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| Speaker: | Milton Viorst, "Storm From The East: The Struggle between The Arab World And The Christian West," and former contributing writer, the New Yorker |
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| Presider: | Frank G. Wisner, Vice Chairman, External Affairs, American International Group, Inc., and Former United States Ambassador to Egypt |
May 10, 2007
Council on Foreign Relations
FRANK WISNER: Ladies and gentlemen, if I could have your attention, my name is Frank Wisner, and I have the privilege this evening of engaging Milton, Milton Viorst, whom many, many of you know and have read, as a journalist, as a writer on subjects of vital importance to us, notably the Middle East.
But before we get started, if I could ask you to be certain to turn off cell phones, BlackBerries and other wireless devices.
I also would like to remind everyone here this evening that unlike many council sessions, this one is on the record -- only fitting for a journalist, to put his own remarks on the record.
I'm -- Milton, I'm pleased to be with you. It's a huge honor. And I thought we should get started this evening. I keep turning round and noticing old friends I haven't seen in a long time. Walt Cutler, what a treat to see you.
Milton, I have in my hand "Storm from the East." I found it a truly splendid book, and I congratulate you for it. For anyone in the room who might not have read it, it is a short read. It is extremely lucid. It is one of the finer compact accounts of the Middle East over the centuries and particularly in the modern age.
Milton, you've succeed in setting out the basic facts that all of us have to take into account in thinking through the region, its challenges and the policy choices before the United States.
Nancy Roman, let me thank you very much as well for the Council opening its doors to this subject and to Milton. You're doing absolutely terrific work in opening our eyes and thinking to the challenges of the current Middle East.
Milton, I thought it would be useful for all of us to set the stage before we get into our discussion, to have you outline your core contentions.
What are your principal conclusions when you look back over the centuries of the Middle East and then in the latter portion of your excellent book on the United States' engagement in the Middle East? What would you leave us with as your core views?
MILTON VIORST: Well, what I argue in this book is that the Iraq war is simply the latest chapter in a 1,400-year-old struggle between East and West. It began of course in the seventh century when Mohammed brought this new religion to Arabia, and then his successors spread out to the West as they moved across the top of Africa and into Spain and were not stopped until they got well into France.
In the other direction, they moved up to the north, conquering lands and stopping only at the Gates of Byzantium. And I think what we tend to forget is that these were all Christian lands, and this notion of there is no clash of civilizations or -- there is a clash of civilizations, and I think we have to be aware of that and take it into account.
It was a long time before -- it was not a long time before Mohammed and his successors shaped the Islamic world, leaving the Western world, the Christian world much reduced. And over the ensuing centuries, right up until the 19th century, there were constant struggles between these two sides, sometimes one, sometimes the other. The Arabs themselves fall out of the mainstream but were succeeded by the Turks; between them, they not only occupied Spain for 800 years but many of the islands of the Mediterranean, and then the Turks pushed eastward across the top of Europe. And I think what happened here -- and I talk a great deal of this in the book about historical memory; I don't think we give enough attention as Americans to the idea of historical memory.
These things are deeply embedded. Historical memory is not history. Historical memory is what we selectively remember, and of course, the Arabs selectively remember things much more -- much differently from us. The crusaders came along in a strategic counterattack at the beginning of the new millennium. They upset the Muslim hegemony, but they certainly didn't dislodge it. And in centuries after that, there was Lepanto, which ended church threat in -- on -- by sea, but at the same there -- Islam continued its attack on West Europe, and I think this is something that all of Western civilization has somewhere in the back of its head.
We reached a new climax at the beginning of the 19th century, when the phenomenon called imperialism became -- after Napoleon -- became part of a conflict. The -- Napoleon demonstrated quite clearly that the West and the East were no longer on equal terms, either militarily or intellectually, and this was followed by a struggle throughout the century. The French began -- the French and the British began nibbling away at this empire, and probably could have taken it sooner had it not -- had they not been so busy fighting one another in Europe. But it was only the Turks that kept the Middle East, that kept the Arab world safe for so long, and it was clear that at some point this had to end. And of course, in World War I it did.
And I'll end there, and I'll -- but that's -- as Frank pointed out, the modern era has only made the story much worse. But I want to hear another question because I'm talking for too long.
