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home > by publication type > transcripts > A Conversation with Surin Pitsuwan [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service]
| Speaker: | Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General, Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
|---|---|
| Presider: | Stanley O. Roth, Vice President, International Government Relations, The Boeing Company |
May 14, 2008
Council on Foreign Relations
STANLEY OWEN ROTH: Good evening. Could I ask everybody to take his or her seat, please?
My name is Stanley Roth, and I've been asked to preside over tonight's conversation with Dr. Surin. We're all eager to hear what he has to say, so I'm going to be very brief. And I'm happy to say there are really very few instructions that I have to give tonight.
First, of course, please turn off your cell phones, BlackBerrys and other wireless devices. I'm as addicted to the BlackBerry as everyone, but mine is off, not even on "quiet." And I want to emphasize a pleasant point that this meeting is on the record. I don't have to define off the record, background or any of the other variations. Anything you hear, you may use and so keep that in mind.
The format for tonight is fairly straightforward for those of you who are participants of these council events. I will introduce Dr. Surin. He is going to speak from the podium rather than from the chair. Then we will mike up in the chairs, and we will have a conversation. I will not go past 7:00 on the conversation to ensure that there are at least 30 minutes for your questions.
In terms of the introduction of my friend Dr. Surin, one, he knows the United States as well as all of us. You've read his bio, so you know he was an exchange student in high school. He was an undergraduate student here. And he has two graduate degrees, a masters and a Ph.D. from some obscure university, I think, called Harvard that you may have heard of, that he worked for Jerry Ferraro on the Hill and knows our politics intimately as well, and he was a teacher here, all before going back to Thailand, being an academic there but also starting a career in politics beginning in 1986 and serving in the parliament continuously since then.
He has had a number of successively important positions within the government, culminating as foreign minister where I had the great joy of working with him when I was assistant secretary at the State Department, and he was one of the great foreign ministers in Southeast Asia trying to get things done. Maybe he'll say a few things about East Timor and some of the lessons he learned from that in his remarks.
So I don't want to take up anymore time than that. He's still a deputy leader of an opposition party. Who knows what the future brings for him in terms of politics? Of course, he is now the new secretary-general of ASEAN. And the significant thing about that, as he pointed out on his last trip, I'm not being original, is a deliberate choice to have a politician as the secretary-general, not a bureaucrat, in order to enhance the ability of ASEAN to get its message out across the world.
So with that segue, Dr. Surin, the floor is yours.
(Applause.)
SURIN PITSUWAN: Thank you very much, Stanley.
This is certainly a high point in my trip to Washington this time. Originally, it was to be a very personal trip. My eldest son is graduating with honors from the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown. But (Catherine (sp) ?), the commencement or the graduation ceremony is going to take place at 6:00 on the 17th. My flight back to Singapore for the foreign ministers meeting is at 11:00 from New York. And I've looked around. There's no choice except to leave before the commencement ceremony on the 17th.
That's the ASEAN way, by the way. You have to sacrifice. You have to put away your own agenda and preferences and to work very, very hard for the region.
But ASEAN, for the last 40 years, ladies and gentlemen, has been, what I would call, the fulcrum of power plays in the region, trying to balance the players outside the region, inside the region, those who are interested in the region. And we manage that by what we call a system of dialogue partnership. The U.S. is our dialogue partner, so is Canada. I just got a call from the foreign minister of Canada, appealing for the secretary-general of ASEAN to please pry open the sky and the channel of communication into Myanmar, just two hours ago.
Russia, China, Japan, all the permanent members of the U.N. are in our dialogue partnership. So essentially, the whole world is somehow connected with or part of the ASEAN process.
In the past 40 years, we have been able to generate many other architectures in the region, including APEC, including ARF, including ASEM, Asia Europe Meeting, including ASEAN Plus Three, including ASEAN Plus One Plus One Plus One, now Plus Six in the East Asia summit.
We have generated all these architectures, all these structures, and they have been working quite well to the point where we ourselves feel insecure that they are taking on with the lives of their own, and they are bypassing us. And we at the center of gravity, we with the centrality, central role or centrality of ASEAN in the driver's seat, all of a sudden the leaders realize that competition out there is too fierce, things are going out of our control or even our knowledge.
Former foes are talking to each other without having to use our service offering the forum and fora or the lobbies anymore. China and Japan are getting together, chummier. China and India are getting together without having to come through us. We are feeling pretty insecure.
