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| Author: | Jayshree Bajoria, Staff Writer |
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Updated: January 28, 2009
Reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il has been ailing since he reportedly suffered a stroke in August 2008 have sparked intense speculation about the future of the country without him. North Korea, a nuclear-armed country under Communist rule, is one of the most closed-off societies in the world. A September 2008 CFR Council Special Report says there is a possibility North Korea might intentionally transfer nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist group, and thus merits Cold War-style methods of deterrence from the United States. While some experts believe the country might see some reform in the period after Kim, others see little hope for change, especially in the ongoing effort to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons.
Since its founding in 1945, North Korea has been under the leadership of the Kim dynasty. Known as the "Great Leader," Kim Il-Sung ruled from 1945 until his death in 1994. His son, Kim Jong-Il, the "Dear Leader," took over as head of state in 1994 and is now sixty-six. Both father and son have ruled the country as an absolute dictatorship. Experts have often characterized North Korea as a failed state that is unable to provide for its people. Gary Samore, CFR's vice president and an expert on North Korea, says it is probably the most brutal regime in the world today.
Kim Jong-Il has three sons but has not announced his successor, leading to worries about who will control the country after him and if the transition will be peaceful. According to news reports, Kim suffered a stroke in August 2008, though North Korean officials denied he was ill. In January 2009, he reportedly met with a foreign envoy (Hankyoreh) from China.
While the extent of Kim's recovery is unclear, the prospect of his departure as absolute leader has triggered discussions about how to respond to upheaval in the North. "There might be a power struggle, there might even be a collapse of government authority," says Samore, who adds that other countries are thinking about their options if faced with instability in North Korea. A January 2009 Council Special Report urges the United States to prepare for sudden change in North Korea in concert with its allies in the region. The report calls for broader contacts with Pyongyang, and at the same time recommends that Washington promote the establishment of a standing institutional mechanism for regional security cooperation in northeast Asia.
However, some experts doubt Kim's sudden death will lead to chaos. "The North Korean political system has demonstrated surprising resilience and stability in the past," says Evans J. R. Revere, president of the Korea Society, a New York-based nonprofit organization. He says the main elements of state power in North Korea--the Korean Workers' Party, the military, and the security apparatus--seem to be functioning as usual and "preservation of the country's political, social, and economic system remains the regime's highest priority."
Robert Carlin, a former U.S. State Department official who took part in negotiations with North Korea from 1992-2000, says post-Kim scenarios prompt discussions of North Korea's collapse by those on the outside because of their view of North Korea as an illegitimate state. But that's not how North Koreans view their country, he says, noting "as far as I can tell they have a strong sense of nationalism and national identity."
North Korea analysts think a kind of collective leadership is most likely to emerge in the absence of a recognized successor. "The problem is none of his sons are in a strong position as a successor," says Samore. The eldest of Kim's sons, Kim Jong-nam (37), went into exile after being arrested by Japanese immigration authorities for attempting to enter on a forged passport in 2001. The other two, Kim Jong-chol (27) and Kim Jong-un (25), are too young, say experts. Under a collective leadership scenario, the country would be run by senior officials of the party and the military, with one of Kim's sons as a figurehead.
Very little is known about Kim Jong-Il's inner circle, but some names have emerged in recent times. Kim's brother-in-law, Jang Sung-taek (62), is occasionally cited as his right-hand man. Jang was promoted to the post of minister of administration in October 2007, and is responsible for the National Security Agency, the People's Safety Agency, the Central Procurator's Office, and the Central Court. Kim Yong-nam (70), president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, is often touted as Pyongyang's number two, and is the ceremonial head of state. He represents North Korea on all state visits and also receives visiting heads of state. North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il is another top official.
Some experts think Kim Jong-Il's "military first" policy has made the country's armed forces very strong and they might take greater control of the country in the future--and in such a scenario, Pyongyang would toe a harder line. However, Samore says the entire North Korean leadership is focused on one thing--survival. He says it will continue to use a combination of tough and soft policies, aiming on the one hand to threaten and deter the outside world, and on the other to try to gain as much aid and assistance as possible.
North Korea remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $1,900. According to South Korea's Central Bank, the North's GDP declined by 2.3 percent in 2007, while GDP growth in the agricultural industry decreased by 9.4 percent. In December 2008, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Food Program warned that about 40 percent of the country's population, an estimated 8.7 million people, mostly young children, pregnant and nursing women, and the elderly, will urgently need food assistance. The country spends a significant portion of its GDP on the military, whose ranks are filled by one-fifth of its population of 23 million people in active or reserve status. According to a 2004 Congressional Research Service report, 25 percent of GDP was spent on military expenditure (PDF) in 2002.
"But clearly the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] that we see today is quite different from the one that existed even five years ago," says Revere, pointing to an increasing reliance on the market, and a growing understanding among the population of the role of markets and money. This has also led to a boom in black markets and increased smuggling along the China border, say experts. "With the partial exception of the military industry, the only functioning parts of the North Korean economy are the unofficial private markets," writes Andrei Lankov, an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, in Foreign Affairs.