WISNER: No, you're not.
Milton, it's hard to take issue with this superbly written account of the contest between East and West, and yet I think all of us are reasonable -- reasonable observers of the region can think about the centuries in which, at the same time there was contest, there was extraordinary degree of peaceful interaction.
The flow of information, technology, art from Muslim Spain north, the interactions between the Byzantine Empire and the Arab and then Turkish successors, the trade across the Mediterranean, the unbelievable riches that you can observe in the Metropolitan Museum today in the Venice Muslim world, contact, there's another reality besides conflict. There is another cultural reality. But what is true about the modern age is that -- and certainly at present and in recent years -- is a violent minority of willful political Islam has set about to punish, redress the balance, resort in the harshest forms of confrontation.
Now, if you look at the two sides -- confrontation, competition/ cooperation, trade -- are we forever to be fated with this Islamist surge? Is this with us forever? It is a passing phase? Is it a fever that will wear off? How deeply rooted is it? How long will we as Americans have to be preoccupied?
VIORST: Well, my personal disposition is to say, yes, I wish it were a passing phase. I'm not sure that I agree, Frank, that the thousand years, let's say, from the Abbasid Empire, when the Abbasids did begin actually drawing inspiration from Byzantium, and through Byzantium to the Greeks, and they had an opportunity to transform Islam but chose instead to reject that opportunity, I don't think that there was very much interaction, considering the magnitude of these two civilizations over the course of a thousand years. There was little interaction in music and literature and art.
Yes, there were long periods when there was not active engagement in war, but there was always confrontation, always hostility. I've heard from Arab people I've talked to over the course of many years working there, and as you have no doubt too, who would say, well, the tragedy of our civilization is that we never had a renaissance. And you hear that over and over again.
There was never any real adaptation between the ideas of the two sides, and I think that's why we are so distant now. And that distance has only increased over the course of the 20th century, and it's not growing narrower.
Now I would like to say, and people say, Viorst, why don't you bring something positive to your remarks, and I wish I could. I really do wish I could, but I don't see anything terribly hopeful in the long-term relationship between these two civilizations. It is true that we are in a downer period now. There's no question about that. And it is true, as you point out, that some radical faction, perhaps a radical faction on both sides, is stirring up the juices of both cultures. But it's the cultures themselves, I think, that remain so far apart, and that we really have to work at promoting extended truces in the hope that perhaps modern technology or whatever will ultimately bring an exchange ideas. But that exchange of ideas, in my judgment, basic, fundamental ideas, civilizational values, has not taken place.
WISNER: Well, I think there's, Milton, no quarrel that -- we are in the most dangerous dilemma. I came back from the Middle East on Monday. And having spent the past 40 years one way or the other in and out of the region, I come back compelled to conclude, we're going through the most dangerous phase that I've known any time in my lifetime, with multiple crises, crises that are interlinked, crises that involve the United States. And so I thought what we might do for a moment is begin to take these apart and get your sense, from the perspective of history and your experience over the years, as how you see roads ahead.
Now it's impossible in an American audience not to start with Iraq, and your book ends with a very compelling set of conclusions on Iraq. As I think about Iraq, I know and feel American troops will be out of that country, but we will not be out of Iraq. How are we going to balance our enduring interest in peace in Iraq and our responsibilities for what has happened there, and at the same time the natural forces of rejection that you've so accurately identified in Storm from the East?
VIORST: Let me go back, sure we have prerogative of a historian in talking about the 20th century. I said earlier that Europe might have overthrown the Turkish empire before, but it took place during World War I, as we all know. And during World War I, particularly after Gallipoli, when the Turks won this huge battle and stunned the British, they decided, hey, we have all these Arabs out here; maybe we can figure out a way to mobilize them. I mentioned earlier that the Arabs had long been content to remain within the embrace of the Ottoman Empire. They were all Muslims, and the Arabs did not have a sense of nationalism, a sense of collective identity, really, until it was introduced to them mostly, ironically, by Christian missionaries who were working the turf in that area.
But the British found a candidate, and he was the great grandfather of King Hussein, the beloved King Hussein of Jordan. And King Hussein had ambitions of his own, but he said, look, I will rouse the Arabs against the Turks; in return for which you will deliver to me a restoration of the Arab nation. And we will debate forever, I think, historians will debate forever what kind of commitment the British made, but the Arabs, King Hussein -- Sharif Hussein was he real title -- certainly thought that the British had promised the restoration of the Arab nation.
