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| Director: | Henry Siegman, Former Senior Fellow and Director for the U.S./Middle East Project, Council on Foreign Relations |
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| Publisher: | Council on Foreign Relations Press |
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Release Date: July 1997
46 pages
ISBN 0876092040
$5.00
Task Force Report No. 15
U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process
Henry Siegman
Senior Fellow and Director, U.S./Middle East Project
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Preface
Executive Summary
Findings and Recommendations
Introduction
The End of Incrementalism
Defining American Interests in the Middle East
U.S. Priorities in the Peace Process
The Syrian-Israeli Track
The Need for a Bold Initiative: A New Declaration of Principles
Refugees
The Palestinian Economy
The Role of Allies in the Peace Process
Preparing for a Middle East at Peace
Members of the Task Force
Dissenting Views
Additional Views
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work of the independent Task Force on U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process went through several stages, each contributing significantly to the final product. During the initial study phase of its work, the Task Force was chaired by former Senator William S. Cohen, who resigned from his chairmanship and from the Task Force when he was nominated by President Clinton to serve as secretary of defense in December 1996.
During this initial study phase, the work of the Task Force was organized and directed by Stephen P. Cohen, president of the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development, who produced summaries and syntheses of presentations made to the Task Force by a wide range of Middle East experts and of the Task Force's own deliberations.
In the second phase of the Task Force's work, a new document was prepared by two members of the Task Force, Shibley Telhami and Dov Zakheim. That document, which underwent change in significant respects, served as a basis for the Task Force's final recommendations.
I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Secretary William Cohen for his wise counsel and guidance while he served as chair of the Task Force during its early study phase, although he took no part in the Task Force's subsequent deliberations and takes no responsibility for its recommendations. We are equally indebted to Stephen P. Cohen, Shibley Telhami, and Dov Zakheim (none of whom is necessarily in full agreement with the final report), without whose efforts the Task Force's exertions would not have reached a successful conclusion.
We are indebted to James R. Tanenbaum; Stroock, Stroock and Lavan; the Jonathan and Frances Ilany Charitable Foundation; John C. Sites, Jr.; and the Monterey Fund, Inc., whose generous financial support made the Task Force Report possible.
My thanks also to Barbara McCurtain, Magda L. Aboulfadl, and Jonathan S. Paris of the U.S./Middle East Project staff for their administrative support. Our largest debt is to the members of the Task Force who labored patiently for nearly a year to fashion a set of thoughtful recommendations to help put the peace process back on track. If the Report contributes even in small measure to this goal, I know they will feel more than amply rewarded.
PREFACE
-The independent Task Force on U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, began its work when the Middle East peace process still seemed "irreversible" but was already encountering serious difficulties. That was in the aftermath of the traumatic terrorist acts committed against Israeli civilians in February and March 1996 and immediately following the May 1996 Israeli elections, which brought a new Likud-led government to power.
The Task Force's undertaking--to assess U.S. peace policy in light of these developments--assumed greater urgency with every passing day as the peace process encountered ever greater difficulties and then reached the dangerous impasse that it now faces.
The Task Force's mandate was to identify important U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and to examine how U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israel negotiations can best serve to advance those interests. It was not the Task Force's mandate to engage in a broad review of U.S. policy toward the region.
The impasse in the peace process has created conflicting reactions in the foreign policy community and in the public at large. Some argue for greater American distance from the conflict, since "we cannot want peace more than the parties themselves," while others urge a far deeper and more proactive American role, given the potential damage to important American interests in the region if the conflict is not resolved.
In view of the passions that are aroused by the Israel-Arab conflict, the results achieved by the Task Force are quite extraordinary. To be sure, the Task Force did not escape those passions, and several of its members dissent vigorously from some of the Task Force's main recommendations. But even the dissenting minority (with but one exception) agrees with several of the Task Force's major findings: that the incremental "confidence-building" measures no longer work and have now turned into a prescription for conflict; that the time has come for the parties to define a framework for the negotiation of final-status issues; that a Palestinian state, however constrained in its sovereignty, is an essential component of such a framework, along with measures that assure Israel's security (for the minority that dissented, the trade-off for statehood is Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem); and that the United States must be deeply engaged in the peace process, even if it cannot and should not impose a settlement. They also agree that the first priority of U.S. peace efforts must be the Palestinian track, even as efforts continue to get Syria/Lebanon-Israel negotiations underway.
Members of the Task Force agree that the situation has deteriorated to a perilous point and that without strong and determined U.S. leadership to put the peace process back on track, it can easily lead to renewed conflict, with potentially devastating consequences not only for Arabs and Israelis but for important American interests in the area as well.
Henry Siegman
Project Coordinator
Executive Summary
Major setbacks to the Arab-Israeli peace process in the past year have jeopardized the historic opportunity to achieve broad Arab-Israeli reconciliation that emerged with the Oslo Agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.
The current impasse threatens a total collapse of the peace process, which could have the most serious consequences for important American interests in the region. These interests include the uninterrupted flow of oil, the survival and security of the state of Israel, the security and stability of friendly Arab states, and the prevention of both terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
A broad Arab-Israeli peace is therefore an important American interest, and the sooner the better. Palestinian-Israeli peace remains the most essential step for a broader regional conciliation and must remain the first priority of American diplomacy.
THE END OF INCREMENTALISM AND FACILITATION
Since the Oslo Accords, two major principles have characterized U.S. policy toward the peace process:
1. Acceptance of Oslo's incremental approach of progressive movement toward ever larger areas of Palestinian self-governance that is matched by Palestinian efforts to prevent the impairment of Israel's security. Progress in this incremental process was expected to build to a level of mutual trust that would enable the parties to tackle the more difficult final-status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees.
2. U.S. reliance on Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate their own agreements with minimal American intervention, except to help manage crises when they occur, provide moral and political support, and rally international backing.
