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| Interviewer: | Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor |
|---|---|
| Interviewee: | Daryl Kimball |
October 6, 2003
Daryl G. Kimball, the executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, says that the report of the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group headed by David Kay reinforces the view that senior administration officials were deliberately “misrepresenting” the facts to justify the war against Iraq.
The preliminary Kay report, which was submitted to Congress on October 2, “exaggerated the case on what we now know to be discredited, disputed, or entirely bogus intelligence information,” Kimball says. Kimball urges that the U.N. inspectors be returned to Iraq, backed by U.S. and British forces, to complete the work of verifying the facts and dismantling any existing programs.
He was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on October 6, 2003.
What do you make of the unclassified version of David Kay’s October 2 testimony to Congress on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction [WMD] programs? Does it increase the amount of information known about Iraq’s WMD programs?
Clearly, it is a contribution to what we know. However, it does not change fundamentally what many of us believe was the situation before and after the war. [The Kay report] draws a blank on the question of finding actual chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Iraq. The administration had charged there were chemical and biological weapons in Iraq that could be used relatively quickly. On that count, the report does not support the administration’s conclusions. The report also undermines quite clearly the administration’s dire claims about Iraq’s nuclear program. It raises a significant question about whether these programs, while they clearly existed at some level, actually posed the urgent or imminent threat that the administration said they posed before the war. And it raises the question of whether the weapons inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission [UNMOVIC] who were in [Iraq from November 2002 until March 2003] could not have continued to contain [Iraq] indefinitely.
Let’s break it down by sector. What did you think of the section on biological weapons?
Kay’s report suggests that there were a number of plans, potential capabilities that Iraq still possessed, and that those capabilities represented a rapid breakout production capability. That is what many independent experts had suspected before the war. That is not so surprising a finding. It also does not, for example, answer the question of whether Iraq had the capability, or was prepared, to deliver biological agents using unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], which the administration had alleged it could.
And on chemical weapons?
Kay did not find any actual chemical weapons. He found a number of munitions facilities that the survey group is still searching. He holds out the possibility that there may be some chemical munitions in those storage facilities. A small percentage of them have been searched thus far by the survey group. But overall, what he found was that Iraq was exploring the possibility of chemical weapons production, but did not find any evidence of chemical weapons production post-1998 [the start of a four-year period when no U.N. inspectors were in Iraq]. Now, there are a number of dual-use facilities that exist, that weapons inspectors have known existed. But again, there is no evidence of any actual weapons or chemical weapons production.
Were you surprised that no chemical weapons were found?
It is not that surprising that chemical and biological weapons have not been found. I would also say that I would not be too surprised if some relatively small quantity were found over the next few months. Why? Because the theory that I believe has greater credibility as time goes on and evidence is accumulated is that the vast bulk of the chemical and biological weapons capabilities, programs, and weapons stockpiles had indeed been eliminated by the U.N. weapons inspectors after 1991 [following the first Gulf War]. Certainly, serious questions remained about capabilities and quantities of [substances that are] precursors [of biological and chemical weapons] that Iraq had not accounted for, but it appears as if the bulk of these programs and weapons had been destroyed.
And when it comes to the nuclear realm, this is even more evident, because Kay’s report confirms thus far that— and I quote— “to date, we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material.”
This corresponds to the United Nations Special Commission [UNSCOM] report of 1998 and the preliminary findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in March 2003. So, I am not that surprised that no weapons have been found thus far. It seems to me that Saddam Hussein was maintaining the capacity to quickly produce chemical and biological weapons, and perhaps the knowledge base to try to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program. But so long as inspectors remained in Iraq, he was being deterred from [producing weapons].
If, in fact, the Iraqis really didn’t have anything, why did Saddam Hussein fail to cooperate as fully as he could have with the U.N. inspectors?
That question is as difficult to answer today as it was before the war. It is quite possible, as some have suggested, that Iraq wanted to maintain some uncertainty about its chemical and biological weapons capability, believing it might serve as a mild deterrent against attack. It is true that the Central Intelligence Agency had assessed in the fall of 2002 that the most likely reason or way in which Saddam might use any chemical or biological weapons he had was if Iraq were invaded. As we know, there are many other theories on why Saddam was not more forthcoming with U.N. weapons inspectors. Iraq had a number of activities that were prohibited by the U.N. resolutions but which Iraq continued to hide, and it may be that Saddam had reason on that basis to remain secretive about any of those activities.