Well, while he was working on that assumption to arouse the Arabs -- and this is a major story of his own, which Lawrence of Arabia tells in exquisite detail, but we need not dwell on that now -- but while Sharif Hussein was mobilizing the Arab cause, the British were behind everybody's back negotiating with the French on how they were going to divide up these lands after the Ottoman Empire fell. And they did. They had something called the Sykes-Picot Treaty. I often like to say to audiences that I speak to: How many of you know who the -- what the Sykes-Picot Treaty was? But I won't do it because this is much too well informed and intellectual an audience, and I'm sure you all know a great deal about the Sykes-Picot Treaty. (Laughter, laughs.)
But the Sykes-Picot Treaty was a secret treaty up until the Bolsheviks dug it out of Czarist archives and revealed it much to the embarrassment of the Western powers, and it was just about the same time that the British also, much to the mystification of the Arabs, announced that Palestine would become the homeland of the Jews. So they got this right about the same time, in 1917, and it was a stunning, cataclysmic revelation for them.
Woodrow Wilson at that point came along. This was 1917. Woodrow Wilson came along and said, "Hey, you guys, forget the Sykes-Picot Treaty. We are going to end colonialism here and now." And he rather specifically in his -- he very specifically in his 14 points mentioned freeing the Arabs from Turkish domination, except it never happened. We all know that Wilson had serious problems, not the least of which is that he had very little support for this kind of course in the United States, and he was sick, and -- anyway, the whole Wilsonian vision collapsed. And Clemenceau and Lloyd George set the terms of the division of the Middle East according to the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.
Well, the Arabs never forgave that, as you can imagine. I mean, how times have you sat in an Arab drawing room and felt Arabs gritting their teeth and saying, "Sykes-Picot, Sykes-Picot"? I mean, it is really one of the -- it is really one of the burrs, if I can put it mildly, of the historical memory of the Arab collectivity.
Well, conceivably we should have gotten beyond that. But the British and the French, as imperial powers, were not very good. And then after World War II, when the United States insisted upon disbanding the British and the French empires, we had an opportunity. And the Cold War interceded, and we were much more interested in enlisting the Arabs on our side against the Soviet Union than we were in restoring their liberty. And Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, the most dominant figure of that period, said, "Hey, look --" and he said this to Dulles on several occasions, Dulles being probably the most powerful secretary of State of the postwar era -- he said, "Look, I mean, give us a little time. We have been under somebody else's domination for nearly a thousand years. We need time and calm and opportunity to create our own political institutions." And the United States response to that was, "We don't want to know about that. We want you signed up on our side against the Russians." And Nasser said, "Hey, look, the Russians never occupied any Arab lands. It was the British and the French. It was the West that occupied Arab lands." And Dulles said, "That's irrelevant. I mean, we really -- you're either for good or for evil."
So, you know, it's the kind of thing that does not endear the West and when the opportunity arose did not endear the United States to the Arab world. And we were moving aside the Arab-Israeli issue, which is obviously a major one. We have here an opportunity that was lost and certainly has never been regained. And it seems that we now have a government that was totally unaware of this substructure of -- I hate to use nasty words like "hatred" or "animosity" -- but that substructure of profound reserve about the West.
In general I think it is fair to say that the general vision that the Arabs have for Western society is one of betrayal, and there is probably ample, if not more than ample, reason for them to reach that conclusion. So it makes it a little difficult. It makes a little difficult when Dick Cheney arrives in Baghdad and says, "Hey, you guys, why don't you follow the logical course that I am laying out here for you?" And it is a logical course. I mean, stop fighting, Sunnis and Shi'ites, share the oil; I mean all of this is a very plausible -- very plausible pattern for reconciliation. But the fact is that we don't have much credibility out there. We just don't have any reason -- we just have never given the Arabs any reason to believe that our objectives, either on a historical or, God knows, on a more immediate level, are intended to benefit them in any way.