These two principles served the peace process well up to the Hebron agreement of January 1997. However, the collapse of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians over the last year and the ability of opponents of peace on both sides to exploit incremental measures to their advantage have brought the peace process to a dangerous impasse. The two major principles of U.S. policy no longer work: Incrementalism, far from building confidence, now threatens to undermine it further; and an American role limited to facilitation will not enable the parties to resume successful negotiations.
The time has come for a change in U.S. policy and for a bold American initiative to induce Israel and the Palestinians to agree on the broad contours of a final settlement that can satisfy the minimal aspirations of both parties. Only the promise that these aspirations are achievable can revitalize the peace process and sustain it to a successful conclusion. While the United States cannot and should not impose a settlement on the parties, only an American willingness to offer a road map to a final settlement and to influence the parties to proceed in that direction is likely to break through the current impasse.
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
In the first phase of this proposed initiative, the United States would undertake intensive diplomatic efforts, culminating in a Washington summit, to get the parties to agree on a new Declaration of Principles. The Declaration would identify the basic principles of a final settlement. It would also set the framework for a second round of negotiations following the summit, whose purpose would be to reach agreement on final-status issues consistent with those principles and on a phased implementation of steps leading to the final settlement.
The Declaration of Principles would not relieve the parties of any of the obligations undertaken by them under the terms of the Oslo Accords. Nor is it the aim of the Declaration of Principles to resolve the many issues that will be part of a final settlement. Rather, it would contain general principles that accommodate the basic needs of each side in a trade-off of tangible benefits:
* Palestinians would be assured that the final status of the Palestinian territories will be statehood in Gaza and most of the West Bank.
* Israel would be assured that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, that Israel will retain a veto power over the new state's ability to form military alliances with other states, and that appropriate security arrangements to ensure the security of Israel's citizens_including benchmarks for Palestinian measures against terrorism_will be implemented.
* Territorial agreement would be based on the principles of maximal territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state in the majority of West Bank and Gaza territories and minimum relocation of Israeli populations now living in the territories, giving Israel secure and recognized boundaries. (Since 80 percent of Israeli settlers reside on 10 percent of West Bank territories, mostly along the 1967 Green Line, these are not contradictory principles.)
* Because of the complexity and depth of emotions on the issue of Jerusalem's sovereignty, discussion of this issue should be postponed until all other issues are resolved. However, such postponement does not imply that the final outcome can be anything less than an undivided city. Any final settlement of the Jerusalem issue must recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and al-Quds (the Arab name for Jerusalem), whose location and boundaries are to be negotiated by the parties, as the capital of the new Palestinian state.
* The parties would have to reach an understanding about Palestinian functional rights in Jerusalem (e.g., municipal and religious rights, rights of residency, etc.) within the context of the continuing status quo. Unilateral actions that alter significantly the demographics of Jerusalem would be precluded. (A minority view holds that the issue of Jerusalem's sovereignty should not be postponed because doing so would be a prescription for continued conflict. Furthermore, in this view the only incentive for a Likud government to accept Palestinian statehood is Palestinian recognition of Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem.)
The Declaration of Principles would frame the difficult issues of settlements, boundaries, and Jerusalem in the context of an agreed final status. Although negotiations over these and other outstanding issues will remain complex and contentious, an environment in which the achievement of the overriding goals of both sides is assured increases the chances of success.
REFUGEES AND THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY
Following adoption of the Declaration of Principles, the United States should announce a series of steps intended to bolster the confidence of the parties, including the organization of an international fund to settle the outstanding claims of refugees displaced by the Arab-Israeli conflict. It should seek to encourage private sector investors in the Palestinian economy by offering guarantees to such investors and by encouraging the immediate implementation of a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, the opening of the Gaza airport, and the construction of the Gaza seaport. In a climate created by a revived peace coalition between Palestinians and Israelis, the economic dividend for the Palestinians could finally arrive.
THE SYRIAN/LEBANESE TRACK
The Syrian/Israeli track remains central for the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region. While movement on this track is not as urgent as on the Palestinian track, real danger exists of an unintended conflict that might begin with a crisis in Lebanon. The United States must work with Syria, Lebanon and Israel to prevent escalation on the Lebanese front and to lay the foundation for further agreements.
COORDINATING WITH EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL ALLIES
To assure maximal diplomatic success, the United States should seek far greater coordination with its European and regional allies of its efforts in support of the peace process. To this end, the United States should engage Europe and friendly Arab states, particularly Egypt and Jordan, in an ongoing dialogue that aims at the closest possible coordination of policies in order to maximize the chances of success.
Findings and Recommendations
INTRODUCTION During the past year, reversals in the Arab-Israeli peace process have resulted in renewed tensions between Israel and the Arab world in general, and between Israel and the Palestinians in particular, thus jeopardizing the accomplishments of the 1993 Oslo Accords.
The United States has vested interests in restoring the momentum toward Arab-Israeli peace. The approach that has served the United States well up to the Hebron agreements of January 1997_standing on the sidelines of the negotiations but intervening when they stalled--is no longer suited to the task. While the United States cannot and should not impose a settlement on the parties, we believe the time has come for the U.S. administration to offer its own road map to Arab-Israeli peace and to use its influence to move the parties along that road.
Despite the demise of the Soviet threat in the Middle East, the United States continues to have significant interests there that have endured for half of this century and that are likely to endure well into the next century: the uninterrupted flow of oil from the region; the security and stability of friendly Arab states, and the survival and security of the state of Israel. Because the Middle East is a major area of terrorism that specifically targets American interests and American citizens, the United States also has a special interest in preventing the spread of terrorism and of weapons of mass destruction in the region.
The pursuit of these important American interests frequently has been complicated by the Arab-Israeli conflict, as demonstrated vividly by the Arab oil embargo of 1973_74. It has been an axiom of American foreign policy that a lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is essential for the successful implementation of U.S. policy in the region; the less intense the hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the more effective the advancement of primary American interests in the Middle East.
