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| Speakers: | Jack Reed, Member, U.S. Senate (D-RI) |
|---|---|
| John William Warner, Member, U.S. Senate (R-VA) | |
| Presider: | Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations |
May 15, 2006
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
ALTON FRYE: Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. My name is Alton Frye, and I want to welcome you to the Council on Foreign Relations and to this evening’s conversation with two eminent public servants, Senator John Warner, Republican of Virginia, and Senator Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island.
Before we begin, may I please ask you to turn off your cell phone, your BlackBerry, any other wireless device that might interfere with the evening’s proceedings.
I want to remind you that this evening we’re having a meeting that is on the record. Following an initial discussion here on the dais, we will turn to questions and comments from the floor.
As with a number of recent council events, the topic for this session is “Iraq: The Way Forward.” To address this excruciating challenge, our guests bring deep experience in national security affairs. Both have served in uniform, Senator Warner as a 17-year-old enlisted sailor in the Second World War, and later a Marine officer in Korea; Senator Reed as a West Point graduate, an Army Ranger and a paratrooper. Both are lawyers who have given priority to public service over private practice.
Both have made a point of spending time with our men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan, Senator Warner most recently last month, and Senator Reed earlier this year, with a return now slated, I understand, for July. As you know, Mr. Warner also served as secretary of the Navy before winning the first of his five elections to the Senate, where Mr. Reed is now in his second term. Senator Warner chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which Senator Reed also serves.
The true measure of their professionalism, I would venture, is that although they undoubtedly are deeply invested in the Army-Navy football rivalry, it doesn’t show up in their committee work. (Laughter.)
SENATOR JOHN WARNER (?): Yet.
FRYE: Yet.
Our purpose is to concentrate on next steps in Iraq, but we cannot disconnect the situation today from the decisions that brought us to this juncture. Although this is not an occasion to dwell on the past, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld last week said that the intelligence that triggered the attack was wrong. A number of retired flag officers have said, here at the council and elsewhere, that the secretary and his team were wrong to ignore the need for a larger initial force on the ground and to dismantle the Iraqi army.
A key question now is, what are the implications of those admitted mistakes for the future U.S. role there? Does the executive branch’s performance require a more assertive role for Congress in shaping the next phase of policy in Iraq?
And Senator Warner, if I may, we’d welcome your views to open the conversation.
Senator Jack Reed, Alton Frye, and Senator John William Warner
discussing possible next steps in Iraq.
WARNER: Sure. I’m glad to do so.
You made no mention of Iran. Did not we discuss—
FRYE: We’ll come to that in the course of the discussion.
WARNER: Oh, I see, you’re going to—all right. (Laughter.) I think one is linked to the other, but anyway.
I’ve been privileged to serve on the Armed Services Committee 28 years. And we held a long series of hearings as it related to our nation’s entry into the Iraq conflict. And I’m proud of the work that the committee did in the oversight.
I remember very vividly one day when George Tenet was on the stand, and I asked him the question in rather a parochial way to make sure that C-SPAN, which was covering that, and a lot of other media, the Americans could understand it. And I directed my attention straightforwardly to the question of weapons of mass destruction.
And I said, “Mr. Director, after the initial phases of any conflict, should we go in?” We hadn’t at that time, in the Congress, knew of a final decision. “Would the evidence of weapons of mass destruction be there clearly for the international media to see?” And he said, without a moment’s hesitation, “It will be everywhere to be seen, seen and understood.”
Well, as we now have learned, not only did the United States, but the other principal nations focusing on this conflict likewise felt that that weapons of mass destruction was a foundation for going into that conflict. It’s behind us now. We know that they were not there, at least not to the magnitude we anticipated, although the capacity—and underline “the capacity”—to go into production remained in—certainly in some areas.
Now, where we are today is a very precarious situation. I’ll be careful in my remarks tonight for one reason. We have invested very heavily in life and limb and dollars in this conflict. We’re at that stage where our entire focus is upon a new government coming into being. A series of courageous elections for the people, and now the government coming into being.
As we gather here this evening, the reports are that there’s a struggle to conclude the final decisions relating to the several ministries—namely, Defense, Interior and the Energy Ministry—and that possibly the new prime minister-designate would decide to reserve those three ministries to a later date. So, none of us know exactly what’s going to transpire in the days and—hopefully not the weeks, but the days to come. The 22nd of this month, if they fail to reach a government, then the president goes in to, under the constitution, start all over again, you know, in many respects.
So I think we should give them the benefit tonight that they will come together with a government. Hopefully that government will be able to accept the full role of responsibility regarding a sovereign nation which the United States, together with these coalition forces, have given it.
And I’ll yield the floor now to my colleague, Jack Reed. We have traveled together to Iraq. We have worked together on this committee many years. I admire your steadfastness and your conviction and the experience that you bring to the table. Surprisingly, when I came to the Senate 28 years ago, over 80 percent had served in the military; today there’s just a handful of us. That’s not to say our colleagues wouldn’t, had they given the opportunity to them, been good soldiers, sailors or airmen. But I value your participation, Jack.
