In outlining his new strategy for the beleaguered Afghan military campaign, U.S. President Barack Obama put Afghanistan's nascent security forces front and center in the U.S. effort to right the mission. Obama announced the deployment of about four thousand additional U.S. troops to train Afghan soldiers which, the president said, will "fully resource our effort to train and support the Afghan Army and Police" for the first time. Senior U.S. military officials, meanwhile, have said America's exit strategy is tied to Afghanistan's ability to provide its own security, and NATO and coalition partners have embraced the concept that improving the capability of Afghan forces is the quickest way to exit. Japan, for instance, announced plans in February 2009 to pay the salaries of roughly eighty thousand Afghan police officers for six months. And NATO nations in late March 2009 pledged to add upwards of five thousand temporary troops to improve security for elections, as well as to help in training efforts. Yet some analysts warn that building Afghanistan's security apparatus will take more than pledges and cash (RFE/RL). Even the top military commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. David McKiernan, acknowledges the handover of security to indigenous forces is "years away."

Afghanistan's National Security Forces consist of three principle components--the army, the army air corps, and the national police. Within these units, specialized personnel round out the country's security capabilities, including communications and logistical staff, border guards, and narcotics officers. Yet as sound as the country's security apparatus appears on paper, its effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness remains uneven. In March 2009, with violence in Afghanistan at an all-time high, President Obama vowed to "accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan Army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011." The U.S. government has spent at least $16.5 billion (PDF) to train and equip Afghan army and police forces. But experts say realizing the new Obama endgame--turning over "security responsibility to the Afghans"--will take time, money, and far more resources than have been committed.

A breakdown of each security component, and its current state of effectiveness, follows:

Afghan National Army: The Afghan National Army (PDF) is widely seen as the most capable branch of the country's security forces. It recruits soldiers nationally, and pays them roughly $100 per month. In March 2009 the Pentagon measured the size of the Afghan army at nearly 83,000, though only 52,000 were engaged in combat alongside international or U.S. forces (an additional 5,400 troops were believed to be AWOL). This represented full fielding for 95 of a planned 160 units. Structurally, the army is divided into five ground maneuver corps consisting of two to four brigades. Each brigade is comprised of infantry kandaks (Afghan battalions), combat support kandaks, and combat service support kandaks. Once it is expanded to 134,000 soldiers, the army will consist of five corps headquarters (Long War Journal), a division headquarters, 21 brigades, and 114 battalions. Since August 2008 the army has assumed lead responsibility for security in Kabul and is extending its reach into some provinces.

Progress notwithstanding, the size of the Afghan force is a point of major contention for U.S., Afghan, and NATO allies. In March 2009 President Obama called for an expansion of the Afghan army to 134,000--a figure that is to include 12,000 trainees--as early as December 2011. But these benchmarks were originally approved by the U.S. military in late 2008, leaving some Afghan officials to question the U.S. president's March 2009 commitment. While the president left open the possibility of "additional enlargements as circumstances and resources warrant," officials closest to the U.S.-led training effort say they were expecting a greatly expanded force (NYT)-somewhere in the combined 400,000 ballpark. Maj. Gen. Richard P. Formica, head of the U.S. unit responsible for training Afghan forces, acknowledged in a press call to reporters that his unit had considered "nearly doubling" the size of the Afghan army, a plan some U.S. lawmakers, including Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT), advocate. Afghan Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, meanwhile, told CFR.org in April 2009 he was under the impression President Obama was set to run with the doubling recommendation, but appears to have changed course without explanation. The final number, Gen. Wardak says, "was a big surprise."

Yet regardless of the Afghan army's long-term growth plans, oversight and sustainability issues continue to plague the force in the near term. A February 2009 analysis (PDF) by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that roughly 17 percent of the small arms, mortars, and grenade launchers supplied to the Afghan security services since 2002 are unaccounted for. Meanwhile, the equipment the Afghan army does possess remains a limiting factor, military officials say. Currently, the army's primary tactical vehicle is a Ford Ranger truck, which Gen. Wardak argues provides little in the way of protected mobility. "A small mine hits them and they are gone," he says. Coalition trainers are in the process of augmenting the Afghan forces with up-armored HUMVEES, but the conversion will not be completed until mid-2010. Wardak says he has consistently asked U.S. and NATO allies for other materiel--artillery, rockets, mortars--but supplies have been slow to materialize. "I was much [better] equipped when we were fighting the Soviets," the Afghan general says.

The army's ability to operate independently has been delayed by these limitations, U.S. military officials acknowledge. As of November 2008 just seven battalions were capable of operating without international support, Pentagon statistics show. This pace is expected to quicken as U.S. and international trainers surge into the country. But even a rapid expansion of the Afghan army will not necessarily bring U.S. involvement to an end. As CFR defense expert Stephen Biddle cautions, building an Afghan army capable of beating back the Taliban will cost billions of dollars a year in support, money and time that could prove politically "much more problematic" for American strategists.

