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| Speakers: | Charles Ferguson, Council Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations |
|---|---|
| Michael A. Levi, Council Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations | |
| Presider: | Anya Schmemann, Council on Foreign Relations |
June 13, 2006
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
MS. ANYA SCHMEMANN: (In progress) – Good Morning. Thank you for being here at this early hour. I’m Anya Schmemann and I manage communications and press outreach here. And I’m very pleased to introduce our two fellows in science and technology, who are the authors of this paper on the India nuclear deal. A brief introduction of them: Both are experts on nuclear issues and have degrees in physics.
Michael Levi is a relatively new face at the Council on Foreign Relations. He comes to us by way of Brookings. Charles Ferguson was previously at the Monterey Institute and has the distinction of having served as a nuclear engineering officer on a ballistic missile submarine.
Their report assesses the U.S.-India nuclear deal and offers a strategy for moving forward. The U.S.-India relationship is obviously important, and strengthening that strategic partnership has been of particular interest to this Bush administration.
Congress is also, of course, interested in strengthening ties to India, but the deal presented to Congress in March has put Congress in a bit of a bind. Accepting the deal would reward a nuclear proliferator. Rejecting the deal would jeopardize the important relationship.
This report does not dwell on what could have been, might have been, should have been. It is pragmatic and forward-looking and outlines a practical, realistic approach for moving ahead.
Michael and Charles will briefly outline the deal, warts and all, and offer a constructive approach. The way we’re dividing things up here is that Charles will begin, talk a little about what the deal is, and how we think in general about nonproliferation priorities. Michael will handle the political angle: what Congress should do and how their approach, that of the authors outlined in this report, is different from that proposed by Congress, particularly by Congressman Lantos.
A few ground rules. This session is on the record. We are taping it and we’ll have a transcript available in a day or so on our website. And I should note that the report reflects the views of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations takes no position on such issues. It is not the Council’s point of view. It is that of our two distinguished authors.
So, with that, I turn it over to you, Charles.
MR. CHARLES FERGUSON: Thank you very much, Anya. And thank you all for coming out here on Tuesday morning to talk about this deal. I know it’s stirred up a lot of interest, certainly in India, and I think in some quarters, certainly the United States, especially in the nonproliferation community and also the foreign policy community.
And as we were saying before the meeting started, it’s a very interesting issue in that it’s stirred up a lot of passions and it’s cross-cutting; it’s very bipartisan. You can’t really pin this down as a Republican or Democratic issue. Now, it’s certainly a Republican administration. The Bush administration started this deal off last July. And as Anya indicated, they worked out the details with India in President Bush’s meeting in New Delhi in early March.
And so I’m going to quickly just kind of sketch what are the components of this. And I know you know a lot of the details already, but just to kind of get us up to speed, and then just give you insight in terms of our thinking of the philosophy of the nonproliferation angle. And Michael will give you more details about the legislation and our particular strategy we’re recommending.
Okay, so what’s required of India? What’s required of the United States?
What’s required is that India and the United States construct what’s called a 123 agreement. It’s a technical term for a cooperative bilateral agreement between the two countries to allow nuclear technology transfers. And so that’s vitally important here.
And another important piece is that the Nuclear Suppliers Group, called the NSG, comprising 45 nations who conduct nuclear business throughout the world, have to agree, reach consensus to agree to change their rules, relax the rules, carve out an exception for India.
And another component is the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, must form a safeguards agreement with India, because, as part of the deal, India has agreed to place more of its civilian nuclear reactors under safeguards. Currently India has the two old Tarapur reactors under safeguards. It’s agreed to put some of the upcoming Russian reactors under safeguards, and then it’s also agreed to put eight more of its indigenous reactors under safeguards, for a total of 14. So 14 out of 22 of India’s reactors will be placed under safeguards.
And then there is not a firm commitment, but there is at least an expressed desire on the part of both parties that India in the future will try to place more and more of its civilian reactors under international safeguards. So we have to work out the details of a safeguards agreement, and that’s going to take some effort between India and the IAEA.
And then finally, the fourth piece is that Congress must act and they have to change U.S. law, amend the Atomic Energy Act to basically carve out this exception with India, because, as I think all of you know, India is neither fish nor fowl when you think about the nuclear regime. It has nuclear arms. We all know that. It’s no big secret there.
But it’s technically not a nuclear weapons state because, under this international treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, which entered in force in 1970, has a stipulation, that if you had tested nuclear weapons prior to 1967, you’re not a nuclear weapons state under the treaty, although we know that there are three countries who never signed the treaty—Israel, India, Pakistan. We know India and Pakistan certainly have nuclear weapons. Israel, we believe, has never tested, but it’s kind of an open secret they have them.
So there are three sets of countries in the world—the non- nuclear weapon states, the nuclear weapon states under law, and these three other countries. And so, yes, it’s a discriminatory system. A double standard is embedded in the treaty. And so what this deal is trying to do is trying to work out a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between two countries, to allow nuclear trade. And the concern among the nonproliferation community is that this may allow India to produce more fissile material for nuclear weapons.
So now let me just go into one of the substantive areas that we address in the report, and this is the issue of nuclear testing and fissile material production.
Under the terms of the agreement, India is committed to uphold—continue its moratorium on nuclear testing. And we say in the report that’s much more important than the size of the arsenal. Now, of course it’ll be great if India could agree to a cap of its fissile material, stop producing fissile material for weapons, just like the other five original nuclear weapon states have done.
But we know that India is in a part of the world where there are certain regional security dynamics, where India doesn’t want to do it unilaterally, wants to do the fissile material pact in the context of Pakistan, India, and also the global cutoff. So part of the commitment under the deal is that India would work toward a fissile material cutoff treaty.