FRYE: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed, may I encourage you to pick up the exact opening theme that Senator Warner was called on to ask—to address, namely, are we at a stage where the Congress needs to step up, not being able to conduct a war, but to guide it more firmly and more explicitly?
SENATOR JACK REED: Well, first let me say what a privilege it is to be here with John Warner. I have a feeling if you were casting a movie and you called central casting for a United States senator, he would get the part, not me—(light laughter)—for some strange reason, but—. It’s a pleasure serving with you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and it’s good to be with you tonight.
Let me just say from the outset that I think the administration’s approach to Iraq represents a strategic misstep coupled by serious operational mistakes in the conduct of these operations. I did not feel at the time in October of 2002 that Iraq was an immediate threat. It was subsequently, then, determined because of a lack of weapons of mass destruction and others that it was not an immediate threat. But we have now engaged in that effort. And I think the admonition to look forward and not look back is one that I will take.
Simply, I must add also that a great deal of the opportunities that still exist in Iraq are a result of the courage and the skill of the forces that are fighting there. The soldiers, the Marines: they’ve done a remarkable job. I think there are mistakes that have been made that still weigh heavy on the conduct of these operations.
The first, I believe, is insufficient troops. I was with Senator Warner, in fact, with the 4th Infantry Division July of 2003, and I was shocked to hear General Odierno say there were literally hundreds of ammo dumps that could not be secured because we lacked the military personnel to do that. My sense then, it is now, that there was a window, if we had robust military forces we could have influenced in a much more positive way the direction of activities there. And today I think this unwillingness to have robust forces still operates as a brake on the administration in terms of their proposals. And frankly, at this point, there’s a real question of whether additional forces would add a significant margin to our efforts there.
I think there was also insufficient attention immediately to the rapid economic progress. Without that rapid economic progress, the men and women on the street in Iraq sensed that this was not going well. It gave them grievances that they didn’t have previously. And it dispelled the sense we had initially that we were practically invincible. And today this lingers, because we have not yet been able to deploy the civilian equivalent of shock and awe to help restore that economy. And I think that continues to haunt us there.
I think we allowed the militias to persist. Today we’re trying to bring those militias into line. But that’s another attribute of insufficient forces. I was up with the 173rd in the northern part of Iraq, and frankly, the peshmerga and the 173rd had a very careful relationship. They weren’t in the position of disarming them at the time, and probably not today.
I think there was a failure to bring the Sunnis into the process because of de-Ba’athification and disbanding the army. And today I hope that this political process has reignited an attempt to bring the Sunnis into that process.
Of course, we lost international support. We were, in some respects, disdainful of it. We went in with a unilateral approach. I think we also have generated a huge backlash in the Islamic world. That still persists and haunts us today.
We’ve had a huge burden placed upon our military forces, the army and the Marine Corps. That burden is being shouldered, but it gets increasingly difficult, and will be difficult in the days, months and years ahead.
And then I think the American public, their attitude towards these types of operations has been seriously challenged. I think they’re very much skeptical of the administration now. And that’s a cost that this administration will bear going forward.
And I think also there is a question about deflection from the real war on terror, trying to root out those terrorists that are across the globe. Very difficult to gauge, but there’s a sense that our preoccupation with Iraq has in some respects complicated our ability to deal with terrorists that very well might be plotting to attack the United States.
I feel, and it responds directly to Alton’s question, is that Congress has to play a more forceful role, understanding that the direction of the military operations is that of the president and the administration. But I think we can be more influential; we must be more influential.
The bottom line question is will these mistakes be so decisive that they frustrate us from a successful conclusion. I think the jury’s out. But I believe they certainly diminished the possibilities that we could have achieved in Iraq had we done things differently.
FRYE: Let me turn again to you, Senator Warner. You mentioned the hopeful emergence of the new Iraqi government. And in relating the American role to this unfolding political experiment in Iraq, is the crucial judgment now whether the American presence is doing more to fan the insurgency and draw attack than it is to facilitate accommodation among the Iraqi factions? What is your judgment about that?
WARNER: It’s a debatable question. And I don’t think there’s a very clear answer. Oftentimes on our trips it’s brought up. But bear in mind, were we not there, I don’t think anyone in this audience could say that a civil war couldn’t erupt tomorrow, and we would lose such gains as we have made thus far.
I cannot stress the fragility of this situation more vehemently than I’m trying this evening. If we do not wait patiently for another few days, weeks to come, make statements here tonight, or elsewhere, that destabilizes that situation, which is on a trigger hair line, in my judgment, then we could lose it all. And I just hope that—certainly not here tonight we’ll not do it. But we’ve got to wait another few days or weeks to really see how this thing works out.
