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| Interviewer: | Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor |
|---|---|
| Interviewee: | Sidney R. Jones |
September 21, 2004
Sidney Jones, a leading expert on Indonesia, says the apparent election of former General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president—official results will be announced October 5—is “really good news.” In the September 20 vote, Indonesia’s first direct election of a president, “not only did one person come out on top, but he appears to have come out with an overwhelming mandate,” she says.
The Indonesian government expelled Jones, The Indonesia Project director for the International Crisis Group, in June, reportedly because officials were unhappy with her research on separatists and terrorists. She says that Yudhoyono is widely seen as someone who can crack down on widespread corruption in the country and limit the role of the military. “He’s a reformer, but a reformer within a certain kind of establishment mode,” she says. The new president, she says, has the strong support of the United States but, because of widespread anti-U.S. public sentiment, it was not publicly expressed. “It’s the kiss of death to any Indonesian politician to be seen as liked by the United States these days,” Jones says.
Jones was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on September 21, 2004.
What is the significance of the election of General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono?
First of all, it’s a huge mandate for a democratically elected president, which is the first time any president has had such a popular mandate.
The outgoing president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, did not have such a mandate?
No, because she [was appointed] after [President] Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached [in July 2001]. Her party had won the biggest share of seats in the parliament in 1999, but there wasn’t direct election of the president [at that time]. This was the first direct election for president; not only did one person come out on top, but he appears to have come out with an overwhelming mandate. That’s really good news for Indonesia, for Indonesian democracy, for the ability to actually take authoritative action.
What kind of person is he? How did he become a general?
He’s from a small town in east Java. He rose through the ranks, but never in the real combat jobs. He was always considered an intellectual within the armed forces, which is not the oxymoron you might think. He’s a reformer, but a reformer within a certain kind of establishment mode. People give him credit for pushing to have the dual function of the military—its involvement not only in defense and internal security but also in day-to-day politics—removed from the army’s definition of itself.
In that sense, he has a very positive image as somebody who is trying to bring about change from within. Indonesian voters, I think, looked at his military background and said this is the kind of decisive leader we are looking for, because Megawati was certainly not that. The problem is that the one word that’s used repeatedly to characterize him is “indecisive.” People who have worked closely with him say that he’s very cautious, that he has difficulty coming to closure on things, and that he’s not the “great white hope” that many people believe he is. His response to that—he’s been asked directly about this because it’s such a widespread characterization—is that it was the president who was blocking any policies from coming forward and that, once he’s in charge and can make the decisions, this particular attribute won’t be visible any longer.
He was the security chief…
His official title was coordinating minister for political and security affairs.
Did Islamic terrorism grow under his watch?
One of the problems with that job was that it had no real executive authority and no budget. It was powerful in theory, and he was certainly overseeing everything as much as he could, but he was basically overseeing a bunch of extremely hostile services that couldn’t relate to one another or coordinate [their activities], and he didn’t have the mandate to knock heads together. One of the things I think he’ll change is the administrative nature of the security agency, and he’s talking about putting together a U.S.-style National Security Council with a national security adviser.
Megawati has been accused of being too soft on the terrorists. Is Yudhoyono going to be able to crack down?
First of all, even under Megawati, the police were doing a pretty decent job, far better, I think, than most of the other countries in the region. The police cracked down on people who had been [involved] in various [terror] bombings, they penetrated the network and caused serious disruptions within [the Indonesian Muslim extremist group] Jemaah Islamiyah [JI]. On the law enforcement side, greatly aided by the Australian Federal Police, the Indonesians have done a credible job. The problem is that the government has never banned Jemaah Islamiyah, the government has never acknowledged its existence as an organization, and it’s never moved the problem beyond law enforcement to look at the more thorny issues about what kinds of places produce these bombers, what kind of recruitment goes on, and so on.