Now, why is testing more important than fissile material cutoff? Because nuclear testing, one, is very obvious. If a state does that, you know that they’re trying to advance their arsenal. They’re probably trying to modernize their arsenal. And so that could very likely trigger a new arms race in South Asia and also in East Asia as Pakistan and China react to India nuclear testing, or if India reacts to possible testing on the part of Pakistan and China. So that’s why we say it’s very important in this deal to try to maintain that moratorium on testing.
And now let me turn to the other substantive area, export controls versus trying to micromanage, dictate the exact details of the India nuclear arsenal, before I turn it over to Michael.
We say that export controls are much more important than trying to define the exact shape of the India nuclear arsenal at this stage, because right now both countries face the threat of terrorists. Both countries face the threat of states such as Iran, so-called rogue states, trying to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. And we know about the A.Q. Khan network originated in Pakistan.
So it’s vitally important to try to prevent the transfer of these sensitive nuclear technologies out of any country, not just India but the United States, Pakistan, any country. So that’s why it’s very important to try to strengthen the India nuclear export controls. And we point out that both countries also have a vested interest in cooperating in fissile material and physical security of nuclear materials and facilities, because both countries have experienced terrorist attacks, India more so than the United States. And so we also recommend a truly mutual cooperative agreement where both countries can exchange security practices and try to control these materials much more effectively.
So with that, let me turn it over to Michael so he can talk about our two-stage approach and the legislation before us.
MR. MICHAEL LEVI: Thanks, Charles. And thank you all for making it here so early this morning.
There are two separate questions that you can ask about this deal. The first is, should it have been made the way it was made? Should it have been made when it was made? And then you can ask, what should we do about it now?
There’s one school that says that your view about whether it should have been made should be precisely the same as your view about what should be done now. If it shouldn’t have been made, you should kill it. If it should have been made, you shouldn’t touch it. That’s not the right way to look at things.
We’ve got a separate situation now where, for better or worse, rejecting the nuclear deal would do a lot more damage to the bilateral relationship than would have been done had the deal not been made in the first place. There’s not enough reason to automatically endorse the deal, but it is a reason to go looking for priorities like Charles laid out.
And what we propose is an approach for Congress that would try to cement the top nonproliferation priorities while conceding an arrangement that is certainly less than ideal.
Here’s what we want to focus on: First, preventing a unilateral Indian return to nuclear testing; number two, ensuring that inspections, the safeguards that Charles referred to, are permanent on Indian facilities; number three, making sure that an exception at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an exception in export controls for India is not made either at the expense of allowing China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation or at the expense of weakening the consensus approach of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
What we concede can’t be done at this point without effectively undermining or torpedoing the deal is any kind of imposed restriction on the size of the Indian nuclear stockpile. That doesn’t mean that’s not a goal for future American diplomacy. It certainly should be. But as part of Congress’s approach, that’s something that is not going to be achievable in this round.
So how should Congress go about doing this? Here’s the problem. I just listed several things that we argue need to happen, none of which Congress has control over directly. Permanency of inspections has to do with the IAEA agreement with India. Nuclear Suppliers Group rules and whether or not they would allow commerce with Pakistan, that’s to be done at the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
And restrictions on nuclear testing are in part something that comes into the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the so-called 1-2-3 agreement, between the United States and India. Congress doesn’t have a direct say on those things. What it can do is wait until those pieces are in place before it passes its own legislation, the fourth part of this deal, changing American nonproliferation law. And that’s precisely what we recommend, that Congress wait to pass final legislation until these other pieces are in place and are satisfactory.
In order to make that a strategy that will fly in India, that will not kill the deal on the other side, what Congress needs to do is take a first step sooner and declare what its bottom lines are, but at the same time declare its support for the overall framework that was agreed to July 14th of last year and that was extended March 2nd of this year.
We advocate a Sense of the Congress resolution that would lay down bottom lines quite soon and would also explain where Congress is not going to go. And then that would be followed, after the other steps, if those steps are done correctly, with passage of changing U.S. law. And if those steps are not done correctly, Congress would not make the changes in U.S. law.
Before we go to questions, let me very quickly explain some differences between this and the other two-stage approach that has been floating around a lot in recent weeks that Congressman Lantos has proposed. It’s hard to make a precise contrast because the Lantos approach has not been flushed out. No particular legislation or amendments have been offered.
But there are a couple of important differences. One is it’s unclear if the approach advocated by Congressman Lantos would wait until all of the other pieces are in place before voting—nuclear cooperation agreement, IAEA agreement, and NSG agreement. We’re very clear that all the other pieces should be in place.
And the second is, it’s unclear whether, under the Lantos approach, a significant amount of American legislation would be changed up front, right now, even before anything has been delivered on the other side. And we are very clear that the actual substantive legislation that right now restricts cooperation with India should not be changed until the other pieces are in place.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay, thank you.
Two quick questions, maybe just to give a little context to this, and then we’ll open it up.
Ambassador Bob Blackwell sat here a couple of months ago speaking to reporters and said, “This deal is as significant as opening relations with China or the Soviet Union.” And so Michael, I put to you, why is India so important to this administration? Why is the time ripe now for this deal after 30 years of India pursuing its nuclear program?
And then to Charles I would say: we can’t have this discussion without bringing up the ‘I’ word, as in Iran. And your report says that this deal should not affect our efforts to oppose nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea. Why not? Does this deal send the wrong signal to Tehran?
So to Michael first—India.
MR. LEVI: Let’s answer two questions. There are two separate questions. One is, is Bob Blackwell right when he says that? And the other is, as an analyst, what do I think of why the administration got to where they are?
I disagree with what Bob Blackwell has said. Why? Well, before the opening to China and before the opening to the Soviet Union, American relations with China and American relations with the Soviet Union were considerably worse than American relations with India were a year ago, before this deal was made.
