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home > by publication type > op-eds > The Silence of Mbeki
| Authors: | J. Anthony Holmes, Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies on Africa Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Associate Editor |
|---|
April 17, 2008
International Herald Tribune
Twenty-eight years ago, Zimbabwe celebrated its independence from Britain, the end of white minority rule and the victory of Robert Mugabe in the country’s first democratic elections.
Yet today, Zimbabwe’s population is suffering from hyperinflation (165,000 percent annually), 80 percent unemployment, widespread hunger, and wholesale trampling of basic democratic rights.
Nearly three weeks have passed since the March 29 elections in which opponents of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party stunningly won a parliamentary majority for the first time ever and outpolled Mugabe in the initial round of the presidential contest. Yet Mugabe’s government has refused to release the official results.
Despite calls to publish the vote count from Zimbabwe’s southern African neighbors, George W. Bush, Gordon Brown, and the UN secretary general, Ban Ki Moon, the man with the greatest leverage, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, has remained bizarrely silent.
Last Saturday, after a closed-door session with Mugabe, Mbeki stunned the world by declaring that “there is no crisis in Zimbabwe.”
On Wednesday, Mbeki chaired a special session of the UN Security Council to discuss African security issues. But despite calls for a free and fair runoff from the United States, Britain and France and the secretary general’s statement that “the credibility of the democratic process in Africa could be at stake here,” Mbeki prevailed, insisting that his “quiet diplomacy” be given more time. (In reaction to criticism at the UN, a South African government spokesperson issued a statement on Thursday calling the situation “dire” and urging publication of the election results.)
Since Zimbabwe began to implode in 2000, Mbeki has alternated between coddling the former liberation war hero and pursuing his so-called “quiet diplomacy” rather than insisting on better governance in Zimbabwe.
But this policy has proved a resounding failure. In late 2007, Mbeki presided over secret negotiations between Mugabe and the Zimbabwean opposition on a new constitution that included major reforms and democratic safeguards that leveled the electoral playing field.
Yet Mugabe repudiated Mbeki’s efforts by insisting that the March 29 elections be conducted under the old constitution. Mbeki’s refusal to condemn Mugabe and lead a regional diplomatic front to pressure him to honor the vote—either by holding a fair runoff or stepping down—is particularly disappointing because he and other anti-apartheid activists condemned Western countries for precisely this sort of softball diplomacy during the 1980s.
When the African National Congress called for universal suffrage and sanctions against the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration instead pursued a gradual policy of “constructive engagement.”
Now, when the Zimbabwean opposition and democracy activists call for free and fair elections and a public tally of three-week old votes, Mbeki’s ANC government thumbs its nose and places South Africa squarely against the democratic values upon which it was founded.
This inaction in the face of Mugabe’s blatant suppression of democracy makes a mockery of the good governance agenda at the core of Mbeki’s signature pan-African initiative: the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. As a result, South Africa’s carefully cultivated image as a defender of democracy and human rights has taken a serious blow.
Fortunately, divisions within the South African government are emerging. Mbeki’s continued equivocation and protection of Mugabe has strained his already shaky hold on the foreign policy leadership of his own party.
Since he was defeated by his arch-rival Jacob Zuma in December in an effort to win a third term as president of the ANC, Mbeki has been a lame duck. Tension has mounted over the division of power and policy leadership between the Zuma-controlled party structure and Mbeki’s government. Zuma has publicly criticized both Mugabe and Mbeki’s ineffectual approach, giving hope to the Zimbabwean opposition.
While Mbeki has failed to play the role of regional power broker in forging a solution to the Zimbabwean impasse, other leaders have cautiously stepped forward. Presidents Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia and Ian Khama of Botswana have treated the situation as an emergency and encouraged the Southern African Development Community to play a stronger role. If only South Africa would join them, these countries could display a united front and deny Mugabe the legitimacy that he craves personally and needs politically.
Strong African rejection of his actions, more than anything else, could fracture his support from the Zimbabwean military and internal security czars who are presently propping him up.
In the meantime, though, as Mbeki dithers and the vote tally remains secret, ZANU-PF has embarked on a full-fledged campaign of voter intimidation to ensure that Mugabe “wins” the runoff round of presidential elections.
There are numerous reports that gangs of government loyalists have targeted communities where support for the opposition was strongest, beating and bludgeoning those who voted against Mugabe. Mbeki had hoped that the New Partnership for Africa’s Development would be a hallmark of his foreign policy legacy. Instead, by denying the crisis in Zimbabwe and perpetuating Mugabe’s egregious misrule, he is more likely to be remembered as the apologist who abandoned his own values and ignored the plight of his 13 million African brothers next door.
This article appears in full on CFR.org by permission of its original publisher. It was originally available here
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