How would the Israeli defense establishment respond if Iran went nuclear?

Jonathan Pearl says that with the New START treaty entering into force, next steps must begin now for the U.S. to achieve further bilateral nuclear reductions with Russia.

Ray Takeyh says that the most effective means of disarming the Islamic Republic is to invest in the Green Movement in Iran.

This Working Paper reviews different possible Iranian nuclear capabilities, examining the conditions under which Iran should be considered a genuinely nuclear-capable power. It also assesses the regional and global consequences of a nuclear-capable and nuclear-armed Iran.

Jonathan Pearl says that in the wake of the uprisings in the Middle East the United States must not neglect the issue of nuclear nonproliferation.

Richard A. Falkenrath discusses Stuxnet and the need for the United States to engage in offensive information warfare.

As nuclear talks between Iran and major powers resume, the moment is ripe for a U.S.-led diplomatic offensive, backed by economic incentives, to persuade Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program, says CFR's Matthew Fuhrmann.

This New York Times article by William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger examines the development and impact of the Stuxnet computer worm in undermining Iran's nuclear program.

Following U.S. ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, join Rose E. Gottemoeller, Steven Pifer, and Micah Zenko for a discussion of the next steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear cooperation.

Following U.S. ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, Rose E. Gottemoeller, Steven Pifer, and Micah Zenko discuss the next steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear cooperation, in particular with regard to missile defense cooperation and the new "123 Agreement."

Following U.S. ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, Rose E. Gottemoeller, Steven Pifer, and Micah Zenko discuss the next steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear cooperation, in particular with regard to missile defense cooperation and the new "123 Agreement."

Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser warn against the dangers of the hysteria over nuclear weapons and blackmail that underlies the calls for military force against Iran.

Max Boot discusses the use of covert action and secret warfare to fight terrorism and weapons proliferation.

Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz explain how, "The damage done by rogue Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's network show that nations must put aside their individual interests to stop proliferation."

All previous attempts at total nuclear disarmament have failed, as strategic logic and state interest have prevailed over wishful thinking. A similar fate awaits Global Zero, the newest disarmament movement, for similar reasons.

It is unclear how a nuclear-armed Iran would weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of brinkmanship, meaning that it could be difficult to deter Tehran from attacking the United States' interests or partners in the region.

Micah Zenko argues that New START is a good step forward for limiting strategic nuclear weapons, but the proliferation and deployment of tactical nukes is a serious, and unaddressed, problem.

Support of the U.S. national security establishment was crucial in gaining Senate ratification of New START, but follow-on arms control agreements with Russia face a tough road, says CFR's Stephen Sestanovich.

The New START treaty is due for a ratification vote today, clearing the way for future arms reductions talks with Russia along with continuing political battles over arms control.

Joshua Kurlantzick says, "The junta might be building nukes--but is the United States doing anything about it?"