The Gulf War of 1991, the Palestinian-Israeli agreements of 1993, and the end of the Cold War combined to reduce the link between Western oil interests and the Arab-Israeli conflict. States in the Gulf had been more immediately concerned about their own security than they were about the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The assumption that the Oslo Accords signaled the end of that conflict both freed Gulf states to contemplate potential common interests with Israel and enabled the United States to gain the support of Arab states for its policies toward Iraq and Iran and for its strategic plan of pre-positioning equipment and troops in the region. In the post-Oslo psychology that assumed the inevitability of peace, U.S. diplomacy in the region was effective, even in the face of serious difficulties.
But the psychology of an irreversible peace process that followed the Oslo Accords has been replaced in the past year by fears of its imminent collapse; even those who joined the peace process early on are now skeptical about its prospects. This psychology threatens to derail peace altogether. Given the current incremental approach, the prevailing mood of profound suspicion promises to turn every problem into a major crisis. As international support for U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is weakening for other reasons, Arab-Israeli tensions threaten to undermine that support even further. The emerging differences between the United States and its allies at the United Nations, and recent Arab League resolutions threatening to halt normalization with Israel because of Israel's actions in Jerusalem, are vivid indications of the frailty of the Oslo process. They illustrate the continued connection between the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and other critical issues in the Middle East.
U.S. Peace Policy
Since the Oslo Accords, two major principles have characterized U.S. policy towards the peace process:
1. Acceptance of Oslo's incremental approach of progressive movement toward ever larger areas of Palestinian self-governance that is matched by Palestinian efforts to prevent the impairment of Israel's security. Progress in this incremental process was expected to build sufficient confidence between the parties to enable them to tackle the more difficult final-status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees.
2. U.S. reliance on Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate their own agreements with minimal American intervention, except to help manage crises when they occur, provide moral and political support, and rally international backing.
The collapse of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians since mid-1996 and the ability of opponents of peace on both sides to exploit incremental measures to their advantage have brought the peace process to a dangerous impasse. The two major principles of U.S. policy no longer serve to advance the peace process in this new situation. Incrementalism, far from building confidence, threatens to undermine it further. And in the present atmosphere of deep mutual mistrust, the parties are unable to resume successful peace negotiations on their own. Only a vigorous American role that goes beyond facilitation holds any hope of getting the peace process back on track.
A New Declaration of Principles
The time has come for a change in U.S. policy and for a bold American initiative to get Israel and the Palestinians to agree on the broad contours of a final settlement that can satisfy the minimal aspirations of both parties. Only the promise that these aspirations are achievable can revitalize the peace process and sustain it to a successful conclusion.
In the first phase of this proposed initiative, the United States would undertake intensive diplomatic efforts culminating in a Washington summit to get the parties to agree on a new Declaration of Principles. The Declaration would identify the basic principles of a final settlement. It would also set the framework for a second round of negotiations following the summit whose purpose would be to reach agreement on final-status issues consistent with these principles and on a phased implementation of steps leading to the final settlement.1
This new initiative can succeed only if the United States moves beyond its limited role of "facilitation," advances its own view of the minimal goals of a final settlement, and uses its influence to achieve the necessary mutual compromises that would make such a settlement possible.
THE END OF INCREMENTALISM
The Oslo process has broken down because the parties no longer see the process as serving their interests. The new Likud-led government that came to power in May 1996 has said that it defines Israel's security differently from its Labor predecessors and that it takes a tougher position on Palestinian compliance with the Oslo Accords. In its view, the price Israel has to pay under Oslo's terms--significant territorial compromise (including Israeli withdrawal from a large majority of West Bank territories in zones B and C, which may eventually lead to Palestinian statehood in these areas)_may not be worth the normalization with the Arab world that Israel is promised in return.
Palestinians, too, are no longer convinced that the peace process, as it is being pursued by the Israeli Likud government, is serving their interests. They see renewed Israeli settlement activity in the territories and continued construction in Jerusalem as an Israeli attempt to preempt final-status negotiations. Because of repeated statements by Prime Minister Netanyahu opposing Palestinian statehood, they no longer believe the Oslo process will be allowed by Israel to lead to Palestinian self-determination under any circumstances.
The confidence and trust that characterized the Palestine Liberation Organization's relationships with Israel at the outset of the peace process have given way to angry recriminations and to a laxness in Palestinian efforts against terrorism. Known terrorists were released from detention and security cooperation between Palestinian officials and their Israeli counterparts has been seriously impeded. This, in turn, has been invoked by the Israeli government to question the Palestinians' continued adherence to their obligations under the Oslo Accords and Israel's ability to make further concessions without impairing its security. This downward spiral has not only brought the peace process to a halt but threatens to lead to increased violence and to a complete undoing of the historic progress achieved between Israel and its Arab neighbors since September 1993. And it has turned the logic of the Oslo process on its head.
It was believed--correctly--that the final-status issues cannot be successfully addressed at the outset of the process because of the passions these issues arouse on both sides, and that their resolution must therefore await the establishment of a sufficient level of mutual trust, something that could result only from the successful implementation of a succession of limited measures. Despite repeated crises, the process worked as it was supposed to from 1993 until early 1996. It suffered a series of major setbacks as a result of terrorist outrages by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in February and March 1996, which led to drastic closures by Israel of Palestinian towns in Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians then decided to take more serious measures against the terrorist networks, and the Oslo process was expected to resume its progress after the Israeli elections in May 1996.
However, in the changed circumstances following the unexpected election of a Likud government, Oslo's incremental process has turned on itself. As shown by the negotiations over Hebron, even the limited compromises that are necessary for incremental change have become far more difficult, if not impossible, primarily because the parties no longer believe these compromises serve to bring them closer to their final goal. Negotiations over the most limited steps have become as complicated as negotiations over final-stage issues are expected to be.
