Print
Email
Share
presented at
Chatham House
London, England
12 September 2003
by
Rachel Bronson, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies
Council on Foreign Relations
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this august institution. Now is an appropriate time to reconsider US policy toward the Middle East, as it seems to be currently in flux after the President’s speech on Sunday. The violence of the summer, the ongoing political, economic and particularly military challenges, have shown that some of the more ambitious expectations for Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and the greater Middle East, will not be met. A 60-90 day occupation is a figment of history. Iraq’s oil self-financing reconstruction is all but a fantasy. Forcing changes inside the Palestinian leadership alone, will not quell violence. Security in Kabul is not synonymous with security in Afghanistan. The President’s speech may in fact be a harbinger of a changing approach, and we will have to watch carefully. I will therefore spend my time today closely considering it.
But first, let me begin by pointing out that US policy today is nothing like what one would have anticipated when the President took office. Then, the Israel-Palestinian issue was deemed a small regional problem, something not worthy of super power involvement, and something the region would have to work out on its own. Afghanistan was the subject of a new set of white papers, to be officially released by the Administration sometime in the fall or winter of 2001/2002. China and Russia were to be this Administration’s main focus, with Europe perhaps a distant 3rd. And certainly post-conflict reconstruction was not a serious issue. The Defense Department in fact viewed it as wasted resources, someone else’s responsibility, and only briefly touched on it in the quadrennial defense review, a mandated report. The one place where things are perhaps as expected is in Iraq. The Administration campaigned on it, as was committed to a much more aggressive Iraq policy than the Clinton Administration. This is a controversial statement, as I am among the minority of analysts who see very little linkage to Iraq and September 11th, but I believe the evidence bares me out. If you are interested, we can discuss this view further in Q&A.
But, now, the Middle East has become “the central front” in the Administration’s foreign policy considerations, and nation-building, post-conflict reconstruction, stability operations, whatever one wants to call them a pressing issue. It is absorbing extraordinary amounts of time and resources.
The President, in fact, has embarked on one of the most breathtaking nation-building campaigns in modern American history. Not since Truman and the Marshall Plan has an American president set such an ambitious agenda. From Afghanistan to Iraq to Palestine in particular, and the Middle East and Muslim world in general, the President is embarked on a awesome journey to take on radicalism through the promotion of democracy, eliminate abhorrent religious and secular regimes and encourage grass root economic initiatives.
But few presidencies have been less equipped to succeed in this task and at the moment the President risks losing the peace in Afghanistan, Iraq after winning the wars, and leaving the Israeli-Palestinian situation worse than he found it. It is important to remember that in his bid to become president, Bush and his team campaigned on basically three foreign policy issues.
1. bringing change to Iraq,
2. no nation-building, and
3. as a subset to no nation-building, pulling troops out of the Balkans.
The “yes” to Iraq, and “no” to nation-building, is the conundrum that the Administration faces in Iraq. After taking office, the President distanced himself from the anemic programs the Clinton Administration had devised to take on new emerging responsibilities. Only in the late summer of 2002 did the Administration begin to draft post-conflict reconstruction plans for Iraq, and only in January was General Jay Gardner put in charge of the effort. To this day, our commitment has been under resourced, poorly staffed (civilian and military) and strategically under-developed.
That being said, it is important that you know, that I strongly supported the war, and actively lobbied for it. There is little doubt in my mind that this was right for the Iraq, the region, international interest, and American national security. While I argued with the Administration over the timing of it, I believed then, and believe now that the best diplomatic course was to fight this war now, in the Fall, rather than rushing to conflict in the late Spring and thus losing even the chance for greater international support. Nonetheless, the UN inspectors were gravely concerned about unaccounted for weapons of mass destruction. In a report to the UN Hans Blix challenged "mustard gas is not marmalade. You keep track of how much mustard gas you produce." Saddam was adamant that we believe he had them. Intelligence agencies in the US, UK, Germany, Israel and to a lesser extent France and Russia believed he had them. Our difference was over how imminent the threat was, and the means for dealing with it, not the threat itself. Containment I believe was an immoral policy, torturing the weak to benefit the strong; that Saddam was an exceedingly destabilizing force in a region that requires a modicum of stability; and that all other non-military means had been tried. Anti-Americanism was on the rise in the region due to the ugly policy of Containment, it was simply not sustainable. Those arguing for continued Containment, were not willing to put up the forces necessary to achieve its success. I do not second-guess my support.