So the leaders decided that this is a time to put our house in order. And to put the house in order is to have our first charter in our history. And the charter, I can report to you now, we have passed the midpoint. Six out of 10 have already ratified. Singapore was the first ambassador -- (inaudible) -- thank you very much. The day that I assumed power, (Jack Foo ?) brought the ratification instrument to me, and Singapore was the first.
Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam -- now four left -- Thailand. Thailand informed me that they need one more legislation in order to completely ratify the process, but Thailand interprets its own commitment to international body like the ASEAN charter.
In Malaysia, I don't think we have any problem. I have talked to the committee one, and a lot of them have been my counterparts, my colleagues in the Indonesian parliament before. And there is no problem with Myanmar, I don't think. It's a matter of timing. And then Thailand, and then the Philippines. There might be some noise there because a lot of them want to be part of the process of the ratification. They have been very active. The Philippines has been the slowest in ratifying any -- any -- commitment, any agreement, any treaty within ASEAN, partly because it is a democracy, partly because it is a very, very open participatory process.
But I'll be going there, and the chair of the Philippine senate is a very close friend President Arroyo. And I think we will need a little bit of work, but I expect no problem of full ratification by the end of this year when they meet again in Bangkok.
So what will the charter do to ASEAN? It will give ASEAN its first legal personality. It will enhance the role of the secretariat. It will empower the role of the secretary-general. I will have the role of monitoring compliance. According to one of the drafters of the charter, Ambassador Tomiko -- sorry. I had only two and a half hours sleep last night. (Laughs.) Ambassador (Tomiko ?) said, out of 100 agreements within ASEAN, only 30 have been complied with. That's the ASEAN way.
My (senator ?) said talk first and let us think about ratification later. So I think ratification is within reach. And it is going to transform the organization into a legal entity with its own rights and privileges and its ability to engage, to initiate and to interact with international actors, countries, governments or international organizations more effectively at the end of the process.
The issue of discrepancy within us, the gap between us is tremendous. And it is a structural defect for the organization. The gap is between the poorest, $209 per capita per year, and about 50,000 (dollars) per capita per year. That gap has to be managed. We realize that; therefore, we are thinking of building a community, mobilizing more resources, engaging dialogue partners who see the vision, who see the utility, who see the possibility of a prosperous, unified, stable, secure Southeast Asia ASEAN as an end objective to be achieved, to be pursued, to be promoted so that 567 million people of our 10 countries can become one unified market, prosperous, with purchasing power, with its own participatory, with its own culture of transparency, accountability, demanding good governance. That is the possibility of having one unified Southeast Asia.
We are building this community on three pillars. One is the political and security community which will be dealing with issues of traditional and nontraditional threats to the region, issues of something that we have not had before, before the age of integration, before the age of globalization, the issues of trafficking, the issue of drugs, the issue of -- (inaudible) -- international or transnational crimes. All these things are parts and parcel of integration and globalization. Integration does not bring only good things. It also exposes all of us to each other's problems and weaknesses. Southeast Asia ASEAN has to manage that, and we will do that through political and security community kind of arrangement of concept.
Of course, this will get into that issue of noninterference. How much security you want to discuss? How much political issues you want to discuss without getting into sensitive issue of noninterference? Well, I can tell you that things have moved quite a bit except the one that you will have questions about. And I will deal with that later. (Laughs.) Things have moved quite a bit.
Before, issues were sensitive and could not be put on the agenda at all. Before, leaders will have to come and said, I volunteer to share with you the problems in my country. Don't ask, because if you ask, it's interference. It's that bad.
So I can remember President Habibi, President -- (inaudible) -- came to a summit meeting and said, don't ask, I'll tell you about East Timor. Don't ask, I'll tell you about Archay. That's getting around the sensitivity of interference. But things have gone pretty far to the point where sensitive issues can be on official agenda. They can be quite candid, quite direct and quite open about it.
I remember the foreign minister of Vietnam in the last retreat in Singapore saying something like this to the foreign minister of Myanmar, please listen to the international opinion. We have been through before. We know how difficult it is, but you have to accommodate international opinion. That came from Vietnam to Myanmar. At the table, on the table, that would not happen long, long before.
So we are building security and political community. We are building economic community. It's a 1 trillion (dollar) economy combined. It's 500 billion (dollars) foreign reserves combined. It's 1.6 (billion dollars), 1.7 billion (dollars) trade between us and among us and with the world. The possibility is enormous. And we are integrating it. We are making it one investment area zone, one market, one economy. Tremendous challenge, but we are going through what we call economic blueprint that we have put together. And we are going through a very, very tedious process of reducing everything that would be obstacles to our trade.
