home > by publication type > interviews > Parmentier: Europe 'Disappointed' by Bush's Victory, Awaits Policy Signals
Email
| Interviewer: | Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor |
|---|---|
| Interviewee: | Guillaume Parmentier |
November 5, 2004
Guillaume Parmentier, the director of the Center on the United States at the French Institute for International Relations, says that his fellow Europeans are disappointed by George Bush’s re-election and are looking for signs of policy adjustments and awaiting personnel changes in the second Bush term. Senior staff changes “will give an indication of the course that President Bush intends to pursue during his second mandate,” Parmentier says. “Does he want to continue on the course that he has set, and is he going to be feeling infallible because he has won this election?” He says a key foreign policy indicator will be the U.S. reaction to new Palestinian leadership in the post-Yasir Arafat era.
A long-time student of the United States, Parmentier notes that Europeans generally “prefer second-termers as opposed to first-termers” because of the perception that in a second term, presidents have fewer political constraints and more flexibility in foreign policy matters. He was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on November 5, 2004.
When we spoke before the U.S. elections, you said most Europeans would be “delighted” if Bush lost. Have they gotten over their disappointment?
It depends which level you’re talking about. Public opinion, obviously, has been disappointed. People were led to believe that there was a chance that John Kerry would be elected. Many people got carried away, especially in the first half of the evening [on election night], when exit polls seemed to indicate that Kerry was likely to be the president. Still, in government circles, there was a certain tendency to keep one’s options open and hedge one’s bets. We’ll have to live with the new administration.
One thing we need to know is what the new administration will be like. We know who the next president will be, but we don’t know who will be in the next administration. Who will be secretary of state, who will be national security adviser, who will be secretary of defense? Once we know those names, it will give an indication of the course that President Bush intends to pursue during his second mandate. Does he want to continue on the course that he has set, and is he going to be feeling infallible because he has won this election? His instincts have been validated by the support of the American people. Is he going to feel more free as regards his domestic base, especially the Christian fundamentalist right wing, which gives him more leeway?
In general, Europeans prefer second-termers as opposed to first-termers. Most presidents during their second term are more free from domestic constraints and generally devote a very large portion of time to foreign affairs and invest capital in foreign affairs. That is often not the case during the first mandate. Therefore, at this juncture, it’s rather difficult to know whether we’re going to like Bush’s second mandate as [much as] we did [Ronald] Reagan’s second mandate, or whether we’re going to get more of the same or, indeed, worse.
Have people accepted the fact that Bush has won?
The result is definite and without question. What’s very interesting is that this election is the first in my experience where foreigners felt so disenfranchised. After all, this election was of enormous importance for people who live in foreign countries. Of course, they have no say, which is perfectly normal; no one says we should have a vote. But because of the enormous importance of what America does to anyone having to do with global affairs, there is a feeling of disempowerment, especially among Europeans who feel close to America culturally.
There’s been a feeling of that kind for a number of years. There was a British author who wrote after the Second World War that, if there were an alliance, it was only logical that all the members of the alliance should vote for the American president because, he said, “Otherwise, it is annihilation without representation.” Today, that’s no longer the case, but especially after what happened in Iraq and et cetera, there’s a feeling that this is of enormous importance to us, and we have no influence.
You mentioned that Europeans are interested in the president’s staff. They are looking to see, in particular, who the secretary of state and who the national security adviser are, and how much influence they will have in the administration?
Right. We also look closely at the administration’s reaction to the Middle East peace process after [Yasir] Arafat’s likely departure.
In his news conference yesterday, the president said he was for a free Palestinian state. That’s still on the table.
I think Arafat’s departure will make American support more real and less purely verbal than was the case before. Especially if [the Palestinians] choose someone the Americans trust.
I suppose what’s crucial on the Middle East is for the United States to bring its influence to bear on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government to deal with whomever emerges as the new Palestinian leader.
If the Americans do not push for the Gaza Strip to be made into a sort-of viable area with the proper communication to the outside world, then the Europeans are going to see the Sharon policy and the American support for Palestinian statehood as a sham. It’s not only a matter of [acknowledging] the fact that there is a Palestinian Authority [PA], you must also [cultivate the conditions] to make it work. One must remember that the PA, which has been, to a very large extent, a sort of proto-state, has been very largely financed by the Europeans and has been destroyed by the Israeli army, which relies very largely on money given by the Americans.
How are the personal relations between French President Jacques Chirac and President Bush?
They’re not as bad as the ones between Bush and [German Chancellor Gerhard] Schroeder. Schroeder is seen by Bush as having used anti-Americanism to win his election [in 2002], which is to some degree correct. But there’s no doubt that on Chirac’s part, there’s clearly the impression that Bush does not understand foreign policy or thinks of these things in too-simplistic terms. On Bush’s part, there’s the impression that Chirac is sort of a cynical leader who doesn’t see the difference between good and bad in ways that are stark enough. These are completely opposite conceptions of international relations.
Does Bush have any European friends outside of Italy?
