Experts say it is quite likely the next terrorist attack in the United States will not be the work of well-trained al-Qaeda operatives sent from abroad, but rather that of an American citizen. As al-Qaeda leaders focus more of their energy on trying to inspire others to commit acts of terror, most security and counterterrorism officials believe their message will resonate with at least some small number of Americans. Such fears tend to focus on American Muslims, which might seem logical given recent events in Europe. Yet the American Islamic community also has proven one of the government’s best resources for preventing the emergence of homegrown Islamic terrorists.

“The possibility of a ‘homegrown’ terrorist attack against New York City or any other American city is real and is worsening with time (PDF),” Richard A. Falkenrath, New York City’s deputy police commissioner for counterterrorism, recently told the Senate Homeland Security Committee. This kind of threat is particularly troublesome to counterterrorism officials because it is hard to anticipate the motives or actions of a homegrown terrorist. Yet despite the high probability of a homegrown terrorist attack, experts say such an event is likely to have a relatively small impact when compared to attacks by conventional terrorist networks. As CFR Senior Fellow Steven Simon told a recent symposium, homegrown terrorists are often “feckless and ineffective,” though they have at times proven quite lethal. Simon cautioned that self-radicalized individuals and groups can become far more dangerous when they reach out for support from more established terrorist networks.

Though many of the homegrown terrorists identified in the United States—especially since the 9/11 attacks—have been Muslims, it is important to note that religious motivations are not present in all instances. The best example is Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber who, prior to 9/11, carried out the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil to date. R.P. Eddy, senior fellow for counterterrorism at the Manhattan Institute, says, “If you think of any ethnic community in this country…there are people of all stripes.” However, he suggests counterterrorism efforts should pay close attention to Muslim communities in the United States, where al-Qaeda’s message of radical Islam is more likely to resonate. This builds on lessons from the attacks in Madrid in 2003 and London in 2004, which originated in Muslim communities. Some experts believe it is only a matter of time before the United States falls victim as well.

The White House’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism says the main terrorist threat today comes from those who “exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.” Experts say individuals who are likely to adopt a terrorist ideology share several qualities: youth, unemployment, feelings of alienation, a longing to feel self-importance, and a need to be part of a group. Religion can be compelling to such individuals, who are then prone to exploitation by deceitful religious leaders.

By and large, American Muslims express great concern over the prospect of homegrown terrorists in their midst. To this end, members of Islamic communities have worked to establish good relationships with U.S. officials, particularly on the local level. Hussein Ibish, executive director of the Hala Salaam Maksoud Foundation for Arab-American Leadership, says in terms of counterterrorism efforts, “Most of the major successes the government claims within the United States have actually involved cooperation with the local Muslim communities.” He points to the arrest of the “Lackawanna Six,” a group of Yemeni-Americans who attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, as one example where reports of suspicion from Muslims in the area led to the initial government investigation. Authorities investigated and later arrested six men plotting an assault on Fort Dix, New Jersey after a shopkeeper reported a suspicious request to copy a jihadi videotape.

While encouraged by American Muslims’ commitment to preventing terrorism, Ibish says, “Most people in the community are really distressed about the discourse in society that is anti-Muslim.” A recent report from the Council on American-Islamic Relations found that from 2004 to 2005, the number of incidents of anti-Muslim discrimination rose nearly 30 percent (PDF). Anecdotal evidence suggests American Muslims feel increasingly disaffected. Simon calls such trends dangerous: “This is a community, ultimately, on whom we will rely for our security.”

Experts judge government responses as mixed. Generally speaking, the local approach proves most effective. Eddy says local police are the best tool the government has for preventing homegrown terrorists. Good community policing—establishing relationships and keeping abreast of trends in a neighborhood “based on common interests other than terrorism”—underpins any effort to detect a homegrown plot. Eddy views officers as “first preventers and not just as first responders,” but it remains incumbent on political leaders to support them as such.

One approach taken by the FBI has been to invite thousands of Muslim and Arab men for voluntary interviews. Some 8,000 men were interviewed in the months after the 9/11 attacks, and according to then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, this program “developed valuable intelligence that protected American lives,” so much so that in 2004 the FBI embarked on a second round of interviews. But Ibish calls the practice “one of the most damaging [policies] that we’ve seen,” because of the confusion and fear it generated among Islamic communities. If American Muslims continue to feel unfairly treated, the alienation “might dissuade people from talking to the authorities,” Ibish says. “It’s really important that people aren’t given that impression.”

Not always, experts say. “On balance [the Justice Department is] doing a poor to mediocre job,” says Ron Kuby, a prominent defense attorney and legal commentator, who adds most terror cases against American Muslims consist of “vastly overblown charges.” That is not to say that the Justice Department has not had some successes. One of its better efforts involved the prosecution of Iyman Faris, a Pakistani-born U.S. citizen who, after protracted negotiations with prosecutors, pled guilty to working with al-Qaeda and plotting to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge. A less stellar example involved the so-called “Detroit Sleeper Cell,” a group of men convicted of providing material support to terrorists after investigators found false identifications as well as videotape and sketches that prosecutors said were of potential targets. After the trial, court papers revealed that prosecutors withheld evidence and gave misleading testimony, and the government had to drop all terror charges as a result. Errors like these are “about the stupidest thing we can do,” Eddy says. “It’s just yet another example for radical Muslims to rail against the West.”

Short of withholding evidence, other cases exist where investigators or informants have actually induced suspects “to say stupid or ugly things,” Kuby says. For example, Hamid Hayat, a twenty-two-year-old U.S. citizen from Lodi, California, now awaiting sentencing after his conviction for providing material support to a terrorist plot and attending a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The Los Angeles Times reports Hayat’s confession to FBI agents—the main evidence against him—read like a scared boy telling his interrogators what they wanted to hear, rather than the truth. Before his interrogation, the paper reports, a paid FBI informant befriended Hayat and actually encouraged him to explore radical ideologies. “The problem with treating every disaffected yacker as the next World Trade Center bomber,” as Kuby puts it, is that the best anti-terror mechanism in the United States is human intelligence. In order to acquire such information, potential informants must believe “the people they are coming forward about will be treated fairly,” he says.

Generally speaking, Muslims integrate into American society more thoroughly than their counterparts in Europe, landing better jobs and achieving more educationally. They also account for a smaller percentage of the population than Muslims in most Western European countries. More importantly, writes Peter Skerry, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, the American Muslim community is “probably the most diverse [Islamic population] in the world, hailing from many parts of the globe, speaking numerous languages and practicing several different versions of Islam.” This lack of uniformity, he argues, makes it more likely that Muslims in the United States will adapt to their surroundings, rather than keeping to isolated pockets of cultural familiarity.

“You’re starting to see the very first inklings of an American Muslim discourse,” Ibish says, which “makes for a much better adjusted community.” Despite this, many experts are concerned that discrimination against American Muslims could help foster the radicalization of a few bad seeds. While this is a legitimate concern, Sperry points out, “Muslims never sound quite so American as when asserting their rights against government policies they consider unjust.”