(Tax ?) has already been down tremendously. Ninety-five, 96 percent of them less than 1 to 5 percent. Only remaining is the (none ?) tariff barriers -- very, very difficult, still perfectionist, still vested interest inside, but it's going down also.
If it's going to be one investment area, it's going to be one economy. If it's going to be one area where skilled labor can flow very freely from one country to another, it offers a very, very, very big potential for all of us, all of you, all the potential trade assessment, investors, trade in the region.
Just imagine if one-third of the population in 20 years' time, two decades, could be described as middle class -- and our middle class will be different from your middle class because we start from a very, very different level starting point. We were told by a consulting firm that in Thailand, a family of 70,000 (dollars) a month, husband and wife, could be considered middle class. But even that, if one-third of our population in 20 years could be classified as middle class ASEAN, it will be an enormous market with its own lifestyle, with its own tastes, with its own demand for participation and for everything that's going on, good governance in our society. It offers tremendous, tremendous potential and opportunities for all of us.
But you have to help create it. You have to engage. You cannot just be an uninterested bystander just looking in. We need participation. We need contribution. We need help. And fortunately, the U.S. government has been helping through USAID trying to strengthen the capacity of the secretariat, analyzing our weak points, analyzing our -- (inaudible) -- steps, providing us with information, with technical support so that we can support our own economic ministers, our own finance minister, our own various ministers to deliberate on issues important to us in community-building.
The third pillar is the sociocultural pillar which comes late, but I think it has an enormous contribution to make in our community-building because we need to build what we call an ASEAN identity. People need to feel ASEAN. People need to feel belonged. People need to feel the ownership of ASEAN; otherwise, you cannot have the commitment, the energy, the loyalty that we can build a community on. Only the works of the leadership, only the works of the diplomats, only the work of the technocrats talking about integration. People don't feel a thing. That is not going to be healthy. That is not going to be a strong foundation for community-building.
Furthermore, ASEAN is pretty much a way off, but it is known as a nice word. Some countries in the West accuse me, accuse us of spelling the word "Asian" wrong. (Laughter.) It's i rather than e, Mr. Secretary-General. Still Asian, not ASEAN, that is to be expected. But in Southeast Asia, the word ASEAN has been adopted, but the depth and the understanding of it is not there. We need to bring real understanding, real attachment, real a sense of identity with it.
I have told the audience this morning at the Asia Society, when I was named as a nominee for this position, I went around Thailand. In Phuket, I saw a sign Asean something. I asked my driver to back up. He said, sir, it's Asean barber shop. (Laughter.) In Hadyai, I saw the word "Asean" big, prominent, over a building. I said, back up, what is it? He said, sir, it's Asean Hotel. But the best part is in Pattaya. Blinking lights, I said, back up, back up, what's Asean? He said, sir, it's Asean massage parlor. (Laughter.)
So the word "Asean" has been adopted rather universally but not quite the way we want it, not quite the way that it would contribute to a community-building. So we need to work very hard engaging with the NGOs, engaging with civil society, engaging with the academic institutions, like yours, engaging with the business people, engaging with international organization.
I call what we are trying to do at the secretariat a networked secretariat, meaning reaching out, engaging through you, through various civil society. In the ASEAN landscape, we can reach the people of 567 million people because we can't do it ourselves. So by this networking, by networked secretariat, we hope to build that sense of belonging to ASEAN.
What is it at the end of the process? Well, the end of the process is going to be one strong, stable, secure and prosperous community. I was in Geneva with the leaders at the World Economic Forum. After the end of the presentation, the leaders, particularly Lee Hsien-Loong was asked, with all these ideas and objectives and views and visions that you have, don't you need a strong bureaucracy? Lee Hsien-Loong said, yes, we have the secretariat in Jakarta, and we have the new secretary-general is here. Surin, you want to say something?
And this is what I said. We are committed to build a community, open, engaging with the world, competing, at the same time contributing. Help us succeed. If and when we succeed in translating, realizing the dreams of our forefathers 40 years ago -- secure, prosperous, stable -- at least the world will have one less region to worry about. I think that means and says a lot about the world today.
