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home > by publication type > op-eds > Responding to China's Anti-Satellite Test
| Authors: | Charles D. Ferguson, Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology Bruce W. MacDonald |
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January 22, 2007
Christian Science Monitor
China’s provocative test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon last week shines a spotlight on the long-overlooked national security issue of space weapons. Given the substantial US dependence on civilian and military satellites, the successful test’s implications are troubling for US security—and relations with China. Before taking any hasty action, it would be prudent for the United States to think hard about how to react to this worrisome Chinese move.
For years, Beijing has called for banning space weapons, but the test flies in the face of this rhetoric. Washington and other governments are right to decry the test. However, it may reflect the logic the US used in the early 1980s when it deployed medium-range missiles in Europe to encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate limits on these weapons.
Ironically, had the US conducted this test, it would have been entirely consistent with its newly revised policy that places greater emphasis on offensive space capabilities. For several years, the Bush administration has signaled its interest in attaining antisatellite capabilities and has openly rejected any interest in legal agreements that could restrict countries from acquiring these capabilities. While China, Russia, and the US have demonstrated these capabilities, any country with a ballistic missile program could develop an antisatellite weapon.
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