My concern is that the expectations are so high about this new government come in, if they’re not met, then what do we do? If they do not grab the reins of full authority for a sovereign nation, then what do we do? Simply in my judgment, we’ve got to sit down and let calm and collected minds—not ours alone, but international community—decide, all right, we’ve given it our best shot, what next do we do? And I do not suggest in any way nearly a pullout. But we’ve got to do something if this government does not meet expectations.
FRYE: Senator, that actually frames, I think, a logical next question, because the art of military strategy, and of political strategy, is contingency planning—what are you going to do under these possibly adverse circumstances. If there’s one point of consensus in this very troubling and troubled debate, it is that the Iraqis have to take more responsibility for their own future.
Now, assuming that some of Iraq’s neighbors might even contemplate allowing us to do it, would a way to energize the Iraqi process be to consider the suggestion some have made to move the American deployment at an early stage to an over-the-horizon deployment—keeping forces in the area but not necessarily on Iraqi territory. Would that be a way to provide the most powerful incentive for the Iraqis to get on with it?
Senator Reed?
REED: I feel that we have to begin to rapidly redeploy. And part of it—and I think the chairman is exactly right, this is a very fragile situation. It’s one that’s very difficult to understand fully.
But the sense I have from listening to some of the commanders in the field is that our presence is both enabling and disabling. We have to be there, I think, in the very short run to maintain some stability. But the longer we’re there, we seem to accumulate a lot of resentment by the Iraqi people.
I can recall reading in Cobra II John Abizaid’s comments about American troops being the antibody in the—sort of the culture there. And I served with John in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment about 30 years ago, and he’s a very competent and capable person. I tend to agree with his comments. Similarly, General Chiarelli, just a few weeks ago, talked about the fact that sometimes it’s not good to have our troops involved directly because they are—sometimes give more offense than comfort to the Iraqis. And also, I think Barry McCaffrey’s comments about this dynamic suggest that it would be good for us to reposition.
And I’ve always felt the first notion of repositioning is try to disengage our troops from the populous areas, put in Iraqi security forces, when they’re capable, and then begin to, hopefully, reach for that point where our position will be logistical support, training, and over the horizon, never relinquishing the opportunity and the right to strike, particularly the terrorist elements, like Zarqawi.
WARNER: You know, we can’t leave that question without saying what will be the mission of our forces if they’re withdrawn to these cantons—I don’t know where it is—Jordan, Saudi Arabia. What is the mission, and at what point do we trigger their re-entering?
And as you know, Jack, from your own military experience, if you give up ground and come back, you’re at a disadvantage because you’ve got to go in and regain what you once had.
I just think any message now that we’re thinking about pulling back or redistributing our forces best be kept out of discussion until this government is given a full opportunity to come into being and a reasonable period to prove itself.
REED: I would add further, Mr. Chairman, I think the notion of deadlines are not as helpful as simply stating a policy objective of redeployment, because I think then you tie yourself down arbitrarily.
But I think the notion that we are coming out is something that has to be communicated because I think it will in fact help the Iraqis get even more serious about standing up their security forces, of making arrangements for a situation in which we will not be the lead combat element.
WARNER: I think the president has consistently laid down the conditions by which we want to remove our forces. But they’ve yet to be met. And I think two things have occurred here recently that is very important. One, our United States ambassador has done a remarkable job. Clearly, his constant, subtle diplomacy, together with others, brought about the designation of the new prime minister. And throughout all this, our troops have fought with incredible courage, and General Abizaid down to the privates deserve a tremendous amount of credit.
But you now see the British forces being subjected to challenges which they haven’t experienced here of recent. That area is becoming more unstable as other areas continue to experience just, I think, an unacceptable level of fighting between the Shi’ites and the Sunni.
FRYE: Senator Warner, picking up the earlier observation you made about this political transition again, let’s talk a bit about the unfolding politics. I think you’ve heard your colleague, Senator Biden, express a view that is shared by the Council’s president emeritus, Les Gelb, that the incoming government should press for great decentralization in the future arrangements within the country, and tripartite autonomy among the Shi’ites, the Sunnis and the Kurds.
Do you think that that is a workable plan? Is it a desirable plan?
WARNER: Well, recently on the floor of the Senate I commended my good friend, Senator Biden, and Les Gelb, for putting that on the table. It’s an option on the table.
But should we begin to weigh that option at this critical time, in the next few days, the weeks of this government coming into being and starting out? We shouldn’t, I think, be focusing on those options at this time. Leave it on the table for the future, but not now.
FRYE: Well, one of the great successes that began in the previous term of the administration was the dramatic overthrow of the Taliban and the advance in Afghanistan toward a democratic regime.
Before we turn to Iran, I’d like to ask both of you, beginning with you, Senator Reed, in thinking about Afghanistan as a focal point of the wider war on terrorism, is the U.S. engagement there in some sense dependent or tied to success in Iraq? What do you see about that connection?