So help us, engage with us, give us the opportunity. Don't write us off just yet. The challenges that we are going through, I personally am going through now is to make ASEAN relevant. I did not expect to be baptized by a cyclone, but that's exactly what is happening. We are now trying to build to what we call a coalition of mercy because nothing else has worked. There is a consensus emerging now that ASEAN has to take the lead, and ASEAN has to rise to the occasion.
I cannot second guess what my colleagues, the foreign ministers, will be deciding on the 19th in Singapore. But I think they, too, know that the world is expecting ASEAN to rise to the challenge. It is a defining moment for ASEAN, but ASEAN needs encouragement, ASEAN needs less of the criticism, ASEAN needs less of the ridicule. The question has been asked, why can't you suspend, why can't you just eject? Well, the same question may be asked about some members at the United Nations. Why can't? It is even written in the U.N. charter you can suspend, you can reject. It is not that easy. It is not that simple.
How about invoking the principle of responsibility to protect, as you have heard over the airwaves? First, it is extremely difficult to do. According to the principle itself, according to (Garrett Evans ?) himself -- and I was an adviser to that commission -- it has to be the last resort. It has to be decided by the Security Council. It has to be proportionate. It has to bring good better than the negative consequences by resorting to that extra kind of traditional or extra legal means. It won't work, and you are condemning ASEAN. You are giving ASEAN a kiss of death.
So ASEAN is now setting up that coalition of mercy. We mean to achieve what is expected of us. They have already agreed to issue visas to our rapid assessment team. Two Singaporeans been in there, an adviser to the office in the secretariat in Jakarta has been there. A few more are going in. It is a beginning. With the support, with the help, with the encouragement, we will accomplish our task. We will be able to rise to the occasion. Don't just write us off yet.
Well, I think the world is hanging in the balance on this issue, very anxious, very angry and very frustrated. And you have the right to be. But let us work together in order to get around a lot of these reservations, a lot of these sensitivities. I have pledges from various entities around the world to work and to help us. I appreciate that. And I think together we can accomplish something, not to the full satisfaction, but at least we'll be the beginning of something better for the region, for the people of the region and, by extension, for the international community as a whole, too. Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
ROTH: Break, intermission while we mike up.
I'm going to ask the first question and then open it up. And I thank the secretary-general for not beginning with Myanmar, which I requested of him. All to often discussions of ASEAN immediately turn into a discussion of Burma/Myanmar just as in the old days discussions of Indonesia always started with East Timor, and you sometimes missed the big picture. So I'd like to stick with the big picture before we open it up, Mr. Secretary-General.
And I'd like to ask you for your assessment of two key ASEAN relationships. The first with the U.S., obviously, as an American. There's been good news and bad news in recent years. You've mentioned on piece of the good news, the AID help that you're getting. Obviously, we have a new position created. A U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, which is a significant step. And you're also familiar with the complaint side of the ledger, the fact that the president was unable to schedule the ASEAN summit on the anniversary, the fact that the secretary of State has missed several of the ASEAN meetings, some concern about U.S. preoccupation with other regions of the world to the, you know, downfall of our image and prestige in Southeast Asia.
So to get your assessment of U.S.-ASEAN relations and any advice, if you want to offer, for the next administration of either party.
And the flip question won't surprise you, your assessment of ASEAN-China relations. There are many people who are afraid of the growing Chinese influence and see it as a zero-sum game. There are some people who actually go back and read what people were saying four or five years ago when ASEAN was terrified of China when it was often referred to as a vacuum cleaner, sucking up all the foreign investment. And that's gone. Now you're hearing instead China is the locomotive of growth and the opportunity. But I'd like your assessment of where you see the ASEAN-China relationship going.
PITSUWAN: Well, first of all, we very much appreciate the decision by the administration, by the Senate, by the Congress, by the government to name the ambassador to ASEAN, ambassador for ASEAN. I have said in Southeast Asia the U.S. has stolen the show. Even the ASEAN themselves have not appointed permanent representatives to Jakarta to the secretariat because we have to wait for the charter to be ratified.
As the dialogue partner, you don't have to. You can take that initiative, and you have done it. Thank you very much. By one stroke of the pen, signing, appointing, you have taken the lead, and other dialogue partners are considering seriously to follow suit. The prime minister of Japan had already committed at the summit last November here knowing that it's coming from Washington, the idea, the appointment. He said, we are committed to appoint ambassador to ASEAN, too. If Japan does it, China certainly will follow. And I think South Korea will, and I think Australia and New Zealand, Indonesia, the EU, Canada, you are going to create a bandwagon.