Yudhoyono will probably improve coordination among intelligence agencies, which is a useful thing to do, but it’s not clear that—even if he wanted to, and it’s not clear that he does—he will move beyond law enforcement, or that he would be able to overcome the constraints Megawati faced. I don’t think she had the political will, but she also had two serious constraints—one on the left and one on the right. She had a strong Muslim constituency led by her vice president Hamzah Haz, who believed that to either ban Jemaah Islamiyah or to crack down on the schools where some of these guys were being recruited was to stigmatize Islam and the Islamic community generally. The argument was that the name “Jemaah Islamiyah” means “Islamic community,” and therefore to ban it or to declare it tantamount to a terrorist organization was to stigmatize the Muslim faithful in Indonesia. She let that argument win.
Has Yudhoyono indicated that he would crack down on JI?
No, and when he’s been asked specifically whether he would ban it, he waffled. You have that kind of obstacle on the Muslim side, and on the political reformist side, in the NGO [nongovernmental organization] community, and in much of the media, you have the concern that to ban an organization like JI is to raise the specter of restrictions on freedom of association and freedom of expression. There’s this concern that we can’t do anything that would jeopardize the hard-won civil liberties that we gained after [General] Suharto [Indonesia’s autocratic ruler in 1967-98] fell. That’s the constraint on the other side.
For Indonesian voters, are economic issues paramount in this election?
No issues were paramount. It was all personality-driven. If you look at the campaign literature, it’s hilarious—you get this book called “99 Reasons to Vote for Yudhoyono as President,” and it’s everything from “he’s a person of integrity, he’s clean, he’s loyal, he’s devout, he’s sexy,” and nothing about any kind of policies or specific issues. If you ask Indonesian voters specifically, then eventually economic issues come out, but issues were never the basis of this election campaign.
How is the economy faring?
There was a stock market boost after Yudhoyono’s victory. The economy overall is OK, but a bit stagnant. There’s little new investment coming in, but I think more might [start in the wake of Yudhoyono’s election]. The rupiah is stable, but the economy is not growing fast enough to absorb the labor force.
What can Yudhoyono do about corruption?
One of the [questions] is what he’s going to do on legal reform and corruption. Megawati basically did nothing on either.
Is that a big problem in Indonesia?
It’s huge. Indonesia’s routinely listed by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
Corruption exists throughout public life?
It has for years. The only way you’re ever going to make a dent is to have leadership from the top, with the Cabinet setting an example. Megawati’s husband was the biggest non-example in the leadership; he did nothing to try to put curbs on that. If you talk to Yudhoyono, he will talk about how he admires what [Prime Minister Abdullah] Badawi has done in Malaysia, he will talk about the need to take on high-profile cases as a model, but most importantly, he’ll talk about having his own administration. That’s easy to say; it’s much less easy to do when he’s got to [distribute] ministries to political allies.
What kind of corruption? A company gets a contract and has to give a cut to the minister involved?
That’s one aspect of it. For example, the Ministry of Education basically gives out privileged tenders or contracts to cronies to print elementary school textbooks. The most corrupt ministry of all in Indonesia is the Ministry of Religion because of the amount of money skimmed off in the hajj [annual pilgrimage] to Mecca, which is all state-run.
How does the U.S. government feel about Yudhoyono?
The U.S. government is extremely supportive, but part of the problem is that it’s the kiss of death to any Indonesian politician to be seen as liked by the United States these days.
Polls indicate that U.S. popularity is at an all-time low in Indonesia.
It is. Anti-U.S. sentiment has never been higher, and it’s very much focused on [President] Bush and the Bush administration. As an American, I don’t have any problems with the Indonesian populace; individual Americans don’t feel like they’re the subject of hatred or hostility, but the hostility toward the government is unbelievable.
Is it all because of the war in Iraq?
It’s Iraq, and it’s support for Israel and [Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon, and it’s immigration policies—Indonesians see themselves being discriminated against, they have Muslim names or come from a Muslim country, and they can’t get U.S. visas for study—it’s a whole range of things.
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