Furthermore, because the parties no longer believe that the process can achieve their minimal goals, the incremental process has become particularly vulnerable to attacks by opponents of the peace process. Every issue, no matter how limited, rallies opponents of peace on both sides as if it were a final-settlement issue, without mobilizing the support of the proponents of peace.
Paradoxically, only agreement on broad final-status goals can now restore a level of confidence that will make further incremental progress possible. Israelis and Palestinians must be persuaded once again that the process can achieve their minimal objectives: security for Israel and statehood for Palestinians. Only then will they regain the confidence to implement the incremental steps that will get them to those objectives.
DEFINING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Interests in the Arab World
The United States has significant economic interests in the Persian Gulf and long-standing political and strategic commitments to friendly Arab states. The Persian--Arabian Gulf region holds two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves and over half of its natural gas reserves. The United States has viewed the uninterrupted flow of that oil as a vital interest since the days of the Nixon administration. Direct U.S. petroleum imports from the Gulf have certainly diminished since the oil shocks of the 1970s. Nevertheless, they still constitute about one-fifth of all such imports worldwide. Because the world price of oil is determined by the market, sudden changes in the pattern of oil flows from the region would have serious economic consequences for the United States, particularly in the short term before markets and worldwide demand can adjust to those changes.
Oil-producing states need to sell oil as much as oil consumers need to buy, but there remain two sources of threat to this common interest. First, hegemonic control of most of the region's oil resources by an aggressor state would give that state the capacity to affect markets for political reasons. (It was this threat that most affected U.S. calculations following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when the United States feared that Iraq could also control the Saudi oil fields.) Second, political instability in the region can alter short-term prices or flows and complicate American strategies.
Since the Gulf War, the United States has moved to address the first threat by consolidating its military presence in the region, bolstering its capacity and pre-positioning equipment on the ground. U.S. global military planning and weapons procurement strategies are predicated on the belief that the United States must have the capacity to fight a regional war in the Persian Gulf. This strategy identifies Iraq and Iran as the two states that pose a potential hegemonic threat in the region and seeks to contain both.
Although many in the Arab world were suspicious of U.S. intentions even before the breakdown of the peace process, their opposition to U.S. policy was muted in part by their belief that the peace process was working and that the United States remained indispensable to its success. Disagreements about American policies toward Iraq and Iran and about the extent of the U.S. presence in the region have become sharper since the American response to Iraq's renewed threat to Kuwait in October 1994. Pressure to do business with both Iraq and Iran has been coupled with a growing Arab uneasiness about the peace process and America's role in the conduct of that process since the May 1996 Israeli elections. These concerns fed the difficulties that the United States confronted in gathering regional support for its attack on Iraqi targets following Baghdad's penetration of Iraqi Kurdistan in August 1996. Concern in many Arab countries about the nature of the American response, most notably the targeting of southern Iraq while hostilities were taking place in the north, and fears that the United States was planning the dismemberment of Iraq, something many Arabs strongly oppose, were reinforced by a perceived lack of American resolution in getting the peace process back on track.
The U.S. military presence in the region has significantly reduced the hegemonic threats of Iraq and Iran. However, U.S. strategy in the Gulf continues to be challenged by political threats, including domestic instability in some Arab states and a weakening regional and international consensus in support of U.S. policy in the region. Effective deterrence requires regional support for the U.S. military presence and operations and international support for limiting the threats from Iraq and Iran, especially in the area of weapons of mass destruction, so as to reduce the need for the American use of force. Such support is not at a level adequate to sustain the viability of U.S. strategy in the Gulf.
Support for a Secure Israel
Just as America's interest in the flow of Gulf oil will endure for the foreseeable future, so too will America's interest in a secure and peaceful Israel. That interest derives from many factors: historical ties dating back to America's early support for the creation of the state in 1948, shared Judeo-Christian religious sensibilities, and common democratic values. Israel enjoys the strong and emotional support of a large segment of the American population. This support is more broadly based than the Jewish community, although this community's ties with the Jewish state are especially close.
Israel's long-term security requires a stable peace with its neighbors. Given continued American military and technological support, conventional Israeli security is more easily assured today. The greater current threat to Israel comes from regional instability that breeds terrorism and low-level conflict, and from unconventional capabilities that can best be controlled through negotiated incentives in an environment of peace. Clearly, the broader the peace coalition, the easier it will be to confront those who remain outside of it.
The Threat of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction America's interests in the Middle East and in other parts of the world are threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and by the spread of terrorism. As indicated, the Middle East is a major area of nonstate and state-assisted terrorism that specifically targets American interests and American citizens, both within the region and far beyond. A deterioration and collapse of the peace process would enormously complicate America's efforts to counter these threats.
In short, the effective protection of primary American interests in the Middle East requires the broadest possible settlement that would leave Israel secure and at peace with its neighbors and provide a foundation for long-term stability and prosperity in the region. This means that the American role cannot simply be one of mediation; the United States has an interest in the actual nature of the agreement. From the American point of view, an Arab-Israeli agreement is desirable to the extent that it both serves long-term Israeli security and is also acceptable to the broadest possible circle of Israel's Arab neighbors so as to make the agreement viable. In addition, the United States has an interest in seeing an agreement at the earliest possible time. To be sure, the United States should not and cannot impose a settlement on the parties, as the longest-lasting agreements are negotiated consensually. But given the deleterious consequences of a collapse of the peace process for important U.S. interests in the region, the United States has good reason to be actively engaged in efforts to bring such agreement about.
U.S. PRIORITIES IN THE PEACE PROCESS
The Israeli-Palestinian track must take first priority in U.S. diplomatic efforts, although a peace agreement between Israel and its immediate neighbors, Syria and Lebanon, remains central for enlarging the peace in the rest of the Arab world. Ultimately, American interests require a peace that involves the broadest coalition of Arab states.