And the image and the profile of ASEAN has been lifted by just one appointment. Thank you very much. We are not being marginalized.
While the president has postponed the summit meeting, commemorative meeting with the ASEAN leaders, for one reason or another, Secretary Rice, of course, has missed twice the ministerial meeting, the ARF meeting during the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers. This year we're still hoping that the U.S. will be represented at the highest level in Singapore. It is important for the psychology, for the impression because to be there in person, in the picture is to be identified as engaging with the process, with the community-building, with the emotion, with the energy that are going on in the region. Absence in person, absence of the person of the highest level will create a big vacuum, and people feel a little bit, you know, disappointed -- disappointed. So I hope that will not be the case with the new administration. I understand Singapore, the host, is still trying to get Secretary Rice there.
ASEAN-China, I don't think you have much to worry. The countries in Southeast Asia have learned to accommodate, have learned to handle, have learned to live with the reality that somehow we have to join the supply chain. If they have sucked the oxygen out of the region, India and China, the only thing that is left for the countries of ASEAN is to join the supply chains of both economies. And they have pulled us along. They have helped us increase our exports, increase our tourism, increase our purchasing power, increase our volume of trade.
So with the stark choice of engaging with them or living in isolation from them, the choice is to trade, the choice is to engage, the choice is to accommodate. And I don't think the U.S. should feel, you know, that that is a threat because more and more the countries in the region are looking for opportunities to interact, to invest and to trade. And that has been the strong pillar of U.S. foreign policy. And I would say, the U.S. business in the region has not been affected by the increase of Chinese presence in the region.
In fact, we welcome U.S. investment. We welcome you as engagement. And certainly, we welcome U.S. security engagement. Admiral Keating is in the Gulf of Thailand, has gone into Myanmar, has delivered a message of mercy. We want to help, please let us engage, let us help. And I understand the president has already put an order out to your Foreign Service people, your diplomats, put politics aside for the time being, save lives first. I think that is a very, very kind posture in this situation.
And I do hope -- and I have an experience. You want me to say something about East Timor. In East Timor, when the countries of Southeast Asia sent troops in order to help restore law and order on that island or half of that island, we went there as members of the region, individually, not as ASEAN at that time, still very, very sensitive. Some of the countries would not want to use the word ASEAN in there. So we went in as neighbors.
But in the end, we had to turn to the U.S. for technical support, for transport, for intelligence. The Japanese provided the resources, the money, $100 million. I remember I and -- (inaudible) -- of the Philippines asked for 50 million (dollars) from the permanent representative in New York. Within 10 hours, he came to us, and he said, I got 100 million U.S. dollars to help all of you to go into East Timor. But in the end, the technical support, the transport, the C-130, the ships to transport the troops and the bodies into East Timor came from the U.S.
So whatever ingenuity that we put together as a structure to go in to solve some problem, in the end we need to rely on traditional alliance that we have had with the U.S. It's appreciated. We know that we can rely on you. Everybody appreciates the U.S. presence there. So the good will is there, very much welcome. We'd like you to engage, to stay there and to stake your claim of your business opportunity there, your investment opportunities there. People would like to see you there.
ROTH: Thank you.
We're going to now turn to the question-and-answer portion. Just a few rules -- please wait for the microphone to get to you. When it comes, please stand up, identify yourself, and please indicate your affiliation. And most importantly, we have roughly 20 minutes left, so the shorter your question, the more time for the secretary-general to answer.
Yes, Priscilla, I suspect I know the topic, but I will --
QUESTIONER: Stanley, thank you very much indulging me. I'm Priscilla Clapp, the former charges in Rangoon.
PITSUWAN: Yes, of course.
QUESTIONER: Very nice to see you. I believe that the coalition of mercy is, as you say, an extremely significant move on the part of ASEAN and a defining moment and, to me, a very encouraging move. I think it also stands as an example of why Burma should still be in ASEAN because it has to be in ASEAN for this sort of thing to happen. But my question is, do you see the coalition ultimately becoming an effective mechanism for facilitating the full range of international assistance into the country and for establishing more reliable delivery mechanisms? That's a big question, I know.
PITSUWAN: Yes, well, I think at this point, we cannot afford to think only of relief. Relief is necessary, but right now we have to think ahead. And I have discussed with partners who want to join institutions and countries we have to think about also medium term rehabilitation. We have to think about long-term reconstruction. And I think that's only wise.
