive Brazil is likely to remain a lead player in diplomacy on this issue.
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