Even though the Palestinian issue is now a lesser priority for most Arabs, it remains the benchmark against which Arabs judge the prospects for peace. The Oslo Accords enabled Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel, led to negotiations between Israel and Syria, and emboldened Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa to forge closer ties with Israel. The deadlock in the peace process in the past year has halted further normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world and has intensified opposition to normalization by the general Arab public and its intellectual elites, putting strains even on the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Although Syria's own calculations about peace with Israel are primarily bilateral, the Syrian president's assessment of the prospects of agreement with Israel may well be affected by what happens in the Palestinian negotiations.
More importantly, Israelis and Palestinians are entangled in their daily lives in an environment of political and economic despair for the Palestinians and the threat of terrorism for Israelis. There is palpable anxiety, insecurity, and mistrust on both sides. Fear governs the lives of both people; neither Palestinians nor Israelis have another home address. To the extent that politicians feed these fears even more, the peace process, and the people whose fate is affected by it, are seriously harmed. Thus, the urgency of a process moving forward with a well-defined timetable goes beyond the impact of the process on other tracks. It goes to the heart of people's everyday lives. Time is of the essence.
THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI TRACK
The Syrian-Israeli track remains central for the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region. Movement on this track, however, is not as urgent as on the Palestinian track, even though there is a low-level proxy war between Syria and Israel along the southern border of Lebanon. The Syrian-Israeli border is stable, and there are no imminent hardships looming for either side as a consequence of delay. The shape of a possible settlement is well known to both sides, and its absence is more a function of political will than effective bargaining. Both states have significant leverage to bring to bear on the negotiations for a final agreement. Here, mediation is the appropriate American role, although the United States needs to pay careful attention to developments in Lebanon.
The biggest concern on this track in the short term is an unintended conflict that might begin with a crisis in Lebanon. Israel and Lebanese militias are painfully entangled in south Lebanon. American diplomacy must therefore continue to deal actively with the situation in Lebanon, even as its primary focus remains the Palestinian track. The United States must work with Syria, Lebanon, and Israel to prevent escalation on the Lebanese front. And it must seek to foster the conditions that could permit the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that troubled state.2
THE NEED FOR A BOLD INITIATIVE: A NEW DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
The new U.S. initiative we propose entails a U.S.-sponsored diplomatic effort along the Israel-Palestinian track to get the parties to agree to the broad contours of a final settlement. The effort would culminate in a Washington summit where the agreement would be concluded in a new "Declaration of Principles" formally signed there.
The initiative is not intended to replace the existing Oslo Accords, nor would it relieve the parties of the obligations they have undertaken under the terms of those Accords. The Declaration of Principles must not aim at resolving all the difficult issues of final settlement. Instead, it must address the essential goals of both Palestinians and Israelis and define the contours of a final settlement about which a majority view is already emerging among Israelis and Palestinians.
For Palestinians, the objective is a fully independent Palestinian state on most of the territory that Israel took from Jordan in the June 1967 War, with al-Quds (the Arabic name for Jerusalem) its capital. For Israel, the objective is national security. Israelis cannot accept a Palestinian state that is militarized or aligned with a power hostile to Israel. In its direct relations with the Palestinians, Israel's primary concern is the safety of its citizens within secure and recognized national boundaries, both as they currently exist and ultimately will be defined. Equally important to Israel is recognition of an undivided Jerusalem as its political and spiritual capital.
Addressing these complex issues obviously requires mutual Palestinian-Israeli concessions. Given the absence of mutual confidence, domestic constraints on each side, and the reluctance of either party to make the first move, the necessary concessions are unlikely to be made without third-party participation and ideas. The American initiative should thus focus on getting the parties to agree on some general principles that accommodate the basic needs of each side in a trade-off of tangible benefits. In the opinion of most Task Force members, that trade-off would consist of Palestinian statehood in exchange for enhanced Israeli security within secure and recognized borders, and agreement on spheres of functional authority and rights in Jerusalem while negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem's sovereignty are postponed.
A minority view holds that the issue of Jerusalem's sovereignty should not be postponed because that would be a prescription for continued conflict. Furthermore, in this view the only credible incentive for Israel's Likud government to accept Palestinian statehood is Palestinian recognition of Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem.
For the majority of the Task Force, the following are the major features of the proposed Declaration of Principles:
* Assurance to the Palestinians that the final status of their territories will be statehood in Gaza and most of the West Bank would be coupled with assurance to Israel that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized; that Palestinians will not have the right to forge military alliances with hostile states; that the minimum necessary contingent of Israeli forces will be stationed in parts of the Jordan Valley; and that appropriate security arrangements to ensure the personal security of Israel's citizens--including benchmarks for Palestinian measures against terrorism--will be implemented.
* Territorial agreement would be based on the principle of maximal territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state on the majority of West Bank and Gaza territories, while holding to a minimum the relocation of Israeli populations now living there, and giving Israel secure and recognized boundaries. Since 80 percent of Israeli settlers reside on 10 percent of West Bank territories, mostly along the 1967 Green Line, this principle can be met.
* Because of the complexity and depth of emotions on the issue of Jerusalem's sovereignty, discussion of this issue should be postponed until all other issues are resolved. However, such postponement does not imply that the final outcome can be anything less than an undivided city. Any final settlement agreement on Jerusalem must recognize both Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and al-Quds (the Arab name for Jerusalem), whose location and boundaries are to be negotiated by the parties, as the capital of the new Palestinian state (in line with proposals reportedly put forward in the so-called Abu Mazen-Yossi Beilin plan).
* Because the status quo in Jerusalem would prevail until all other issues are resolved, neither party would take unilateral steps to alter significantly the demographics of the city. Unilateral actions such as the recent housing project in Har Homa /Jabal Abu Ghneim would be precluded. At the same time, reasonable ground rules must be negotiated for the accommodation of the proportional growth of both Israeli and Palestinian communities in Jerusalem and for functional spheres of authority and rights, including municipal and religious rights, the right of access to the city, rights of residency, property rights and the right of locating Palestinian offices of varying kinds.