And so you get this irrationality, this irrationality throughout all of reaction, irrationality not just of radicals but, you know, there is some irrationality on the general response of Iraq to us, but it's not an irrationality that doesn't have its roots both in 1,400-year-old history and in the history of much more recent times. And it's -- I don't know that we're going to be able to overcome that in any way.
WISNER: It would be very difficult, no question. And I'm certain we'll come back to Iraq in the course of questions. I'd like to dog you with your perspectives on Iran, on Lebanon, but I think time won't let me pursue you on each subject. I would like to close with one -- close my interlocutor's role with you with one other question, and that's the mother of all the issues that we face, the Palestinian-Israeli contest.
We face a situation you've just described. Loss of credibility. A diplomatic absence, if you will, over the last six years. At this point a badly divided Palestinian leadership. An Israeli leadership that is hanging on but by fingernails. An American administration that is in its advancing lame duck cycle.
Your knowledge of history, your perspectives on this region: In this circumstance of multiple weaknesses, how does history tell you you can get traction on the issue of the Arab-Israeli contest and America's historic responsibilities to try to mobilize and catalyze understandings?
VIORST: Well, I think that we did have some traction for a while. The first President Bush, I think, made a major step forward in the Madrid conference, which brought about in its train the reconciliation of Palestinians and Israelis, a movement that was gradually taking place over the course of the previous decade. But I'm afraid to say, as a good Democrat, that President Clinton did not take terribly good advantage of this opportunity. He had problems of his own.
And then I think we have a government now which looks at this from a totally different perspective. We clearly have not only the first government that has not made even an excuse for a serious effort at reconciliation between the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews of Palestine, but I think we have a president who doesn't really believe that that is the best course for the people of -- who share his convictions.
And so what we have done is, we have lost what role we could have played -- and occasionally did play -- as an honest broker. I mean, we were never a totally honest broker, but we did have enough sense of the need to conciliate both sides that we were able to serve that purpose, and now we're not able to serve as -- serve it at all.
And more than that, I mean, we have a secretary of State who went out to the Middle East three or four weeks ago and made an effort, but she, like -- you remember I wrote about this once, about William Rogers -- she didn't have the support of the president, as Rogers didn't have the support of the president. Suddenly William Rogers looks pretty good, in retrospect, for 1970. But clearly she went out there without very much authority, freelancing in the hope of getting a little traction, and she didn't.
So I don't see anything happening whatever until we get another government, until another president comes in who looks upon this somewhat differently. And until we do that, I don't see that there is any prospect of our successfully interceding in Iraq, because the suspicion of us is so pervasive at this point that whether it's the vice president of the United States or even the president meeting Prime Minister Maliki or the ambassador -- and we happen to have a very good ambassador there now, whom you and I both remember from -- Ryan Crocker, who was Frank's deputy in Egypt when we spent a great deal of time together some years ago. But he's -- his job is hopeless, in my judgment.
So I think we have to hope that not too much happens now -- between now and the time we get a president who brings a different perspective to this problem.
I would argue -- and I have been arguing -- that what we have utterly failed to do is take advantage of friendly Arabs who might act as intermediaries. I've written about the Arab League. It doesn't necessarily have to be the Arab League. It might be the king of Morocco or somebody who can walk into a room full of Arabs, speak their language, and everybody will say, "Hey, he's right," which is not the case with any American that I can possibly imagine. But clearly we have a government that refuses utterly to consider this.
We have some proven Arab talent in this area, which we have -- which we as a government have failed to utilize. It's the only prospect, I think, at this point, that some positive results can take place, which will enable us to withdraw some forces from Iraq and withdraw them without leaving a shambles behind us, but it's not happening.
WISNER: Milton, I listen to you, and I must say one can only draw the conclusion from your remarks of what a tough road we have ahead and what a gloomy outcome your reflections on history bring you to.
There is one reflection in your book which itself is such an act of respect to history and the perspective of Arabs. You say at one point, neither side can choose the other's course. And it would seem to me that that's at the core of figuring out what happens to us next, a very careful appreciation that there is no imposition and that one has to listen and draw the right lessons before one moves ahead. I was much compelled by that conclusion among many others in your excellent book.
But that leads me to the fact that it's everybody else's turn, not just mine, to talk about it. We have some time to engage Milton. I've been asked if those who would like to ask a question, if you could wait until a microphone is brought. Do we have a mike? The mikes are in both sides of the room. And when you receive a microphone, if you'd be kind enough to state your name and your affiliation and then your question.