So, firstly, the problem that needs to be solved is not nearly as big. Let’s be clear about that. The second thing that we can learn from the openings to China and the Soviet Union is these are gradual things that take a long time. There was an opening to China quite a long time ago. American relations with China are still far from ideal. It’s still not even an ally.
So any piece, no matter what the relationship, is not going to transform the character of that relationship.
Does removing the thorn of fighting over the nuclear issue from the U.S.-India relationship help for a smoother relationship, open more of a potential to build a more cooperative relationship? Absolutely. And would killing the deal after the Bush administration has so publicly and prominently announced it reinforce unfortunate Indian perceptions of the United States as an unreliable partner and hurt future relationships? Absolutely.
But was it necessary? Was there something pressing in July of 2005 that made this necessary to move the relationship forward? No. And that’s why we argued that the deal shouldn’t have been made the way it was, when it was.
But, that said, there is a compelling argument in the long term for a stronger U.S.-India relationship. And that’s why we are concerned about sending that negative signal of unreliability at this point.
China and India are both rising in Asia. It’s important for the United States not to undermine India’s position there. India shares a lot of common values with the United States. India is the world’s largest democracy, and the Bush administration has become very invested in democracy promotion. India has the world’s second-largest Muslim population. The United States is very interested in engaging with Muslim populations around the world.
I would say also, to be very clear, there are certain elements in the Bush administration that would like to explicitly build India as a nuclear hedge against China. And we do not support that sort of approach.
In order to implement that kind of a strategy, India would probably need to modernize its nuclear arsenal, which means nuclear testing. That is a significant reason for why we think this deal should be used as leverage to dissuade India from returning to nuclear testing.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay. Charles, what kind of signal does this send to the nuclear wannabes?
MR. FERGUSON: Well, first of all, I’ll start off sounding like an administration official. India is not Iran, or India is not like Iran. Why not? For a number of reasons. I could at first get very legalistic with you and cite the nonproliferation treaty, as I said in my opening remarks, in saying, well, India never signed the NPT, so it has a legal right to develop nuclear weapons. And Iran did sign and ratify the NPT so it doesn’t have the right to develop nuclear weapons.
But that’s not, you know, my words and I think it’s too legalistic. I think there are larger kinds of strategic issues and larger security reasons why India is much better positioned than Iran to have this kind of cooperative agreement with the United States.
For starters, India has a very good record in terms of proliferation. It’s not a perfect record. The administration likes to say it has an impeccable record on nonproliferation. It doesn’t. But no country has a perfect record on nonproliferation. But India has a very good record on nonproliferation, much better than Iran.
Iran for almost 20 years has been secretly trying to acquire a nuclear program. It’s unclear yet whether it’s a nuclear weapons program, but there are some warning signs that it may be. And India has been very good in terms of the material it’s acquired internationally has been under safeguards in terms of its reactors. Its indigenous reactors weren’t required to be under safeguards. Now it’s going to put some of its indigenous reactors under safeguards. So in that respect it’s also trying to be a responsible player on the nonproliferation scene.
Then there’s also the issue of when did India acquire nuclear weapons capability? This was some 32 years ago, 1974. And you could say, “Well, that’s kind of old news.” So should India continue to be punished for something it did 32 years ago? And so in our report we talk about sort of the time period of punishment; so kind of, you do the crime, you put in the time. But should this be a life sentence? And according to the Bush administration, no.
And I think even we agree no. I mean, there are ways you could try to craft a deal where you could allow civil nuclear commerce between countries as long as they have a very responsible track record. As Michael pointed out, India’s the world’s largest democracy, and Iran is not a democracy—not that you want to condition nuclear sales necessarily on being a democracy, because the United States has nuclear cooperation with China; China’s not a democracy.
And so there’s certainly judgment calls there in terms of how you deal with these certain states. And so it’s hard to have a one-size- fits-all nonproliferation approach. But Iran right now is posing a serious danger of perhaps acquiring nuclear weapons capability and perhaps proliferating that to other countries, or even perhaps terrorist groups, although I think it’s highly unlikely they would do that, and we don’t see indications at all that India would do that. In fact, they’ve indicated that they would take steps to strengthen their controls over these technologies.
MR. LEVI: Can I add one small point? The other argument that’s made is that somehow doing this deal with India will sap other states’ interest, desire, in cooperating with American strategy on Iran or North Korea. If you look at every major state that is engaged on the Iranian issue, the North Korean issue, they have not changed their strategies since this deal was announced. There’s certainly not a reaction to this deal. And the strategies, if anything, have come more in line with the American one, again, not because of this deal but for completely separate reasons.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay. With that, let’s open up. Miles, we’ve got you.
Question: I mean, I’ll just put it on the table. I differ with some of your priorities in terms of nonproliferation goals, but I’ll leave that aside for the minute and try to get into some of the specifics of your questions.
When you talk about nuclear testing beyond the moratorium—and India declared long before it entered negotiations with the United States—what would you be looking for from India in terms of commitment that you call for in a Sense of Congress resolution?
Just a couple of other questions. When you talk about India’s commitment to an FMCT, which it made long before this agreement entered into place, as you’re well aware, FMCT right now is going nowhere because of the U.S. position at the CD. Have you considered, in the Sense of Congress resolution, calling for the U.S. to change its position so that the FMTC could advance and India’s position could mean something?
Also you talked about inspectors—permanent inspections on nuclear facilities. As you’re aware, the bilateral agreement that’s called—I mean, the U.S. in the agreement, they call for India- specific safeguards that appear to be tied to fuel supplies—in other words, if the fuel gets cut off—for instance, if India tests a nuclear weapon, so the safeguards would end.