* Both Palestinians and Israelis must commit to serious efforts to end the inflammatory rhetoric that, coupled with the threat of violence whenever a crisis materializes, conjures up the other's worst historic fears. Palestinians must commit to an unrelenting war against terrorism.
* The parties must agree to a timetable for a phased implementation of the agreements. Sufficient time must be allotted for Israel to put in place the necessary security arrangements and for Palestinians to build the necessary institutions. But as the history of the peace process has shown, too much time serves the purposes of the enemies of peace, whose ability to destroy the process is only increased as negotiations and the implementation of agreements are delayed.
Once the parties agree to the new Declaration of Principles, the United States must refrain from acting as the court of first resort when disputes between the parties arise. Palestinians and Israelis must work out arrangements between them that conform to the contours of their agreement. On the other hand, Washington cannot return to the sidelines; it must stand ready to speak out forcefully when differences over questions of interpretation and implementation threaten to disrupt the peace process.
REFUGEES
The United States could also take the lead in organizing funds for the dispossessed of the Middle East conflict. Humanitarian considerations aside, it is clear that an enduring settlement must deal with the outstanding claims of refugees (both Palestinian and Jewish refugees from Arab countries), many of which will be financial. Beginning such a process would in itself signal seriousness about moving toward final settlement.
Together, the provisions of the Declaration of Principles and the initiation of an international effort to resolve the claims of refugees should produce a change in the psychology of the protagonists as profound as the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993. They would frame the difficult issues of settlements, boundaries, and Jerusalem in the context of the agreed principles described above. Although negotiations over final-status issues will remain complex and contentious, an environment in which achievement of the overriding goals of both sides is assured increases the chances of success.
THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY
In this new climate, it will also be possible to deal with the catastrophic condition of the Palestinian economy. Uncertainty about the final outcome of the peace process has prevented private investors from taking business risks in the region. As a result, the economic dividend that was seen to be essential for the success of the process has not materialized. Instead of improved economic conditions for the Palestinians on the ground, income has declined by nearly a third since the Oslo Accords. Blame for this is widely spread: Palestinian Authority mismanagement and corruption (including governmental monopolies), Israeli closures of labor markets, and disappointing international aid.
In a revived peace coalition between Palestinians and Israelis, the confidence of private investors in the Palestinian economy will be strengthened by the immediate implementation of a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, by opening the Gaza airport and constructing the seaport, and by the knowledge that the Palestinian territories will ultimately achieve statehood. The United States could further boost this confidence by offering guarantees to private investors and by encouraging the Palestinian Authority to create a suitable climate for such investment by promulgating banking regulations, investment codes, and a legal regime that protect contractual rights and obligations. The economic dividend for the Palestinians could finally arrive.
For Israel, these bold moves would reopen the prospect of increased cooperation between Israel and the Arab states, and reinforce the flow of investment into Israel that began as a result of the Oslo Accords. America's credibility in the region would be enhanced, and its influence would grow commensurably. So too would the prospects for regional stability: America's allies would be more likely to work in concert with Washington to isolate those who continue to oppose the peace process.
Upon the conclusion of a new Declaration of Principles agreement, the United States could turn its attention to the other important issues of Arab-Israeli relations: First, American diplomacy would focus on reviving Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. No broad Arab-Israeli peace is likely in the absence of agreements on these two fronts. The United States should consider offering guarantees for an eventual agreement if the parties request them. Second, the United States would revive efforts to establish normal relations between Israel and the broadest coalition of Arab states. Third, the United States would intensify its efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the region.
THE ROLE OF ALLIES IN THE PEACE PROCESS
To assure maximal diplomatic success, the United States must seek far greater coordination with its European and regional allies of efforts in support of the peace process. A previous tendency to see European and regional allies as meddlers in the peace process should be abandoned in favor of a more collaborative role under American leadership.
Over the past two decades, Europe has both taken a harder stance toward Israel, thereby breeding considerable suspicion in Jerusalem, and shown far more flexibility toward Iran and Iraq than the United States would prefer. In the early 1990s, during the Gulf War's aftermath and the onset of the Oslo process, the United States found itself more in agreement with its European allies, which made U.S. policy in the region more effective. More recently, Europe's path has once again begun to diverge from that of Washington. Both Europe and the United States share an interest in regional stability, however. Following the new Declaration of Principles agreement, the United States should engage Europe in a new dialogue aiming to coordinate efforts in support of the peace process, to the West's ultimate benefit.
Similarly, popular frustration over the paralysis of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the seeming lack of American resolution in getting the peace process back on track is fueling domestic opposition in certain Arab countries that have been important for the success of U.S. policy in the region, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. To the extent that the American aim is to achieve the broadest possible peace between Israel and Arab states, it is very important to prevent the deterioration of relations with these states, and to protect the only two peace agreements that Israel has today with Arab states, those with Egypt and Jordan. This task entails an ongoing American dialogue with friendly Arab states and closely coordinating policies toward the peace process, with the understanding that the peace process has serious ramifications for the domestic politics of these Arab states.
PREPARING FOR A MIDDLE EAST AT PEACE
Formal Arab-Israeli peace agreements will not end instability in the region. There are forces on both sides that are driven by irreconcilable religious and ideological motives and that will not be satisfied with a pragmatic peace. And instability in the region has economic and political causes that are unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab-Israeli peace, however, provides governments in the region the opportunity to address these regional problems by removing the conflict as an excuse for failing to engage in needed economic and political reforms and reducing military spending. These governments will become increasingly pressured to establish their legitimacy on the basis of economic performance and broader political participation--not transnational ideology. But even with the best of intentions and the wisest of policies, real economic reform and political democratization will take time. In the meanwhile, opponents of peace will continue to exploit the weaknesses of governments. It is therefore important to achieve the broadest possible coalition among Middle Eastern elites in support of peace agreements, and it is essential to provide hope through example. In an environment of conflict, what an Arab leader gains in Israeli sympathy and trust he loses in legitimacy and support at home. This is not the case in an environment of peace. In such an environment, the hope can be revived of transforming the conflict from one that pits Arab against Israeli to one that pits supporters of peace against its opponents. That transformation also holds the best hope of protecting American interests in the region.
