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| Author: | Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies |
|---|
October 25, 2006
Wall Street Journal
Mercenaries used to dominate warfare. The “Hessians” who served Britain in our War for Independence (many were actually from other German states) became notorious among the colonists, but foreigners formed a major part of every army in the world until the French Revolution. Their outlook was pithily expressed by a 17th-century soldier who said: “We serve our master honestly, it is no matter what master we serve.”
And they did provide good service. It was thanks largely to “free lances” (the origin of that now common term) that absolute monarchs managed to consolidate their power in Europe and carve out vast overseas empires. Private entities like the Dutch and English East India Companies even marshaled their own armies and navies to defend their domains.
But with the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, soldiers of fortune fell into disfavor. The assumption became prevalent that it was honorable to fight for one’s country, even if compelled to do so via a draft, but dishonorable to fight for a paycheck.
Yet mercenaries remain abundant. Some serve nation states—for instance the Nepalese Gurkhas in the British and Indian armies. Many more are employed by companies such as DynCorp, Vinnell and Blackwater, all of whom vociferously resist the “mercenary” label; they prefer to be called security companies or private military firms.
Call them what you will, such outfits have grown in importance as the armed forces of the U.S.and other countries downsized after the end of the Cold War. Today, from Afghanistan to Iraq, much of the logistical support for American troops is provided by Halliburton subsidiary KBR.
Hired hands aren’t just serving chow or cleaning latrines. They’re also carrying guns to safeguard supply convoys, buildings and VIPs. Even many U.S.ambassadors are protected by private bodyguards. Our man in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, never leaves home without his heavily armed Blackwater detail.
Peter Singer, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of “Corporate Warriors,” estimates that at least 20,000 private gunslingers have been employed in Iraq alone. Among foreign troop contingents, they are second in number—and in casualties—only to the U.S. military. Mr. Singer quips: “President George W. Bush’s ‘coalition of the willing’ might thus be more aptly described as the ‘coalition of the billing.’“
Many of these contractors, largely veterans of Western and Soviet bloc militaries, have performed bravely in trying circumstances. But they have also caused their share of problems. There have been numerous scandals over firms charging too much or not delivering what they promised. Even more pervasive have been complaints about guards running wild. In their black body armor and armored Chevy Suburbans, contractors are notorious for careening through traffic and firing wildly, not caring who gets hurt as long as they reach their destination.
Yet, for all their shortcomings, there is no way to end our reliance on privateers—at least not without a big increase in military end-strength, which is needed but not likely. And they can actually perform valuable work that we won’t send our own troops to do.
Case in point: Darfur. A force of 7,000 lightly armed African Union peacekeepers has been helpless to stop the genocide being carried out in this region of the Sudan. Odds are that a contingent of U.N. blue helmets, if and when they finally arrive, won’t do much better. Why not turn to the private sector?
Mercenaries have committed their share of abuses in Africa. (See “The Wild Geese” and “The Dogs of War,” both based on real events in the 1950s and 1960s, the heyday of “Mad” Mike Hoare, “Black” Jacques Schramme and other notorious swashbucklers). But they have also been effective in stopping human-rights abuses.
In 1995-96, Executive Outcomes, a South African firm working for the government of Sierra Leone , made short work of a savage rebel movement known as the Revolutionary United Front that was notorious for chopping off the limbs of its victims. As a result, Sierra Leone was able to hold its first free election in decades. The now-defunct Executive Outcomes also helped the Angolan government quell a long-running insurgency by Jonas Savimbi’s Unita, leading to the signing of a peace accord in 1994. Another private firm, MPRI, helped to bring peace to the former Yugoslaviain 1995 by organizing the Croatian military offensive that stopped Serbian aggression.
Hired guns could be equally effective in stopping the campaign of rape, murder and ethnic cleansing carried out by the Sudanese government and the janjaweed militia in Darfur. In fact, several firms have already offered their services. They could be employed by an international organization like the U.N. or NATO, by an ad hoc group of concerned nations, or even by philanthropists like Bill Gates or George Soros.
Critics complain that mercenaries didn’t provide long-term fixes. Sierra Leone, for instance, fell back into brutal warfare after Executive Outcomes left. But that’s because the mercenaries were on short-term contracts; they might have created more lasting stability if they had been given longer-term employment.
Many also worry about abuses committed by mercenaries, who in some cases have tried to plunder or even take over small states. But the record of privateers compares favorably with that of U.N. peacekeeping forces, which have been distinguished more by their propensity for committing sex crimes than by any success in keeping the peace. To deal with potential abuses, private fighters could be hired under a contract that would hold them liable for war crimes in the International Criminal Court or some other jurisdiction. That would make them more accountable than U.N. forces, which operate with almost complete impunity.
Sending mercenaries to Africa isn’t politically correct. But it would be a lot more useful than sending more aid money that will be wasted or passing ineffectual resolutions that will be ignored.
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