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| Author: | Lionel Beehner |
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Updated April 22, 2006
Shiite leaders ended their deadlock on forming a national-unity government four months after the December 15 parliamentary elections. The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shiite political bloc that won the most votes in December, had been divided for months over the post of prime minister. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the embattled incumbent, originally won the nomination by a narrow vote in February, but after intense pressure from the United States, from Kurdish and Sunni Arab leaders, and from within the UIA, Jaafari decided on April 20 to abandon his bid for the premiership. The conditions of his withdrawal required a replacement candidate from Jaafari's conservative Dawa Party, thus guaranteeing that Adel Abdul Mahdi, his rival from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), would not win the nod. Instead, the nomination for the premiereship has gone to Nouri Kamal al-Maliki. Kurdish and Sunni Arab leaders in parliament say they will not block the nomination. But experts say Maliki lacks political stature and experience, which some say could leave Iraq's central government weaker than it was under Jaafari's rule.
After the visit earlier this month by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, considerable pressure was placed on Jaafari to break the political deadlock. Jaafari also realized his nomination would likely be blocked by Sunnis and Kurds in parliament. So a compromise was negotiated whereby he would step down, provided a member of his Dawa Party would be nominated in his place. Experts also say that Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s senior religious leader, wielded considerable influence behind the scenes to break the logjam.
Ranked number two in the Dawa Party, the fifty-six-year-old Maliki was head of the security committee in the last parliament. He hails from a prominent family—the Muhasins and holds a master’s degree in Arabic language from Baghdad University. He fled Iraq in 1980 and spent much of his time abroad in Syria. Maliki was heavily involved in Dawa’s opposition politics and briefly edited one of the party’s newspapers. Some experts say his candidacy may be compromised by his role as deputy chairman of Iraq’s de-Baathification committee set up by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003. He was also a hard-line negotiator during the constitution-drafting process, resisting U.S. attempts to get more Sunni Arabs involved. Still, Abbas Kadhim, assistant professor of Islamic Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, calls him a strong candidate. “If I were to pick a replacement [for Jaafari], it would be him,” he says, but adds “Maliki may not be amenable to Sunni Arabs and that will create another schism [between the Shiite and Sunni leadership].” Also, Maliki’s brash and outspoken personality may not play well on the international stage, experts say. Others say he may be too sectarian and point to his close ties with radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr as well as his alleged ties to Syrian intelligence.
In the event Maliki's nomination were to be overturned, the following are seen as top candidates for prime minister:
* Editor's Note: The original version of this story did not contain Haider al-Abadi's denial of published reports that he improperly influenced telephone contracts in Iraq.
Much of the government's makeup depends on who ends up prime minister. However, Sunnis, given their representation in parliament, are expected to take more portfolios than the eight they currently hold under the interim government. The breakdown of the cabinet does not necessarily have to reflect the composition of parliament. Experts say the most powerful and sought-after portfolios are the ministries of interior, defense, and oil, followed by the ministries of finance and foreign affairs. Here is a look at the chief posts to be contested:
Political parties affiliated with Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr won roughly thirty of the UIA's 128 seats for parliament, a gain of 50 percent from their earlier parliamentary representation. That will increase the influence of Sadr on Iraqi politics, experts say. Sadr's followers are not a unified camp, experts say. In general, Katzman says, "he will want to shift the whole UIA bloc toward a less cooperative stance with the United States and pressure us to draw down our forces and start clearing out." Further, Sadr is less concerned with issues of federalism and less pro-Iranian than SCIRI. His platform appeals more to younger, poorer Shiites from Sadr City -- a Baghdad slum named for Moqtada's late father -- and Najaf, a predominantly Shiite city about 100 miles south of Baghdad. According to the Christian Science Monitor, Sadrists are expected to pick up two more portfolios in the future government -- most likely the ministries of education and housing -- to add to the three ministries they already control: health, transportation, and civil affairs. "The health ministry serves half a million people a day. The transportation ministry serves 200,000 to 300,000 people," Hazem al-Arraji, a top Sadrist cleric, recently told the Monitor. "But what does the foreign or interior ministry do for poor Iraqis? These ministries are under the control of the occupation; we have no use for them."
On April 22, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, formally designated Maliki to begin formation of a permanent government and nominated Abdul-Salam al-Mashhadani, a Sunni Arab leader who has made controversial comments in the past, to be speaker of the parliament. Talabani's two vice presidents are expected to be Mahdi, a SCIRI leader, and Tariq Hashimi, leader of the Iraqi Consensus Front, the largest Sunni bloc. Prime Minister-elect Maliki then has a month to pick a cabinet. The parliament must then approve his cabinet by a simple majority. The cabinet, however, does not have to follow the political breakdown of the parliament, but experts expect more Sunni Arabs and members of Sadr's group to be given more portfolios.
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