Why does this page look this way?
It appears that you are using either an older, classic Web browser or a hand-held device that allows you to view our content but may not work with every feature of our site. If you are using an older browser, please upgrade for the best experience.
Navigation
home > by publication type > op-eds > Get Tehran inside the tent
| Authors: | Vali R. Nasr, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies |
|---|
December 6, 2007
International Herald Tribune
The recently released National Intelligence Estimate undermines the Bush administration’s assertion that Iran is seeking immediate acquisition of the bomb for aggressive purposes.
But even if the United States does not face the prospects of a war with Iran, it must still confront the challenge of taming a rising power. And it is here that the Bush grand strategy only exacerbates the problems in the Middle East, leading to further instability and disorder.
In a return to its past, Washington took a page out of its early Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, when Western powers successfully frustrated Moscow’s expansionist designs. By directly projecting its own power and creating a broad-based Arab alliance, the Bush administration thought it could check - and if possible reduce - Iran’s influence.
Accordingly, the United States increased pressure on the Islamic Republic by building up its naval presence in the Gulf and engineering a series of United Nations sanctions against Iran for its nuclear violations. The administration also rallied Arab support against Iranian policies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Iraq.
Through a series of regional meetings and conferences, beginning with the meeting at Annapolis, the administration is also seeking to rejuvenate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as a means of refocusing regional energies on Iran.
This new strategy for containing Iran is based on mistaken assumptions, beginning with the fallacy that Iran can be compared to the Soviet Union and that the early Cold War model is applicable to today’s Middle East.
The first problem that the United States will encounter is that although its Sunni allies may have disdain for Iran, they also hold in contempt the Shia-dominated government of Iraq.
This leaves the U.S with the dilemma of how to work with a pro-Iran Shia government while also building up a regional alliance with Sunni Arab states. A confrontation between the United States and Iran will inevitably play itself out in Iraq, further destabilizing that hapless nation.
Moreover, the notion that there is an Arab consensus against Iran is a misreading of the region’s temperament. To be sure, states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with their Shia minority problem do fear Iran’s influence. Yet smaller Gulf emirates such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates enjoy extensive economic ties with Iran, and their primary fear is that escalating tensions between United States and Tehran will damage their relations with Iran.
Far from participating in a wall of containment against the Islamic Republic, many Arab regimes will asses their capabilities and vulnerabilities, shape alliances and pursue their interests on the premise that they are susceptible to Iran’s influence.
Even the assumption that a revival of the Middle East peace process is the lynch-pin to containing Iran is problematic.
Washington believes that resumed diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors will assuage the Arab street and rally Arab governments behind the United States. But the current state of Palestinian and Israeli politics will not support the necessary compromises for a credible breakthrough.
For an administration that relies to so great an extent on its reading of history to shape policy, its grasp of recent Middle East history is curiously inadequate. The last time the Unites States rallied Arab support to contain Iran, in the 1980s, it succeeded in radicalizing the political culture to the extent that it nurtured Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Whereas during the Cold War confronting communism meant promoting capitalism and democracy, in the Middle East version it will mean promoting Sunni militancy.
Instead of focusing on reviving a shattered balance of power, the United States would be wise to aim for regional integration and fostering a framework where all powers see it in their interests to preserve the status quo.
Iran, as the National Intelligence Estimate noted, is hardly the radical power determined to upend the regional order. Iran is an unexceptionally opportunistic state seeking to assert predominance in its immediate neighborhood.
The task is to conceive a situation in which Iran would want to be contained - in other words, one in which it would see benefits in limiting its ambitions and abiding by prevailing norms.
Dialogue, compromise and commerce, as difficult as they maybe, are a means of providing Tehran with incentives to commit itself to regional stability. Instead of militarizing the Gulf and forming up shaky alliances on Iran’s periphery, Washington should move toward a local security system featuring all the regional actors.
Engaging Iran and regulating its rising power within an inclusive regional security architecture would present the best way of addressing the concerns of America’s Arab allies, stabilizing Iraq and even giving a new direction to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
A regional integration strategy in which all the states of the region are invested is more sustainable, and its maintenance will tax U.S. resources least. Ultimately, security for both Arabs and Israelis will be more achievable if Iran is part of the region and is vested in its stability rather than excluded from it.
To order Task Force reports, Council Special Reports, and Critical Policy Choices, please call, fax, or order online from our distributor, the Brookings Institution Press: phone +1.800.537.5487, fax +1.410.516.6998.
For information on other reports that are not for sale, or for general publications information, please call +1.212.434.9516 or email publications@cfr.org.
Start-Up Nation addresses the trillion-dollar question: How is it that Israel—a country of 7.1 million, only sixty years old, surrounded by enemies— produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the UK? With the insights of geopolitical experts and investors, the authors examine this nation’s adversity-driven culture to answer this question and offer prescriptions for a global economy on the rebound.
In Forces of Fortune, Vali Nasr presents a paradigm-changing revelation that will transform the understanding of the Muslim world at large. He reveals that there is a vital but unseen rising force in the Islamic world—a new business-minded middle class—that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy and that holds the key to winning the cold war against Iran and extremists.
In Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, Julia E. Sweig presents a remarkably accessible portrait of Cuba's unique place on the world stage over the past fifty years, including its internal politics, its often fraught relationship with the United States, and its shifting relationship with the global community.
Complete list of CFR Books
Browse Content By Region IssuePublication TypeThe Think TankFor The MediaFor Educators About CFR
Copyright 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations. All Rights Reserved.