Members of the Task Force
SPENCER ABRAHAM is U.S. Senator from Michigan (R). He was Executive Director of the National Republican Congressional Committee.
STEPHEN P. COHEN_is President of the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development.
LESTER CROWN is the Chairman of the Executive Committee of General Dynamics.
KENNETH DUBERSTEIN is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Duberstein Group, Inc. He is the former Chief of Staff to President Reagan.
RICHARD M. FAIRBANKS III is Managing Director for Domestic and International Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Special Negotiator for the Middle East Peace Process from 1982 to 1983 and Ambassador at Large from 1982 to 1985.
HENRY A. GRUNWALD* is the former Editor-in-Chief of Time Inc. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to Austria.
RITA E. HAUSER is President of the Hauser Foundation, Inc., and Chair, International Peace Academy.
ROBERT K. LIFTON is Chairman of the Board of Medis El, Ltd. He is a former President of the American Jewish Congress.
RICHARD W. MURPHY is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1983 to 1989.
LOUIS PERLMUTTER* is Managing Director at Lazard Freres & Co. LLC. He is former Chairman of the Board of Brandeis University.
LESTER POLLACK is Managing Director at Lazard Freres & Co. LLC. He is former Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.
ROBERT L. ROSEN is a General Partner at RLR Partners.
GEORGE SALEM is a Professional Corporation Partner at Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld, LLP. He served as Solicitor of Labor at the U.S. Department of Labor.
ROBERT SATLOFF_is Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
BRENT SCOWCROFT* is President of the Forum for International Policy and President of the Scowcroft Group. He served as National Security Advisor to President Bush from 1988 to 1992.
HENRY SIEGMAN* is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the U.S./Middle East Project. He served as National Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress from 1978 to 1993.
SHIBLEY TELHAMI* is Director of Near Eastern Studies at Cornell University and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
JOHN WATERBURY is Director of the Center of International Studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
DOV ZAKHEIM* is Chief Executive Officer of SPC International. He was Deputy Under Secretary for Planning and Resources under President Reagan from 1981 to 1987.
MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN_is Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of U.S. News and World Report and Chairman of Boston Properties Inc. ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES_
HERMANN EILTS is a former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
RASHID KHALIDI* is the Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Chicago.
PHEBE MARR is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Note: Institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only.
Experts who were invited to address the Task Force and who endorsed this Report.
*Concurs with the Report but submitted an Additional View.
Dissenting Views MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN
AND LESTER POLLACK
The basic position of the Report is that the Oslo process of incrementalism has come to an end and that a new approach involving what is in effect final-status talks should begin. While this is a legitimate view which we share, what we don't agree with is that the United States should take any kind of explicit positions on the critical issues that divide the parties. It is far better for the parties to seek to negotiate their own agreements, for only if they have negotiated and compromised on their own will they live with the consequences of the decisions and concessions they have made. For the United States to propose its solutions would be to drastically reduce the effectiveness of the American role in the negotiations. It might make us feel good at home, but it is bound to create suspicions on one or both sides and inhibit the role of the United States as the interlocutor and communicator between the two parties.
So much for process in a part of the world where process is critical. As to the substance, this Report advocates an approach that ostensibly meets the aspirations of both sides, a trade-off whereby incentives to both sides would be such that each side could gain so as to absorb the pain of the other side's gain. No pain, no gain.
The problem is that the incentives do not extend to both sides. The Palestinians have much to gain from the proposals put forth here. But where is the gain for the Israelis?
The great Palestinian incentive is for the United States to recognize statehood for them in Gaza and most of the West Bank. The trade-off originally was to have the United States acknowledge Israel's full sovereignty over Jerusalem with the exception of symbolic Muslim sovereignty over the holy sites and symbolic Palestinian sovereignty in an outlying area of Jerusalem such as Abu Dis. Instead, the issue of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem has been deferred, and Israel is being asked to make further concessions in the interim period by limiting what it can do in Jerusalem under the terms of the present Oslo Agreement regarding its rights and its role. The Israelis are being asked to negotiate functions and rights with the Palestinians and, as well, to restrict what they, the Israelis, can do in and for the city. The notion of functional spheres of authority and rights the Report describes for the Palestinians in Jerusalem would surely be seen by the Israelis as a step towards divided sovereignty, to be negotiated at the end of the process when all the pressures would be on the Israelis to make such a compromise. Such a delay would not resolve the conflict. Rather, by deferring it, it would inflame the Israelis and make it even more difficult for them to make the concessions necessary to reach a final agreement. Therefore, both as a matter of process, that is, deferring the issue of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem until the end, and as a matter of substance, that is, formalizing Palestinian rights and restricting Israeli control in Jerusalem, the Israelis would see this approach not as an incentive but as another disincentive.
The Report also stipulates that the Palestinian state in the West Bank would provide "secure and recognized boundaries" for the Israelis, and that it should also provide for maximum territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state and minimal disruption of the Israeli population. It then states that since 80 percent of the Israeli settlers reside on less than 10 percent of the West Bank territories, mostly along the Green Line, the border adjustments should be minimal and mostly along the Green Line. Since these borders essentially did not provide Israel with security prior to 1967, it will hardly satisfy the Israelis' need for secure boundaries. The standard should not just be the issue of relocation of Israeli populations. Secure and recognized boundaries involve a lot more than just where people live. There are military considerations of time and space, which are relevant to where borders are located so as to provide security.