REED: Well, I think there is a connection between Iraq and Afghanistan. One obvious one is that the resources that might have been available for a concentrated effort in Afghanistan were transferred in large part to Iraq.
I think the other issue is one in which in the age of the Internet, not only images coming out of Iraq, which help inflame Islamic spirits there, and also, technical aspects—the IEDs that are being displayed now in Afghanistan, beheadings, which is something that were not common in Afghanistan. I think that’s flowing out of this experience in Iraq.
But I think the real influence, both positive and negatively, on Afghanistan, in terms of our view, is what’s happening in Pakistan. I just returned from Afghanistan about a month ago, and talked to General Eikenberry. The first point I’d make is that more resources could be used for civic action in Afghanistan than are forthcoming. I think that’s another consequence of the Iraq engagement.
And second, the Taliban has something of a sanctuary in Pakistan. Maybe it’s that the Pakistanis don’t clearly believe that we’ll be there 10 years from now, and they might think the Taliban—and they want to have friendly terms. I don’t know. But the movement of Taliban forces from Pakistan into Afghanistan is affecting operations.
So I think there are definitely relationships between Iraq and Afghanistan, but the more prominent and more significant—the relationship between what’s going on in Pakistan than what’s going on in Afghanistan.
WARNER: We should take note that NATO has stepped up to accept the challenge of beginning to provide security for the reconstruction teams in all of Afghanistan. The final contingents of British and Canadian and I believe Dutch will be moving into the lower quadrant, where the United States has had its forces, this summer and take over full responsibility.
But the situation in Afghanistan is very serious for a number of reasons.
One is that they don’t have a good handle on how they’re going to stop this drug business. That is—the largest heroin-growing section of the whole world is right there. The economy—regrettably, the GNP is highly dependent on the indirect proceeds from that drug trade coming back into the economy of this country.
Now, we’ve got, fortunately, an extraordinary man who is the leader. We all admire him greatly. And their legislature—when I visited a few weeks ago, you knew it was coming into being because we met with about 30 of them, and they just quarreled and argued with each other for the whole hour we were with them. So I know they’ve got the instincts of how to perform their legislative duties.
But my concern is the rise of incidents—and you mentioned several, but you need to include the human bomber, the person who will give his or her life in a cause. They’ve begun to infiltrate. And the Taliban want to show the British—now, the British went through an experience in the 1800s, you may recall; they suffered devastating losses in trying to conquer that country. And the Russians, of course—the Soviet Union failed miserably. The Taliban want to show the Brits and others that they can knock them out again. And they’re increasing in their influence and attacks, this time using, regrettably, much of Pakistan as a refuge.
FRYE: Well, it’s quite clear that our ambition to teach democracy is not matched by what others are teaching, and they’re clearly showing up as successful tutors on suicide bombings and IEDs and other things.
But let’s turn to the issue that I think was on your mind at the start of our conversation, Senator Warner. And I’d like both you and Senator Reed to offer some thoughts about the other crucial problem in the region, namely how to deal with Iran—not only as a factor in the Iraq equation, but more generally as a problem in its own right.
Apart from the question of Iran’s nuclear program, would a more forthright American opening to Tehran ease the situation in Iraq? Or would it only enflame it by spurring fear of greater Shi’ite influence in the region?
WARNER: Well, I’d like to take a minute or two on this because I think it’s the most serious problem facing not just America but the whole region and indeed much of Europe, and therefore, we’ve got to go about it with extreme caution. And I believe thus far our country has done its best in the negotiations, working with the United Nations, working with our partners in Europe, and regrettably China and Russia seem to have both feet against the door and have thus far precluded what I’d hoped to be a diplomatic solution.
So therefore, we’re left to options on the table. You mentioned the possibility of bilateral talks. Well, I frankly believe it’s an option that should be on the table. I’m not suggesting we take part in them at this time, but it’s an option that should remain on the table as we watch the unfolding of the current diplomacy and the steps being taken in the Security Council.
Secondly, I also have this following idea, and I brought along a quote with me. I studied the other day what the secretary-general said in NATO, and he said the following. He said, at a February 10th, 2006, press conference, “ Iran is, of course, a very, very relevant subject for NATO, that Iran can be discussed in NATO.” He went on to say—well, I think I’ll just—“Either we tackle”—this is another phrase he said—“Either we tackle the challenges to our security when and where they are, or they will end up on our doorstep.”