I think what we need -- I've talked to Sir John Holmes from the U.N., and I've encouraged him to get in touch with the governments at the highest level in the region, get the delivery system, get the logistics down so that when there is real opening, and if we do things right it will be that opening. We don't have to lose time for logistics, for transport or whatever it is.
It depends on how we play our hand. It depends on how we cooperate. It depends on how imaginative we are. And I think this is a defining moment for ASEAN. It is a transformative moment for the region and for countries involved. We have never had this, okay, this chance, this opportunity before. It is a very, very challenging moment. I think it has long-term implication for the region.
ROTH: Catherine.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Catherine (Del ?) Pino from Georgetown University.
My question actually happens to be a follow on to that. When Assistant Secretary Hill was in the region in March, he proposed that in the 2009 ARF meeting when Thailand will be chair of ASEAN that the group conduct an exercise in humanitarian intervention. I'm not sure if that's quite the word. How was that received in the region? Does the cyclone change anything? If ARF were to be a mechanism, would that be overloading the circuit too much? Is that a viable option?
PITSUWAN: No. The beginning of, you know, ARF meaningful exercises, ASEAN Regional Forum, the only security forum in the region, in Asia Pacific -- although now the six-party talks are very ambitious trying to form itself into some mechanism for Northeast Asia. I think the beginning that would be a consensus, accepted and less controversial, would be preparedness for such emergencies, natural emergencies. We have had the tsunami. We have had various floods and storms in Vietnam, earthquake in Indonesia.
When I first made a courtesy call on His Majesty the Sultan of Brunei, he said to me, the first to be on the spot any time disaster strikes within ASEAN should be your flag, should be the ASEAN flag, not even any other member. And I think it's less controversial, less sensitive. And I think, you know, our partners, our dialogue partners, like the U.S., like the EU, like Japan, would like to contribute to that kind of contingency plan -- preparedness for emergency relief for disaster management.
And we have gone some way in that direction. ASEAN, since the six months, five months after the tsunami -- in July, six months, seven months -- have made an agreement called disaster preparedness emergency agreement. And we are working on that basis now. My staff at the secretariat is working in a unit called ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Unit, and we have focal points in every country, including in Myanmar. And that's how we alert and we energize and we warn each other to get prepared.
And then from there, that kernel of preparation, we are leading to this coalition of mercy. That was based on an agreement in 2005 as a result of the tsunami of the end of 2004. So the direction is right, and I think the sentiment is right and, I think, less controversial, less sensitive, and dialogue partners would like to be part of that disaster preparedness. It would be contributing a long way in ARF activities meaningful to the people of the region, yes.
ROTH: Anyone in the back, just to spread it around?
All the way in the back.
QUESTIONER: (Name and affiliation inaudible.)
I come here as a reporter, but I would like to present a question as a Vietnamese American. Here in Washington, D.C., people told me -- (inaudible) -- be aware of China. When I go to Hanoi, they told me the same thing but in Vietnamese. How does ASEAN see China? Do you concede that China has a path to this region? Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
ROTH: Well, I think you answered that already.
PITSUWAN: Yeah, I think some countries, you know, have varying views on the issue, I think, again, you know, closer to the big neighbor. I mean, Vietnam may have different perspective on China. Myanmar may have different perspective on China than other countries in the region. But on the whole, as ASEAN, I think, with China, we have more mechanisms of interaction than with any other dialogue partner. So that is a level of, I guess, comfort that they want to engage. They know the potential. And they know the necessity for interaction with big economy with great, great potential like China.
ROTH: Yes.
QUESTIONER: Edward Goldberg, Annisa Group and the Zickland Graduate School of Business in New York.
Secretary-General, you almost, in your introductory remarks, almost laid out almost an EU-like growth future. So do you see in the future charter almost a wealth-sharing device like the EU has now between the poorer nations and the wealthier nations? In the future, of course.
PITSUWAN: Good question. We are now embarking on community-building, no longer coordination of policies. So we need such a fund. But every time there's an issue of having that structural fund or solidarity fund, whatever the Europeans say, have, you know, it's always faced with objection that we don't want to go that way. What I'm saying is European Union remains our inspiration, not our model, because the European Union is a union of states transferring sovereignty to the central body, supratnational body called the union. That's not the kind of architecture that the ASEAN member states are ready to contemplate.
So inspiration -- a lot of things the European Union does, we can emulate. But a lot of things the European Union does, we have to wait. So inspiration rather than a model.