I’ve talked to people at the IAEA about this. The way that this would have to be accomplished through a letter from the United States or India to the board of governors. The board of governors would have to approve this. It’s going to be negotiated directly with the IAEA secretariat.
Given that obviously the U.S. would have to cast a vote on it, would you call for something in your legislation that would direct the United States to only approve—(inaudible)—66 safeguards or some other permanent measure?
MS. SCHMEMANN: We’ve started with the nuclear expert here.
MR. FERGUSON: Yes. (Laughs.)
MS. SCHMEMANN: I would ask that we don’t get too far into the technical weeds. We can continue the technical discussion with Miles afterwards.
MR. FERGUSON: I’ll try to define—
MS. SCHMEMANN: Start by telling us what a Sense of Congress resolution is, please.
MR. FERGUSON: Okay, right. I think Michael will try to outline the approach here, the Sense of Congress resolution. So it would not have the force of law, but it would express a sense of Congress that in general they support the basic framework of the deal. But as Michael pointed out, we would have these bottom-line restrictions pointed out.
But the bottom lines would have to be structured in a balanced way, so you want to make sure you’re giving both supporters and opponents of the deal something that they can both root for or look at. So if it’s just heavily weighted toward putting more and more restrictions on the deal and not kind of giving the other side something that they can support, that Sense of Congress resolution could look like it’s a sneaky way of trying to reject the deal.
And so, as we said earlier, you’d have this testing moratorium restriction. And true, you know, India has already agreed to a testing moratorium. But this would be a further kind of strengthening, solidifying that.
In terms of export controls, some people have pointed out in the nonproliferation community, “Look, isn’t India already committed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 that was passed two years ago to strengthen its export controls, pass that necessary legislation?” Sure, every country is entitled to that. But if it was just a matter of passing a U.N. Security Council resolution, we’d already have peace in the Middle East. Israelis and Palestinians would get along.
So I think there is value in kind of reiterating and strengthening past practices and past commitments in that respect.
In terms of—I don’t know if, Mike, we want to handle some of the specific things about the safeguards.
MR. LEVI: Sure, specifically on nuclear testing, what are we looking for? Well, if the United States has nuclear cooperation with India that is contingent on India refraining from nuclear testing, that is a significant point of leverage that doesn’t exist right now. Okay, so our proposal requires that that point of leverage be there.
“The FMCT is going nowhere”—I’m repeating what you’re saying, not saying this is necessarily true. You say the FMCT is going nowhere because of the U.S. position. I think it’s a little too quick to say that FMCT—that the U.S. proposal on FMCT that was made recently is going nowhere. I think there’s a lot of debate in European circles about whether to support the approach—
Q It’s not going anywhere because of the disagreement on—
MR. LEVI: On verification.
Q No, not verification—(inaudible)—and the other issues.
MR. LEVI: Again, there are different views on where it’s going. In the report we endorse a verified FMCT approach, in particular because it promotes transparency in Asia. But it doesn’t necessarily have to be a substitute for what the administration has proposed. If the five declared nuclear weapon states could all of a sudden announce that they are not going to produce nuclear weapons material anymore, that would be a significant advance. But it would not be the end of the road.
Q (Inaudible.)
MR. LEVI: We can get into the technical details of that another time.
Permanent inspections on nuclear facilities are the trickiest part of this. Again, a system of inspections that allows India to withdraw its facilities from inspections is not a permanent system of inspections. Should we specify the exact previous IAEA language that should be used? No. I think that’s too—at least my personal opinion is that that is too narrow and too rigid. But there is—but permanent is a fairly clear word.
MR. FERGUSON: I think, in terms of permanent, I mean, really, the Information Circular 66 is really the only one that would really apply to—(inaudible)—(facility-specific type of ?)—
Question: Well, but my question was on the—the language of the U.S.-India agreement says their cooperation in safeguards is conditioned on fuel supply. That’s the language of the agreement—(inaudible)—because Congress could—(inaudible)—that’s not acceptable, because, as you said, if the leverage is to cut off fuel supplies if they test nuclear weapons, then otherwise you’re getting rid of your leverage.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Jonathan.
Question: I was going to ask about—I mean, you’re saying that it’ll be very damaging if the deal isn’t agreed. And I was just wondering why, because there’s no country, is there, that’s going to step in and fill a void? I mean, there’s no other country going to do what the U.S. is doing—like, for example, China—is there? And President Bush has shown a willingness to do a deal, and if Congress scuttles it, he can blame Congress. I don’t see quite why it’s so damaging to U.S.-Indian relations if it doesn’t happen.
MR. LEVI: First, I’m not sure how the president blaming Congress would help make the United States look any better. This is not about making the president popular. This is about American credibility.
That doesn’t answer the first part of your question yet, but I don’t think the fact that the president can go and blame Congress is going to make anyone in India say, “Well, in the future we’re going to be able to depend on commitments made by American presidents.” If anything, that makes that worse.
As far as someone else coming—firstly, this is a big deal in India. Here you are—we were talking about this before the meeting—here, this barely registers. In India this is still a really top, very public issue. And rejecting the deal would be a very big, very public thing to do. It would not stand alone as an event. It would fit into a past pattern, as perceived in India, of the United States going back on its commitments.
It’s not an utterly deadly thing. Would it destroy the U.S.-India relationship? Would it throw India into the hands of another great power? No. That’s why we shouldn’t be willing to give up all these nonproliferation prerogatives in order to make it happen.
But it is not—the relationship does have enough significance, and the impact of rejecting this is important enough, that if you can get, as we say, two of the top three priorities on nonproliferation, then it’s not something that we would counsel rejecting at this point.
MS. SCHMEMANN: So if Congress scuttles the deal, what are the consequences?