Milton, let you take them as they come, good.
Yes, sir, why don't you start? Yeah.
QUESTIONER: I'm Dan O'Flaherty of the National Foreign Trade Council.
One of the premises on which our current government has operated in the region is that the root of the hostility to the West, to us, is poverty, joblessness and so on. And this has led them to conclude that engendering prosperity via free trade agreements and all that's supposed to follow those is one of the solutions, if we can handle the military side of it on the other side of the ledger. What is your assessment of that?
VIORST: Well, I certainly would not dismiss poverty and lack of education, illiteracy, whatever as factors in this. That leads me to another area which is, up until now Arab culture has not been very good at taking advantage even in fact -- I discussed this more in the last book that I wrote than in this one. But Arab culture has not been very good at seizing opportunities as, let's say, Thailand has or Korea or for that matter Japan. I mean, Arabs have often said to me, wow, in 1900 we were at the same economic level as most of the Pacific, and now look at where they are and look at where we are.
And I think we can kid ourselves about why this is so, as some Arabs do, by saying, oh, this is all a Western conspiracy. I think it has to do with what I talked about before, some of the values of Islamic civilization. And I know that that's a sensitive area that people don't particularly like to deal with. We are -- even as George Romney found out yesterday, religion can be -- even sort of innocuous words can offend people when you talk about their religion.
But Islam has not generated -- certainly Islam in the Middle East has not generated much of the kind of economic activity that has brought prosperity elsewhere in the world in the 20th century. And it makes you ask some questions about the civilization itself, but we're never going to get there. We're never going to get to that point unless we solve these military questions, I think, which stand in the way of even having Arabs re-examine their own culture to find out where the failures lie.
Arabs are pretty good at talking about failures. They know that they're culture has not responded as well as it should. A lot of them are either not aware or unwilling to take the steps that are necessary. Let me be honest. I think that this can only happen in what we call a secular society, and so far Arab civilization has rejected secular society.
WISNER: Walt, Walter Cutler.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Frank, I certainly share your assessment.
WISNER: Remember to --
QUESTIONER: Yeah, okay. Well, formerly Foreign Service and formerly -- just formerly head of Meridian International Center, and I share your assessment of this book. I've given it and recommended it to I don't know how many friends.
We hear so much about the Shi'a revival, the Shi'a Crescent, the problems between Sunnis and Shi'a. Does this resurgence, if you want to call it that, of Shi'as, does this affect the storm from the East? Is it helpful in any way? Is there any way that we from the West can look at this division, this religious division and perhaps think, well, in some way that that can help or just exacerbate the problem?
VIORST: I don't think so. I think Shi'as and Sunnis have been fighting each other for a long time, but for the most part, they live next to each other in reasonable harmony over the course of 1,500, 1,400 years, give or take a few.
Strangely, the -- in Iraq, for example -- and elsewhere -- in Bahrain, the Shi'a have been the engine of economic growth, and the Sunnis have inherited the mantle of governance from the Turks who were there before them, and so the two have kind of cut out areas for themselves, which, when they weren't at each other's throats, worked out all right. That has not been the case. And of course one of the great ironies of the president's invasion of Iraq is that he has totally turned the strategic balance of the Middle East upside down. Shi'a were always rather content to remain in the background politically. The president, by bringing democracy to Iraq, has made the Shi'a certainly the dominant force in the region, and I think as Americans we respect that, because they are the majority of the society.
But to think that this is somehow going to bump around and come out being favorable to the West or to the United States -- well, maybe I'll be fooled, but I don't see much prospect for that. It's a little bit early, because Shi'a are beginning to rise up -- this is only a phenomenon a couple of years old, not just in Iraq but also in Lebanon. Perhaps a seed was planted by the Shi'a uprising -- the successful Shi'a revolution in Iran giving political ideas for the first time in a very long time to Shi'a throughout the region. I cannot, however, see a scenario where we're going to wind up ahead of the game by it.
WISNER: Back of the room. The gentleman --
QUESTIONER: I wonder if you could give us some hope or at least some direction -- Jack Janes from Johns Hopkins -- about who we should be looking for to help lead this development. A lot of people say to me, where's the Nelson Mandela of this region? They may mean -- but you know these people, you know their leaders. Who should we be paying attention to, supporting, perhaps, as we try to do what we can, limited as it is, to help the next stage of this development?