ROTH: Okay.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Randy Henning at American University and the Peterson Institute.
And the question that I had for you tonight was about trade policy. We have, of course, in place the China-ASEAN trade agreement, other ASEAN Plus One trade agreements under consideration, proposal for ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Plus Five. And meanwhile, the individual member countries of ASEAN are negotiating bilateral agreements with Japan, China, Korea and the United States. So my question for you is, do you have a strategy for sorting and sifting and prioritizing these multiple trade proposals? Or is it just okay to let 1,000 flowers bloom? (Laughter.)
PITSUWAN: We are negotiating with the U.S., with the EU. We have completed with Japan, with China, with South Korea. I think India and Australia could be done very, very possible by August. And individual countries, as you said, have their own engagements. Singapore has already completed its own agreement with the U.S. a long, long time ago and has taken some part of Indonesia along so that, you know, it can share the benefit.
No, I think what we can do as a group we would do as a group slow, complicated. That's why with the U.S. we have this process, you know, a rather long-drawn process, because the 10 countries are extremely diverse. And we have found out that younger countries, newer countries, like Vietnam, are more prepared to engage, to concede even more because they don't have any vested interest inside. Country's economies like Thailand, like Malaysia, like Indonesia, Philippines have found it very, very difficult to concede this, concede that because of the vested interest inside. And we cannot just ignore them because they have been the basis of our growth for the last 30, 40 years.
So we, I think, compare notes. If it's on bilaterals, we cooperate if it's as a unit. And we have done quite well, you know. With the Japanese, I mean, it's not easy, but we have done it. With the Chinese, easier because, you know, they are about the same level as many of the countries of ASEAN. But we have been able to accomplish the free trade agreement. So I guess the question is yes and no. We compare notes, we share experiences, best practices on issues that we need to. And if we can go together as a group, we go as a group.
In the end -- (inaudible) -- kind of thing, you know. Many relationships, many (webs ?) of relationships will become whole and mutually reinforcing.
ROTH: Let me ask a quick follow up. Does ASEAN see any hope for Doha? Or do you think that process has passed its time?
PITSUWAN: Not very excited about it. Some countries said when you discuss trade agreement, don't bring Doha in because it complicates matters more because it has so many layers of meanings and of obstacle and problems for countries -- (inaudible).
ROTH: Okay. Harry.
QUESTIONER: I'm Harry Harding of George Washington University.
Mr. Secretary-General, you indicated that ASEAN's priorities now are largely internal. And I can see that the focus on the charter and ratification and community-building, that is understandable and important. But if I understood you correctly, before you said that, you said that the need for ASEAN to do some of the things that it has been doing in promoting cooperative security in the region were no longer so urgent. And I'm wondering if that's really true, if there really is enough trust and transparency among major powers, despite the improvements to some bilateral relationships, if there's really enough cooperation on transnational issues, if there's really enough progress toward preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. I wondered if you could tell us more about why you think that there's less need for the external security cooperation, even as there's more need for the internal.
PITSUWAN: I did not mean that there is less need for external engagement. What I meant was some of the major players are finding it more easy for them to get together themselves by passing us. I still believe that ARF has a long way to go, has a lot of things to accomplish, confidence building, transparency and a genuine structure of peace, of understanding, of exchange that would create a sense of confidence within the region. And we will continue to do that.
But I think we feel that -- I can real the logic behind the charter is that if we are not ourselves integrated and united, our weight in the international arena, serving as that fulcrum of power play, will not be as effective as in the past. Some people have said, we have been in the center. We maintain the centrality, our driver's seat, only because we were needed by default because the players were not comfortable with each other. Well, we need to make sure that we are not going to continue in this role by default. It has to be by design. And the only way to do it by design is to make sure that we, in the driver's seat, have a valid driver's license, and that needs to be renewed. And the renewal of that driver's license is through community-building, through integration, through the charter. So we will continue to engage very much so.
ROTH: All the way in the back.
QUESTIONER: (Name and affiliation inaudible.)
Sir, you've spoken about oneness, regional integration and a sense of belonging. But I think ASEAN still owes an explanation to the world that two weeks after the cyclone hit Burma and tens of thousands of people have died, ASEAN has still not managed to get one official into the country to look into what's happening.