MR. FERGUSON: Well, writing this report has been an evolutionary process for me, because I have to admit I started out in the nonproliferation ayatollah camp. You know, it’s toe the line on nonproliferation. And in that sense I thought all this doesn’t look like a very good deal.
But the more we wrestled with this issue, the more we talked to people—we had an advisory committee we met with. And this wasn’t a consensus-type product; it was something just the two of us wrote together finally. It was our decision. But just in talking to many different people who are on both sides of the issue and sort of in between, I began to develop the sense that, look, what if there’s a situation in the future where India and Pakistan are approaching war, and maybe even nuclear war? And we’ve seen these kinds of situations in the past.
And the United States has played a vital role in many of those past situations. And so I think the United States will be a much more trusted partner if the deal can go through properly, as we outlined in the report. And both India and Pakistan—and the United States has very good ties with Pakistan, too, because of the global war on terror—I think all three countries could have much greater trust with each other.
I think it would, I think, lower the likelihood of nuclear war in South Asia; you know, we can’t guarantee that, but I think it’s better to have as close a relations as we can with both India and Pakistan to try to bring greater stability in the region.
And I know some people have talked about trying to play off India versus China. But India’s leaders are very smart. They’re not going to kind of fall for that game. They’re going to try to develop good relations with both Beijing and Washington. So I think it’s kind of nonsense to try to build up India so they can challenge China sometime in the future.
Question: Sorry, isn’t Pakistan looking to China now for similar cooperation?
MR. FERGUSON: Sure.
Question: So I don’t quite understand why you’re saying it’ll lower tension in the region.
MR. FERGUSON: Well, let’s think about it in just the nuclear realm. Okay, let’s kind of imagine—okay, this deal doesn’t go through. You know, what is India likely to do? What is Pakistan likely to do? Will they continue to build up their nuclear arsenals? Probably. You know, perhaps—it looks like there might be a gradual buildup in India. I mean, they’re not totally transparent in where they’re finally headed with their arsenal. Is it likely that we’ll see renewed grounds for nuclear testing? Probably not. But I think the chances of nuclear testing would be far less if this deal goes through.
In terms of sort of the Pakistan-China connection, as we emphasize in the report, we shouldn’t carve out any kind of exception for Pakistan. Pakistan has not been a responsible player with nonproliferation, and so we shouldn’t bend the rules in the NSG for Pakistan.
But there are other things we’re doing with Pakistan, obviously, to improve that kind of relationship. And it’s not that you say to Pakistan, “You’re never going to get nuclear cooperation.” There could be a period of time where we can lay that out.
And as we talk about in the report, what we recommend is that this is an opportunity, this deal right here, for Congress to urge the administration to present a nonproliferation strategy and to lay out a series of hearings to explore nonproliferation very thoroughly.
And I think one of the issues we need to address is, what is this period of punishment? How long should a state be in the dog house if they commit one of these so-called nuclear crimes? Is there a period of time 20 years from now in which Pakistan, if it develops stronger export controls and stops proliferating, that they’ll eventually be able to have some kind of similar deal?
MR. LEVI: Let me re-emphasize and what Charles said, because there are two separate arguments, one within the United States, one beyond the United States. Presumably the arguments like “the United States will not be as trusted a partner with India” are not particularly compelling to the majority of states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, for example, that need to approve this deal, because they don’t particularly care.
So to some extent it’s important—in the United States it’s very important to look to the larger foreign policy context, but it’s also important to focus on the nonproliferation benefits.
Charles has pointed out one very important one—increased leverage in preventing a return to nuclear testing. That’s very important.
Number two, there’s been a lot of talk about whether the inspections on Indian facilities are meaningful or meaningless.
If their goal is to stop India from producing fissile material, they’re not going to do all that much because India will still have facilities not under safeguards.
If their goal is to begin a process of building more transparency in Asia, in the nuclear sphere, they will have an important impact. India will, amongst the nuclear countries, have the largest fraction of its nuclear capacity under international inspection. Is it preventing them from using it to make material weapons? No. Is it promoting transparency that in turn promotes stability and perhaps to move things further? Yes.
Will this change the Indian approach on FMCT? No. If India feels spurned in this whole approach, will it back away from these sorts of things, especially if the United States is trying to lead? Perhaps. But key things that this does gain directly on nonproliferation are on testing and on transparency.
A third thing I should point out is it’s an opportunity to reinforce the consensus approach of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has been badly undermined in recent years by Russian exploitation of what’s called a safety loophole. And I won’t get into details. Bottom line, it’s a loophole. It’s a way of avoiding the consensus approach that’s really fundamental to NSG.
And we’re very clear that the United States needs to go through normal process, needs to get actual rule changes at the NSG, not perpetuate this abuse of this loophole. That in turn helps solidify the NSG as a consensus group.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay, let’s hear from some of our Indian and Pakistani colleagues here as well. In India, it seems the deal represents India’s arrival on the world stage, and it’s been conflated to mean recognition of India by the U.S. as an equal partner. So—Sridhar—what do you think?
Question: Yeah. My question has got to do with how do you—how confident or how optimistic are you of this deal getting through the NSG, given China’s—China has already made it very clear that they would like—they have backed Pakistan in their call for a similar kind of arrangement with the U.S. So why do you all sit here talking about what the Congress should do or should not do when we’re only sure that one-half of what you want Congress to do is likely to get through, because the other part of it, getting the NSG approval, is very much in the air?
MS. SCHMEMANN: Briefly on NSG approval: Charles, do you want to take that on?
MR. FERGUSON: Yeah. And also Michael should probably comment, too, because he’s actually talked to some people involved in the NSG process. I think there is probably going to be a lot of kind of “log rolling” going on; as we say in American politics, a lot of give and take.