Well, I said in a speech the other night to the Atlantic Council, “It’s on your doorstep, Mr. Secretary-General, now.” And it would be wise for Iran to perceive that NATO—which is one of the most extraordinary, if not the most extraordinary military alliance in contemporary history—in its containment of the Soviet Union, in its progress in the Cold War—what other organization has a better experience, a better track record for success in containing a potential adversary than NATO? They ought to announce that they’re going to do some planning, and send that signal in the hopes it perhaps it would bolster the strength of the negotiations taking place from the perspective of those free nations that do not want Iran to obtain any type of fissionable weapon through their process to date, which they claim they have. And therefore, I would urge that NATO send a signal—we’re just going to look at the plans—a plan by which they would put a ring around Iran, similar in many effects of what we did in Europe. And we’re not there to threaten you, but we’re there to let you know that if you do something, then you can expect the free nations of the world, through NATO, to take appropriate responses. Now, that just might be the catalyst to break this logjam of diplomacy today.
FRYE: Senator Reed, before we turn to the audience—where I see Jim Hoagland of The Post—Jim and others have written about the need to think very thoroughly and deeply about how to respond to the noted letter from President Ahmadinejad to President Bush. And I wonder what you think. Is the response to that letter yet to be framed, one that can be the key to opening and keeping alive, to nursing along, if you will, the option that Senator Warner says should certainly be on the table of more direct communication with Tehran?
REED: Well, I concur with Senator Warner. I think that option should be on the table. And there is at least two major lines of discourse.
One is what’s happening in Iraq—and there’s a clear indication that the Iranians have influence there—in fact, even have a presence there. There’s disturbing reports about technology—IED technology coming across and maybe even MANPAD missiles coming across. So at a local, operational level, I think we should engage in discussions. In fact, I think our ambassador has indicated in the past that he’s been authorized to do those discussions.
When it comes to the nuclear issue, I think, again, discussions should be on the table. I don’t think those discussions should be automatic. I think they have to be conditioned on demonstration by the Iranians that they’re serious about entering into the discussions. I haven’t seen that degree of seriousness yet.
And I think also we have to be very careful about separating ourselves from our European allies, and also we have to be much more diligent in developing an effective dialogue with the Russians and the Chinese about Iran. And to that end, I don’t know how—you know, how effective or timely were the vice president’s comments in Vilnius about the Russians. But I don’t think we can be seen as isolated or broken apart from all of our allies, because I think the essence of Senator Warner’s proposal, which I agree with, is that if we can show a unified, international front that is solid, then we have much more leverage and better hopes of ending this crisis. And so I would not take them off the table, but I think we have to do a little work before we get down to bilateral discussions.
FRYE: Bilateral engagement in the context only of a strong multilateral connection.
REED: I think absolutely.
FRYE: Ladies and gentlemen, we turn now to members of the audience to take part in the discussion. When you are recognized, will you please wait for the microphone and speak directly into it. And we would ask you also to stand, state your name and your affiliation, and set the admirable example of concise intervention, so that your presider will not have to set the painful example of cutting you short.
QUESTIONER: I’m William Hauser without an affiliation. My question for both senators is, if the game is up, and we’ve biten off more than we can chew, if Iraq is dissolving into mutual ethnic cleansing and Afghanistan into warlordism, which one would be the more desirable to backout of in order to salvage the other?
MR. FRYE: Senator Warner, you’re used to voting. That’s a good one to vote on.
WARNER: Yeah, but I’m going to say, most respectfully to your question, that to answer that question could well jeopardize the fragility of the situation that exists in both countries today. We’re not there yet, and I don’t know of anyone in any of the debates on Capitol Hill of recent who want to try and look into the future and try and select between those two theaters. They’re quite different. Just remember, Afghanistan was the training ground for al Qaeda, and while we haven’t, unfortunately, caught Osama yet, there are many things under way to catch him, I assure you. And I have not given up hope that someday that will occur, and therefore, until he is brought to justice one way or another, we should, I think, stay the course there in Afghanistan.
Iraq , let us trust that this new government will take hold and the reins of sovereignty will be exercised with strength and commitment.
FRYE: Senator Reed, years ago with the Rand Corporation we had a group looking at Vietnam, and the group was known as the Sour Contingencies Group. You’ve just had the sour contingencies question, do you have a choice on those lines?
REED: Well, I think we have to work in both areas, both Afghanistan and Iraq, to avoid those outcomes of ethnic cleansing, sectarian violence, civil war, chaos. I think we still have a chance. Time might be running out, but we still have a chance. I would only suggest that if it’s in terms of strategy, in terms of economy of effort, I think there’s a larger potential in Afghanistan to get it right for many different factors.
One is that the opposition is not quite as robust as it is in Iraq. Two, one of the impressions that I received when I was out with General Eickenberry is that the Afghanis are sort of war-weary. It’s been a long time. The Iraqis are not quite yet there. But I would not pose it as an either/or, get out of this one or stay there. I think it might be a holding action with diminished expectations in Iraq and concentrating more efforts for much more success in Afghanistan. But I don’t think we can give up on either one at this point. It wouldn’t be fair to the troops that are engaged today.
