Continental rift: Europe was divided on Iraq, but it's moving toward a unified voice to counter U.S. power

With the Bush administration's threat last week to take steps to isolate France diplomatically, punishment for its opposition to the war against Saddam Hussein, already tense relations across the Atlantic may well get worse. And European nations may again have to choose whether to side with Washington or Paris, exacerbating the divisions that the war opened within Europe -- not good news for a European Union that is seeking to deepen its collective character and speak with a single voice on the diplomatic stage.

Europe's internal divide on Iraq stemmed primarily from contrasting visions of the European Union's future. In one camp are France, Germany and Russia. They staunchly resisted war, casting themselves as counterweights to U.S. hegemony. In the other camp are countries that stood by Washington, viewing the United States as a hedge against Europe's larger powers and a continued protective presence in the region. The United States reaps its own benefits by welcoming intra-European rifts; a divide-and-conquer approach gives Washington considerable leverage across Europe.

The United States cannot, however, presume that Europe will remain divided and pliant. On Iraq, there was more unity than met the eye; European governments might have disagreed, but their electorates were almost uniformly opposed to military action. In addition, the European Union is in the midst of a constitutional convention that will strengthen its governing institutions, including those responsible for forging a common position on foreign policy.

Nor is a divided Europe in the best interests of the United States. America ultimately needs a strong and capable European partner if the two are to ensure the triumph of the democratic principles that both worked so hard to defend over the course of the 20th century. And now that the United States has pressing missions elsewhere, it is unlikely to remain Europe's guardian, giving the continent's smaller countries little choice but to look to the European Union to provide security.

The readiness of France, Germany, and Russia to stand their ground against America's rush to war started as an election ploy in Germany. Faced with lagging poll numbers in his bid for re-election last year, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ran on a platform opposing war against Iraq, tapping into the swelling anti-American sentiment stoked by what were seen as unilateralist policies of the Bush administration. Schröder succeeded in salvaging the election, but he also found himself politically committed to resisting Washington.

Paris then aligned itself with Berlin for three main reasons. The French sincerely believed that attacking Iraq would backfire, ultimately radicalizing rather than taming the Muslim world. They wanted to strengthen the Franco- German coalition, especially on matters of foreign policy. A Gaullist inclination to offset U.S. power further strengthened President Jacques Chirac's willingness to face down Washington in the U.N. Security Council.

Russia was next to join the anti- war coalition. In siding with continental Europe rather than America, President Vladimir Putin was keeping his eye on Russia's long- term interests. Russia's trade with Germany alone is more than twice the size of its commerce with the United States. In terms of foreign direct investment in Russia, European companies far outpace their U.S. counterparts. As the European Union expands eastward, Russia's geopolitical and economic future will increasingly be shaped by decisions taken on its side of the Atlantic.

The motivations of those countries standing behind Washington were equally varied. Britain played its traditional role as a bridge between the United States and continental Europe. In addition, Prime Minister Tony Blair appears to have shared George W. Bush's conviction that Saddam Hussein had to go -- otherwise Blair would not have adopted a stance that set him against the British public and much of his own party.

Most of the other European countries that backed Washington did so not because they sincerely supported the war, but because they did not want to let the conflict scuttle the trans-Atlantic link. Smaller countries like Portugal, the Netherlands and Denmark have consistently looked to America to counterbalance the Franco-German coalition, as have Italy and Spain.

The central Europeans remain some of America's strongest allies in Europe, partly a payback for the U.S. contribution to their liberation from communism. History has also taught them not to depend on Europe's major powers for their security, another reason they have been so anxious to enter NATO and win the prize that comes with membership -- a U.S. security guarantee.

But it is likely that, over time, the trans-Atlantic divide will prove more permanent and intractable than the divide within Europe. Several factors point to growing European unity and autonomy -- at the expense of Europe's ties with the United States.

Now that the war in Iraq has ended, E.U. members are generally coalescing around common positions. They have been united on the need for direct U.N. involvement in the reconstruction and administration of Iraq. Not even Blair supports the Bush administration's view that Washington maintain tight control. Nor is there any support in Europe for taking the fight to Syria or some other target in the Middle East.

Rising anti-American sentiment across Europe is helping to restore a unified stance. It used to be only the French who called for the European Union to emerge as a counterweight to the United States, but this goal is gaining traction in nearly every E.U. country, including those that have tilted toward the United States. Central Europeans admittedly share little enthusiasm for challenging U.S. hegemony. But as memories of life under communism fade and younger generations rise to positions of prominence, much of this reflexive pro-American sentiment may dissipate.

Europe is also becoming increasingly capable of holding its own against the United States. The European Union's collective wealth is drawing equal with America's, and the euro has been steadily gaining ground against the dollar. Moreover, important institutional changes are taking place. E.U. members are debating the adoption of a constitution as well as the appointment of a single foreign minister and directly elected chief executive. These reforms would deepen the collective identity of the union and strengthen Brussels' hand on matters of foreign affairs -- at the expense of the autonomy of the individual member states.

The European Union's efforts to acquire greater military capacity promise to move slowly. But there are signs of life: France is increasing its defense spending by 20 percent; Germany appears ready to end conscription in favor of a more capable professional force; Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg will be meeting later this month to deepen defense cooperation. Even under the most optimistic of scenarios, the European Union will not challenge America's military primacy anytime soon -- if ever. But Europe will become far less reliant on the United States for its security.

America, too, seems unlikely to hold up its end of the traditional trans-Atlantic bargain. With Europe wealthy and at peace, it no longer needs its American pacifier. Meanwhile, pressing threats in the Middle East and East Asia are already diverting U.S. resources and attention to those regions. Poland may want a strong NATO and a sizable U.S. presence in Europe for decades to come. But Warsaw is likely to be disappointed, leaving it little choice but to opt for a stronger Europe. A new division of labor appears in the offing -- the European Union manages Europe's security while the United States focus its attention on other parts of the world.

A more united Europe, at least in the short term, will exacerbate the current trans-Atlantic rift. Especially under the Bush administration, Washington will not take kindly to a European Union that more frequently holds its ground against America.

But as Europe deepens its unity, both sides of the Atlantic will at least have the option of fashioning a more mature and balanced partnership. The United States in the end will ultimately be better off if the European Union emerges as a responsible center of power, shouldering its fair share of anchoring an uncertain world.

Charles A. Kupchan, a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "The End of the American Era."

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