Enlightened Imperialism Could Save Liberia

Author: Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies
July 28, 2003
USA Today

The Bush administration is understandably loath to intervene in Liberia. The U.S. military is overstretched and there doesn't appear to be much of a national security stake there. But that doesn't mean we have to sit by and watch another Rwanda-style massacre unfold. There's an alternative to either large-scale intervention or inaction: Follow the example of the British Empire.

During the 19th century, the British were constantly intervening, from Africa to Tibet, where their national security interest was fairly minimal. With a small army garrisoned around the world, Britain didn't have many troops to spare. Its solution: Use non-British enlisted men led by British officers.

There were many such outfits. In 1881, the Indian Army had fewer than 70,000 British troops and more than 125,000 "natives," the most famous being the Gurkhas. And when Maj. Gen. Horatio Herbert Kitchener invaded the Sudan in 1898, most of his forces were Egyptian and Sudanese.

The recent war in Afghanistan showed how effective such an approach could be today. The Taliban were toppled and al-Qaeda routed by no more than 300 special operations troops. Air power gets much of the credit, but also vital was the fact that the commandos directed Northern Alliance soldiers, who deftly exploited the impact of precision-guided munitions.

Trainers vs. fighters

Yet we have been slow to use this approach elsewhere, for fear of body bags coming home. Normally, when Special Forces "A teams" are sent abroad, their job is limited to training local armed forces. They do this around the world, from Nigeria to the Philippines to Colombia. They are excellent trainers. But their impact is diminished because they are usually forbidden to go into battle with their students. They chafe at this, and sometimes scheme to go on "training exercises" that just happen to draw enemy fire. But, by and large, the Green Berets do as they're told, because Washington policymakers are deathly afraid of another Vietnam-like quagmire.

The result is that local troops aren't nearly as effective as they could be. We're now confronting this in West Africa. The Clinton administration used Special Forces to train Nigerian, Ghanaian, Sengalese and many other troops, hoping they would take over the peacekeeping responsibilities the U.S. doesn't want. But that hasn't produced a combat-ready force that could go into Liberia and impose law and order. Once again, the call goes out for U.S. intervention.

The United States should tell the nations of Africa: You provide the men; we'll provide the logistics and the leadership. Only if several countries provide soldiers willing to take orders from Americans should the U.S. intervene.

Such a force would be far more effective than sending in West African peacekeepers by themselves, and far cheaper than sending a lot of U.S. combat units.

The second stage

Once the civil war is over, the problem of peacekeeping arises. Nation building is a massive commitment, and the United States barely has the resources to handle Iraq, much less any other spot.

The British Empire again provides the answer: Turn Liberia and other failed states into international protectorates. Bring in a foreign administration, probably under United Nations auspices, of the kind used in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia during the past decade. Keep the Special Forces there to train a Liberian military able to preserve stability.

This sort of enlightened imperialism, dressed up in multilateral clothing, is the only thing that can protect the people of Liberia, and many other countries, from the predations of local warlords. And it needn't be a huge commitment. A few professional soldiers can make a big difference against ragtag opposition. The Taiping Rebellion ravaged China from 1851 to 1864. The Manchu government was unable to end the onslaught, so merchants hired mercenaries. It took only a few years for the "Ever-Victorious Army," led by Charles Gordon, an officer loaned by Her Majesty's Army, to rout the Taipings.

Liberia doesn't need the 82nd Airborne today. It needs its own "Chinese" Gordon.


Max Boot, Olin senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, is a member of USA TODAY's board of contributors.