FRYE: Right here, please.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. John Duke Anthony, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. If both senators would address the following question, which many would argue is as relevant, timely and potentially ominous as the ones you have addressed—namely, on the one hand, the aspect of construction, not reconstruction, of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, the largest that any country has in history on the planet; the only project that’s being completed within schedule and under budget. And on the other hand, the four mega military bases at different places in Iraq, which would seem, from an insurgent’s perspective, as though some great power had invaded and occupied the United States.
Talked about downsizing its troops, withdrawing, not staying a moment longer than as necessary, while simultaneously building mega bases outside of Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis and Denver.
FRYE: Senator Reed, why don’t you take the first crack, and then, we’ll turn to Senator Warner.
REED: Well, I think the mega bases are sort of a demonstration of the way we fight wars. You know, we insist on making sure that our forces have a quality of life and excellent protection, and that’s the way we do it. And I don’t think we’re going to change that. Although, I can understand that from a perspective of a(n) Iraqi that doesn’t look like the way we do business everywhere. That looks like a special deal for Iraq.
In a very practical sense, one of the most difficult challenges to redeploy would be to get away from those bases, to be able to shrink our logistical footprint, and that’s going to be a real challenge for many months. How do we deal with that? First, we have to emphatically say again and again we have no aspirations there for territory or for oil, and we have to keep saying that. I think we will.
As far as the embassy goes, you know, I think the embassy is an example of trying to provide force protection for our diplomats, and one final point I’d make is one of the problems I think we have with our diplomatic presence is that it’s concentrated in that embassy, which is fortress-like, and we don’t have the kind of dispersion throughout the country in small groups because of security concerns. That would be much more effective in getting our message that we’re here not for our benefit, but for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
FRYE: Senator Warner?
WARNER: Well, I’d simply say that we’ve got to have such an embassy that is adequate. I don’t have a real feeling, but I don’t want to see a monument built there that would sort of incite more criticism about our presence as a cause for the disruption. So there’s a balance that has to be struck.
And with regard to the bases, I assure you that when the pieces come together—and they can exercise through the adequacy of their own military, and the adequacy of their own police the security, and add to a problem which both Jack and I are concerned with—you’ve got to have a logistic train that takes care of the new Iraqi army and the police.
They’re now highly dependent on our logistics. We call it tooth-to-tail in the military. And there’s very little tail on what is emerging as a formidable and credible Iraqi military. But it stops at the gate, because they don’t have any really reserves of supplies or men, and furthermore, their equipment is largely of old Soviet Union derivatives. That’s what they’ve used for years, and they like it—comfortable with it. And they really can’t repair much of the equipment that we’ve been able to give them.
So there’s a lot of problems to be met, and we need a base structure to resolve those problems. We can’t walk away and just leave them.
FRYE: We’re going to go here and then here. And then we’re going to go to the back of the room. But right here, please.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. That was a nice lead-in to my question. I’m Thom Shanker with The New York Times. I’d like to drill a little bit more into the deployment and troop numbers. It’s of great interest to the American public and of course the men and women in uniform.
There’s a bit of the conventional wisdom out there that the administration’s goal is to drop down to 100,000 troops in Iraq by the end of this year and then perhaps close to 60,000, 50,000 by next summer. Are you getting any indications of that planning? Do you think that’s a reasonable glide path?
And both of you talked about tooth-to-tail and logistics. You spend time there. You know the military. The Iraqis have no combat support or service support whatsoever. So how many tens of thousands of Americans will have to stay for how many years to support these new Iraqi security forces? Thank you.
FRYE: Senator Warner?
WARNER: Well, let’s take the second part of your question, because we do concur on this tooth-to-tail problem. That has got to be done largely not only by the United States but there are other countries.
I really believe—I’ll make one prediction tonight. If this government stands up, and it’s credible, and it seizes the reins, I think you’ll see additional support from other countries be drawn into this complicated equation. No longer will it be just the United States, Great Britain and our other coalition partners. I believe the rest of the world will now see that we have delivered a government, and it’s going to stand up, and it’s going to do the job, and they’ll come help to us (sic). They could pick up the logistic responsibility as easily as we, but we must stay there to see that through.
As to the troop levels, as to what we might draw out in the future, I’m not going to touch that question, because that touch—directly bears on the success of this new government. And that is yet to be proven.
FRYE: Senator Reed?
REED: Well, what’s publicly known is that they’re proposing to keep back one brigade that was scheduled to rotate into Iraq, which represents a small decrease. And I’m not familiar with any specific plans about redeployment schedules or manpower schedules going forward.
And I would also add the point that Senator Warner’s made and that you made implicit in your question. A logistical operation is a large-scale operation for that country. So the idea that we can get down to a few trainers and a few thousand troops in a short period of time, I think, is just not feasible, given the fact that we need to support our own forces, and we also have to support the Iraqi army for the foreseeable future. So I think there will be a significant logistical base.
