Just as exaggerated proclamations of success followed military victory in Afghanistan in 2001 and rapid political developments in 2002, so now have increased fighting, a focus on weak government, and a lack of instant economic progress resulted in exaggerated pronouncements of failure. The situation is grave, but far from hopeless. What went wrong has been examined in extensive detail at a policy level, but the implementation of policies has attracted little attention. The result has been an intensifying search for broad policy that often carries with it an unexamined assumption that better policy will produce rapid improvement. This is unrealistic.

A major insurgency in a weak state will not be defeated quickly, particularly when that insurgency enjoys significant sanctuary in a neighbouring weak state. This is especially true when the counterinsurgency is waged by a collection of sovereign nations that move slowly to align individual national views of how to proceed. Those views will remain different because each government brings different domestic political constraints, theories of how to proceed and levels of national political commitment to the mission. Yet if the coalition of military and economic donors has many weaknesses it also commands resources that dwarf those available to an insurgency with very limited popular support.

In order to succeed, several factors have to coalesce. One is short-term progress in security to reverse the perception of impending doom. The second is clearer mid-term policiesfor progress in Afghanistan based on a realistic definition of success. A third is a broader regional focus, dealing particularly with Pakistan, India, Iran and Russia, whose conflicting policies and fears exacerbate the problems of Afghanistan. The second and third elements are inevitably long-term and much greater public clarity is needed.