You know, China, as you point out, is a sticking point, but it seems like the French and the Russians, certainly, they’re eager for this deal to go through. You know, they’ve been lined up for some time to sell nuclear technology to India. As Michael indicated, the Russians already cited a safety loophole in the NSG rules to provide nuclear fuel to Tarapur, and they’re building reactors in Kudunkulum. And you know, Russians want to do more business. The French also want to do more business.
One thing – what’s funny with this deal is the U.S. nuclear industry actually isn’t going to be in business with India. You know, it could be the Bush administration has kind of greased the skids for some other countries to do much more nuclear business. But I think it’s sort of the Bush administration looking kind of overall—at the overall package of the non-nuclear components of the deal, too.
So there might be some trade-offs—horse trading among the NSG. I can imagine seeing certain countries that are kind of holding out for certain things that the United States can provide, and it might not necessarily be all nuclear, to allow them to get the right votes on that.
MR. LEVI: My impression from discussions with people involved in this issue at the NSG is that China will make a lot of noise, but ultimately, this is not where China wants to blow its political capital. I don’t see China as holding it up.
My understanding is that Sweden is the swing—I shouldn’t say the swing vote. Sweden is the key country that would hold this up at the NSG. It’s an interesting debate right now. Right now Sweden is against it. One prominent Swede, Hans Blix, came out with his Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission report a couple of weeks ago. Depending on how you’re feeling when you read it, you can read it as supporting or opposing the deal.
MR. FERGUSON: I suggest you read an article on this—an interview in ACT.
MR. LEVI: There will be interesting debate—if you want to get in the weeds on NSG agreement, the debate in Sweden is going to be an interesting place where this is done, but I don’t see China as ultimately holding out.
Question: If I may, can I follow up? What kind of examples can be gleaned or what are the pointers that we can glean from what is happening that prevents a agreement with the Americans, the Europeans, the Russians, the Chinese just to work out the package for Iran? How difficult—you know, we—that itself has proved to be very difficult, but now you have—you’re going to start up another contentious thing with the NSG over India?
MR. LEVI: We’re not talking about going to war with anyone or about heavy economic sanctions—I mean, the stakes are—what I’m saying is, a big part of the difficulty of getting an agreement on Iran is that people are concerned about slippery slopes towards war and heavy economic sanctions. The political dynamics are entirely different.
Maybe Charles wants to—
MR. FERGUSON: I think – maybe, I think you’re referring to the fact that, you know, as part of the incentives packages that’s put before Iran that that group of countries would provide light-water reactors to the Iranians in addition to the Bushehr reactor the Russians are helping them build. So how do you work that out through the NSG? Is that—I think that is—
Question: No, that is part of—the other things I’m seeing is there is going to be kind of a spillover, you know, from the debate that is part of the acrimony that is taking place over Iran. Is that likely to spillover into that NSG debate over India, for instance?
MS. SCHMEMANN: Let’s think about that for a minute and go to Michelle.
Question: Yes, I have a question about the domestic political scene about how strong the India lobby is in Congress about, you know, all this, and whether you see yourselves as sort of the counterweight to that if the nonproliferation lobby, if you can call it, is becoming more active.
MR. FERGUSON: We’re in neither camp. I mean, that’s kind of—we’re in a special category. I mean, I talk about three categories of countries in the world: you know, nuclear weapons states, non-nuclear weapon states, and the three countries that never signed the NPT. Not that we’re in any kind of those categories, but we’re sort of in our own kind of special category because people want to label us as pro- deal/anti-deal. We’re about getting the details right, as Michael was talking about earlier, and what the details are.
In terms of the India lobby, as you know, they’re very powerful. And you know, we’ve been talking to some staff in Congress who have senators and congressmen involved in the India lobby. So we’ve been reaching out to them to kind of get their point of view to see where they may be headed on this.
And you know, some members of Congress are both very strong in India lobby—in India caucus, I should say, excuse me—and also very strong in terms of supporting nonproliferation. So they kind of feel tugged in kind of both directions. And so I think the kind of approach we outline in our report would appeal to that type of congressman or senator. So it kind of gets something for both—gets something for both sides.
MR. LEVI: Also say, to the extent that there’s concern about a particular political lobby, that increases the appeal to members of Congress for some sort of two-stage approach where the second stage comes after the elections.
A strong sense of Congress resolution would still give members something to take and say we are supportive and we have formally been supportive, without having to actually vote on the final deal, and at the same time would allow them to be more responsible on the nonproliferation side.
But we should be clear, for people who have taken a consistent line in favor of this deal, roughly, as it is, this approach that we’re proposing will be tricky to swallow and it will be for a lot of the community that has been quite against this deal also. But we think that it’s a compromise that both groups and the quieter majority that has been looking for something that addresses—imperfectly, but to a significant extent—both sets of concerns, that it would be appealing to that group which tends not to be quite as loud.
Question: The lobby seems pretty active—
MR. LEVI: Lobbying. There’s been quite active lobbying from groups with all interests. And it has not been—it’s been—it’s sort of been—lobbying—it’s not been—how do I put it? It’s not been particularly partisan lobbying. On both sides there’s been a very vocal pro-India contingent. There’s been a very vocal contingent in favor of nonproliferation.
Also coming from across the spectrum, I’ve seen reports from the Heritage Foundation pro and against. I’ve seen people from AEI pro and against; Brookings Institution, pro and against; our organization, Carnegie Endowment. I mean, pick a major think tank in Washington and there are people writing for and against this deal. It is a really—actually, it’s quite encouraging to see that kind of non-rigid discussion and debate.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Helene.
Question: Charles, I know you said you started your research into this as part of the nonproliferation—(inaudible)—and you’ve sort of moved. If this deal goes through, even with all the restraints that you’re talking about, you know, trying to get through this, do you not see this as sort of the beginning of the end of the NPT?