VIORST: Well, there have been a few miracle figures in recent Arab history, or I guess recent history generally. Mandela is one of them. Sadat was another. You know, Israelis will say, "Hey, how come nobody's coming to visit us in Jerusalem?" and using that as an excuse for not doing anything themselves. And, you know, that's okay. It would be nice if there were some Sadat or Mandela. Arafat had a lot of failings, but he was a strong leader, and we, after agreeing under Bill Clinton to try him out, under George Bush we have certainly squashed him, or to use that term I keep hearing these days, threw him under the bus.
So, you know, I mean we can't sit around and wait for a Mandela or another one. We can't wait for Joan of Arc. Every once in a while one of these people comes along and we're damn grateful that they have, and, you know, maybe we can say the history of the United States would have been quite different if not for this fantastic George Washington. But I don't think you wait around till it happens. I mean, it's like the Jews and the Messiah. You know, it's just not the kind of thing that you can afford to wait for. There are just too many steps that call upon us to be taken before that happens.
WISNER: Right here, the young lady in gray.
QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Camille Caesar, Commerce Department. I've noticed in my own sort of informal survey of these things that among the younger cohort of elite opinion, there seems to be a growing distaste for future American activity in the Middle East really at all, as a result of the Iraq war. And I'd really appreciate your comments on that because I think that, you know, many people younger than me, especially, you know, they see the threat posed by China, they see the threat posed by other states with growing military capability, and they really just don't want to be bothered anymore with resolving things in this part of the world and lack the commitment of previous generations.
Thank you.
VIORST: To the best of my knowledge, your observation is an accurate one. And there is a great danger -- and I use the word "danger" deliberately -- in the fact that our people, particularly the young, might be walking away from this. And for a while it was possible to say, "Well, let them solve it themselves, the hell with them." I mean, you know, "There is no American interest here." Even if we don't consider oil, I think that that's a narrow-minded consideration.
One of the things we learned about the Arab world, or, if you like, relearned about the Arab world and Iraq is that they may not have tanks and guns and they may not have the level of organization necessary to send in battalions and divisions, but they sure as hell know how to wage war when the time comes, and they showed that many times over the centuries, including most recently against the British and the French before we even got there, during that inter-war period.
So, yeah, I think that there is an ongoing and permanent danger in this -- if I can borrow from Professor Huntington -- in this clash of civilizations, in this conflict, this confrontation between East and West. And I don't think that our young people, or Americans generally, can wash their hands of this, because I think it does endanger us. We all know the reasons. There are a lot of nasty weapons out there. It doesn't take a huge level of organization in order to put them to very destructive use. And I think we have to address these things as we see the problem and not by walking away from them, because that won't help us at all.
WISNER: Milton, I was thrilled over the last couple of weeks to see not only in Cairo, in Beirut, in Syria, in Jordan, in Yemen, all of the Arabic language schools are just bulging with young Americans with a taste for the region, who want to get involved. If I could put your book in all their pockets too, that would help.
VIORST: (Chuckles.)
WISNER: But I'm pleased -- while I think your remark is right on target about the society in general, lots of young Americans are turning to say, "What's going on, and how do I understand it, and how do I get inside of it?" That's just a terrific outcome.
Right in the front row, if I could, please. Steve.
QUESTIONER: (Off mike.)
WISNER: Steve, one sec. Yeah.
QUESTIONER: Steve Low, Foreign Affairs Museum Council. Now, your recipe for moving ahead, to oversimplify it enormously, is get the rest of the Arabs involved in helping us in this. And in this I'm glad to see you're hand in hand with the vice president of the United States.
But going back to Walt's question, is the predominantly Sunni Arab world willing to help us essentially install a Shi'ite government -- and a narrow Shi'ite government, at that -- in Iraq? Are they really going to help us, or are they just going to --
VIORST: No, I don't -- one thing -- Steve, as you know, one thing I think that Sunnis and Shi'ites agree upon is, they want the United States the hell out of there. I mean, this is the one element that they will agree upon. After that, they will grapple, they will grapple for power. That's why I think that only an Arab intermediary, whatever the title he may bear, can go in there and say, "Hey, look, you guys, I mean, you know, you are speaking for all of us."
