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[Note: A transcript of this meeting is unavailable. The discussion is summarized below.]

What We Know:

North Korea is a country that is moving ahead with the development of nuclear weapons; a clear violation of both the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the October 1994 “Agreed Framework.” The development time scale for North Korea to build new weapons ranges from one to three years, depending on the process implemented. However, the U.S. intelligence community stated in 1993 that North Korea may already have one, or possibly two, nuclear warheads; this number was later reduced to just one warhead.

Historically, North Korea’s threats and actions in developing Weapons of Mass Destruction have been used to bring the United States to the bargaining table under the pretense of ending enmity with the United States. The 1994 Agreed Framework traded energy support, reduced sanctions, and made progress towards an end to enmity in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear programs.

Some believe recent events are due to the United States not followed through with its 1994 Agreed Framework promises: assembly of two light-water reactors did not begin until 1999, sanctions were not substantively reduced until 2000, and the United States often failed to deliver promised heavy fuel oil on time. Further complicating U.S. relations with North Korea was George W. Bush’s naming of North Korea to the “Axis of Evil” and the release of a new policy of preemptive strike.

What We Don’t Know:

There is still uncertainty as to North Korea’s actual possession of a nuclear weapon and its nuclear production capabilities. The Bush administration has treated this uncertain outlook with “worst case scenario” responses. It is not clear that this is the ideal way to make progress.

However, North Korea’s claim that it wants peace and is willing to trade nuclear weapons for an end to enmity is dubious. Can one expect North Korea to abide by a new agreement? Can a new agreement be effectively enforced given available verification options?

If military force is chosen as the route to disarm North Korea, it is not clear that it could be done in the context of a limited war. Moreover, the United States risks alienating Japan and provoking a response from China. Is the United States ready or willing to deal with the possible consequences of military action?

If sanctions are implemented in an attempt to starve out North Korea’s programs, will China and South Korea, both key countries, participate?

What Are the Next Steps:

The United States has the same four options it had after the 1993 missile test, which resulted in the 1994 Agreed Framework. They are:

1) Compel the collapse of North Korea

2) Invoke sanctions

3) Attack nuclear facilities

4) Negotiate

It has been presumed that the first option, compelling the collapse of North Korea, would provoke North Korea to a successful nuclear armament more quickly than it would to a collapse. The third option, to attack, is often thought as a sure path to war; likely to result in an attack on South Korea’s major city of Seoul, possibly Japan, and perhaps the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The two remaining options—to invoke sanctions or to negotiate—remain as the best choices given the above considerations. Speakers disagreed on which of these two options were best.

One view is that violators of agreements should be punished, particularly through sanctions, in order to set an example for the rest of the world. If one negotiates with North Korea, it will encourage other countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction so that they too might receive special treatment.

The other view is that the Untied States should negotiate and try to accomplish directly its goals. Negotiations could work towards the eventual disarmament of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; eventual reconciliation with South Korea; and the end to the development, production, and proliferation of missile technology.