North Korea has engaged in increased trade and economic cooperation with neighbors South Korea and China. A growing number of Chinese firms are investing in North Korea and gaining concessions like preferable trading terms and port operations. David C. Kang, a professor at the University of Southern California, in this December 2007 interview, said North Korea was beginning to take the initial steps "to open up reform and yet maintain control. "
But there is no consensus among experts regarding Pyongyang's road to reform. While most agree that there is little chance of any political reform, economic reforms, however, remain a difficult issue. Revere says: "Economic transformation in the North is inevitable, primarily because the economy is so badly battered, but the content and direction of that transformation seem likely to follow a different path than China's." Lankov argues otherwise. "Were North Korea to reform, the disparities with South Korea would only become starker to its populations," which could undermine state control and legitimacy, writes Lankov. Meanwhile, Samore says if North Korea allowed economic or political reform, it would "cease to exist as a country."
The Six-Party Talks, the multilateral agreement to end Pyongyang's nuclear program, came to deadlock in September 2008 after North Korea expelled international inspectors from Yongbyon, its main plutonium-producing nuclear facility, and removed seals and security cameras intended to prevent Pyongyang from reactivating the plant. Pyongyang said it would return nuclear materials to the reprocessing plant within a week in order to reactivate the facility. The Yongbyon site was originally shut down in July 2007 as Pyongyang agreed to cease its nuclear activity in exchange for foreign aid and diplomatic incentives.
CFR's Samore says a post-Kim North Korea will have little impact on the denuclearization process. "The policy followed by the current government will be followed by any successive government," he says, "which is to retain their nuclear weapons." In the book, America's Role in Asia: Asian and American Views, Han Sung-Joo, chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, writes: "For Kim Jong-Il, nuclear weapons are not only an essential security assurance and a bargaining tool (PDF), but also an irreplaceable instrument of domestic control and political survival." Experts say Kim's successors, similarly, would not risk looking weak by giving up their nuclear weapons; instead, Pyongyang will continue to use them to extract benefits in the form of money and oil from the West.
For Seoul, an unstable North is even more dangerous. The two countries are technically at war in the absence of a peace treaty at the end of the Korean War in 1953. Experts say Koreans in both parts of the peninsula have long hoped for reunification. A 2006 Gallup poll found 67 percent of South Koreans wanted reunification of the Koreas. However, the enormous costs have become a disincentive to near-term reunification, say experts. In the poll, 56 percent of South Koreans said they had more to lose than gain from reunification. Seoul has been engaging in economic cooperation with Pyongyang to try to transform the North gradually so that unification may be less costly economically and politically for the South. But given the North's opposition to reunification, experts say, it is only possible in the near term if North Korea collapses. China, some Western experts say, is interested in preserving North Korea as a buffer zone between itself and democratic South Korea, and does not accept reunification on U.S. terms. The Chinese government says it will go on supporting North and South Korea in improving relations and realizing independent peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.
The U.S. role in the Korean War, and its longtime presence in South Korea, translated to an antagonistic relationship between Washington and Pyongyang. Bound by a 1954 Mutual Security Agreement to defend South Korea in the event of outside aggression, the United States has some 28,000 troops and marines stationed in the country. However, North Korea and the United States have made some attempts in recent years toward normalizing relations. In October 2000, the two countries signed a joint communiqué for better bilateral relations. And the denuclearization plan of 2007 also sought improved relations through a multilateral engagement on ending North Korea's nuclear program.
In February 2008, the New York Philharmonic performed in Pyongyang. Revere, who traveled with the orchestra, says the concert was a signal by North Korea's leadership of "its desire for better relations with the United States." But Pyongyang's continued possession of nuclear weapons will make such a relationship "impossible to achieve," he says, "just as it will prolong and possibly deepen" its isolation in the international community.
The presence of nuclear weapons makes the international community fearful of any future instability in North Korea, prompting calls for better contingency plans.
The Council Special Report on preparing for sudden change in North Korea says the United States should work with allies in the region to plan crisis response efforts. Currently, the U.S. and South Korean Combined Forces Command have a contingency plan, CONPLAN 5029 (GlobalSecurity.org), to prepare for North Korea's collapse. The plan outlines how South Korean and U.S. forces would respond to a civil war in the North, a mass exodus of refugees, natural disasters, kidnapping of South Korean citizens, or loss of control over weapons of mass destruction. However, a U.S. effort in 2005 to devise a more detailed operational plan (OPLAN) failed due to Seoul's fears of antagonizing Pyongyang and undermining South Korea's sovereign interests. According to news reports, the United States pushed for the formulation of an operational plan once again in October 2008.
The January 2009 Council Special Report says cooperation between the principal powers in the region provides the best chance of coping with the fallout of sudden change in North Korea. When formulating policies, though, it urges Washington to draw lessons from its role in the German reunification, where it led an intensive diplomatic effort to reassure the security concerns of all concerned powers.
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