The Administration has given the Syrian opposition more than six hundred and fifty million dollars in nonmilitary aid, but Obama has consistently opposed arming the rebels or intervening militarily on their behalf. The United States has taken a tenuous position: not deep enough to please the rebels or its allies in Europe, or to topple the regime, or to claim leadership in the war's aftermath—but also, perhaps most important, not so deep that it can't get out.

Obama is right not to rush to war, given our checkered past on the use of chemical weapons and the sinkhole of hatreds in Syria, writes Leslie H. Gelb.

Scott A. Snyder outlines five things to know about the increase in threats from North Korea.

The success of a UN investigation into an alleged chemical weapons attack in Aleppo province last week will depend on a number of factors and could prove inconclusive, says CFR's Gregory Koblentz.

A take-it-or-leave-it deal by the United States on the nuclear issue is the wrong strategy, says Ray Takeyh.

Director General Amano discusses challenges facing the IAEA, including action plans for global nuclear safeguards and security.

Director General Amano discusses challenges facing the IAEA, including action plans for global nuclear safeguards and security.

Graham Allison ("The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50," July/August 2012) seems to believe that U.S. President John F. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis was an unalloyed success.

Michael A. Levi and Micah Zenko say nuclear terrorism, however unlikely, is one of the few prospects that could truly devastate the USA, and there are still steps that the U.S. can take to reduce the odds of a catastrophic attack.

Micah Zenko says even though telling the United States that it should be more scared of Iran has failed so far, Israeli officials will continue to sound the alarm about a nuclear-armed Tehran, with the ultimate objective of changing America's threat perception.

A nuclear-armed Iran would not make the Middle East more secure, argues Colin Kahl; it would yield more terrorism and pose a risk of a nuclear exchange.

This week's latest round of Iran talks seems to have done little to reconcile the two sides on the country's nuclear position, says CFR's Michael A. Levi.

U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that a nuclear-armed Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. In fact, by creating a more durable balance of military power in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran would yield more stability, not less.

This week's nuclear talks ended without resolving the issue of uranium enrichment, leaving Iran to potentially face tougher sanctions, says CFR's Ray Takeyh.

Jamie Fly and Matthew Kroenig argue that drawing red lines linked to the guaranteed use of force by Washington and its allies could be the best way to avoid conflict with Iran.

In his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Ray Takeyh discusses the conflicting priorities of Iran's Supreme Leader. Khamenei needs America as an enemy and a robust nuclear infrastructure to legitimize his rule. Yet, these enmities only further erode his economy and potentially threaten his hold on power.

When it comes to Iran's nuclear program, then, the United States and its allies should get out of the way and let Iran's worst enemies -- its own leaders -- gum up the process on their own.

In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Scott Snyder argues that the United States should redouble its efforts to shape North Korea's strategic environment rather than try to identify the right combination of carrots and sticks to be used in a negotiation with Pyongyang.

Steven A. Cook states that Iran's development of a nuclear weapon won't spur its neighbors to get the bomb.

The White House released this statement on March 27, 2012 during the U.S.' participation in the nuclear security summit in Seoul, South Korea.