Iran's nuclear ambitions are likely driven by multiple factors, from security concerns to domestic polices. However, political competition within Iran, rather than Israel's nuclear capabilities, plays a more significant role in driving Iran's nuclear ambition.

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The United States tried to convince Israel to join the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) when the treaty was first introduced and before it was widely believed that Israel had nuclear weapons. The NPT's objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and further the goal of universal disarmament.

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Ray Takeyh warns that the West is falling into a diplomacy trap set by Iranian clerics regarding the nuclear Non-Prolifieration Treaty (NPT).

Since the discovery of illicit Iranian nuclear facilities in 2002, the United States has sought to mobilize an international coalition to address the Iranian nuclear challenge through various coercions and incentives. UN member states agree that Iran is entitled to a civilian nuclear program for purposes of energy generation, but they require assurances that such a program is not going to be misused for military purposes.

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Ray Takeyh calls for "a more imaginative re-conceptualization of the existing diplomatic paradigm," between the United States and Iran.

Participants discuss possible U.S. policy approaches to Iran's nuclear program and the recently concluded talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

World powers are now offering to ease sanctions on Iran if it agrees to halt its most sensitive nuclear activity. Expert Daryl Kimball urges a full diplomatic press to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons line.

A take-it-or-leave-it deal by the United States on the nuclear issue is the wrong strategy, says Ray Takeyh.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made these remarks at a meeting with Iran's air force on February 7, 2013, responding to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's offer of direct talks about Iran's nuclear program.

In the nuclear dispute between Iran and the United States, a grand bargain is unlikely given the level of mistrust between the two parties. What's more realistic is a modest compromise that breaches the wall of mistrust and potentially sets the stage for further-reaching arms control measures, says Ray Takeyh.

Halting Iran's progress toward a bomb will require the United States to make credible promises and credible threats simultaneously -- an exceedingly difficult trick to pull off.

The IAEA Board released the Director General's quarterly report on progress of the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran, on November 16, 2012. The report provides an update on the nuclear situation in Iran since the last report of August 2012.

The drawn-out talks between Iran and the P5 +1 nations over Iran's nuclear program are expected to resume after the U.S. presidential elections, says veteran arms control expert Daryl Kimball.

In the case of Iran, Richard N. Haass says, "Diplomacy needs to be move faster if is not to be overtaken by Iran's march to a nuclear weapon—and, with it, by the West's march to conflict."

Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi discusses Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East.

Micah Zenko says even though telling the United States that it should be more scared of Iran has failed so far, Israeli officials will continue to sound the alarm about a nuclear-armed Tehran, with the ultimate objective of changing America's threat perception.

Though Iran might be capable of making a nuclear weapon soon, whether it has decided to is up for debate and calls into question the pressure for immediate military action, says expert David Albright.

Ray Takeyh argues, "The United States will make genuine progress with Iran only when moderate leaders assume greater control of the state. An interim accord may provide time, but that time must be used to broaden the contours of Iran's political system."

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave this statement regarding Iran on September 14, 2012.

A nuclear-armed Iran would not make the Middle East more secure, argues Colin Kahl; it would yield more terrorism and pose a risk of a nuclear exchange.