Well, there’s [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair, I suppose, but on the continent, basically not. Even the Poles are taking their troops away from Iraq. The Hungarians announced the day before yesterday that they would. It’s not that easy.
What will happen in January if the elections in Iraq are perceived to have gone about as well as possible?
That would be a step in the right direction, certainly. I think the likelihood is remote, frankly, but it would be better if that were the case. I think it would be welcome in Europe—we don’t want this to become a mess. We are skeptical, and when you hear [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld saying, “The election will be OK even if it only takes place in parts of Iraq,” this is the road to disaster.
Many in the United States are waiting to see if Rumsfeld remains as defense secretary. Almost everyone seems to assume that he will.
That would be a grave mistake.
Did the French public remain anti-Bush through the end of the campaign?
They were all rooting for Kerry, not because they liked Kerry particularly, but because they wanted to get rid of Bush. The press was very one-sided—there’s no question about that. For someone like me, if I wanted to make a fortune, I should have stated a strong support for Bush. I would have been on every TV channel, because there are so few Frenchmen who say anything in support. There’s one professor who has been everywhere, but he knows very little about the United States. He was a minority of one, essentially.
Where did the right-wing parties in France stand on the U.S. election?
The right-wing parties are close to the Democrats. Look at the program of the center-right in France—if anything, they’re to the left of the Democrats. There is absolutely nothing among the respectable politicians that compares to [U.S. House Majority Leader] Tom DeLay or people like that. Nothing.
Social issues, like gay marriage, were issues in the U.S. campaign. How those were electoral issues viewed in France?
Gay marriage was, of course, a trap for the Democrats. It is something that’s been discussed in France, but it’s not become a political issue because both sides have taken a moderate view. We should help the gays enjoy some privileges but going all the way to gay marriage is a mistake. There’s one socialist member of parliament who is also a mayor who has decided to [perform] gay marriage; mayors marry people in France. This was struck down by the court and that was the end of it, and he was extremely isolated. He’s a self-publicizer, that’s why he did it—he’s not even gay himself—but this has not become a political issue.
What about abortion rights?
Abortion rights are no longer an issue. We’ve never had late-term abortion, what they call the partial-birth abortion, that’s never been legal in France. Basically, abortion is almost at will until six months, and after that, it’s almost impossible, which I think is not a bad compromise, to be honest. If you’re going to abort, you might as well do it before, except, of course, for medical reasons.
My wife is French and, when we visit France, she attends church and is always struck by the small size of the congregations. Is the number of church-goers much different in Europe, or France in particular, compared to the United States?
Oh yes. There’s no doubt, but I think more importantly, the social attitude is different. For an American, religion is viewed as a means of liberation, because the country was created to escape the oppression of the established religions. Of course in Europe, religion is seen as a more oppressive factor, so, obviously, there’s a different instinctive reaction. But as a result of that, today there’s a very interesting phenomenon that not enough people have noted. If you take opinion polls and ask people whether they practice religion or not, in the U.S. more people will answer yes than actually do practice. In Europe, certainly in France, it’s the opposite—if you take opinion polls, fewer people will say they practice religion than actually do. In France, it’s supposed to be a purely private matter, something that you do not necessarily share with other people.
Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1.212.434.9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
Start-Up Nation addresses the trillion-dollar question: How is it that Israel—a country of 7.1 million, only sixty years old, surrounded by enemies— produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the UK? With the insights of geopolitical experts and investors, the authors examine this nation’s adversity-driven culture to answer this question and offer prescriptions for a global economy on the rebound.
In Forces of Fortune, Vali Nasr presents a paradigm-changing revelation that will transform the understanding of the Muslim world at large. He reveals that there is a vital but unseen rising force in the Islamic world—a new business-minded middle class—that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy and that holds the key to winning the cold war against Iran and extremists.
In Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, Julia E. Sweig presents a remarkably accessible portrait of Cuba's unique place on the world stage over the past fifty years, including its internal politics, its often fraught relationship with the United States, and its shifting relationship with the global community.
Complete list of CFR Books
The report of this bipartisan Task Force of distinguished leaders and experts represents a strong consensus on the importance of repairing America's immigration policy. It makes the case that maintaining America's political and economic leadership depends on attracting talented and hard-working immigrants, and on securing the country's borders in a smart, effective, and humane way.
This report finds that nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security in the near term, and makes recommendations on how to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. deterrent nuclear force, prevent nuclear terrorism, and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR
Complete list of Task Force reports
Identifying international threats and acting on them may be the most difficult job for U.S. policymakers. This report
provides an actionable road map for managing international threats before they erupt into crises and makes a strong case that preventive action is not a luxury but a necessity.
For more than a decade, the United States has mostly watched from the sidelines as Asian countries organize themselves into an alphabet soup of new multilateral groups. In this report, the authors review the relationship between pan-Asian and trans-Pacific institutions and suggest policy guidelines for a new U.S. approach to this new Asian landscape.
Complete list of Council Special Reports
To request permission to reprint or reuse CFR material, please fill out this permissions request form (PDF), referring to the instructions on page 1.
Copyright 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.