But I think a lot of the debate, to be fair, among the American public and even within Congress is about combat maneuver brigades of the United States Army and Marine Corps, who are carrying the fight. I think if the situation resolves itself so that they’re not needed and that what’s left is a logistical base, and they’re well-protected, I think that would be much more acceptable to the American people and to the Congress.
FRYE: Right here.
QUESTIONER: Jim Hoagland, Washington Post. Alton, thanks for the plug, and thanks for arranging the evening.
I wanted to ask these particularly two level-headed senators a two-part question about Iraq, if I could. In November the secretary of State outlined a fairly new approach called “clear, hold and build” as our strategy in Iraq. That was going to feature provincial reconstruction teams.
From your trips and from the briefings that you’ve had, do you see that this strategy has taken hold? Is it anything—is it much more than an idea, a slogan? Can you describe to us how it works, how well it works?
And the other question touches on John Warner’s comments in particular about equipment. Your comments reflect a memorandum that General McCaffrey has written—it’s been widely circulated—in which he talks about the Iraqi forces that we’re standing up being appallingly equipped.
WARNER: Ill-equipped.
QUESTIONER: That’s right. How do—how do—how do we deal with that problem?
WARNER: That’s the toughest one because there’s a school of thought—and when I served in the Pentagon in Vietnam in the last five years of that conflict, we began to have Vietnamization, where we literally turned over our equipment as we left and gave it to the—what was the remnants of the South Vietnamese in those days. Didn’t work, but—we are now pondering how much of our equipment that we can turn over without really destabilizing our base back home to train and continue to prepare for what—hopefully never, but anyway, we got to prepare for the next contingency. So I think we’ve got to strike a balance between what we are able to provide them and what they must go and find elsewhere.
Secondly, let’s go to the secretary of State’s memorandum. I think progress is being made. The goal is to have a reconstruction team for each of the 18 provinces. Unfortunately, there’s only five in place today. Now, what is a reconstruction team? It’s a self-contained unit that can come into a geographic area of Iraq, and they’ve got the engineers, they’ve got the designers, they’ve got the security, they’ve got the full capability to take on a project or projects and complete them. All self-contained. And we need to go to 18 in order to fulfill the secretary’s, I think, very significant program.
FRYE: Senator Reed?
REED: Well, my impression of the strategy is clear, hold and wait because we do not have sufficient resources to do that part of the mission, which is the reconstruction.
When I was there in January, I visited two out of then three teams, one in Al Hillah and one in Mosul, I believe. And first, the teams were not at full strength. It’s very difficult to get the kind of experts you need first from the State Department, and then from other departments like the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, because they’re not organized as expeditionary forces like the Department of Defense, and the culture’s very difficult to change. There are some—still questions about who’s going to protect those teams, whether they’re going to have private contractors who protect them or United States military or Iraqi forces that can act to protect them.
So there’s still a lot of questions, and this is a top—I think the secretary’s right about her vision and the priority, but I haven’t seen the kind of acceleration and momentum and effort behind this that is necessary. In the intervening several weeks two teams have been added, but we need a lot more than that. And they need to be able to get out. They need to have their own resources, which would allow them to have funds like the military has, CERP funds, the little projects they could jump-start. That’s unclear whether they’ll get that type of money.
So this—and this is something very frustrating because when Senator Warner and I traveled out in ’03 and I went later in November, the same comment I got from military commanders: where are the civilian experts that’ll help us make the transition? I don’t think we’ve made the grade yet.
WARNER: Can I make a footnote here, Jim? That was an important question.
I put in legislation—and I attached it to this current bill, the appropriations bill, which I hope will eventually be shaped and passed into law—at the request of the secretary of State namely to change the authority of each of the Cabinet officers and agencies’ head in the United States to give them the authority to provide incentives for their people—be they Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, Department of Commerce—all of those needs are desperately required for these reconstruction teams and other goals that the secretary of State has stated. The president designated the secretary of State as the action officer for this administration in recruiting and encouraging more of our civil service to go over there and pick up the jobs.
They don’t have a good, sound judicial system. They don’t have a good monetary system. Their health system needs help. Their—there is a crying need for help that can only be provided to help our troops finish the job and provide us stability in that country.
REED: Can I just take one comment about the equipment? And that is—and I think Senator Warner was very accurate and precise about the need and the difficulty of transitioning equipment, but there’s another fact here; that is, training people to take care of the equipment there. And that’s going to take a long time also, and that raises the question will they be Iraqi soldiers, or will they be contractors, or how do we—how we set up a whole elaborate system of depots. This is going to be a very difficult and challenging issue, not only in terms of the hardware, but also the people that will maintain the equipment.
FRYE: Equity requires that we go to the back of the room. Right here, please.
QUESTIONER: Excuse me. Edwin Williamson from Sullivan and Cromwell. Today the administration announced that it had taken Libya off of the terrorist list of countries. This is the culmination of a series of events that started in 2003. To what extent might the U.S. action in Afghanistan and Iraq have had a favorable impact on where Libya has now gotten?