MS. SCHMEMANN: Charles – the beginning of the end of the NPT?
MR. FERGUSON: On the NPT—I don’t. And in fact, you know, some of my colleagues in the nonproliferation community have used terms like “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” body blow to the NPT. And there was a horrible NPT review conference last year in New York. It looked like, you know, the United States was doing a very one-sided approach emphasizing one aspect of the treaty and not another aspect of it. In particular, it was emphasizing the Article IV part of the treaty, which is pointing to Iran, saying, you’re not in compliance with your safeguards agreement, so you don’t have the right to these nuclear technologies unless you come into compliance. And the United States really didn’t want to talk about Article VI commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament.
And what’s interesting is that India, I think, has always been in the position of saying, we’re for nuclear disarmament, but you’ve got to do it in a global context. And you know, India said at the very beginning when the NPT was put up for a vote, we’re not going to join this because it’s discriminator; it splits the world in haves and have-nots. And until you get this time-bound commitment among the countries with nuclear weapons to pursue disarmament, then we’re going to remain outside of that framework.
So in some sense, it’s relevant, obviously. But in another sense, it’s kind of outside of the NPT. I think India acquiring nuclear weapons is something that, as I said earlier, it happened 32 years ago, and that points to problems with the NPT as it was kind of originally formulated. And countries deciding not to acquire nuclear weapons and joining the NPT do so for very specific reasons.
As we point out in the report, countries tend to be driven toward nuclear weapons because of regional security concerns, prestige, internal politics, and not necessarily because India has nuclear weapons or may be able to produce more nuclear weapons with or without this deal. So in some sense, there’s not really that strong of a linkage between this India deal and the NPT, but there’s sort of the perception that there is as you’re trying to carve out this exception.
Question: But the belief right now is that the number of nuclear states in the world is eight, right? Eight?
MR. FERGUSON: Perhaps nine.
Question: Maybe nine.
MR. LEVI: North Korea says they have nuclear weapons.
Question: Okay, maybe nine.
MR. LEVI: Yeah.
Question: Why do you think it’s only that number and not, say, 25?
MR. FERGUSON: I think the regime has been, on balance, very effective, and not just the NPT, but the export control regime and security assurances through the United States and other countries. So it’s a whole kind of suite of interlocking mechanisms that are in place, because you know—
Question: But you don’t think this takes us on the road to 25?
MR. FERGUSON: No, I do not.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Michael, whither the NPT?
MR. LEVI: Yeah, whither the NPT exactly—I don’t know; maybe we will, if we screw things up enough, end up in a world with 25 nuclear powers, but it won’t be because of this U.S.-India deal.
Charles and I have both written a lot, not in here, about how to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. I think it’s important to talk about the nonproliferation regime, not the NPT. NPT is very important. It’s an important piece of the regime; there are many other pieces. Charles and Bill Potter wrote a book, “The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism,” that talked about a lot of the issues. Mike O’Hanlon and I wrote a book called “The Future of Arms Control,” that talked about a lot of these issues. And we are heartened that so many seem to care so much about the future of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime, apparently, because of this U.S.-India deal. We would hope that we can translate that attention into some more constructive debate, dialogue and policymaking on the much wider set of issues that need to be addressed, if we are going to deal with genuine proliferation problems. And we list at the end a series of subjects and questions that Congress should promote debate on.
Congress has certain things it can do. It can say no. And we are asking it to use that power to shape the deal. It can attract attention to issues. And we are asking it to use that power also—on Iran and North Korea, the two biggest credibility tests for the nonproliferation regime; on promoting appropriate arms control and transparency in South and East Asia; on promoting controls on enrichment and reprocessing, the very issue at stake in Iran right now.
And we should mention that one thing we asked Congress to do is to enact a moratorium on American transfers of enrichment reprocessing. They’ve already committed not to transfer these to India. They’ve said they’re not planning to transfer them to anyone else—formalize that. India has also agreed not to transfer those technologies, again—giving a bit of a kick start to a moribund proposal—and also to talk through punishments for proliferation.
If the reason that—if Iran is going to mistakenly take the lesson from the India case that it will get a free pass we should be very clear that not only are the requirements—good governance, responsible foreign policy, responsible proliferation behavior—but also a very long time period where you are ostracized form the community responsible for states trading in nuclear power.
And we, I think I can say, we find it difficult to see the leadership in Tehran looking at that kind of framing of this and saying, well, if we do this and then are punished for 32 years, then become democratic, respect human rights and have responsible foreign policy, then we’ll get nuclear cooperation; that sounds like a great deal. I don’t quite see that thinking process happening in Tehran. But we do have to be very careful and be clear about what this is not a precedent for.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay. Anwar, I know you’ve been following this issue very closely.
Question: Yes, I was interested in what you said about this doghouse of punishment, given the Muslim love for dogs. (Laughter.) I mean, how long do think you think? Is it 20 years or whatever? And what should be the conditions, for coming out of the doghouse? Can you explain it a little more?
MR. FERGUSON: Well, what I would like to see from Pakistan is more transparency about where it’s headed with its nuclear arsenal. And I know it can’t really do that in isolation. It has to do that in conjunction with India. And India also has to do that in conjunction with China.
But in terms of its proliferation record, I’d love to have greater access to Dr. Khan. And I’m still trying to—I know a number of my colleagues here in the United States are trying to figure out, is the Khan network still alive or something like the Khan network still active?
You know, President Bush says the Khan network’s been brought to justice. There was actually a story on NPR just a few weeks back about the fact that Swiss are having a very hard time bringing one of the members of the Khan network to justice, because the United States is very reluctant or refusing to give information about that person and the Khan network. And so there are still a lot of unanswered questions about that proliferation network, so I’d like to get to the bottom of that. I think a lot of us would like to get to the bottom of that.