In June, when we last talked, you said the administration’s claims about Iraq’s WMD programs were “exaggerated.” Is that still your view?
The Kay report does not alter my view or the facts about the Bush administration’s very dire predictions and claims about Iraq’s chemical, biological and— especially— nuclear programs. Let me take you through some of them. As we all will recall, the president and others in his administration claimed that Iraq had been trying to obtain uranium from Africa. This was disputed not only by Ambassador Joseph Wilson but also within the United States intelligence community before the war and was pretty definitively rejected by the IAEA in February and March when it examined the documents the United States handed over on this.
In addition, the Bush administration alleged that the Iraqis were reconstituting their nuclear program because they had tried to obtain specialized aluminum tubes [for use in gas centrifuges]. That was also a disputed claim within the U.S. intelligence community. In a classified October 2002 special intelligence estimate, the Energy and State departments called that claim “highly dubious.” Now, we know from press reports that those aluminum tubes’ specifications correspond exactly to a conventional artillery technology of Italian design that the Iraqis were trying to reverse engineer. In addition, the administration claimed as late as February-March 2003 that Iraq possessed mobile labs capable of biological weapons production. The Defense Intelligence Agency has, since the end of the war, disputed that allegation after looking at the labs that have been uncovered. Kay’s report does not support the idea that [the labs] were used for biological weapons production. But he also says it is unclear what purpose these mobile labs [served].
The other dire claim made by the administration about Iraq’s WMD capabilities was the presence of unmanned aerial vehicles, which [U.S. Secretary of State] Colin Powell said could be used to deliver chemical and biological weapons and could in fact be used to attack American cities. Before the war, the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Office called that a very unlikely capability. Upon examining the UAVs on the ground in Iraq, it turns out that these UAVs were for reconnaissance purposes and were not physically capable of carrying heavier loads.
Those were the dire claims made by the administration. Kay does not provide any credence to those claims and in fact his preliminary findings seem to reinforce the idea that these claims are not supported by any evidence on the ground today or before the war. That’s why I say that the administration exaggerated the case on what we now know to be discredited, disputed, or entirely bogus intelligence information.
Did administration officials make these claims so they could get the war started against Iraq?
I think the senior administration officials certainly understood that some of these claims were disputed by other members of the intelligence community. Yet they went forward and characterized these claims as being based on solid evidence. To me, that represents knowingly misrepresenting the intelligence that was provided to them. It is not so much a failure of intelligence as it is a misrepresentation of the intelligence made available to the political leaders for the purpose of reinforcing a previous political decision to go forward with the war.
What was your reaction when President Bush said last week that the Kay report, in effect, justified the Iraq invasion?
I was surprised that the president continues to make that argument. To me, it only widens the credibility gap that is emerging on this issue for the White House. The president seems to be saying at this stage that the mere intention of the Saddam Hussein regime to pursue chemical and biological and possibly nuclear weapons is reason enough to launch a pre-emptive military invasion without the authority or support of the U.N. Security Council. To me, that does not represent a justifiable reason.
There has never been any question about Saddam’s intentions. The question has been about Iraq’s capabilities to develop these dangerous weapons and the capability of the international community and the U.N. weapons inspectors to detect or contain the reconstitution of these programs. The Kay report reinforces my view and the view of many others that the threat Iraq posed was not an immediate one. And it was not a threat that could not wait a few more weeks or months for U.N. weapons inspectors to zero in on the list of remaining questions that Iraq needed to answer. A few more weeks or months should have been given to that task. That might have brought the Security Council together rather than dividing it on the question of taking military action against Iraq if Iraq did not comply with more specific demands from the Council. To me, the president’s arguments are falling apart as more evidence comes in and the credibility gap widens as he grasps at the bits of useful but still circumstantial evidence coming from the survey team.
What recommendations do you have?
What needs to be said about the current process is not so much any commentary on David Kay the man or his views, but the importance of obtaining, in the end, a clearly objective and balanced assessment of Iraq’s past capabilities and a verifiable dismantling of its WMD programs. That can only be done, in my view, by UNMOVIC, which has the mandate to disarm Iraq. David Kay has argued that this was not an appropriate role for UNMOVIC, given that his team still faces hostile conditions on the ground in Iraq. That’s a good argument, but it is possible and I think advisable that UNMOVIC be authorized to go back into Iraq and be given the protection of British and U.S. forces to the extent that it might need.
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