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| Author: | Eben Kaplan, Associate Editor |
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Updated: May 30, 2008
Since 1992, Hassan Nasrallah has been the leader of the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militant group Hezbollah. A popular political figure in Lebanon and the Arab world, Nasrallah is a driving force behind Hezbollah's ongoing military operations as well as the group's move into politics. Early in May 2008, Nasrallah and his group captured international attention when Hezbollah seized much of western Beirut after battles that began when the Lebanese government took measures against Hezbollah's private telecommunications network.
As the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Nasrallah is the group's highest-ranking official. He rose to that position in 1992, when an Israeli helicopter gunned down his predecessor and mentor, Sayyad Abbas Musawi. Viewed as an extremist by Israel and the West, Nasrallah is a prominent figure in Lebanese politics. Charismatic, highly intelligent, and deeply religious, his face appears on billboards, key chains, and screensavers; excerpts of his speeches are even used as cell phone ringtones.
Born in 1960 in East Beirut's Bourji Hammoud neighborhood, Nasrallah, the oldest of nine children, aspired to religious leadership from a young age. In 1975, when a civil war broke out in Lebanon, Nasrallah's family moved to its ancestral home in the southern Lebanese village of Bassouriyeh. While attending services in the nearby city of Tyre, Nasrallah caught the attention of one of the clerics, who encouraged him to pursue his theological education abroad. The following year, upon finishing secondary school, Nasrallah went to study in a seminary in Najaf, Iraq. It was there he first met Musawi.
In 1978, Iraq expelled hundreds of Lebanese religious students, and Nasrallah and Musawi were forced to return to Lebanon. There Musawi established a religious school where Nasrallah taught and studied. His passionate sermons won him a number of Shiite followers, many of whom joined Nasrallah in organizing an armed resistance to the Israeli invasion in 1982. These fighting groups soon evolved into Hezbollah, and Nasrallah distinguished himself as an adept guerilla commander. In 1987, during a lull in the violence, Nasrallah resumed his religious studies at a seminary in Qom, Iran, but when hostilities resumed in 1989, he returned to Lebanon. By that time, a rift was emerging among Hezbollah's leadership between those—led by Musawi—advocating broader Syrian influence in Lebanon and those—led by Nasrallah—who opposed Syrian involvement and pushed for a harder line against Israel and the United States. Nasrallah found himself in the minority. Later that year he was sent back to Iran to serve as Hezbollah's representative in Tehran in what experts say was likely an effort to sideline him.
In 1991, Musawi became secretary-general of Hezbollah and Nasrallah returned to Lebanon, apparently having softened his views on Syria. Nasrallah replaced Musawi as Hezbollah's leader after his mentor's assassination by Israeli forces. In December 2007, the London-based newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat caused a stir when it reported that Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had ordered Nasrallah to hand over control of Hezbollah's military wing to deputy chief Sheikh Naim Qasim. But Hezbollah and Iran's foreign ministry have refuted this report.
When he became secretary-general of Hezbollah, Nasrallah lacked the credentials of his predecessors, who had spent many more years in religious seminaries, and his appointment to that post reportedly ruffled a few feathers within the organization. He won broad grassroots support by cultivating a social welfare network that provided schools, clinics, and housing in the predominantly Shiite parts of Lebanon.
Nasrallah also presided over Hezbollah at the time of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. Though he cannot claim full credit for the military operations that Hezbollah waged, he was largely responsible for the propaganda campaign that won Hezbollah broad Shiite support and helped sour Israeli public opinion toward the occupation of Lebanon.
Israel's withdrawal caused Nasrallah's popularity to surge both within Lebanon and throughout the Arab world. Though Hezbollah had held seats in Lebanon's parliament since the early 1990s, this new esteem granted Nasrallah greater political capital. In January 2004, Nasrallah arranged a prisoner-exchange deal with Israel, which allowed for the release of over four hundred Palestinian, Lebanese, and other Arab prisoners.
In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the first polls to take place after Syria ended its twenty-nine-year occupation of Lebanon, Hezbollah made substantial gains, and even won two cabinet seats. As Syria and Israel have withdrawn from Lebanon, Hezbollah has begun to "position itself as a Lebanese nationalist organization," says Hussein Ibish, communications director for the American-Arab Anti-discrimination Committee. The following year, Nasrallah boasted, "As long as there are fighters who are ready for martyrdom, this country will remain safe."
In July 2006, Israel renewed attacks on southern Lebanon. A month-long war ensued, during which Nasrallah was praised by many in the Arab world for maintaining a stiff fight against the Israeli army. After the fighting ended, Nasrallah further enhanced his reputation locally by helping reconstruct the homes of Lebanese who had been displaced in the fighting. But Nasrallah has also faced criticism from a range of Lebanese politicians. State leaders around the world have expressed misgivings about Hezbollah’s activites, which included seizing much of western Beirut in May 2008.
Although he is the leader of Hezbollah, Nasrallah does not hold official office in Lebanon. "He's seen as a messianic figure, much higher than any official in Lebanon" says Walid Phares, a Lebanese-born terrorism expert. Nevertheless, Nasrallah presides over Hezbollah as it is becoming increasingly politically active with representation in both the Lebanese parliament and cabinet. Hezbollah's goal is to establish an independent Islamic state in Lebanon with Nasrallah as its leader, Phares says.
Yes. On July 14, 2006, Israeli war planes destroyed Nasrallah's home and offices. According to Phares, "He and a number of Hezbollah officials are marked [for death] by Israel." But Nasrallah has grown accustomed to dodging threats since his expulsion from Iraq. Phares says Nasrallah was deeply affected by Musawi's death and has studied the life of Yasir Arafat in hopes of mimicking the late Palestinian leader's ability to withstand Israeli attacks. In an August 2006 interview with the New York Times, a senior Israeli commander said Israel is still committed to killing Nasrallah despite a cease-fire agreement with Lebanon.
Nasrallah has criticized the other Islamic movements. He told Washington Post reporter Robin Wright that the Taliban was "the worst, the most dangerous thing that this Islamic revival has encountered," and he condemned the beheading of U.S. contractor Nicholas Berg by al-Qaeda in Iraq, saying "It is unacceptable, it is forbidden, to harm the innocent." But when Wright asked Nasrallah about suicide bombings in Israel, he explained, "There [are] no other means for the Palestinians to defend themselves."
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