And in my view, as an American, I believe our policy was made slightly better by the subtle influences of Tony Blair who was the only reason we even tried to go through the UN and who tried to soften the roughest edges of this rough-edged American Administration.
Today I have heard those who still believe this was a war for oil. Oil plays into the Iraq equation, of course, because it lubricates the international economy and we require a relatively stable Middle East in order to assure its flow. But if oil was the primary driver of American policy in the region, the easiest and cheapest policy was for us simply to lift sanctions on Libya, Iran and Iraq, and let the oil flow. It would have been far cheaper. War was hardly the best policy. If oil drove American foreign policy, we would have a very different policy toward Venezuala and toward Israel. We would have stayed in Kuwait to run its oil fields in 1991. In fact, before the war it was impossible to judge whether the war would lead to higher oil prices or lower oil prices. The logic of the argument that this is/was a war for oil, I must confess, escapes me.
Before launching in to the problems and challenges let me spend a moment on things that went well and things that have positively surprised me. During the war, oil wells were not torched, inter-ethnic fighting remained contained (even after the recent bombing in Najaf), the neighbors have been largely kept out, Israel wasn’t attacked, the Arab world was not compelled to join the fight, and neighboring states like Jordan did not collapse. In much of the country, some semblance of normalcy is returning, and a new school year will begin for Iraqi children.
In Afghanistan, Karzai is still in power, still struggling, but still there. The Taliban are out of power and a new offensive is continuing to challenge their presence. In Palestine, the post of Prime Minister has been established and an internationally respected finance minister installed, a demand shared by the Israelis, Americans, Palestinians and Europeans. However, many of these successes have been squandered rather than built upon largely because there is no strategic context, no strategy for success, that links the successes in a coherent way, or helps build momentum.
The one thing that has truly surprised me is the measure of nimbleness the Administration has shown over the last 5 months. When General Gardner’s efforts were failing, the Administration quickly removed him and his entire team and sent in Jerry Bremmer. When their anemic resourcing of reconstruction became obviously problematic, the Administration switched to they eye-popping call for more resources. The Administration has shown itself able to switch horses mid-course when reality demands it. This has been overlooked by much of the commentary on the President’s team.
THAT BEING SAID, LETS TURN TO THE SPEECH.
The President’s speech on Sunday marked a potential, and I stress potential, turning point in the Administration’s approach to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as America’s role in the world.
$87 billion
In putting forward this eye-popping number, the President is finally coming clean with the American people about what a reconstruction plan costs. It includes
a. $65.5 billion directed to the armed forces ($51 billion for Iraq, pursuing remnants of the regime and foreign terrorists inside Iraq.)
b. $15 billion toward rebuilding Iraq
c. $5 billion toward building its security forces (border guard)
d. $800 million in new spending for civilian programs in Afghanistan
Such funds should have a marked affect on the lives of average Iraqis and should begin to help build support domestically. Had this figure been offered earlier (and the amounts could and should have been predicted), the United States and Britain would not be facing such frustration from the Iraqi people and may have more information about the enemies now threatening Iraq.
The enormous amount will allow us to go to next month’s donors conference in Madrid in a serious capacity. Its not to say Madrid will be easy. In fact it will be a hard-fought slog. The United States is asking the international community to contribute the $50-75 billion required to address Iraq’s reconstruction, minus the $15 billion US contribution. Still, that we are now contribution 20-25% is significant. Had we gone into Madrid with the 5% we up until recently had been contributing, we would have been rightfully laughed out of the room. But as Iraq is an international problem, there should be an international contribution, an argument I will be happy to defend in Q&A.