FRYE: That’s a sympathetically-leading question.
Senator Reed, Senator Warner, what do think about that?
REED: I think it had an effect, certainly. I think it just certainly caused them to focus on their future because of the success initially in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I think also, though, it was probably another factor, and I don’t know what weight to give to each, the recognition that being a pariah in the world was not going to lead to economic development, to a better life for the people of Libya, and even more security for Qadhafi. So I think it was a function of both being shocked and coming to grips with the question, and then making a calculation that they’d be better without their incipient nuclear program than they were with it.
FRYE: Senator Warner?
WARNER: Well, I would simply add yes, I think that we can—the coalition of forces that are fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq can take some credit for that. It shows commitment and a decision to use force when diplomacy fails. Mind you, diplomacy can only be so strong as the commitment behind it to use force if it fails. And in both instances this was done. But the world community has really, as Jack said, said those nations that want to try and move ahead independently, much like we’ve got in Iran today, we will not accept it, and there will be consequences that follow. And I think Qadhafi just decided to fold his proverbial tent and do what he can to join the world.
FRYE: We’re going to try to wrap up by compressing a couple of interventions here before the senators respond. So I’ll take one here and one here to wrap up the session we have. Right here, please.
QUESTIONER: Bill Courtney with Computer Sciences Corporation. The Defense Department has some advanced military modernization programs underway. The more recent Quadrennial Defense Review, though, seems to talk of softer power, if you will, greater emphasis on cultural and language training for military forces. What are the lessons, do you believe, are the Afghan war and the Iraq war for the kind of military we need in the future?
FRYE: Now, before you respond, let me invite a comment here, please, and you can deal with both or either.
QUESTIONER: Jim Moody, Merrill Lynch, senators. I was alarmed, Senator Warner, by your comment about Iran, encircling Iran as a way of getting their attention. That would require having troops in Afghanistan, Azerbijan, Pakistan and the gulf states. I can’t imagine that those states would be willing to participate in that, as much as I think we need to do something positive about Iran. And, by the way, I served in Iran for a year. The culture is very strong. They feel very much that they are a wonderful nation with this great history. We have to avoid doing anything that—(audio drops).
WARNER: Well, I’d like to take you on. I respect your views, I respect your service. I don’t have that experience with Iran. But you’re overlooking the fact that much of that could be staged at sea on the international waters. It doesn’t necessarily require a ring of bases, but the appearance of ships from time to time—not unlike what we do off the shores of North Korea. And it’s been effective there.
I just feel that NATO is going to have this problem on its doorstep. If we pursue, say, sanctions, look at the situation with regard to the world energy supply and the importance of the oil and other products flowing from Iran. Oil today is priced where it’s almost destabilizing some of the economies of the world. And it could shoot up. So we—thinking through all of the options on sanctions, we’d better look at, perhaps, another option of just saying to them, we’re planning, quietly ships appear, disappear, come back. I think it would be a reminder of the success we had in containing the Soviet Union and avoiding conflict there.
FRYE: Senator Reed, perhaps you can respond to Ambassador Courtney’s query.
REED: I think it depends on what type of fight you have. If you’re in an insurgency, as you are in Afghanistan and in Iraq, technology helps a lot. There are a lot of technologies we’ve deployed to counter the IEDs, which has saved countless lives. A lot of the UAVs are very helpful.
But the big gap seems to be that cultural awareness, language skills, a sensitivity to what’s going on around you. And that takes a long time to build into an institutional environment, and I think we’ve got to really emphasize that much more than we have.
Interesting—you know, maybe this is sort of bad history—but we seem to catch up, but it takes a long time. When I was at West Point, everyone was studying Russia, the Soviet Union. We understood that 30 years from now we’d be confronting the Russians, the Soviets across the line; wanted to know all about them. Then they disappeared—the Soviet Union, at least. We weren’t thinking of Arabic—except some bright people like John Abizaid—Arabic, Muslim culture, et cetera. That was just totally off the range.
So I do think we have to be much more aware of these cultural issues, not to ignore technology, but, you know, if this is the struggle we’re preparing for over the next several years, then it’s very important.
FRYE: Some of you may remember the very wise maxim by the British historian, Maitland, who said, “It is important to remember that events now long in the past were once far in the future.” That insight is very helpful as a perspective on understanding and empathizing with those who have made the decisions that have brought us to this point in Iraq. But it doesn’t offer very much guidance about the next steps. And I think our conversation this evening highlights a number of the issues and elements that must go into our forward thinking on this set of problems.
We’ve not reached a conclusion, but we have run out of time and reached the end of the meeting. So I want to thank all of you who offered constructive interventions. Apologize to those of you to whom I could not turn. And especially ask you to join me in thanking Senator Warner and Senator Reed for sharing this evening with us. (Applause.)
WARNER: Thank you.
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