In this regard, the Report implies that the Israeli government is unprepared to make the territorial concessions necessary to ensure Palestinian cooperation. One could just as easily say that the Palestinians are unwilling to make territorial compromises on the West Bank to ensure Israeli cooperation. It is precisely a comment such as this that reveals the disputed burden being placed on the Israelis as different from that being placed on the Palestinians.
The Report refers to providing Israel with the assurance that the Palestinian state would be demilitarized, that appropriate security arrangements will be implemented to insure the security of Israeli citizens, including benchmarks for Palestinian measures against terrorism. Palestinian obligations to combat terrorism have existed since Oslo I and were repeated in Oslo II and in the Hebron agreement. Palestinians have failed to meet those commitments. It seems unlikely that this will provide an incentive for the Israelis, who undoubtedly are being asked to buy the same bridge for the fourth time. What the Israelis will seek for their security, of course, is not to have it dependent on the Palestinians' enforcement of their obligations. Rather, the Israelis will seek borders that the Israelis feel are secure, or as secure as they can be given the deep emotions in the region.
The more viable approach, then, is to allow the parties to meet and themselves agree on a Declaration of Principles without such proposals from the United States. Such an agreement can only be accomplished out of the public focus that is implicit in the approach proposed by this study. Furthermore, it is in this quiet back channel negotiation that the United States could play a much more constructive role if it has not offered its own proposals but seeks to be an intermediary dealing with both parties in an attempt to bring them together. This is exactly why the United States was effective in bringing about the most recent agreement in Hebron. To advance its own set of principles would greatly diminish the effectiveness of the United States, and to imply that the United States can deliver one side to the other on certain terms would be a huge mistake.
Finally, the United States for decades has sought to limit the involvement of others, including Russia and the Europeans, in the Middle East peace process. To involve the Europeans at this stage, in a new dialogue, would seem to be as counterproductive in the future as it has been in the past.
ROBERT SATLOFF
The basic theme of this Report--that "the time has come . . . for a bold American initiative" and to "use [U.S.] influence to achieve the necessary mutual compromises"--is a profound miscalculation of U.S. strategic interests. The United States has no particular interest in the "actual nature" of any agreement except that it be acceptable to the parties and that it terminate their conflict. They are the best judges of how to achieve the latter objective. Pursuing this policy would risk relations with America's strategic ally, Israel, as well as the structure of a "peace process" that has taken three decades to construct for no appreciable advantage or gain to any U.S. interest elsewhere in the region.
Second, the contention that "an Arab-Israeli agreement is desirable to the extent that it . . . is also acceptable to the broadest possible circle of Israel's neighbors so as to make the agreement viable" sounds magnanimous and rational but is at best misleading and at worst dangerously counterproductive. One of the unsung achievements of American diplomacy over the past 30 years has been to succeed in limiting the conflict to Israel and its immediate neighbors and to enable Israel to pursue a negotiating process that addressed the concerns of each individually and sequentially. According to this Report, Israel's accord with the Palestinians now must please "the broadest possible circle." Although I doubt this was the author's intent, this prescription will reopen the door to lowest common denominator peacemaker that is likely to ensure that there will not be any peacemaking at all.
Third, as for the bargain outlined herein, it doesn't sound like a bargain to me. Palestinians win Israel's commitment to "statehood" ( a major historical achievement for the Palestinian national movement) and some "rights" in Jerusalem (a foothold for later advances), while Israelis get in return "security" (which they have already been promised) and a postponement of the negotiation over Jerusalem (which will ensure that this remains a festering sore) coupled with restrictions on Israel activity in the city. Where is the bargain?
Reading the text, one expects the rest of the bargain to come in the form of some mandated pan-Arab normalization with Israel, along the lines foreshadowed with the reference to a "broadest possible circle of Israel's Arab neighbors." The convening of the Arab League to amend its Charter by outlawing war between the 22 Arab states and Israel (individually and collectively), offering a termination of all claims and full diplomatic recognition and establishing an all-Middle East mutual nonaggression pact with detailed annexes on security cooperation, political coordination, and economic and trade relations might (I say might) have been the countervailing incentive to the Israelis to entice them into a deal virtually any government--Labor or Likud--is otherwise sure to refuse. But instead, "for these bold moves," the Report argues, all Israelis get in return is the "reopen[ing of] the prospect for increased cooperation between Israel and Arab states." Thin gruel indeed.
This Report skirts two fundamental issues. First, for better or worse, the Labor government that negotiated Oslo and implemented its provisions, was turned out of office a year ago. The Israeli people have spoken, and while the message of Prime Minister Netanyahu's victory is not fully clear, at least a piece of it reflects the Israeli people's dissatisfaction with the pace and manner of Oslo's implementation, especially vis-a-vis Palestinian compliance with its treaty obligations. In urging a bold American initiative that asks Israel effectively to renegotiate the core Oslo bargain--changing the formula of "security for recognition + self-government + a promise of final-status negotiations" to a new formula of "security for statehood"--this Report does not address that changed reality. Instead, the Report refers to the objective of a "revived peace coalition," which sounds awfully like a heaving sigh for the bygone days of a Labor-led government. While that may be self-satisfying, it is also irrelevant in the current circumstances.
Second, it is true that a vigorous internal Israeli debate--reflected in the Beilin-Eitan discussions--has pointed out significant areas of common ground between Labor and Likud. Regretfully, however, no such debate has occurred on the Palestinian side. In my view, the most interesting aspect of the Beilin-Abu Mazen "understanding" referenced in this Report is that it has been publicly repudiated by Abu Mazen. The reality is that no Palestinian public figure has yet ever suggested publicly any willingness to accept anything less than 100 percent of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem in a "final-status" agreement. As a result, we are left with the fact that, on "final-status issues," the difference between Labor and Likud is less than the difference between any Israeli government and the PLO. It may not always be so, but it is so today.
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