Full circle on nation-building
The President’s $87 billion request sets aside money for Afghanistan as well as Iraq. The two are now joined as key foreign policy priorities. The President has committed himself to succeeding in both places. President Karzai’s fear that Afghanistan would be marginalized as a result of Iraq appears to be unfounded. The stability and success of both countries is of major American interest.
After the President’s speech it is now clear that nation-building is a central component of the Administration’s foreign policy. Money, soldiers, and policemen are required. At least this begins to address the money component. After this experience, it will no longer be possible for any American leader to deny the role of nation-building as a major part of our security policy. There will be no constituency for it. Both Democrats and Republicans have engaged in it. No one has been able to ignore it. This should lead to a major rethinking about America’s role in the world and the capabilities needed.
Internationalization
In his speech, the President left open the possibility for internationalizing the problem of Iraq. The Europeans should jump on this opening. I agree with those who say that Iraq should be internationalized, that a joint effort is more likely to lead to success.
However, I am frustrated. The Europeans, and in particular the French who are putting forward a joint French-German proposal, aren’t providing any incentives for us to listen to them. Neither side is helping themselves. We want help, but won’t give up full control. The French and others want internationalization but they’re not giving anything. At least the Pakistanis and the Indians up until recently were saying that if you get the United Nations Security Council, we’ll provide the troops.
These are some of the positive signals that the President’s speech suggested. However there were also some areas that caused me concern.
The money that the President will request is still short of a Marshall Plan. In current dollars, the United States put $97 billion into Europe at the end of World War II, most of it coming in the first two years of the plan’s timeframe. $12 billion went to Germany, which is comparable to the $15 billion the United States is proposing for Iraq. But the rest went to the reconstruction of Europe, technical assistance programs, reform, etc. Of the $87 billion proposed by the President, $65 billion is going to the US military. We still have to design a wider Middle Eastern reform package. This is something America can only achieve with help from Europe. The transatlantic relationship is as important to this end as ever.
Also, in his speech, the President limited American goals in Iraq. On Sunday the President stated that American objectives in Iraq are destroying the terrorists, getting others to help, and giving a more prominent role to Iraqis. This is a far cry from the earlier goals of building a stable democratic Iraq free of WMD that would set an example to the rest of the region that would pressure change. A stable and free Iraq must continue to be our goal. It is a worthy goal, something Americans and British can support. It is who we are and what we should espouse. It will be harder and more costly than the Administration originally conceived, but we must not walk away from the worthy goals. It is, in the end, what will earn us the larger support of the Iraqi people.
And finally, the President is still only providing laundry lists. There is still no plan or vision for how we are going to do this. What we are willing to give to get, what incentives we will provide, objectives that need to be accomplished, etc. Before the war I co-directed a joint report by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy which argued that a clear plan for post-conflict reconstruction and transition to sovereignty was crucial to winning the peace. Without it, “short-term necessities will seem to contradict long-term goals,” opening a Pandora’s Box of problems. The President and his team have still not put forward a series of goals and milestones. Bremmer’s 7-steps provides a piece of it, and should be expanded upon. But without a larger strategy, successes will be overlooked and problems will be magnified.
CHALLENGES AHEAD. WHAT THE US MUST DO
1. Come to terms with post conflict reconstruction and better organize American civilian and military capacity.
2. We must leverage the help of our partners who do it better than we. The brilliance of NATO’s new role in Afghanistan.
3. Congress should force the Administration to present a plan for Iraq before releasing money.
4. We must think more creatively how to restructure all our institutions and relationships so that we can successfully navigate the 21st century. Whether we like it or not, many of the problems we face, Arab-Israeli, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan will only be solved through international effort. For this political reason, NATO, the EU, the UN are as important as ever.
CONCLUSION
When trying to drum up support for the Marshall Plan, the Secretary of State went on a tour across America explaining its importance and why we should make the sacrifice that we ultimately did. He likened his experience to a “run for the Presidency.” This President must do the same, but this time he must speak to both domestic and international audiences -- reminding and cajoling supporters and detractors as to why political, economic, and military support is important. The President must be prepared to give something to get it, either in Iraq or elsewhere. It will be time consuming, and bruising, but it is ultimately necessary. It is the only way to succeed in the Middle East.