And then, if—I think you would need a period of time. I can’t quite say how long—10 years, 20 years, maybe not quite 30 years, like in the case of India—but some period of time where Pakistan is showing that it has become a much more responsible actor in terms of preventing the proliferation of these technologies.
If you want to add anything on that, Mike?
MR. LEVI: It’s a debate that—it’s a discussion that needs to be had. And I’d just emphasize that it’s a discussion that needs to be had not just in the United States. I think it’s valuable to come up with some sort of—I’m speaking for myself here—but it’s valuable to come up with international understandings for how you deal with these things.
I mean, your doghouse term points to one proposal that Strobe Talbott has offered. I think that’s where the doghouse and the halfway house and whatnot all come from. There’s obviously one way that Pakistan could get back in, which it isn’t going to do, which is to join the NPT. There are other ways that I think need to be discussed, but they are going to take a long time because they all involve changes. And I would personally imagine changes in Pakistani foreign policy, governance and approach to nuclear proliferation, as Charles has pointed out.
But again, this is a—it’s a discussion that we really—that we should be having a lot more. We don’t talk enough about how to deal with cases where the NPT has failed to keep states from going nuclear.
Question: Can I add to it?
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay, quick, yes.
Question: You talked about Dr. Khan. Both Pakistan and the U.S. have—(inaudible)—they are satisfied with whatever arrangement they have with Pakistan. Do you know what arrangement they have? I mean, I was in Islamabad recently. I heard that secretly some people—I mean, I heard it from some intelligence people who were posted at his—at the house where he was—(inaudible)—some people were secretly taken to meet him and that there has been direct interrogation by U.S. personnel of Dr. Khan. So do you know anything about that?
MS. SCHMEMANN: Hold on one second. Let me see—Khalil, is your question on Pakistan as well?
Question: Yes.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Let’s get your question in as well.
Question: It’s beyond—(inaudible)—but, you know, Pakistan had always been seeing any cooperation with India, you know, in a way of comparison, you know, a parity or something. Can there be any way, you know, just to address this nuclear power—this power demand, you know, energy demand? Could there be any way just to satisfy the demand?
MR. FERGUSON: I mean, to address Anwar’s question, a very good question. I don’t think I really have anything to add to it. I have a very similar question. So I don’t—or just really don’t know, to be honest. I don’t know if Michael has any insight of maybe what’s going on there.
But the energy issue, I mean, it’s interesting, and just also, take this also—connect this to the India deal. The administration has put forth the argument that we’ve got to have this nuclear cooperation deal with India, because they’re hungry for energy. And so then nuclear power could help reduce the demand for oil. And that’s just a silly argument, as we point out in the footnote in the report, because oil is mainly used for cars and trucks and you’re not driving, you know, cars and trucks using nuclear energy.
So even if India has been able to achieve its very ambitious goals of some—I’m trying to remember—fourfold or fivefold increase in its nuclear power generation over the next 20 years or so, it’s not going to really displace oil much at all.
And Pakistan has a small civilian nuclear power industry. I think it will probably gradually grow, but I don’t see it as displacing its need for other energy sources in the near term.
Mike, I don’t know if you want to add anything.
MS. SCHMEMANN: We’re also going to, I think, sum up here. So if you could address Pakistan, and then also, maybe conclude by suggesting what the next step is in the time line. Say that, Congressman Hyde and others read your report, they see the light, they endorse your proposal, and things start moving quickly. What could happen in the next couple of months?
MR. LEVI: Only assuming those premises?
MS. SCHMEMANN: Yes. (Laughs.)
MR. LEVI: So quickly on Pakistan. Well, Pakistan needs energy. There are all sorts of non-nuclear ways to help address energy concerns in Pakistan. The United States can engage in those. It has a fairly strong relationship these days with Pakistan. It can do that at the level of providing complete—or dealing in complete technology. The United States also entered a science and technology cooperation agreement with Pakistan a few years ago that provides opportunity for other cooperation in energy technology.
Q Such as?
MR. LEVI: Such as cooperation on, say, clean coal technology, on natural gas technology, on future energy technologies that aren’t nuclear. And the science and technology cooperation agreement actually comes with a pot of money to do things, so that’s always useful. A lot of these agreements come with a piece of paper and no money. (Laughter.)
The other point is the security imbalance. The United States has quite a strong security engagement with Pakistan right now also. And so that should increase Pakistani security confidence to some degree.
On how things move forward, my understanding is that at least the House International Relations Committee will do something in the next few weeks. What that something is, is unclear. It’s being referred to as a markup. It is unclear whether that means the administration’s proposed legislation will be modified in some way, or whether a different approach will be adopted. It’s difficult to tell now, and I don’t—and Charles can give his view—but I don’t believe that either the House or Senate committee leadership, International Relations or Foreign Relations, knows exactly what approach it will take.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Charles, final word.
MR. FERGUSON: Yeah, briefly, I guess my words of wisdom would be, all sides be patient—especially to India. Let’s not rush this. We’re both proud democracies. We both have congresses and parliaments who want to make sure they get things right. And that’s basically what we’re saying in our report.
And I think we also hear that, when we talk to people on Capitol Hill, they’re overall, I think, generally supportive of trying to establish better relations between the two countries. But when something as important as this nuclear deal is before us, let’s not rush it. Let’s make sure we get the details right, make sure we’re satisfied that this will create a long-term, lasting relationship, a relationship that will outlast any U.S. administration or any parliament in India.
MS. SCHMEMANN: Okay. On that note, thank you all. Michael and Charles are available here for questions for a few minutes, and also on the phone at any time. So thank you all for coming today.
MR. FERGUSON: Thank you.
MR. LEVI: Thanks.
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