home > by publication type > backgrounder > What are Iraq’s Benchmarks?
Email
| Authors: | Lionel Beehner Greg Bruno, Staff Writer |
|---|
Updated: March 11, 2008
Iraqi leaders have been cool to calls from Washington for a timetable to achieve certain benchmarks as a precondition for U.S. military and financial support. President Bush, too, had distanced himself from attaching strings to U.S. funding, but in May 2007 acknowledged “it makes sense to have benchmarks as a part of our discussion on how to go forward” (NYT). These benchmarks include passing laws governing the distribution of oil revenues among the country’s warring factions, reversing a de-Baathification plan, and passing a provincial elections law. A September 2007 progress report by the White House shows that Iraqis made progress toward eleven of the benchmarks since the release of an interim report in July 2007. An independent assessment by the Brookings Institution in March 2008 evaluated Iraqi lawmakers’ progress using separate “Brookings benchmarks.” Researchers there gave Iraq’s government a five—out of eleven—though some have questioned the Brookings criteria (Atlantic). The benchmark assessments delivered periodically by the top U.S. military and civilian officials in Iraq are highly anticipated in Washington ahead of the U.S. presidential elections.
Sometimes referred to as “milestones,” benchmarks refer to specific objectives—or rather quantifiable measures of progress toward a future goal—for the Iraqi government to meet with regard to national reconciliation, security, economic performance, and governance. The goal of these benchmarks is to give incentive to Iraq’s leaders to make political progress and start taking over responsibility for security from American troops. “The purpose is to infuse a sense of urgency into the political process in Baghdad,” says Andrew Exum, formerly of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
“I want to see life starting to come back,” Sen. Robert Bennett (R-UT) told the New York Times in mid-2007. “I want to see people in markets.” Other lawmakers have pressed for more specific metrics to gauge whether or not the surge is working. “The key question is: What have we won?” asks Exum. “Have we set the Iraqi government on a path toward stabilization or reconciliation? Or have we just won the right to stay in the country for another six months?” Like President Bush, Gen. Peter Pace, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, distanced himself from specific metrics. Instead he posed a question: “[D]o the people in Baghdad feel more secure today? If not, then all the other metrics may be of interest but aren’t as compelling as that one is to me.” Pace’s successor, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, has attempted to answer the security question and says progress in Iraq is now self-sustaining. “There is so much going in the right direction that is tied to better security,” Mullen told reporters in March 2008. “The level of violence being down has allowed the Iraqis to focus on the development of their security forces as opposed to focusing on where the next bomb is going to go off.” Yet other observers say progress remains a matter of perspective. W. Patrick Lang, former head of the Middle East section of the Defense Intelligence Agency, argues Iraqi and American lawmakers hold different interpretations of what progress means. “[Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki] thinks he is doing the right thing by consolidating Shiite Arab power in Iraq,” he says.
Experts say the benchmarks range in specificity and achievability. They include reaching an agreement on the status of Kirkuk, meeting certain economic criteria like a targeted annual growth, and reducing subsidies on energy and food, which cost Iraq’s economy roughly $11 billion per year, according to the Iraq Study Group. But the most-discussed benchmarks include:
The consequences of failure remain unclear. Some Democratic lawmakers have pushed for a freezing of aid funds to Iraq, while others have sought a more rapid withdrawal, or redeployment, of troops. White House officials say performance benchmarks should not be linked to troop deployments and reconstruction aid disbursements—that is, the consequences of Iraqi inaction should not include imposing limits on the ability of U.S. military leaders or the president to carry out the war. But as Exum points out, “Having benchmarks is worthless unless you have consequences.” Lang, formerly of the Defense Intelligence Agency, says, the trouble is that Iraqis do not believe there will be serious consequences if they fail to achieve these benchmarks. “Iraqis are every bit as smart as we are,” he says. “Realistically they can figure out that the chances we would pull the plug and leave is just about zero.” Similar U.S.-imposed benchmarks set for the South Vietnamese government during the Vietnam War achieved little, he adds.
Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.
Explore international efforts to curb nuclear proliferation with a new interactive from CFR's program on International Institutions and Global Governance.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1.212.434.9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
In War of Necessity, War of Choice, Richard N. Haass contrasts the decisions that shaped the conduct of two wars between the United States and Iraq involving the two presidents Bush and Saddam Hussein, and writes an authoritative, personal account of how U.S. foreign policy is made, what it should seek, and how it should be pursued.
In Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, Julia E. Sweig presents a remarkably accessible portrait of Cuba’s unique place on the world stage over the past fifty years, including its internal politics, its often fraught relationship with the United States, and its shifting relationship with the global community.
As Ray Takeyh shows in Guardians of the Revolution, behind the famous personalities and extremist slogans of Iran is a nation that is far more pragmatic—and complex—than many in the West have been led to believe.
Complete list of CFR Books
This report finds that nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security in the near term, and makes recommendations on how to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. deterrent nuclear force, prevent nuclear terrorism, and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
About Independent Task Forces at CFR
Complete list of Task Force reports
The Canadian oil sands present an important challenge to policymakers: they promise energy security benefits but present climate change problems. Michael A. Levi assesses the energy security and climate change effects of the oil sands and makes recommendations for U.S. policymakers within the context of broader bilateral relations with Canada.
This report explores an important element of the maritime policy regime: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Author Scott G. Borgerson examines the international negotiations that led to the convention, the history of debates in the United States over whether to join it, and the strategic importance of the oceans for U.S. foreign policy today.
Complete list of Council Special Reports
To request permission to reprint or reuse CFR material, please fill out this permissions request form (PDF), referring to the instructions on page 1.
Copyright 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.