Afghan National Police: Afghanistan's national police are another story. On paper the police force looks solid, with the Afghan Uniformed Police responsible for general enforcement and public safety; the Border Police patrolling the country's borders and conducting counter-smuggling operations; the Civil Order Police responsive for disturbances in urban areas; the Counter Narcotics Police countering drug trafficking; the Criminal Investigation Police investigating crimes; and the Counter Terrorism Police heading counterinsurgency operations. But the Pentagon says development of Afghanistan's police force "has been hindered by lack of institutional reform, widespread corruption, insufficient U.S. military trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community."

As of November 2008 there were 76,000 police officers; President Obama's plan adds just 6,000 more. Military strategists estimate the proper ratio of police to people in peacetime is around 1 per 400 citizens, while stability operations call for much high ratios (PDF). Afghanistan, with an estimated population of 33 million, will have a ratio of 1 to 402 police once the force is fully staffed.

But beyond size, there are serious problems with lack of professionalism. An August 2007 report by the International Crisis Group found that the national police force's misuse of power is so pervasive that "Afghanistan's citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security." A follow-on report (PDF) in December 2008 found little had changed. While international commitments to improving the police's capabilities increased, corruption within Afghan ministries hampered progress. Attrition also remains a problem, as does a lack of effective training and equipment. Even more troubling, the International Crisis Group contends, are efforts by the Taliban to target police officers. In the crosshairs of militants, the death rate for police is now three times higher than soldiers in the Afghan army.

There are signs of progress. For one, the number of units considered "capable of operating independently" by the U.S. military is rising, Pentagon data shows. Training initiatives led by the U.S. military--like the so-called Focused District Development program--have brought personnel to Kabul for advanced mentoring with international law enforcement experts; future training efforts will focus on countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), communications upgrades, intelligence advances, and enhanced border surveillance. Gen. Wardak says Afghan officials have also implemented changes to improve police professionalism, such as restricting officers from serving in their home districts to reduce the risk of favoritism to immediate family, extended family, or "the big shot tribal guy."

Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC): The Afghan air corps remains in its infancy. As of late 2008 the Afghan air corps operated and maintained just seven medium cargo planes and a mere thirteen helicopters, though plans were in the works to assign Afghan commando battalions with helicopter detachments for rapid-response missions. Pentagon trainers say the ANAAC will eventually include "reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing aircraft" (PDF), but implementation is years off. A 2009 summary of international activities (PDF) in Afghanistan by NATO reported that the air corps aims to employ 7,000 personnel and 126 aircraft-by 2016.

The Afghan Public Protection Force: Perhaps the most closely watched, though least understood, element of Afghanistan's security forces is the tribal protection force, an experimental militia program modeled after a successful program in Iraq. President Obama has vowed to "support" this local initiative, which some observers liken to a neighborhood watch. Gen. Wardak says these units are being recruited, and vetted, by regional leaders, who in turn with assume responsibility for their performance and discipline. But some experts of Afghanistan's tribal structure, like Thomas Johnson of the Naval Postgraduate School, warn that arming local tribes could awaken deep-rooted tribal blood feuds and do more harm than good. This Backgrounder examines the program in detail.

President Obama has pinned high hopes on Afghanistan's security forces, and is committing additional U.S. troops to improving their lot. As many as four thousand additional U.S. military trainers are expected to deploy to Afghanistan in coming months, and coalition partners have said they, too, will bolster mentoring efforts. Allies agreed at the April 2009 NATO summit in France to send an additional three hundred paramilitary trainers and mentors, and a newly dedicated command--NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan--will coordinate the mentoring mission.

The additions, long overdue, come at a crucial time. The U.S. military provides the bulk of the training to Afghanistan's security forces, coordinated by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and funded by Congress through the Afghan Security Forces Fund. But a November 2008 assessment by the Pentagon found there were only 1,100 embed trainers available for deployment, just half of the military's requirement. NATO training teams have also been in historically short supply. NATO's 2009 assessment (PDF) of allied efforts in the war noted that by December 2010, the security bloc will require up eighty-two training teams, nearly double the current allotment. That could mean an extra 1,600 NATO forces would be needed at a time when the Obama administration has had difficulty convincing allied forces to send more than a token few.

But even more pragmatic challenges than international trainers loom. For one, analysts say police and soldiers are paid more to fight for the Taliban-$100 per month from the Afghan government, versus $300 a month from the Taliban-a calculus that must be reversed. Coordination among allied efforts is another concern. The International Crisis Group's 2008 report says there remains a need for "enhanced coordination in the efforts of different countries involved in reform, with a greater emphasis on developing Afghan institutions rather than parallel programs." While training efforts are currently divided between U.S., NATO, and EU forces, observers say the mission suffers from resource deficiencies and competing agendas. Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair of the RAND Corporation noted in a January 2009 study that more than two dozen countries and multilateral organizations contribute "in some measure" to police training. But so far, Jones and Fair write, "results have been disappointing."

Finally, basic operational limitations are increasingly undermining army and police progress. Even today, seven years into the U.S.-led war effort, NATO, U.S., and Afghan forces don't always coordinate their missions, military experts say, and it's not uncommon for U.S. and Afghan forces operating jointly to have no idea what NATO's ISAF forces are doing and vice versus. One former senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, speaking in a not-for-attribution forum near Washington in early 2009, called "unity of effort" the most serious problem we have in Afghanistan today. "It's not the Taliban. It's not governance. It's not security," he said. "It's the utter failure in the unity of effort department."