PITSUWAN: That's not true. I just told you that we have an adviser to the unit at the secretariat already on the ground since the 8th, I believe, so a few days after. Two Singaporeans went in yesterday. A few more Thais are going in, Malaysia and Brunei and Indonesia are going in.
We are trying to work around a very, very stiff, resistant mentality and mind-set that have been there for a long, long time. It takes a little bit of time. Unfortunately, yes, people are suffering. Unfortunately, yes, people are dying. But I think it's still a more effective and long-term effective way to deal with the problem. I don't think we deny the fact that we have not been able to deliver relief effectively as a group. But in Indonesia, we did it -- tsunami.
In many parts of ASEAN when this kind of thing happened, we did it as a group. In this case, it has been the problem for a long, long time. So --
ROTH: Well, I don't think we need to debate it. But I think, one, there's a consensus that more needs to be done. But two, I think, to just put it bluntly, the problem is Myanmar, not ASEAN. And if you had a U.S. government official here, you could make exactly the same comment. If you had Japanese, EU, any set of international relief agencies. Everybody is frustrated by the fact that they haven't been able to do the job they want to do. I don't think it is particularly a failing of ASEAN. Although as the neighbor, ASEAN obviously feels a special role that it is trying to assume. So let us see what comes out of the foreign ministers meeting.
We have time for one last question.
Ambassador, did you want the last question?
QUESTIONER: Chan Heng Chee, ambassador of Singapore.
May I sit?
PITSUWAN: For you, we will make a dispensation of the rules.
QUESTIONER: I was going to make the point that you made, Stan, that Myanmar should not be made the litmus test of the effectiveness of ASEAN. In fact, Myanmar was brought into ASEAN with us fully aware it was going to be a long and difficult, constructive engagement exercise. And we have indeed been not as successful as we want, not because we didn't try, but I think it is difficult. So let us not just be judged in humanitarian disaster relief by Myanmar alone. It is a difficult case for whoever, you know, wants to help.
But I have a question for Surin. It's just factual. I agree with everything you say. And thank you, you've made an excellent presentation for ASEAN.
PITSUWAN: I learned from you. (Laughter.)
QUESTIONER: Surin, there were reports that Myanmar has agreed to let 160 relief workers from Bangladesh, Thailand and China into Myanmar. Is this something they want to do but be slow in giving out the visas?
PITSUWAN: I think if you count the visas, probably the number is about right. The Chinese Red Cross workers, the day that the earthquake struck in Sichuan, they were there delivering help. So if you count the number of visas, you probably have that number. What we are trying to do now is to go in as ASEAN. And many of us may be skeptical that it's a diversion in order to absorb the pressure opening up for ASEAN but not others. But I think, again, if we do it right, it will be an opportunity to, you know, to bring in some new opportunities and new possibilities for us to do with the situation as a group.
And I'm meeting the president of the World Bank tomorrow. I have met (Ocha ?) people in Bangkok. And we are trying to put the structure together. Every institution has its own limitation, its own conditions. The World Bank might not be able to engage long term, but it has the immediate expertise of disaster management. They will lend that to us at the headquarters, training our officials briefly and then let them go.
Right now, we are hoping that the team can get in, and they can write a good, solid report for the foreign ministers on Monday. And the Myanmese government themselves has been asked to come up with a report for the need assessment. And the two reports will be combined. And the foreign ministers will make their decision what they want ASEAN to do, what they want the group to do, what they want the secretariat to do. And we just have to wait. I cannot second guess them, but I know that they also realize the pressure, the expectation and the challenge and the opportunity that this one offers.
We miss it, it's going to be like a spacecraft coming into the atmosphere and just miss it and then that's it. This window of opportunity will not remain open long. ASEAN has to rise to the occasion. And I think it means to seize it, and it needs support and understanding rather than severe criticism based on the past. I think we have to look into the future.
ROTH: Okay. Well, we're right at 7:30 and end on time. Let me just make a closing comment and express the thought that I think everybody in this room shares the frustration of the gentleman in the back that more hasn't been done. And I think it's not frustration, even anger would be an appropriate word.
PITSUWAN: Yes.
ROTH: So let us leave with a parting thought that we all wish you luck and the ASEAN foreign ministers luck on the 19th that an effective action plan rather than just a tough statement will come out of the meeting. And I hope you can return home telling them of the enormous concern and passion that you saw in the United States firsthand, even as you were here for a personal event, about this issue, and use that to your advantage.
But thank you very much for sharing this hour with us.
PITSUWAN: Thank you. (Applause.)
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