And I think one of the things that the Arab world has learned over the course of the past few years -- and, you know, actually had known it since the beginning of the century -- is that it is so fragile, it is so divided, it has such deeply entrenched powers, it has such deeply entrenched divisions, it has so much to learn in terms of developing institutions and creating an internal dynamism within the culture which will enable it to catch up with, if not the GNP of the United States, then the GNP of Taiwan -- I mean, something. And none of that is happening.
But I don't think that we have anything to offer them at this point, because nobody can look at an American interlocutor at this point and think that he wishes us anything the worst -- but the worst. And the fact is that there's a lot of history -- and immediate stuff, not just historical stuff going back a thousand years; I'm talking about what happened last year with Halliburton or this or that, you know. I mean, there are a lot -- there are too many instances for us to overlook them, to think that we can somehow go in there and acquire their trust. I just think that is painfully naive.
WISNER: Many hands. The gentleman right there. Peter, go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Milton --
VIORST: (Chuckles.) Always -- I'm always glad to see Peter.
QUESTIONER: During much of the 19th --
WISNER: Peter, identify yourself, if you would.
QUESTIONER: Oh. I'm sorry. Peter Rosenblatt, Heller & Rosenblatt. During much of the 19th century, it was the West that in fact propped up "the sick man of Europe" as a balance for the Russians. And after the first World War, during much of the 20th century, that role was resumed by the Republic of Turkey. What can you tell us about the role in the clash of civilizations of those two countries, Turkey and Russia?
VIORST: Hmm. You're pushing me out to the parameters of my area. I think that Turkey is much more interested, like -- you know, the Turks -- I think the Turks have in very large measure washed their hands of the Middle East, if they can get away with it. And as we all know, they're looking much toward identifying themselves with Europe rather than with Syria or Jordan or Iraq.
And I think that the Russians, as a major power, certainly have a great deal to contribute, and perhaps they have a level of credibility because they have never occupied the Arab world -- or they have occupied plenty of places nearby. But I don't think that they have much to give at this point either, I mean, they've got more than enough problems of their own. So I think that they may get back to the point where they will interpret their own policies only as a way of frustrating and thwarting us, as we did with them in Afghanistan.
So I don't see anything very positive coming at this stage either from Turkey or Russia. But they are not active -- you know, they are not active time bombs in the region. I think they're more a neutral force than -- I mean, we're really talking about the United States, particularly, and its Western allies, and the Arabs themselves and, of course, the Israelis.
WISNER: Henry.
QUESTIONER: Henry Precht. I expect your next book will be entitled, "Storm From the West." And I invite you to talk about some of the things that the West has done to the Middle East and whether there might not have been a chance for a more modern, a more productive society to evolve there if we hadn't implanted the state of Israel; if we hadn't interfered by force of arms or by intelligence agencies in their affairs in Iran, in Egypt, wherever; if Egypt, if the Middle East might not have evolved in a more natural and a more positive sense than has been the case?
VIORST: Well, the answer to that is yes, I have no doubt about it. What we did in the Mossadeq period in Iran has continued to hang heavy upon us what -- lo now what, 50 years or more? I have to go back and do my arithmetic.
WISNER: Fifty-five.
VIORST: Fifty-five. And the other -- I mean, we -- that's not the only mischief. That's about as -- but, you know, there was plenty of mischief in the, let us say, the Suez crisis of 1956. So, you know, in most recent times there has been more than enough problems.
As far as Israel is concerned, yeah, that was always going to be a problem. It has become a bigger problem, in my judgment, than it need be. I think that over the course of time it is true that a very substantial element of the Arab world has been willing to accept the existence of Israel. Maybe it was unwise to do this in 1917, but that's over. I mean, that's long behind us.
When does a country acquire legitimacy? That's a very difficult question to answer. We could say the same thing about the Turks. We could make a big argument that maybe we should be campaigning for the return of Byzantium.
I mean, you know, I mean, these things -- at a certain point you have to say, that's a lost battle; we go on. And I think a very large measure, many Arabs are. But I think that as long as we are identified, as we have been unfortunately, not just with Israel but with the military occupation of five million Palestinians, we are not going to restore our position in the Middle East. Leaving aside Mossadeq and all the rest, that just adds to the picture. That's just part of historical memory.
I mean, not many Americans, I think -- I suppose everybody in this room does. But not very many Americans know what I'm talking about, what you would be talking about, Henry, if you say, "Mossadeq." But I don't think there are many people in the Middle East who don't know the answer, who don't know that.
WISNER: Certainly not in Iran.
VIORST: And certainly not in Iran.
WISNER: Actually you're -- yes, that's right, sorry.
QUESTIONER: Irving Williamson from the U.S. International Trade Commission.
I was just wondering if you could maybe speculate on what influence the development, the commercial and economic activities in the Gulf States have had. I mean, this, you know, clearly is a majority globalized society, very wealthy, maybe not -- you know, problems with distribution of income. But I spent the last few years in Ethiopia and have just been amazed at the number of people who go there to shop, who go there to work, and just the influence that region has had, I mean, the Gulf States and their economic development have had. And I was just wondering, does that offer any prospects for --
VIORST: Well, my position on the Gulf States, as it has -- no, Saudi Arabia, is that they're rather prosperous now. And they're doing a pretty good job of distributing the income within their societies. One of the great grievances that most Arabs have not just toward Saudi Arabia but particularly toward Kuwait is that they've never shared this with the Arab world.
But I think we have to ask ourselves whether this wealth that has been generated by oil within these cultures has moved down into the foundation of the society itself, so that if and when oil no longer becomes the main factor in their economic activity, whether they've got something in reserve. And that remains to be seen. Or are our great-grandchildren many generations down the way going to go back and turn Saudi Arabia or even Kuwait into an archeological site of a society which has failed? I mean, I hope that's not so. But there are an awful lot of indications suggesting that that oil wealth is just that, oil wealth, and doesn't percolate through into the mores and other -- and values of the society, which will enable it to have kind of an economic dynamism.
QUESTIONER: How about anymore of the Gulf States, Oman, those states, which I think are much more open --
VIORST: Well, they are. I mean, you know, some are more open than others. But you know, and certainly Abu Dhabi is -- the Emirates and Dubai are pretty exciting places. But I suggest the same caveat exists. I mean, can Dubai thrive for 500 more years on those wonderful hotels that they're building? Maybe.
WISNER: I'm going to disappoint many people. But Ms. Hayes, I think you were next in order, so you get the last question.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Your presentation seems to be a pretty resounding indictment of realpolitik or at least the way we've exercised it in this region.
And my question would be: Is it -- at this point in time, given the narrative that the Arabs have about the West or the U.S., is -- would one be better off designing a policy that looked toward some of these development issues, which we think might make a change, through other parties?
Clearly, the U.N. tried this with the world -- with the Arab development report some time ago, but that doesn't seem to have resonated much. Are there -- I guess, my conclusion of what you said is that we're just going to have to wait until these societies decide themselves that they want to go about undertaking change and so forth, or are there agents that --
VIORST: Well, I think this is one of those questions where all of the above are true. I mean, I think -- but the main thing is I don't think we can undo 1,400 years of history. I mean we just can't do it. We can, you know, get a lot of people drunk, but back there in historical memory that will still be there.
Now, if we get to the point where the immediate confrontation is resolved, both in Palestine and in Iraq and elsewhere, and where -- to go back to that quote from Nasser -- where they can put their minds, their souls to developing what they know they need, which are institutions of government, and there is a certain amount of calm, stability in the region. Then I think it's a lot easier for the agencies that you talk about to make some positive contribution.
But now the whole place is in just such turmoil that it's hard to imagine that the amount of contribution they can make to these societies can be in any way meaningful. I think it's nice that we have these agencies in reserve, but I don't see how they can function for --
QUESTIONER: (Off mike) --
VIORST: Well, you don't have to resolve all of them, but at least we have to show that we're moving in the right direction. And alas, I leave you with this unhopeful note, we ain't. (Laughter.)
WISNER: But I fear that is the last note. The Council's rules are quite strict, and you're all promised we'd end at 7:30. Milton, that's exactly what it is.
Thank you very much not only for your book, but your presentation this evening. And ask all of you to join me in a round of applause. (Applause.)
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